SANDY ZHUJUN DAI [2023] NZSC 69

SANDY ZHUJUN DAI [2023] NZSC 69 [19 June 2023]IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROASC UR 13/2023[2023] NZSC 69RE SANDY ZHUJUN DAIApplicantCounsel: Applicant in personJudgment: 19 June 2023JUDGMENT OF ELLEN FRANCE JThe application for review of the decision of the Deputy Registrardeclining to waive the filing fee is dismissed.____________________________________________________________________REASONSIntroduction[1] The applicant has applied for leave to appeal from a decision of theCourt of Appeal.1 The Court of Appeal in that judgment declined an application toreview the Deputy Registrar's decision declining an application for waiver of the filingfee; declined an application to review the Deputy Registrar's decision not to dispensewith security for costs; and declined an application to stay execution of a costsjudgment made by the High Court.2[2] On 26 May 2023 the Deputy Registrar of this Court declined the applicant'sapplication for a filing fee waiver. This was on the basis the Deputy Registrar was notsatisfied that the proceeding concerned a matter of genuine public interest. Rather, the1 Dai v Professional Conduct Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants[2023] NZCA 132 (Brown and Collins JJ) [CA judgment].2 Dai v The Professional Conduct Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants[2023] NZHC 278 (Churchman J).Deputy Registrar considered that the judgment of the Court of Appeal declining theapplications for review of the filing fee waiver and in relation to security for costsraised case-specific issues. The applicant seeks review of the decision of theDeputy Registrar maintaining that the appeal concerns a matter of genuine publicinterest as defined in the Supreme Court Fees Regulations 2003.3Background[3] The background to the current proceeding relates to the decision of theProfessional Conduct Committee (PCC) of the New Zealand Institute of CharteredAccountants (NZICA) to refer complaints against the applicant to the NZICA'sdisciplinary tribunal.4 Not long after the referral was made, the applicant filed astatement of claim seeking judicial review of the PCC's decision along with variousother applications in the High Court. The claim was struck out by Churchman J,5 whoalso awarded costs against the applicant.6[4] The decision of the Court of Appeal in issue followed on from the applicant'sapplication to appeal from the strike out decision to that Court.[5] In addition to the application for leave to appeal against the decision of theCourt of Appeal, the applicant has also applied in this Court for a stay of execution ofthe High Court's costs judgment; a "stay of the Court of Appeal Proceeding"; and alsoseeks various declarations.Application for review[6] The overall thrust of the applicant's notice of application for leave to appeal isthat the purpose of her proceedings has been misapprehended in the Courts below, hersubmissions mis-stated and/or misunderstood, and critical evidence has been ignored.She points to various matters said to give rise to a miscarriage of justice.3 Supreme Court Fees Regulations 2003, reg 5(2)(b) and 5(4).4 I understand that the complaints have since been determined (Re Dai 30 January 2023,Disciplinary Tribunal of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants) and that theapplicant has appealed.5 Dai v The Professional Conduct Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants[2022] NZHC 4 (presumably [2023] NZHC 4).6 Dai, above n 2.[7] The applicant also wishes to address the appropriateness of the disciplinarytribunal as the avenue for legal proceedings. The applicant says that the question oflaw arising from her application is "whether the Judges failed to apply the correctstatutory legal tests; took into account irrelevant facts; failed to take into accountrelevant facts; gave relevant facts insufficient weight; and/or made findings of factbased on no evidence".[8] Ultimately, the Court on the applicant's proposed appeal would have to addresswhether the Court of Appeal erred in the decisions declining the three applications.Having reviewed the material filed by the applicant, I agree with theDeputy Registrar's assessment that the proceeding does not concern a matter ofgenuine public interest as it turns on its particular facts. That means theDeputy Registrar is correct that there was no basis to grant a fee waiver in this case.[9] In terms of the application for a fee waiver, the Court of Appeal said there wasno adequate explanation of how the appeal had any public interest and nor did thereview application "highlight how either of the" relevant grounds for a waiver wereapplicable.7 The Court continued:[15] This case is confined to a very fact-specific situation and in anyevent, Ms Dai has already paid the filing fee. As such, the proceedings couldproceed. Ms Dai has not provided reasons why the proceedings could notproceed if the filing fee was not waived for public interest grounds.[10] The Court considered that factor made the case unsuitable for a fee waiverunder the relevant regulations.[11] In relation to the application relating to the decision not to dispense withsecurity for costs, the Court of Appeal applied the principles set out in this Court'sjudgment in Reekie v Attorney-General.8 The Court of Appeal concluded the appealwas without merit and had no public interest. The Court took the view this was not aproceeding that a solvent appellant would reasonably wish to prosecute.7 CA judgment, above n 1, at [15].8 Reekie v Attorney-General [2014] NZSC 63, [2014] 1 NZLR 737.[12] Finally, in relation to the decision to decline a stay of execution of theHigh Court's judgment as to costs, the Court of Appeal said that the applications forstay were unlikely to be treated as being in good faith. While the PCC was unlikelyto be injuriously affected by a stay, there was no novel issue, no public interest, theappeal was far from strong, and the balance of convenience favoured the refusal of astay. The Deputy Registrar's decision does not refer to the Court of Appeal's decisionon the stay but I consider that part of the application similarly raises no issue of publicimportance.[13] The Court of Appeal in declining these applications has applied orthodoxprinciples. There is no real challenge to those principles. Rather the challenge is tothe application of those principles to the particular facts. None of the matters raisedby the applicant have any broader significance beyond the application to the presentcase. No questions of public importance arise. I add that nothing raised provides anexplanation why this Court should grant the stay sought.Result[14] The application for review is dismissed. If the applicant wishes to have theapplication for leave to appeal accepted for filing, the applicant must first pay the filingfee.