PUKA v COUNCIL FOR THE ONGOING GOVERNMENT OF TOKELAU [2021] NZCA 349

PUKA v COUNCIL FOR THE ONGOING GOVERNMENT OF TOKELAU [2021] NZCA 349 [29 July 2021]SITTING AS THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TOKELAUE NOHO ANA RITE TONU KI TE KŌTI PĪRA O TOKELAUIN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA105/2021[2021] NZCA 349BETWEEN SIAOSI HETO PUKAApplicantAND COUNCIL FOR THE ONGOINGGOVERNMENT OF TOKELAUFirst RespondentULU O TOKELAUSecond RespondentCourt: Miller and Brown JJCounsel: J W Goddard for ApplicantR J B Fowler QC for RespondentsJudgment:(On the papers)29 July 2021 at 10.30 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURTThe application for an extension of time to appeal is declined.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Brown J)Introduction[1] The applicant (Mr Puka) was employed as the Director of Finance by theGovernment of Tokelau under a Tokelau Public Service employment contract. He andMr Suveinakama, who held the position of General Manager, were initially suspendedand subsequently had their employment terminated as a consequence of theirinvolvement in the purchase of two helicopters for a proposed interim air service forTokelau.[2] Mr Puka and Mr Suveinakama commenced a proceeding against three parties,namely the present respondents and, as third defendant, the Administrator of Tokelau.However the claim against the Administrator was stayed on 1 February 2019, shortlybefore the commencement of the substantive hearing on 11 February 2019. The claimwas determined in a judgment of the High Court of New Zealand sitting as theHigh Court of Tokelau delivered on 26 July 2019.1[3] The nature of the claim was described in the judgment in this way:[26] Although the case was fundamentally about the termination of thecontracts of employment between [Mr Suveinakama and Mr Puka] and thefirst defendant, the pleadings treated the claim as if it were one advanced on apublic law basis and sought the public law remedy of "quashing" variousdecisions including a decision to suspend [Mr Suveinakama and Mr Puka] of13 April 2017, and the decision to suspend them without pay of 30 June 2017.[27] Contractual damages were also sought, being salary and benefits forthe period 24 November 2017 to 10 January 2019 for [Mr Suveinakama], andsalary and benefits from 24 November 2017 until the date of the issue of thejudgment in this matter for [Mr Puka]. [Mr Puka] also sought an order of"reinstatement" to the role of Director of Finance. General damages, interestand costs were also sought.[4] The Court held that the decision to terminate the two employment contractswas lawful but that the decision to suspend them without pay from 13 July 2017 to24 November 2017 was unlawful.[5] In a subsequent costs judgment dated 6 September 2019 the Court ordered thatthe defendants jointly reimburse Mr Puka and Mr Suveinakama for the filing,scheduling and hearing fees totalling $6,050, that being viewed as an appropriateoutcome to reflect the very limited nature of their success in the proceedings.2[6] On 9 March 2021 Mr Puka filed an application for leave to appeal to this Courtagainst both judgments. The application for leave to appeal was unnecessary because1 Suveinakama v Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau [2019] NZHC 1787.2 Suveinakama v Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau [2019] NZHC 2241 at [16].an appeal lay as of right. However, because the notice of appeal was filed more than18 months after the expiry of the appeal period for the first judgment, an applicationfor an extension of time to appeal under r 29A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules2005 (the Rules) was required. We have treated the application for leave to bring acivil appeal as an application for an extension of time to appeal which falls to bedetermined in accordance with the principles in Almond v Read.3 Before doing so wefirst comment briefly on the papers filed by Mr Puka.The form and scope of the application[7] In addition to the notice of appeal and the application for leave to bring theappeal, Mr Puka filed a number of affidavits. The primary affidavit was that ofMr Puka himself dated 11 January 2021, which comprised 86 pages together with 29exhibits. He also filed a much shorter affidavit which was also executed on 11 January2021.4[8] Further affidavits in support were filed by:• Ioane Puka dated 7 April 2021, comprising 35 pages together with exhibitsof 182 pages;• Mr Suveinakama dated 10 March 2021; and• Kuresa Nasau dated 16 March 2021.Each of those further affidavits stated that the deponent had read both the notice ofappeal and Mr Puka's affidavit of 11 January 2021 and confirmed the accuracy of thecontents.[9] The purpose of these affidavits is unclear. Mr Fowler QC for the respondentssuggests it is an attempt by Mr Puka to request that this Court by way of appeal conducta de novo hearing of his claim. However if they were intended to be adduced as further3 Almond v Read [2017] NZSC 80, [2017] 1 NZLR 801.4 The amendment to the date of that affidavit suggests that it was intended to be sworn on1 September 2020 and it is identified in Mr Puka's submissions by reference to that date. We willrefer to it as the shorter affidavit.evidence on appeal, then their filing was premature. In any event, as they largelyrevisit the events the subject of the substantive judgment, they are not fresh. Whilethe absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification for the receipt of furtherevidence on appeal, in Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough)Ltd this Court stated that the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be verystrict.5[10] The affidavits also appear to have been directed to the issue of the venue forthe appeal. Mr Puka's larger affidavit stated:4. In one sense, this litigation is very simple. In order to appease thegovernment of New Zealand, my employer had to make someoneaccountable for progressing an interim air service. It decided to targetMr Suveinakama (the General Manager of the Tokelau Public Service,based in Apia, Samoa) and me. However, in doing so, it breached keyterms of my employment contract by failing to implement fair andreasonable procedures and by forming incorrect conclusions about myconduct. In suspending me (twice) and dismissing me from myposition as Director of Finance, it breached my employment contractthus entitling me to compensation.5. However, the factual, political, legal and cultural context is complex.I expect that it will be challenging for this Court to fully understandthese matters without the benefit of the case being heard in Tokelauand without evidence from the General Fono, the Tokelau PublicService Commissioner, representatives from the villages of Atafu,Fakaofo and Nukunonu and without evidence from the Administratorof Tokelau about his role and the involvement his office has had intothis matter.[11] The issue of venue was addressed prior to the High Court hearing. Mr Pukaand Mr Suveinakama sought to have their claim heard in Fakaofo, contending that thecase potentially could resolve constitutional, political and legal issues and had culturaldimensions making Tokelau the appropriate venue. In a judgment of 6 July 2018Elias CJ rejected the application. She pointed out that the plaintiffs were representedby lawyers based in New Zealand and noted the cost and logistical problems ofaccommodating the trial in Fakaofo, including transport and accommodation for theCourt, parties and counsel, the absence of an air service and the delay in having thehearing in Tokelau.65 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 (CA)at 193.6 Suveinakama v Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau [2018] NZHC 1670 [Change of[12] Nevertheless a change of venue was foreshadowed by Mr Goddard in hissubmissions in support of the application:13. The cultural context is relevant to this litigation which is broughtpursuant to the Tokelau Act 1948 and concerns the developmentaspirations of Tokelau. There are obvious difficulties with a courtsitting in New Zealand trying to understand cultural practices,customs and relationships when the participants may have nevertravelled to Tokelau, speak Tokelauan or have any engagement withthe Tokelauan community.[13] However at present there is no application concerning the venue for the appeal.Hence we will determine the r 29A application on the footing that any appeal is verylikely to be heard by this Court sitting in New Zealand, either in Wellington orAuckland.[14] A further issue arises from paragraph 5 of Mr Puka's affidavit, namely thesuggestion that the participation of the Administrator of Tokelau in the appeal mightbe required. As noted above7 in the High Court the proceedings were stayed vis-à-visthe Administrator. When Mr Puka's affidavits and his submissions in support of thecurrent application dated 8 April 2021 came to the attention of the Administrator,through counsel the Administrator filed a memorandum expressing concern about theassertion that the Administrator and/or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade(MFAT) were a driver of what was said to be unlawful singling out of Mr Puka andMr Suveinakama. The memorandum stated:4. From the perspective of the Administrator, the concern is not only thatit is not fair to seek to rely upon claims against him, his predecessors,successive Ministers and other New Zealand officials when, by theappellant's actions below and in this Court, those claims were not putto proof or decided below or pleaded here. It is also that, as will beself-evident, this proceeding has been demanding for Tokelau, givenits novelty, the scale of the claimed remedies and the time taken. Theproposed appeal ought not add further to that difficulty by furtherattempts to engage with wider grievances or criticisms, not pursuedbelow, that the appellant or others may hold.(Footnote omitted.)venue decision].7 At [2].[15] In a memorandum in response Mr Goddard addressed the status of theAdministrator stating:(a) the decisions under appeal relate to alleged breaches of anemployment agreement and the Administrator is not and hasnever been the employer of Mr Puka;(b) the Administrator has not been named as a respondent byMr Puka; and(c) there has been no indication from the respondents that theAdministrator will be a witness if the appeal is allowed toproceed.It was contended that the Administrator lacked standing to file documents in this Courtand that he ought not to be making submissions on the r 29A application as he is not aparty to the appeal.[16] In our view it is apparent from that exchange of memoranda that the proposedappeal does not extend to any issues concerning the Administrator or his conduct. Thisis a relevant consideration in the evaluation of the significance of the issues raised bythe proposed appeal.8Relevant principles[17] In Almond v Read the Supreme Court explained that when the litigant takessteps to exercise the right of appeal within the required timeframe (including advisingthe other party) but misses the specified time limit by a day or so as a result of an erroror miscalculation (especially by a legal adviser) and applies for an extension of timepromptly on learning of the error, it is not appropriate to characterise the giving of anextension of time as the granting of an indulgence which necessarily entitles the Courtto look closely at the merits of the proposed appeal. The Court commented:In reality, there has simply been a minor slip-up in the exercise of a right.8 At [42]–[46] below.The Court considered that the ultimate question when considering the exercise of thediscretion to extend time under r 29A is what the interests of justice require whichnecessitates an assessment of the particular circumstances of the case.9[18] The following factors were identified as likely to require consideration:(a) the length of the delay;(b) the reasons for the delay;(c) the conduct of the parties, particularly of the applicant;(d) any prejudice or hardship to the respondent or to others with alegitimate interest in the outcome; and(e) the significance of the issues raised by the proposed appeal, both to theparties and more generally.The length of delay[19] As the Supreme Court observed, the longer the delay the more the applicantwill be seeking an "indulgence" from the Court and the stronger the case for anextension will need to be.10[20] Here the delay in seeking to bring the appeal is substantial, being more than18 months after the expiry of the appeal period for the substantive judgment.Mr Goddard accepted that that period was significantly more than the 20 working daysgenerally allowed for bringing an appeal under the Rules. However he submitted thatsuch a period of time was less than the two years permitted under the Tokelau Crimes,Procedure and Evidence Rules 2003 (CPER) for bringing a civil claim or the six-yearperiod of limitation for bringing a claim in the New Zealand courts.9 Almond v Read, above n 3, at [37]–[38].10 At [38(a)].[21] Mr Fowler responded, correctly, that the applicant had misinterpreted r 104 ofthe CPER which refers to the limitation period for filing a civil claim, not to the filingof a civil appeal. That is governed by s 4(1) of the Tokelau Amendment Act 1986which states:An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand from any judgment,decree, or order of the High Court of New Zealand exercising the jurisdictionconferred on it by section 3 of this Act in the same manner as from anyjudgment, decree, or order of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction inrespect of New Zealand.The reasons advanced for the delay[22] Mr Puka advances a combination of factors by way of explanation for the delaywhich are summarised in the following paragraph of Mr Goddard's submissions inreply:47. The attempts at settlement, the attempts at arranging finance, thebureaucracy of the legal aid application, the difficulties in accessingthe Court file, the impact of the Covid-19 lockdown measures, theneed to prepare supporting affidavits, the extent and scope of theevidence and uncertainty as to the nature of the first-ever appealbefore this Court all contributed to a significant but unavoidable delayin filing the appeal.[23] With reference to settlement, it is submitted for Mr Puka that following therelease of the judgments in July and September 2019 Mr Puka and Mr Suveinakamaactively explored settlement of their claims. It only became clear by 23 September2019 that settlement negotiations could not succeed at which point a decision wasmade to appeal, subject to finance being arranged. The respondents contest thesuggestion that there were settlement negotiations, drawing attention to the fact thatthe only document referred to by Mr Puka is an email from the New ZealandAdministrator dated 23 September 2019, acknowledging an email from Mr Puka,which states that the Office of the Administrator does not need further staff to dealwith the proposed air services initiatives.[24] Mr Puka's shorter affidavit explains his difficult financial situation followingthe litigation, both in terms of his debt for legal fees and an award of costs made onthe application of the Administrator.11 He explains that between July andDecember 2019 he sought agreement with his lawyers for funding arrangements tobring an appeal but without success.[25] He explained that on 13 December 2019 Mr Goddard resigned from the legalfirm which had acted in the High Court proceeding but did not commence work as abarrister sole until 10 February 2020. Mr Puka claims that he could only bring anappeal once Mr Goddard became an approved provider of civil legal aid, that approvalbeing confirmed on 22 April 2020.[26] While the respondents do not accept those circumstances as a sufficientexplanation for the first part of the delay, they make the point that there was nojustifiable explanation for the delay of almost 11 months between Mr Goddard'sapproval as a legal aid provider and the filing of the application in March 2021.The respondents also emphasise that there is no justifiable explanation as to the delaysin processing the application for legal aid, observing that Mr Puka's affidavit does notprovide any information to show that the application was submitted in a timelymanner.[27] In any event the respondents submit that suitable arrangements could havebeen made to bring an appeal within time and at the very least Mr Puka should haveprovided notice to the respondents advising of his intention to file an appeal.In response Mr Goddard submits that the respondents were on notice from July 2020that Mr Puka was working towards filing an appeal by reason of the fact that hiscounsel reapplied for certification to appeal before a Court of Tokelau pursuant tothe CPER.[28] The COVID-19 restrictions were said to have contributed to the delay byinterfering with the operations of the Ministry of Justice and the New Zealand LawSociety, with the result that the grant of legal aid was not confirmed until 5 August2020. However the respondents point out that New Zealand only commencedlockdown late in March 2020, some seven to eight months after the substantivejudgment was delivered and well after the expiry of the appeal timeframes. They also11 Suveinakama v Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau (Costs No 2) [2019] NZHC 2974.note that Mr Puka and his counsel are both based in New Zealand and there is noexplanation offered as to how the COVID-19 restrictions would have prevented thefiling of this appeal until 9 March 2021.[29] Mr Goddard's submissions in support of the application observed that the"residue" of the delay is largely explained by the desire to involve Mr Nasau12 in theappeal so the Court is afforded an opportunity to understand the full Tokelaun context.He explains that Mr Nasau, who was not able to attend the High Court hearing due toill health, will be a key witness in the appeal, providing valuable insight into theworkings of the Government of Tokelau. It is said that an initial meeting betweenMr Puka and Mr Nasau took place on 22 September 2020 but the latter's decision totake part in the appeal was not made until a further meeting in February 2021.[30] The respondents have signalled their intention to oppose the receipt of the newaffidavit evidence including that of Mr Nasau. They draw attention to the fact that theHigh Court was in fact provided with detailed evidence of the applicable culturalaspects of the Tokelau Government and Tokelau culture in the affidavits ofSiopili Perez and Afega Gaualofa.The conduct of the parties[31] By reference to the matters traversed in the context of the reasons for delay therespondents contend that Mr Puka has sat on his hands. Mr Puka resists thatsuggestion, submitting that bringing the appeal was a significant task which requiredsignificant work from a number of parties.[32] The significant work from a number of parties would appear to refer to theextensive affidavit evidence which was filed (without any application for leave underr 45 of the Rules) together with the application for leave to appeal on 9 March 2021.13It is self-evident that these extensive documents were prepared over a substantialperiod of time. In fact the shorter affidavit of Mr Puka was initially datedSeptember 2020 and the initial meeting with Mr Nasau took place in the same month.1412 See [8] above.13 The two-volume affidavit of Ioane Puka was filed subsequently on 12 April 2021.14 At [29] above.It is apparent that an appeal had been in prospect for a lengthy period. Indeed an emaildated 20 September 2019 from WCM Legal to Mr Puka, exhibited to Mr Puka'sshorter affidavit and bearing the subject heading "Funding for appeal to the Court ofAppeal of New Zealand sitting as the Court of Appeal of Tokelau", referred to the factof confirmation by the board of WCM Legal that the payment of $40,000 into its Trustaccount would provide it with sufficient confidence to authorise commencement of anappeal.[33] Prior to Almond v Read the conduct of legal advisers was accepted as amitigating factor in the context of an application out of time. In My Noodle Ltd vQueenstown Lakes District Council this Court commented:15[20] We accept that the cause of the delay in this case was a genuinemistake on the part of the applicants' legal advisers. Once the error wasdiscovered, their counsel immediately sought the respondents' consent to anextension of time for appealing. This Court has made it clear that it isnormally sympathetic to an extension of time in such circumstances,particularly where counsel has acted expeditiously to remedy the oversightafter it has been discovered: see, eg, Grey v Elders Pastoral Holdings Ltd(1999) 13 PRNZ 353 at [15] (CA) and Havanaco at [7].[34] The delay in that case, approximately three and a half months (including theChristmas vacation), was described as significant. However prior to the oversightbeing discovered it was clear that all parties assumed an appeal was on foot.[35] The delay in Almond v Read was much less. Through a calculation errorMs Almond's solicitors filed the notice of appeal one day late.16 That provides contextfor the Supreme Court's reference to a minor slip-up.17 The Court also observed thatin a case where there has been a slip-up and the appeal date has been inadvertentlymissed, how quickly the applicant seeks to rectify the mistake after learning of it willalso be relevant.18[36] In Langridge v Wilson the time for filing an appeal expired on6 September 1985 and the application for leave to appeal was filed on 23 October15 My Noodle Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2009] NZCA 224, (2009) 19 PRNZ 518.16 Similarly see Edel Metals Group Ltd v Geier Ltd [2017] NZCA 359, (2017) 24 PRNZ 305 at [24];and Skiffington v Wellington Tenths Trust [2018] NZCA 462, (2018) 24 PRNZ 488 at [16]–[17].17 At [17] above.18 Almond v Read, above n 3, at [38(a)].1985.19 It was submitted that, the failure to file being due to a mistake on the part ofcounsel, the discretion should be exercised in the appellant's favour on that groundalone, citing the English authority Palata Investments Ltd v Burt & Sinfield Ltd.20 Indeclining an extension of time this Court noted that Palata and like cases referred towere directed to circumstances where the delay was very short, in Palata being onlythree days. However in Langridge the delay was six weeks and it was not until fourweeks after judgment (by the filing of an abortive notice of appeal) that notice ofintention to appeal was given to the respondent.[37] The principles in Langridge were followed in Grey v Elders Pastoral HoldingsLtd where this Court commented that once the error is discovered the intendingappellants and their advisers are expected to act promptly.21 Mr Grey was advised atan early point that the appeal period was three months when in fact it was only onemonth. However it was not until a further three months that the application was filed.This Court declined an extension of time as it was not convinced that steps were takenwith sufficient expedition once the error was realised, nor that the delay thereafter wassatisfactorily explained.22[38] Mr Puka does not state in his affidavits when he realised that his proposedappeal was out of time. However we note that his shorter affidavit (bearing the originaldate of 1 September 2020) states that he assumes that it is necessary to apply for leaveout of time and that he was proceeding on the basis that leave was required.Six months then elapsed before the application was filed.Any prejudice or hardship to the respondent or to others[39] Mr Goddard submits that Mr Puka has lost the ability to find work in Tokelauand to live in Tokelau and that his losses are personal, extensive and ongoing.By contrast he contends that life continues as normal for the respondents who knowthat their defence of the appeal will be funded by the Government of Tokelau withcontributions likely from the Administrator and MFAT as required. Hence the19 Langridge v Wilson (1989) 3 PRNZ 341 (CA).20 At 343, citing Palata Investments Ltd v Burt & Sinfield Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 942 (CA).21 Grey v Elders Pastoral Holdings Ltd (1999) 13 PRNZ 353 (CA) at [13].22 At [18].prejudice to Mr Puka is said to be far greater if the appeal is not allowed to proceedthan would be suffered by the respondents if the appeal is heard.[40] The respondents' rejoinder is that as a result of national elections there has beena new Council of the Ongoing Government of Tokelau since February 2020. That newCouncil was entitled to reasonably conclude that this litigation was at an end, giventhe expiry of the appeal period, and no contingency budget was needed for thisparticular litigation. Mr Puka responds that the Council is not new, but that three ofthe six members are new.[41] The respondents further submit that the way in which Mr Puka is formulatingthe proposed appeal will incur significant costs, drawing attention to the additionalsubstantial affidavits that not only attempt to relitigate the evidence in the High Courtbut also introduce a lot of new evidence, the admissibility of which is challengeableand which raise fresh issues of discovery.The significance of the issues raised by the proposed appeal[42] Mr Goddard describes the litigation as historic, unprecedented andground-breaking. He submits that the people of Tokelau deserve to know definitivelyfrom their highest court which laws apply to their employment in Tokelau, theiremployers' obligations when it comes to investigating misconduct anddisciplining/dismissing employees and, importantly, what actions of their employerscan be challenged and how. He goes on to say:12. The wider context is integral to this claim. Over the course of thislitigation, the status of the Constitution has changed from being thefoundation of the nation of Tokelau to being a nullity in the legalsense. This development has confused the roles and responsibilitiesof the General Fono, the Council, the Ulu, the Taupulega and theAdministrator. There is also substantial confusion relating to theTokelau Public Service Commissioner and the extent of his powersgiven that he purported to dismiss the appellant even though he wasnot a party to the contract of employment.(Footnote omitted.)[43] The respondents' rejoinder is that Mr Puka's claim in the High Court was onefor private damages in his personal capacity and it is not possible for an appeal on thismatter to seek any determinations regarding any perceived public issues such as thosegoverning the relationship between the General Fono of Tokelau and the Council.[44] The respondents' submission finds support in the decision of Elias CJ on thechange of venue application:23[12] I do not accept that the claim as pleaded raises constitutional issues orcultural issues which suggest Tokelau might be the appropriate venue for thetrial. It is a claim for unlawful dismissal and raises the sufficiency of theinvestigation that led to termination of the plaintiffs' employment by theCouncil for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau. Contrary to the submissionmade on behalf of the plaintiffs that there is need to clarify whether the Courtis "constituted under the constitution, the Tokelau Amendment Act 1986 orpursuant to its inherent jurisdiction", there is no doubt as to the legal orderapplicable. The Tokelau Act 1948 remains in force. The constitution has nottaken effect to displace or affect it. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of theHigh Court to determine the claim is established by the provisions of theTokelau Amendment Act 1986. The Tokelau Act 1948 specifies the sourcesof law applicable to the determination.[45] While accepting that there was substantial public interest in the claim inTokelau, Elias CJ further observed:[16] Although the background of the case is a matter of public interestbecause the defendants are participants in the government of Tokelau, it isa private claim for damages and associated relief of benefit to the plaintiffs intheir personal capacities.[46] It is also pertinent to note that in response to the memorandum for theAdministrator, Mr Goddard described the decisions under appeal as relating to allegedbreaches of an employment agreement.24Conclusion[47] Not infrequently, efforts to obtain legal aid will result in a modest delay infiling an appeal which may warrant an extension of time. However the very substantialdelay in this case has been the product of several additional factors including initialattempts to resolve the dispute without further litigation, delays in waiting for counselto become available and to secure jurisdictional eligibility and the preparation of23 Change of venue decision, above n 6.24 At [15] above.extensive further evidence, both the relevance and admissibility of which are, to saythe least, questionable.[48] The circumstances of individual cases and the period of delay will of coursevary significantly. However in this case both Mr Puka and his counsel had an appealin contemplation from not later than September 2019. While the Court will generallybe reluctant to countenance a situation where an inadvertent or possibly evenconscious delay on the part of a legal advisor might prejudice the position of anintending appellant, the circumstances of this case are not such that an omission bycounsel can be accepted as the basis for excusing the very substantial delay.[49] Nor is Mr Puka able to say that at an early stage he put the respondents onnotice of the prospect of an appeal. In consequence, notwithstanding that therespondents are public bodies (although, as the respondents say, not a rich orwell-resourced state), there is a measure of prejudice arising from the omission tomake specific financial provision for the cost of still further expensive litigation.[50] It is submitted for Mr Puka that, given this is the first appeal in this jurisdiction,the fact there are no precedents makes it difficult, if not impossible, to say withcertainty what the interests of justice require. However we accept the respondents'submission that the proposed appeal does not engage new areas of law requiringclarification or raise issues of constitutional significance. Mr Puka's claim, which isa private claim for damages arising out of an employment agreement, does not raisesome wider Tokelauan public interest component.[51] For these reasons we consider that the case for the substantial indulgencesought is comparatively weak and is insufficient by a significant margin to justify anextension of time of the length sought.Result[52] The application for an extension of time to appeal is declined.[53] The applicant is legally aided. Accordingly there is no order as to costs.Solicitors:Wakefields Lawyers, Wellington for ApplicantWallwork Lamb Lawyers, Samoa for Respondents