S (CA152/2020) v R [2020] NZCA 522

S (CA152/2020) v R [2020] NZCA 522 [23 October 2020]NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS ORIDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF D AND K PROHIBITED BY S 204 OFTHE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA152/2020[2020] NZCA 522BETWEEN S (CA152/2020)AppellantAND THE QUEENRespondentHearing: 20 July 2020Court: Clifford, Woolford and Dunningham JJCounsel: R A B Samuel for the AppellantR K Thomson for RespondentJudgment: 23 October 2020 at 10.30 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The appeal against conviction is allowed.B The two convictions for abandoning a child are quashed. Convictions forleaving a child without reasonable supervision and care contrary to s 10Bof the Summary Offences Act 1981 are substituted.C The sentence of 21 months' imprisonment is quashed. A sentence of19 months' imprisonment is substituted.D The appeal is otherwise dismissed.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Clifford J)Introduction[1] S, the appellant, was convicted after a jury trial in the District Court atManukau in April 2019 on 17 charges of ill-treatment of her children, including twoof abandonment.1 Responding to the totality of S's offending, Judge Wharepourisentenced S on 5 February 2020 to 21 months' imprisonment.2[2] S now appeals her two convictions for abandonment and her sentence.[3] On her conviction appeal, she says evidence of her 2004 convictions forabandonment was wrongly admitted at her trial as propensity evidence, and thatthe Judge misdirected the jury on the elements of the two further abandonment chargesshe faced at trial. On her sentence appeal, she says the proper sentence was one ofhome detention.Factual background[4] The factual background to this appeal is not straightforward. It is necessary togo into a reasonable amount of detail to provide a proper basis for considering theissues raised, particularly by the sentence appeal.[5] S has three children from two previous partners: a son, N, born in 1992 to thefirst of those partners; and twin daughters, D and K, born in 2003 to the second.[6] The statement of agreed facts at S's trial recorded that the family first came tothe attention of Oranga Tamariki (then called Child, Youth and Family) in late 1998when N came to school with a bloody and bruised nose.[7] A complaint was entered into Oranga Tamariki's database at that time. In 2004S pleaded guilty to offending on 14 November that year against N, D and K. That dayN — then 12 — had been missing from home for several days. S discovered he wasstaying at a nearby house with relations and went to get him. When doing so S lefther daughters, then less than two years old, at home alone. N was reluctant to1 Crimes Act 1961, s 154.2 R v [S] [2020] NZDC 2078.accompany S back to their home. There was a physical altercation between N and S.The police were called and S was unable to return home in the time she had no doubtanticipated. She was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, assaulting N and abandoningD and K.[8] S, D and K were again interviewed by Oranga Tamariki in late 2009. At thattime D and K reported sometimes being smacked but generally feeling safe at home.S said she had learned from mistakes in the past and her drinking was no longer anissue.[9] In June 2016 D and K, then 13 years old, were pupils at their local intermediateschool. During a presentation at the school on youth mental health and related issues,the girls broke down crying. They subsequently told staff of abuse they said they hadsuffered at their mother's hands since they were very young. Soon afterwards the girlsmoved to live with N, his partner and family.[10] D and K gave electronically recorded interviews (EVIs) the following month.They both spoke generally of their mother getting aggressive and angry with them,and taking that out on them by swearing at them, threatening to kill them and beatingthem. They said they had been physically and verbally abused on many occasionsfrom an early age.[11] They each gave specific examples of the physical abuse they suffered. D spokeof three such occasions, two involving arguments when D had confronted her motherabout her drinking habit and her mother had kicked, punched and verbally abused her,on one of those occasions throwing a table at her and on another stabbing her in theleg with a plastic fork. The third occasion involved S swearing and punching D afterS had been questioned by social workers who had spoken to D about events at home.The two incidents K spoke of also happened when K confronted her mother about herdrinking habit, once when her mother had said K could not go out with her friends andagain when she said K could not have pocket money. K said she was kicked andpunched on both those occasions, and on one occasion hit with a vacuum cleaner tube.[12] K also confirmed her mother abused D more than she did K, and corroboratedthe details of the table throwing incident and that of S stabbing D with a plastic fork.K said that, in addition, her mother had threatened to kill the girls with jug cords andknives on more than one occasion after coming home from the pub.[13] S attended an EVI with the police on 25 May 2017. Reflecting the girls'complaints, the interviewing officer advised S she was being spoken to about incidentsof assault with a weapon, assault with intent to injure and assault, all relating to herdaughters in the years from 2012 to 2016.[14] In the course of that interview S explained that during 2016 the death of hermother and one of her brothers had caused a lot of stress and grief and she had hadsomething of a breakdown. As a result, she had had difficulty controlling her emotionsand this had affected her relationship with D and K. She had told the girls, she said,that they needed to do more to look after themselves, like preparing their own lunchesand washing their school uniforms once a week. The girls did not respond positively,and the situation between her and them had deteriorated. Things had got to the pointwhere she had lost her job and could not keep up with the girls' requests for spending.The girls began saying they no longer wanted to stay with her because she could notcare for them.[15] In response to the suggestions of assault S explained her style of discipline wasgenerally verbal "but not a very nice verbal", and gave several examples. When askedwhether she had hit the girls, she admitted she had hit D on one occasion after D, thenaged about seven, had attacked her and she had retaliated. D had walked past her andpunched her in the mouth: in response, she had punched D in the back. She alsoreferred to another occasion when she had hit the girls, when they had called her auseless mother and said that she did not care for them. S also accepted she had inMay 2016 "flipped" — to use her description — a table at D during a forthrightexchange, hitting her on the knee.[16] S denied the other allegations of specific incidents of violence put to her by theinterviewing officer.[17] Towards the end of that interview, the interviewing officer put to S allegationsmade by N. N had said when he was growing up his mother had given him hidings.He had gone to school on a number of occasions with a black eye or a bleeding noseas a result. He also said that, when he was about 11 or 12 years old, S had startedleaving him alone with the girls, who were only two or three at the time, when shewent out at night. N had also said that, when he had taken the girls to his place in2016, D had told him her mother had thrown something at her.[18] S accepted that N had on occasion gone to school with a black eye or bleedingnose, but said she had taken the "rap" for that when it was her partner's fault. She alsoacknowledged that on occasions she had left N, then aged about 11 or 12, to look afterthe girls when she went to the pub. But, she said, before leaving she would have fed,bathed, and changed the girls, put them to bed and given N money for his rugby leaguethe next morning and money for babysitting. She would go to the pub at about 10 pmand return around 3 or 4 am.[19] On 30 May 2017, seven charges were laid against S. Each alleged variousspecific assaults by her on D and K, corresponding broadly to the specific allegationsmade by the twins and put to S by the interviewing officer during her EVI.[20] On 18 January 2018 the Crown assumed responsibility for the prosecution ofthe charges laid the previous May. In February amended charges were laid.Representative charges of cruelty, abandonment, and threatening to kill were laid inrespect of D and K, and a further charge of assaulting D with intent to injure was laidin respect of the plastic fork incident. A representative charge of cruelty against N wasalso added. At that point S faced 15 charges.[21] In late April, the Crown unsuccessfully applied to adduce evidence of S's 2004convictions as propensity evidence.3 That application was made based solely on thesummary of facts detailing the charges and the guilty pleas. When, shortly thereafter,the text of the EVI N had given to the police in 2004 was recovered, the applicationwas made again. It was granted on 19 July 2018.43 R v [S] [2018] NZDC 8895.4 R v [S] [2018] NZDC 14776.[22] Further amendments to the charges were reflected in a revised charge sheet atthe commencement of S's trial. By consent, the charge sheet was further varied duringtrial. Taken together, and with reference to the charges as they had stood in February2018, those changes would appear to have been made to:(a) rationalise the specific and representative charges S faced;(b) avoid charging S for events on 14 November 2004 for which she hadalready been convicted; and(c) recognise amendments to the Crimes Act 1961 whereby:(i) on 21 June 2007, the defence of domestic discipline at s 59 wasrepealed and a considerably narrowed provision substituted;and(ii) on 19 March 2012, s 195 was amended to replace the charge ofcruelty to a child with ill-treatment of a child.[23] As a result, when the jury retired it was required to consider the following19 charges. Of those 12 — some laid expressly on a representative basis and othersnot — reflected N, D and K's general allegations of abuse. Thus:5No. Complainants Charge Date Representative1 N Cruelty to a child 1 May 1997–13 November 2004✗2 N Assault with a weaponon an occasion otherthan charge 31 May 1997–13 November 2004✓4 D and K Abandoning a childunder 610 January 2003–13 November 2004✓5 D and K Abandoning a childunder 615 November 2004–9 January 2009✓6 D Cruelty to a child 10 January 2005–20 June 2007✗6A D Cruelty to a child 21 June 2007–18 March 2012✗8 D Ill-treatment of a child 19 March 2012–31 May 2016✗5 We have grouped sets of charges chronologically to aid comprehension.No. Complainants Charge Date Representative10 D Threatening to kill 1 January 2005–31 May 2016✓7 K Cruelty to a child 10 January 2005–20 June 2007✗7A K Cruelty to a child 21 June 2007–18 March 2012✗9 K Ill-treatment of a child 19 March 2012–31 May 2016✗11 K Threatening to kill 1 January 2005–31 May 2016✓[24] The rest reflected specific allegations. Thus:No. Complainants Charge Date Representative3 N Assault with a weapon,namely a wooden block2004 ✗12 D Assault with intent toinjure30 May 2012–31 December 2014✗13 D Assault with a weapon,namely a plastic fork30 May 2012–31 December 2014✗16 D Assault with a weapon,namely a table7 May 2016 ✗17 D Assault with intent toinjure7 May 2016 ✗14 K Assault with a weapon,namely a vacuum pole1 January 2015–31 December 2015✗15 K Assault with intent toinjure1 November 2015–30 November 2015✗[25] The jury found S guilty on all those charges, save 3 and 14.Issues on appeal[26] The issues raised by this appeal, and the submissions made with respect tothose issues, can be summarised succinctly.[27] S's appeal against her convictions for abandonment was based on thesubmission that the Judge misdirected the jury by failing to identify an essentialelement of that offence. Mr Samuel, for S, submitted that the jury needed to besatisfied that S intended to leave the girls to their fate in the permanent sense.Mr Samuel also challenged the safety of those convictions on the basis that, as theevidence of abandonment had come out at trial, the admission of the 2004 convictionsas propensity evidence had been in error. At the same time, the representative chargesof abandonment covering that entire period sat uneasily with the charges of cruelty,ill-treatment and specific violence. That is, how could S be guilty of abandonment ofa child but also be guilty of ill-treating that child "in her care" during the same period?[28] For the Crown, Ms Thomson submitted that there was, on the facts that wentto the jury, a proper basis for conviction on the charge of abandonment. The Judgewas correct to hold that the charge has no particular temporal requirement and ratherrequires that someone with parental responsibility forsakes that responsibility.Consequently, abandonment could involve something less than permanentabandonment, as a number of Canadian cases showed.6 Furthermore, the propensityevidence had been properly admitted.[29] The essential argument for S on the sentence appeal was that home detention,rather than imprisonment, was the appropriate response. The end sentence the Judgehad arrived at, 21 months' imprisonment, allowed for home detention. The Judge hadbeen wrong not to adopt that course. The representative charges of abandonment andabuse over the whole period from 1 May 1997 to 31 May 2016 did not properly reflectthe ongoing involvement of Oranga Tamariki with S and the twins following14 November 2004. Social workers had apparently been satisfied with S's efforts atrehabilitation and education in subsequent investigations.[30] Were the Court to quash the convictions for abandonment and correctly assessthe seriousness of the balance of the offending, a lower starting point and end sentencewas properly available and, in turn, a sentence of home detention.[31] For the Crown, Ms Thomson submitted the Judge's starting point of four yearswas within range for what she described as "two decades of abuse". The Judge hadtaken careful account of S's personal mitigating factors, in particular as set out in thecultural report that had been provided. His conclusion that a prison sentence wascalled for was available to him.6 R v GKJ 2006 ABPC 72, 394 AR 330; R v Young 2019 NLPC 0818A00133; and R vBokane-Haraszt 2007 ONCJ 228.AnalysisConviction appeal[32] S's conviction appeal focuses on the Judge's direction to the jury as to themeaning of abandonment for the purposes of s 154 of the Crimes Act. Section 154provides:154 Abandoning child under 6Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 yearswho unlawfully abandons or exposes any child under the age of6 years.[33] The Judge directed the jury on abandonment in the following way:Abandonment means to give up charge or custody of the child concerned.It must be shown that the defendant left her daughters to themselves, alone,without some proper and appropriate person to guard them from harm. Harmdoes not need to have to eventuate. It is enough that the girls' lives andwellbeing was left unattended by someone who could reasonably be expectedto keep them from harm. The time which the child is left unattended must bemore than de minimis because the criminal law does not seek to make a personcriminally liable for leaving a child momentarily, for example, such as amother who calls over to a neighbour for a cup of sugar while the child is lefthome alone. But equally the prosecution does not have to establish thedefendant intended to leave or rid themselves of the child in a permanentsense. In the end, whether the time elapsed that an accused leaves the childalone without proper supervision amounts to abandonment is a matter of somefact and degree for you.[34] We acknowledge that the law here is not straightforward. As Adams onCriminal Law comments: "The bald use of the ambiguous words 'abandon' and'expose' creates a difficulty as to the exact scope of the section."7 The text goes on torefer to what would appear to be the only New Zealand case to substantively considerthe offence, Rex v Russell.8 Ms Russell, intending to get rid of a child and to cast itand its maintenance on the state, left the child at a hospital with a doctor.9Her subsequent conviction for abandonment was quashed by the Court of Appeal, whoconsidered that she had intended to rid herself of the child, but had not unlawfullyabandoned it. Rather, she had transferred control of the child to the public authorities.7 Simon France (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CA154.03].8 Rex v Russell [1916] NZLR 343 (CA).9 At 346.Stout CJ (for the Court) considered this was less than what was required, which was"something that shows the child is left to itself without some proper person to guardits person or life, or some fraud or trick played on the person assuming custody of thechild".10 He went on:11It no doubt was the intention of the prisoner — her statement to the constableis evidence of this — to get rid of the child, and to cast it and its maintenanceon the hospital authorities. There is no evidence of her having made anyuntrue statement or perpetrated any fraud or trick on the doctor when heaccepted the child as a patient. Further, there is no evidence that the child wasleft for a temporary purpose, nor is there any statement whether the child'streatment or maintenance was to be paid for.[35] As the final sentence of that passages suggests, we consider that the actions ofparents who leave their children without adequate supervision on a short-term basisdo not fall within the ambit of the section. Rather, we consider the meaning of theword "abandon" is closer to its ordinary dictionary definition, being to "forsake ordesert" a child.12[36] Such an approach is consistent with the English approach to a broadlycomparable provision in the Child and Young Persons Act 1933 (UK) whichcriminalises the neglect, abandonment, exposure, assault and ill-treatment ofchildren.13 Like s 154, it has always been a serious offence, with a maximum penaltyof two years' imprisonment, later raised to 10 years' imprisonment. Unlike s 154,however, it also requires the conduct to be "likely to cause unnecessary sufferingor injury to health", and applies to children as old as 15 years.[37] The ambit of "abandonment" in that section was considered bythe Court of Appeal in Boulden v R.14 In that case, the appellant boarded a train toGlasgow in pursuit of his wife, leaving his five young children aged between one andnine to fend for themselves at their London address in his absence. On appeal heargued that he had not "abandoned" the children as he had subsequently telephoned10 At 346.11 At 346.12 Tony Deverson and Graeme Kennedy (eds) The New Zealand Oxford Dictionary (OxfordUniversity Press, Melbourne, 2005).13 Child and Young Persons Act 1933 (UK) 23 & 24 Geo c 12, s 1(1).14 Boulden v R (1957) 41 Cr App R 105 (CA).the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children to ask them to care forthe children. In dismissing the appeal, Gorman J said:15The question of what is meant by "abandon" was referred to by the LordPresident (Lord Dunedin) under another Act in the case of Mitchell v Wright,when he said: "I think the words 'abandoned or deserted the child' point atthe parent leaving the child to its fate." This court is of no doubt that in all thecircumstances of the case the jury might well have come to the conclusion thatthe appellant's intention was to clear out, to leave these children to their fateand to wipe his hands clear of them.[38] Ms Thomson urged us to consider s 218 of the Canadian Criminal Code, whichis framed in similar terms to the New Zealand provision.16 She referred us to cases inwhich parents have been held liable under this provision for leaving their childrenalone for up to eight hours while they went to work or for two hours while they wentto buy cigarettes.17[39] Those cases, however, are based on an extended statutory definition ofabandonment which provides:18abandon or expose includes(a) a wilful omission to take charge of a child by a person who is under alegal duty to do so, and(b) dealing with a child in a manner that is likely to leave that childexposed to risk without protection.[40] That extended definition has led Canadian courts to place greater weight on thecircumstances in which the child is left, and in particular any hazards that they may beexposed to. For instance, in R v Young — the cigarettes case — the Provincial Courtof Newfoundland and Labrador concluded:19[62] The offence of abandonment was complete when [the appellant] wentout the door and got in her car and drove away. Even if it was true that shedid not intend to be away very long, those boys were left there with a bathtubfull of water, with toys floating in it. That was a clear drowning hazard.15 At 110 (citation omitted).16 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 218.17 R v GKJ, above n 6; and R v Young, above n 6.18 Criminal Code RSC, s 214.19 R v Young, above n 6.[41] We are satisfied that s 154 of the Crimes Act, which does not refer to exposureto risk, does not call for such an approach or criminalise parents who simply leavechildren inadequately supervised (which is achieved by s 10B of theSummary Offences Act 1981).20 Rather, it is aimed at a much more serious offencewhich is complete when a parent effectively washes their hands of a child and leaveshim or her to their fate.[42] We are therefore satisfied the Judge erred when he directed the jury thatthe Crown was not required to demonstrate S intended to abandon her daughters in thepermanent sense.[43] We are also satisfied that a properly directed jury would have acquitted S ofabandonment. S's abandonment involved, initially, leaving the very young girls athome with N when she went to the pub in the evening. In his 2004 EVI, N confirmedwhat S said in her 2017 EVI. N explained:Q. Are there any times that she's asked you to help or you've had to helpwith that?A. Yeah.Q. Tell me about that.A. Um well when she goes out cos I let her go out every week just to giveher like some time out. AndQ. How did you work out to do that?A. Oh cos um when weohoh cos when she goes out um and then shecomes back it's pretty alright, better than before. But then like whenshe does, if she doesn't go out, and she starts getting um she startsgoing angrier oh like yeah, getting stressed out more and so I just lether go out for some company of her friends and that.Q. And that's once a week?A. Yeah.Q. Who looks after the little ones when mum goes out?A. Me. Oh cos shewhen she goes out it's at night time and she makessure that we're alright first before she leaves and so yeah.Q. What kinds of checks does she do to make sure you're alright?20 See below at [46].A. Oh she feeds us, changes the babies or else baths them before sheleaves.Q. Mm.A. And yeah just makes sure um they're alright and I'm alright.Q. Mm.A. Yeah.Q. And who puts the little ones to bed when mum goes out?A. Oh me.Q. And is that okay?A. Yeah.[44] The fact of the preparations S made before going out and leaving the girls withN, and that she always returned home, even if only the next day, counts against anintention to abandon. That is not to condone S's actions. But it is to properlycategorise them under New Zealand criminal law.[45] The girls' evidence of being left alone after N had left home in 2004 was givenin general terms by K. It happened when their mum went to the pub, which she didall the time. They looked after themselves, preparing evening meals and schoollunches. K said she quite like the time away from her mother. An auntie who livednearby would help them when she could.[46] As we assess matters, the evidence at trial and the Judge's direction do notconstitute abandonment. We therefore agree that S's convictions for abandonmentmust be quashed. We are satisfied, however, that in finding S guilty of the charge onthe basis of the Judge's directions set out above at [32], the jury must have beensatisfied of facts that would prove S guilty of the lesser charge of leaving the childrenwithout reasonable supervision and care contrary to s 10B of the Summary OffencesAct:10B Leaving child without reasonable supervision and careEvery person is liable to a fine not exceeding $2,000 who, being a parent orguardian or a person for the time being having the care of a child under theage of 14 years, leaves that child, without making reasonable provision for thesupervision and care of the child, for a time that is unreasonable or underconditions that are unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances.[47] We therefore make an order under s 234 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011quashing S's convictions for abandonment and substituting, for each, a conviction forleaving a child without reasonable supervision and care.[48] On that basis, we deal only briefly with Mr Samuel's supporting submissionregarding the significance of the incorrectly — in his assertion — admitted propensityevidence. We are satisfied that the evidence had probative value in respect of theissues in dispute, notably whether S's animosity spilled out into physical assaults.D and K's allegations clearly echoed the earlier offending. Given the overall gist ofthe factual narrative supporting the charges, in our view N's 2004 EVI evidence andthe fact of the convictions which followed were properly admitted as part of thatoverall narrative.Sentence appeal[49] In sentencing S, Judge Wharepouri set a starting point of four years'imprisonment.21 As he described it, that starting point responded to the "moderatelyserious" nature of S's offending, including the lengthy period over which it occurred.22In doing so the Judge distinguished the offending in R v W, a case pointed to by theCrown as particularly comparable, where a starting point of 12 years' imprisonmenthad been adopted for some 39 charges of abuse of a wife and children.23 As the Judgeobserved, whilst having been committed over a shorter period of time, that offendingwas manifestly more serious than S's.[50] Turning to personal aggravating and mitigating factors, the Judge:24(a) declined to uplift that starting point for S's previous convictions, asthey effectively involved the same pattern of behaviour that hadresulted in the current charges; and21 R v [S], above n 2, at [22].22 At [22].23 At [21], referring to R v W [2018] NZHC 117.24 At [23]–[27].(b) allowed discounts of four months for remorse, eight months for S'sefforts to rehabilitate herself, three months for time spent on bail and afurther 12 months to reflect the difficult life she had had and the manychallenges that had been placed before her, not of her making.[51] As Mr Samuel acknowledged, that was a generous approach to the availablediscounts. It totalled 27 months, that is 56 per cent, and resulted in the end sentenceof 21 months' imprisonment. We do not think that sentence can be criticised, giventhe basis upon which it was imposed. In saying that, we note we have carefullyconsidered Mr Samuel's proposition that the way the charges were laid, both expresslyand in effect, as representative charges overstated the gravity of the offendingoverall.25 We acknowledge that the decision to lay representative as well as specificcharges complicated matters. A more straightforward approach may have been to layrepresentative charges only, with the specific allegations constituting the evidence ofthe necessary incident of offending. It would then have been left to the Judge, in theusual way, to assess criminality overall. Having said that, the two relevant law changesover the period in question would still have had to be reflected. But we do not thinkthe approach taken resulted in an overstatement of S's criminality. As this Court hasrecognised:26 s 195 recognises the realities of child abuse within a relationship of adultauthority where the accumulation of wilful ill-treatment or neglect may beobvious although the causes may be practically incapable of proof asindividual offences or even incidents.So, the question for us at this point is whether the quashing of the abandonmentconvictions means that the end sentence of 21 months' imprisonment requiresadjustment.[52] In those circumstances we think a modest, but not immaterial, adjustment tothe end sentence is called for. In our view, a reduction of two months is appropriate.We therefore quash S's sentence of 21 months' imprisonment and substitute it withone of 19 months' imprisonment.25 See, for example, charges 6, 6A, 7 and 7A.26 R v Mead [2002] 1 NZLR 594 (CA) at [106].[53] We turn to the question of home detention. As the Crown submitted, the Judgevery carefully considered this issue and did so against the background of a sympatheticapproach to S's offending, as reflected in the discounts he allowed. We are notpersuaded we should reach a different view on that issue.Result[54] The appeal against conviction is allowed.[55] The two convictions for abandoning a child are quashed. Convictions forleaving a child without reasonable supervision and care contrary to s 10B of theSummary Offences Act are substituted.[56] The sentence of 21 months' imprisonment is quashed. A sentence of19 months' imprisonment is substituted.[57] The appeal is otherwise dismissed.Solicitors:Jennifer G Connell & Associates, Auckland for AppellantCrown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent