GRANT v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2021] NZHC 1700

GRANT v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2021] NZHC 1700IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDNELSON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAWHAKATŪ ROHECIV-2020-442-38[2021] NZHC 1700BETWEEN SAMANTHA JANE GRANTPlaintiffAND THE ATTORNEY-GENERALDefendantHearing: 21 May 2021Appearances: Plaintiff in PersonM J McKillop and C N Tocher for DefendantJudgment: 8 July 2021JUDGMENT OF ISAC J[On striking out application]Introduction[1] This proceeding concerns grievances in search of a cause of action.[2] The plaintiff, Samantha Grant, has brought a wide-ranging set of claims againstthe defendant. The genesis of Ms Grant's complaints is the belief that the New ZealandPolice unlawfully disclosed inaccurate information to potential employers as part of aPolice vetting process. Ms Grant perceives the disclosure of the information lead to aspiral of events that saw her lose her liberty, her employment, her home, and access toher children.[3] The Attorney-General seeks to strike out Ms Grant's claims on the basis they:(a) are an abuse the Court's process by seeking to relitigate matters alreadydetermined by another Court;(b) disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action; or(c) are so prolix and difficult to understand that the defendant would besignificantly prejudiced if required to respond them.[4] If any of the claims are not struck out, the Attorney-General seeks a securityfor costs order.[5] For the reasons outlined below, I have reached the clear view that all but oneof Ms Grant's claims should be struck out.Background[6] The last decade has been difficult for Ms Grant. It has involved her losing workas a early childhood teacher, separation from two partners, loss of unsupervised accesswith her two children, criminal charges in relation to family violence and breaches ofa trespass and protection order, a conviction for driving with excess breath alcohol,and incarceration as a remand prisoner.Overview of Ms Grant's litigation[7] In 2017 Ms Grant complained to the Privacy Commissioner about the releaseof information to prospective employers in Police vetting reports. This informationconcerned eight alleged family violence incidents from 2009 to 2016. The incidentsdid not result in convictions, but in charges being withdrawn, a discharge withoutconviction, a warning and a dismissal (of one of the assault charges).[8] In December 2017 the Privacy Commissioner wrote to Ms Grant informing herthat there had been no interference with her privacy. Ms Grant asked theCommissioner to reconsider. The Commissioner reconsidered Ms Grant's complaintsand reached the same conclusion.[9] Throughout 2018 Ms Grant (then using her former partner's surname, Everett)filed three statements of claim in the District Court alleging the New Zealand Policehad improperly disclosed irrelevant and inaccurate personal information in Policevetting checks to potential employers and to Oranga Tamariki.1[10] In March 2019, Judge Zorab struck out Ms Grant's cause of action based onthe Privacy Act 1993.2 Ms Grant filed another statement of claim, which resulted inan order for security for costs.3[11] In March 2020, Judge Zorab struck out the remaining claims relating to thetorts of invasion of privacy and intrusion into seclusion, defamation and the claimalleging publication of name supressed material.4 In ordering Ms Grant to pay thedefendant's costs, Judge Zorab in a separate judgment noted:5The plaintiff's claim was misguided and totally without merit[12] That same month Ms Grant filed another statement of claim alleging that herex-husband taking possession of the family home pursuant to Family Court ordersresulted in a breach of privacy, a breach of human rights, and humiliation.Judge Barkle struck out the claims on the basis that none of the proposed causes ofaction could succeed.6[13] Ms Grant has also made two habeas corpus applications to this Court. Bothwere dismissed.7[14] Finally, Ms Grant was also involved in relationship property proceedingsinvolving her former partner, a result of which was for the family home to vest in1 The first statement of claim was filed in May 2018, with two subsequent statements of claim beingfiled in September and October respectively.2 Everett v New Zealand Police [2019] NZDC 4387. Leave was granted for Ms Grant (or Ms Everettas she then was) to amend her pleadings to include claims in tort of invasion of privacy andintrusion into seclusion if she wished to do so. The Judge also advised Ms Grant to amend herdefamation pleading so as to provide sufficient particulars.3 Everett v New Zealand Police [2019] NZDC 25738.4 Everett v Attorney-General [2020] NZDC 2663.5 Everett v Attorney-General [2020] NZDC 6341 at [4].6 Grant v Everett [2021] NZDC 4457.7 Grant v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2020] NZHC 2944; Grant v Ministerof Justice [2021] NZHC 740.Ms Grant's former partner, with him to take responsibilities for the mortgages securedover the home and to discharge the liabilities of Ms Grant in that regard.8This proceeding[15] Ms Grant has filed three documents which she wishes to be treated as herpleading. They are:(a) the document entitled "statement of claim" dated 7 September 2020;(b) the document simply entitled "pleadings" dated 25 March 2021;(c) the document entitled "further to statement of claim as they unfoldedafter filing in March 2020", dated 14 April 2021.[16] I will refer to the documents collectively as "the pleading" unless the contextotherwise requires.[17] Most of the pleading is difficult to understand. It is a diffuse narrative involvinga mix of opinion, submission and fact. The same themes, or grievances, are regularlyrepeated. Ms Grant is not a lawyer and so some departure from convention is to beexpected, but the pleading is truly difficult to comprehend. I will nonetheless assess itagainst the criteria for strike-out, taking a generous view of the pleadings to the extentI am able to.The 7 September 2020 statement of claim[18] This document is 47 pages long. It has 256 paragraphs. It often skips from onesubject to another and back again. The following passage may provide the reader withthe flavour of Ms Grant's approach to pleading:34. The plaintiff does in fact believe the DUI conviction itself is enoughon any Ministry of Justice VET check because "every persons'individual body" reacts differently to the breath test. There are manyarbitrary factors not taken into account on this formal evaluation.8 Everett v Grant [2019] NZFC 10593. Ms Grant's former partner was also ordered to account toMs Grant for her half share in the equity of the property.34.1 "There is a common misconception that a person can avoid beingdefamatory by reporting something as an allegation which implies thatit has not been substantiated." This is not always true. Statementscoached as allegations can be defamatory where the ordinary personis likely to conclude there is some factual basis to the allegation. "35. The plaintiff to gain this reading had to try 27 times to breath into theelectronic device. This is an insult to Justice. Not even the other officestopped the testing. The plaintiff had rib damage caused by the arrest.She only found this out when she went to hospital. The plaintiff willassure you her rib was broken because even today it still hurts whenshe looses weight.36. Among other things Article 10 of the Human Rights Act states:"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair public hearing by anindependent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rightsand obligations and of any criminal charge against him."37. To qualify, under the Defamation Act (1992) there is absolutely nodefence for being presumed in a car and driving with 1197 breathalcohol. That is accusing someone of being drunk in a car! Theplaintiff has been defamed by s 77 of the LTA. The Ministry of JusticeVet Check has recorded her DUI as 1197 breath alcohol under theofficial information act (1982) The United Nations Declaration ofHuman Rights states:"(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to bepresumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a publictrial at which he has had all the guarantee's necessary for his defence."(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of anyact or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, undernational or international law, at the time when it was committed. Norshall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable atthe time the penal offence was committed.[19] Paragraphs [3]–[71] of the document relate to the disclosure by New ZealandPolice of a vetting form. Ms Grant alleges a breach of privacy by way of the "1993Privacy Act" and the tort of "breach of privacy by publishing private facts."[20] It is alleged the vetting form recorded eight family violence episodes involvingMs Grant. Ms Grant says that some, if not all, of the information recorded in thevetting form was defamatory or breached her privacy. The information was releasedby Police to an early childhood centre, which was considering employing Ms Grant.Ms Grant alleges the information in the Police vetting form failed to reflect theCriminal Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004.[21] Interwoven in this part of the statement of claim is an allegation that"defamation has occurred due to s 77 of the LTA". Briefly, the relevant circumstancesunderpinning this claim were these. Police responded to a report of irregular drivingby Ms Grant and found her at her home shortly thereafter. She was intoxicated, andadmitted that she had just driven from her home to a bottle store to purchase a bottleof spirits. She also advised Police that she had consumed a not insignificant volumeof gin after she arrived home, just before the Police arrived.[22] Police required Ms Grant to undertake an evidential breath test, which revealedMs Grant was almost three times the breath alcohol limit.[23] Ms Grant was prosecuted and convicted of driving with excess breath alcohol.She alleges her prosecution and conviction are defamatory because she claims she wasnot under the influence of alcohol when she drove to the bottle store. The essence ofMs Grant's argument is that s 77 of the Land Transport Act, which presumes her breathalcohol level at the time she drove reflects her subsequent breath test, is defamatory.[24] The claim goes on in this part to include various complaints against the Officeof the Privacy Commissioner and the Independent Police Conduct Authority, to whomit appears Ms Grant complained to after the release of the Police vetting form and herprosecution for driving with excess breath alcohol.[25] From [75] Ms Grant alleges Police officers that arrested her for breaching aprotection order committed the tort of intrusion into seclusion by entering herbedroom. Ms Grant also takes issue with her ex-husband's occupancy of the house,and the fact he changed the locks.[26] A heading — 'ISSUES WITH RELATIONSHIP PROPERTY DIVISION'—precedes a wide-ranging discussion of the relationship property judgment.9 Ms Grantappears to object to many — if not all — of the Judge's findings. And Ms Grant againobjects to the Police's involvement in removing her from the house and theirenforcement of the protection order. She says:9 Everett v Grant, above n 8.114. Multiple breaches of privacy have taken place. The plaintiff filed aCivil Suit in March 2020 on her ex husband to qualify that intrusioninto seclusion by way of changing her locks and taking possession hasoccurred. Breach of Privacy under the Privacy Act (1993) and tortintrusion into seclusion.[27] Focus then shifts to the events of 3 March 2020, when Ms Grant returned tothe property. Essentially, Ms Grant says she entered the property, fell asleep on thecouch and was woken by her ex-husband who then called the Police. She says:125. These named people on the protection order had intruded into whereSamantha was and proceeded to wake her up. The protection orderclearly meant they were entitled to do this? Transcript 17 and 18th June2020 [2020] NZFC 4521[28] Ms Grant then alleges:128. and has the photograph evidence that she had been slapped twotimes across the face (causing two black eyes) and was strangledduring this incident by her ex husbands partner. The Police chose toignore the allegations the plaintiff had made during her arrest.129. The plaintiff was arrested by the police. She was forcefully removedfrom the couch.[29] Further issue is taken with how the Police responded to Ms Grant's allegationsof assault and how some household items were managed while she was in prison.Ms Grant was particularly concerned to ensure there were no drugs stored on herproperty, and that her ex-husband was not remotely accessing her computer. She saysPolice did not listen to her concerns.[30] The next heading is 'GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS'.This section primarily relates to Ms Grant's time in Christchurch Women's Prison fromMay until late June 2020. There are again wide-ranging criticisms. These include:"Covid 19 breaches" as a result of soap not being available unless asked for, the factMs Grant was detained alongside convicted and maximum security prisoners, and acomplaint relating to the fact she had to provide her full name, a photograph and herstatus (remand or accused) which she did not want to be made public.[31] Ms Grant then confirms she was eventually granted bail. She says she is stilltrying to seek employment but that her time spent in prison is making that difficult.She says she was not informed of her rights before going into prison, and she haswritten to the Prime Minister with suggestions on how to improve this. She also makesgeneral complaints about her bail conditions, such as the Police checking on her in theearly hours.[32] A new heading — 'GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT MINISTRY OFJUSTICE NZ COURTS'— follows and appears to relate to legal aid services. On oneoccasion Ms Grant says she was turned down for legal aid but was granted legal aidfor her relationship property proceedings. She says her having to have a lawyer hascaused her undue financial hardship.[33] Ms Grant then moves on to lengthy criticisms of the terms — and evidentialfoundation of — the variation to the parenting order against her, made by the FamilyCourt in 2017.10 Particular attention is paid to disputing her alleged alcoholdependency. She concludes:Absolutely no balance has been maintained. Instead the plaintiff has tried timeand time again to change the initial parenting order[34] On the 39th page, Ms Grant explains her causes of action. She says:THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF ACTION IS TO RECTIFY JUSTICE.CAUSE TO ACTION: LOSS OF DIGNITY, HUMILIATION, EMOTIONALAND PHYCOLOGICAL IRREVERSABLE DAMAGE!!!REMIDY FOR RELIEF: 5 MILLION DOLLARS(a) Costs(b) S9 money Act interest[35] Ms Grant's further causes of action relate to:(a) breach of privacy, whereby she seeks implementation of a new Policevetting form to enable private notes to be concealed, and $1m indamages;10 Everett v Irvine [2017] NZFC 10007.(b) defamation, where she seeks "costs her career 20 years x $55,000 shewill never teach again".(c) "breach of human right to be heard in front of a judge in a timelymanner."[36] Under a heading entitled 'REMIDIES FOR RELIEF', Ms Grant then seeks$1m to compensate for the fact she "has had her life so interfered with without anybalance" and a further $1m for the emotional and physical harm she has endured.[37] The final cause of action, at page 46, relates to Ms Grant's children, who shesays are victims of the Police, court process, and the Ministry of Justice. Ms Grantalleges there have been breaches of "Unicef for every child"— presumably theConvention on the Rights of the Child — specifically arts 5,8,18, and 25. Ms Grantseeks a letter to her children apologising for the actions of the Crown, extendedcounselling should they require it, and $1m dollars in "damages" for emotional harmand humiliation.25 March "pleadings" document[38] This document is 15 pages long and runs to a further 55 paragraphs.[39] It makes reference to the Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004 and theUnited Nations Declaration of Human Rights. And, again, it refers to Ms Grant'sprosecution for driving with excess breath alcohol, noted above.[40] Ms Grant outlines her complaint to the IPCA about being breath tested, thewithout notice protection order obtained by one of her former partners, aspects of therelationship property dispute with her former partner and trespass issues arising fromthat, and, once again, her incarceration in Christchurch Women's Prison.[41] Reference is made to the habeas corpus application Ms Grant filed, as well asthe bail conditions imposed upon her release from prison. Ms Grant reiteratescomplaints about the Family Court care and access litigation concerning her twochildren and again makes reference to a claim for intrusion into seclusion.[42] In contrast to the statement of claim, the "pleadings" document does notcontain any clear reference to separate clauses of action or prayers for relief, althoughit does note:Miss Grant had filed this civil proceeding in order to get money back that shelost in the house settlement. The man went too far when he committed perjuryin court and his partner assaulted Miss Grant. Miss Grant wants the protectionorder removed.[43] Overall, this document is also a disjointed mix of alleged fact, opinion andsubmission, with little logical connection between Ms Grant's points of grievance anda cause of action.The "further to Statement of Claim as they unfolded after filing March 2020"document[44] This document was filed in April 2021. It is 13 pages long and 104 paragraphsin length. It begins with the words:This document notifies you that more pleadings are valid:[45] Ms Grant begins by seeking to "add" a challenge to a judgment of this courtrelating to her application for a writ of habeas corpus.11 Again it appears to be, apartfrom the reference to the application for habeas corpus, largely a repetition of the samegrievances outlined in her previous two pleading documents. She gives a detailedperspective on allegations of assault both concerning her as an alleged perpetrator, andvictim, and her experiences in prison, on which she says at one point:After the hearing Miss Grant was sent back in CHC Women's Prison? Whatthe heck is this justicc system doing for Miss Grant? She stood out already,had to return and again the "old gang" was back together. Talking more aboutdrug life this time. Miss Grant spent two further weeks in CHC beforereturning to Nelson. What happened to burden of proof, timely hearings oftrials and worse innocence before guilt?[46] Ms Grant also makes an allegation of negligence against the "EducationCouncil" in what appears to have been a professional disciplinary investigationprocess following her unhappy involvement with the criminal justice process and herconviction for driving with excess breath alcohol.11 Grant v Attorney-General, above n 7.[47] The IPCA complaint is again raised, and Ms Grant also complains about herrelationship property division case that was struck out. She says:where is it a judges right to explain it is ill pleaded, frivolous and vexatious?[48] Other claims, such as her not being able to see her daughter, are again raised.Strike out[49] Rule 15.1 of the High Court Rules 2016 provides:(1) The court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it—(a) discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, orcase appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or(b) is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or(c) is frivolous or vexatious; or(d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.[50] In this case there are essentially two broad grounds advanced in support ofstriking-out: the pleading discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, oralternatively it is an abuse of the Court's processes (the grounds in r 15.1(a) and (d)).[51] The approach to striking out a claim that discloses no reasonably arguablecause of action is well settled:12A striking-out application proceeds on the assumption that the facts pleadedin the statement of claim are true. That is so even although they are not or maynot be admitted. It is well settled that before the Court may strike outproceedings the causes of action must be so clearly untenable that they cannotpossibly succeed; the jurisdiction is one to be exercised sparingly, and only ina clear case where the Court is satisfied it has the requisite material but thefact that applications to strike out raise difficult questions of law, and requireextensive argument does not exclude jurisdiction.[52] Where a defect in the pleadings can be cured by an amendment, the Court willnot generally strike the proceeding out. Instead, it will permit the plaintiff to make theamendment provided the cause of action is still within time.1312 Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267, as confirmed by theSupreme Court in Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 at [33].13 Marshall Futures Ltd v Marshall [1992] 1 NZLR 316 at 324.[53] The principles applicable to second broad ground of strike out, the abuse of theCourt's processes, are also well-established:14[89] The grounds of strike out listed in r 15.1(1)(b)–(d) concern the misuseof the court's processes. Rule 15.1(1)(b), which deals with pleadings that arelikely to cause prejudice or delay, requires an element of impropriety andabuse of the court's processes. Pleadings which can cause delay include thosethat are prolix; are scandalous and irrelevant; plead purely evidential matters;or are unintelligible. In regards to r 15.1(1)(c), a "frivolous" pleading is onewhich trifles with the court's processes, while a vexatious one contains anelement of impropriety. Rule 15.1(1)(d) – "otherwise an abuse of process ofthe court" – extends beyond the other grounds and captures all other instancesof misuse of the court's processes, such as a proceedings that has been broughtwith an improper motive or are an attempt to obtain a collateral benefit. Animportant qualification to the grounds of strike out listed in r 15.1(1) is thatthe jurisdiction to dismiss the proceeding is only used sparingly. The powersof the court must be used properly and for bona fide purposes. If the defect inthe pleadings can be cured, then the court would normally order anamendment of the statement of claim(footnotes omitted)[54] Relitigating matters already determined, including bringing proceedingsdressed in different garb but having the same effect, will amount to an abuse ofprocess.15Summary of Ms Grant's claims[55] The key themes, or grievances, in Ms Grant's proceeding can be summarisedas:(a) information contained within the 2016 Police vetting document wasdefamatory and a breach of her privacy;(b) her prosecution and eventual conviction for driving with excess breathalcohol based on the presumptive nature of s 77A of the Land TransportAct was defamatory;14 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR679, (2013) 26 NZTC 21-007, [2013] NZCCLR 10 at [89].15 Dotcom v District Court at North Shore [2017] NZHC 3158 at [25] citing Rabson v JudicialConduct Commissioner [2016] NZHC 2539; Hunter v Chief Constable of the West MidlandsPolice [1982] AC 529 (HL); and Collier v Butterworths of New Zealand Ltd (1997) 11 PRNZ 581(HC) at 586. See also Faloon v Planning Tribunal at Wellington [2020] NZCA 170 and Lyon v R[2019] NZCA 311, [2019] 3 NZLR 421.(c) her complaints in relation to Police conduct and errors to theCommissioner and IPCA were wrong in their findings;(d) being denied proper care and access to her children;(e) being removed from her home unlawfully;(f) being wrongly incarcerated in prison and wrongly mixed in with thegeneral prison population when she ought to have been kept separatewith the remand prisoners; and(g) more recently, Ms Grant appears to wish to re-litigate her two failedapplications for habeas corpus.[56] I agree with Mr McKillop's submission during the hearing that the vastmajority of the allegations in Ms Grant's pleading are irrelevant to any of thediscernible legal claims.Discussion[57] Due to the wide-ranging and discursive nature of Ms Grant's pleading, the bestapproach in determining whether strike out is appropriate is to consider the themes, orthe general topics Ms Grant has raised, as outlined at [55].The Privacy claims[58] The general breach of privacy and the tort of invasion of privacy were struckout as unarguable by Judge Zorab.16[59] As the applicant notes, there is no jurisdiction to bring a claim under thePrivacy Act in the High Court, and the only exception to this does not apply here.1716 Everett v New Zealand Police, above n 2, at [66]; Everett v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [128]–[133] and [215].17 Privacy Act 2020, s 31 states that the information privacy principles s do not confer on any personany right that is enforceable in a court of law. The one exception to this is principle 6(1), whichprovides that an individual is entitled to receive confirmation that an agency holds personalinformation about them and to access that information.The proper process is to make a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner at firstinstance, and then to the Human Rights Review Tribunal. Ms Grant did complain tothe Commissioner who concluded that no breach of privacy had occurred.[60] As Judge Zorab found:18On any reasonable analysis of the facts of Ms Grant's case, there is no basison which this tort could apply[61] This part of the claim therefore meets both grounds of strike out: it isunarguable (jurisdictionally and legally) and has in substance already been determinedand is therefore an abuse of process.Defamation[62] This claim arises from the statutory presumption under s 77 of the LandTransport Act 1998 that the breath alcohol level a person is tested with is the level theywere driving with. As I have already noted, Ms Grant says she has been defamedbecause of that presumption, and the subsequent recording of her breath alcohol levelin the Ministry of Justice record of convictions and Police vetting report.[63] Ms Grant also says the Police vetting report referring to family violenceincidents she was involved in is defamatory.[64] In relation to the Police vetting report, Judge Zorab said the claim fails at "thefirst hurdle", as Ms Grant was unable to prove the defamatory meaning she alleged;that she is a drunk, a perpetrator of domestic violence and that she does not obey thelaw.19[65] And in relation to the breath alcohol limit, Judge Zorab noted that:20. However, more importantly, no such cause of action could exist. Thesimple truth of the matter is that Ms Grant pleaded guilty to drinking anddriving, and was later convicted of the charge, and was disqualified fromholding or obtaining a driver's licence. To suggest she has been defamed bythe operation of s 77 of the LTA and/or by her conviction is bizarre.18 Everett v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [128].19 At [161].20 At [205].[66] Ms Grant is clearly relitigating this point. But I also agree with Judge Zorabthat a claim founded on defamation in this context is untenable.21 Again, both groundsfor striking out are made out.Intrusion into seclusion[67] Ms Grant says Police committed the tort of intrusion into seclusion by arrestingher for breach of a protection order, as well as when they checked on, and arrested her,while she was on EM bail.[68] Judge Zorab found this cause of action could not possibly be made out on thefacts given the Police were acting within their duty when they visited Ms Grant'shouse.22[69] In any event, and if Ms Grant is now alleging the Police committed the tort ondifferent occasions, it cannot be sustained. The first element of the tort is an intentionaland unauthorised intrusion.23 The Police were authorised to enter Ms Grant's home.[70] This claim is therefore an abuse of process and discloses no reasonablyarguable cause of action.Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004[71] Ms Grant says the Police breached the Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act2004 by including information in the vetting reports that either should have beenexempted (information not resulting in convictions) or were subject to namesuppression.[72] Judge Zorab did not consider this claim to have been made out, noting:24 the Clean Slate Act does not apply to non-conviction information. AsMr Mackay noted, non-conviction information, such as intelligence notings,interactions with police or Court outcomes other than convictions, held by21 Notwithstanding the fact that the defamation claims have not been pleaded in accordance withs 37 of the Defamation Act 1992 and are time barred by s 15 of the Limitation Act 2010.22 Everett v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [136].23 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672 at [94].24 Everett v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [139].NIA that may be relevant to an applicant's role, and which were sufficientlysubstantiated, might be considered for inclusion in a Police Vet Check.[73] Ms Grant's allegation that name suppressed material was included in thevetting report is equally unsustainable, for the reasons noted by Judge Zorab. For one,breach of a suppression order is a criminal offence that cannot be dealt with in civilproceedings, but in any event it was appropriate for the facts of the case in whichMs Grant's name was suppressed to be identified in the vetting report given therecipients' legitimate need to know.25 I agree with this conclusion given Ms Grant'sprofession.[74] Both the IPCA and the Privacy Commissioner have rejected Ms Grant'scomplaint too.[75] Not only has this claim been considered before, it discloses no reasonablyarguable cause of action.District Court and Family Court claims[76] As noted, Ms Grant makes a number of allegations relating to these two courts.The appropriate avenue for these allegations is through appeal, seeking judicial reviewof a particular decision, or applying for a discharge of an order. It is an abuse of processto bring the same allegations determined by those Courts in this proceeding.[77] Equally, the pleadings relating to this broad theme appear to reflect anunhappiness with the outcome of the decisions, rather than a tenable or identifiablelegal claim.Department of Corrections claims[78] As noted, these claims relate to Ms Grant's time in Christchurch Women'sPrison. Essentially, Ms Grant says soap was not made available to her until she25 At [210]–[213].requested it (this was during COVID 19), and she was housed in the same wing asconvicted prisoners (rather than the remand wing).26[79] Ms Grant acknowledges she was given soap when she asked for it. It seemshowever her complaint is that prisoners should not have to ask for soap in the firstplace.[80] The Attorney-General says the Corrections Act 2004 does not requireCorrections to proactively provide prisoners with soap, but rather the CorrectionsRegulations 2005 provide that every prisoner must keep themselves clean, and that themanager of a prison must ensure that the means to comply with that requirement areavailable to every prisoner. The fact Ms Grant received soap when she asked for itdemonstrates that the prison manager's legal duty has been met, and that there hasbeen no breach of a statutory duty that could provide the basis of a judicial review ortort claim.[81] There is no doubt a distinction is made within the Corrections legislation (theAct and the Regulations) between minimum entitlements — which must beproactively provided by prisons — and other things such as cleaning products thatmust be "available". Soap is not a minimum entitlement, unlike food and drink forexample. This may be surprising, but given soap must only be made available, whichit was, it is hard to see how Ms Grant's complaint could form the basis of a claim.[82] Ms Grant's claim relating to being mixed with sentenced prisoners seems morecapable of being the subject of a judicial review proceeding. As the defendant notes,reg 186 of the Corrections Regulations states as far as practicable, accused prisonersmust be kept apart from other prisoners in a prison, and if it is not reasonablypracticable to accommodate an accused prisoner in a separate unit from convictedprisoners, then the accused prisoner must be subject to a separate regime that ensuresaccused prisoners are kept apart from other prisoners as far as practicable.26 Ms Grant also says other prisoners were provided with her name, photograph and status. Ms Grantrelies on the Privacy Act for this complaint. As noted earlier, there is no jurisdiction to hear thisclaim. Ms Grant's remedy lies in lodging a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner.[83] Ms Grant was detained during the COVID-19 pandemic, so the issue may bewhether it was not reasonably practicable to accommodate Ms Grant in a separate unitfrom convicted prisoners. The Court is not in a position in this strike-out applicationto assess this issue, but it seems there may be a genuine issue at play here. And, asMr McKillop responsibly acknowledged, it is the one aspect of Ms Grant's currentproceedings that has not been previously been the subject of a judicial determination.[84] However, given the wider context in which this claim sits — buried within a47-page document — in order to determine whether this aspect of the proceedingought to continue, it is necessary for Ms Grant to file an amended statement of claimand add further particulars or details of her claim in relation to what she says was anunlawful remand in custody, and for her to identify the legal basis for her complaint,and the remedy she seeks.Are any of the causes of action "fresh" proceedings?Education Council[85] There remain some claims that feature throughout Ms Grant's pleading thateither have not been dealt with before or the defendant has not responded to.[86] One of them is a claim that the Education Council was negligent. Exactly howthat is so remains a little unclear, but it seems Ms Grant's complaint relates to theinvestigation undertaken by the Council after Ms Grant's manager advised the Councilof Ms Grant's behaviour (especially her drinking, and the DUI conviction) and herdismissal from employment. Ms Grant seems to take issue with the Education Councilgathering the information it required to undertake its investigation, includinginformation she says was private.[87] But ultimately Ms Grant's claim on this topic is unclear. Negligence is assertedbut not explained. I do not consider this claim is capable of being re-pleaded either, asit is unclear what the claim is focused on.Legal aid[88] This claim relates to Ms Grant being turned down for legal aid where she saysthere was no step by step guide to the documentation she had to provide and theexpectation of the contents of these documents from the courts[89] Ms Grant then appears to take issue with being granted legal aid for herrelationship property proceedings, which she says has caused her "undue financialhardship".[90] This claim is equally as unclear. It appears Ms Grant's issue is with the legalaid scheme in general, rather than an actionable legal claim. It is struck out.Habeas corpus applications[91] Ms Grant's pleading frequently refers to the habeas corpus applications shemade, one of which she made when she was not detained.27 These applications havebeen determined and dismissed. It is an abuse of process for Ms Grant to seek torelitigate them in this proceeding.Conclusion and result[92] Ms Grant's proceeding, except to the extent it involves a claim that she wasunlawfully detained with sentenced prisoners while on remand, is struck out.[93] In respect of the latter claim, Ms Grant is to amend her pleading articulatingthe facts on which her claim is based, identifying the cause of action she advances andthe remedy she seeks. I remind Ms Grant that she is only to focus on this aspect of herproceeding, as her other claims have been struck out. The amended statement of claimis to be filed within 20 working days of this judgment.[94] The defendant's application to strike out the proceeding is also adjournedinsofar as it relates to the one aspect of the proceeding that has survived. The defendant27 Above, n 7.may renew its application, should it wish to, once Ms Grant's amended pleading hasbeen filed.[95] I adjourn the defendant's application for security for costs. I consider it can beconsidered further, if necessary, if Ms Grant's amended claim survives strike out. TheCourt should also be in a better position at that point to assess the merits of the claiminsofar as they might affect the consideration of security.[96] As I noted at the hearing, the Crown has not made an application for a civilrestraint order under s 166 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 and, as a matter of fairnessto Ms Grant, I consider that question ought to be advanced through a formalapplication to which Ms Grant can respond. I do not consider it appropriate to dealwith the matter in the context of the current application, given the limited informationavailable to the Court. Without expressing a concluded view, however, Ms Grant'sconduct of litigation, including this proceeding, certainly appears worthy ofexamination in the context of s 166.Isac JSolicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for Defendant