LOFTUS v AUCKLAND COUNCIL [2020] NZHC 416

LOFTUS v AUCKLAND COUNCIL [2020] NZHC 416 [6 March 2020]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2019-404-2457[2020] NZHC 416BETWEEN STEPHEN LOFTUSApplicantAND AUCKLAND COUNCILRespondentHearing: 5 March 2020Appearances: Applicant in personC G McDiarmid for the respondentJudgment: 6 March 2020JUDGMENT OF PALMER JThis judgment was delivered by me on 6 March 2020 at 11.00am.Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court RulesRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarParty/Solicitors:Applicant in personMeredith Connell, AucklandWhat happened?[1] Mr Stephen Loftus does not acknowledge that is his name, though heunderstands that is how New Zealand's legal system identifies him. He prefers to beknown as "Stephen: loftus". Neither does he acknowledge that he is the personcharged under that name with owning a dog, "Ringo", who attacked an eight year oldboy contrary to s 57(2) of the Dog Control Act 1996. He insists the charging noticewas not valid because it did not have a proper court seal on it.[2] His arguments about this, and associated arguments, were carefully dealt withby Judge A M Wharepouri in the Manukau District Court who convicted and sentencedhim.1 Unsurprisingly, "Stephen: loftus" did not succeed in his arguments. He alsosays the sentencing decision was invalid because the Judge referred to him as "you"and he is not "you".Application for judicial review[3] Now "Stephen: loftus" seeks judicial review of the Judge's decision. He saysthe legal process used was a not a lawful process. His statement of claim is a mish-mash of pseudo-legal phrases that have no meaning in New Zealand law. Some ofthose phrases correspond to labels of grounds of judicial review. But there are nodetails of them.[4] The statement of claim closely resembles, in format and lack of substance,another statement of claim I struck out recently for abuse of process.2 There are alsosimilarities to what one Canadian Judge has called "Organized PseudolegalCommercial Argument" (OPCA).3 Ellis J recently considered the issue of OPCAlitigants, and noted:4At a general level, it seems to me that it will inevitably be an abuse of processfor a litigant to attempt to employ OPCA concepts in seeking to avoid or defeatany state, regulatory, contract, family or other obligations recognised by law.1 Auckland Council v Loftus [2019] NZDC 2063 aty [27]–[35].2 MC v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki, Ministry for Children [2020] NZHC 296.3 Meads v Meads (2012) ABQB 571.4 Niwa v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2019] NZHC 853 at [16].[5] As "Stephen: loftus" acknowledged today in the call of the matter in theJudicial Review List, he considers the law of the land is "totally different" to the legalprocess being used in the New Zealand courts. He also acknowledged my suggestionthat he would accordingly be unsurprised if I do not accept his arguments.[6] The proceeding was served on the Auckland Council, which has filed a detailedaffidavit in response and submits the proceeding should be dismissed.Should the application be struck out?[7] I consider that the statement of claim discloses no reasonably arguable causeof action, hearing it is likely to cause prejudice and delay to the respondent and thecourt system and it is an abuse of the process of the court. I strike out the statement ofclaim accordingly, under the common law of New Zealand, the Court's inherentjurisdiction, r 15.1 and/or r 5.35B of the High Court Rules 2016.Palmer J