BLANCE v R [2023] NZCA 569

BLANCE v R [2023] NZCA 569 [16 November 2023]IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA140/2023[2023] NZCA 569BETWEEN STEVEN ALBERT BLANCEApplicantAND THE KINGRespondentHearing: 30 October 2023Court: Wylie, Mander and Muir JJCounsel: T M Cooper KC and O F Kazmierow for ApplicantB M Finn for RespondentJudgment: 16 November 2023 at 10 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURTThe application for an extension of time within which to appeal is declined.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Wylie J)Introduction[1] The applicant, Steven Blance, pleaded guilty to a suite of drug-related chargesarising from a police investigation code-named Operation Walnut. Mr Blance wassentenced by Collins J in the High Court at Wellington on 22 June 2018 to 14 yearsand six months' imprisonment, with a minimum period of imprisonment of seven yearsand three months.11 R v Blance [2018] NZHC 1518 [sentencing notes].[2] Mr Blance seeks to appeal his sentence. His notice of appeal was filed on14 March 2023 and he therefore requires an extension of time within which to bringthe appeal. He has filed an application in this regard together with an affidavitin support.[3] Both the application for an extension of time and the substantive appeal (in theevent that leave is granted) are opposed by the Crown.Background[4] The following summary of the offending is taken from the Judge's sentencingnotes,2 and from the summary of facts which Mr Blance accepted when he enteredhis guilty pleas.[5] The police investigation commenced in November 2016. It targeted thecommercial supply of methamphetamine in the Wellington region. The policeobtained a surveillance device warrant which allowed them to intercept privatecommunications and carry out visual surveillance of the two principal targets,Mr Blance and Mr Berkland. Both were senior members of the Porirua chapter of theMongrel Mob.[6] Mr Blance was purchasing kilogram quantities of methamphetamine fromAuckland-based suppliers. He and Mr Berkland would then on-supply themethamphetamine to a number of associates through a distribution network thatMr Blance and Mr Berkland had established. Most of these supplies took place at anaddress in Tawa where Mr Blance resided. The associates would then on-supply themethamphetamine to others. The police identified that Mr Blance and Mr Berklandhad been purchasing and supplying bulk amounts of methamphetamine and supplyingit from their addresses in Tawa since at least October 2016.[7] Mr Blance was in charge of the methamphetamine supply operation.Mr Berkland was his right-hand man. Mr Berkland would on occasion run the supplynetwork when Mr Blance was absent.2 At [4]–[12].[8] Mr Blance's Tawa property was heavily fortified. The fortifications includedheavy-reinforced steel doors, purpose-made hiding cavities for cash and drugs and asophisticated CCTV system. There was an electronic beam sensor installed to alertMr Blance to any visitors. Mr Blance also regularly operated a drone as part of hiscounter-surveillance measures and he had a network of informants in the wider area,to alert him to any police and surveillance activity.[9] During the period that the police intercepted Mr Blance's communications —20 February 2017 to 11 April 2017 — over 700 people visited the Tawa address. Thepolice estimate that Mr Blance and Mr Berkland were supplying an average ofone kilogram of methamphetamine per week. Individual supplies ranged from lessthan one-tenth of a gram to multiple ounces at a time. The methamphetamine was soldfor between $500 and $600 per gram, or between $12,000 and $14,000 per ounce (or28 grams). The police investigation established that Mr Blance and Mr Berklandpurchased at least 15 kilograms of methamphetamine, worth at least $5,250,000, inthe period between October 2016 to April 2017. The on-supply resulted in anestimated profit of more than $1,575,000.[10] Some of Mr Blance's customers were drug dealers in their own right whopurchased methamphetamine for the purposes of on-supplying it. Their interactionswith these customers formed the basis for various conspiracy charges whichMr Blance and other co-defendants faced.[11] On the termination of the police investigation in April 2017, search warrantswere executed at several properties involved in the drug operation. During thesearches, police found approximately three kilograms of methamphetamine, numerousfirearms, ammunition of various calibres, a taser and a stolen motorcycle.[12] Mr Blance, Mr Berkland and a number of other co-defendants were chargedwith an array of offences. Mr Blance sought a sentence indication. It was given inApril 2018.3 After discussions with his lawyer, Mr Blance accepted the indication andentered guilty pleas to the following charges:(a) supplying methamphetamine (representative);4(b) possession of methamphetamine for supply (representative);5(c) two charges of possession of methamphetamine for supply;6(d) two charges of conspiracy to supply methamphetamine;7(e) unlawfully possessing a firearm (representative);8(f) unlawfully possessing ammunition (representative);9(g) unlawfully possessing a taser (representative);10 and(h) receiving stolen property.11The sentencing notes[13] As noted, Collins J sentenced Mr Blance to 14 years and six months'imprisonment, with a minimum period of imprisonment of seven years andthree months.123 R v Blance [2018] NZHC 752.4 Crimes Act 1961, s 66(2); and Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(c) and (2)(a) — maximum penaltylife imprisonment.5 Crimes Act, s 66(2); and Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(f) and (2)(a) — maximum penalty lifeimprisonment.6 Crimes Act, s 66(2); and Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(f) and (2)(a) — maximum penalty lifeimprisonment.7 Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(c) and (2A)(a) — maximum penalty 14 years' imprisonment.8 Crimes Act, s 66(2); and Arms Act 1983, s 45(1)(b) — maximum penalty four years' imprisonmentand/or a fine not exceeding $5,000.9 Crimes Act, s 66(2); and Arms Act, s 45(1)(b) — maximum penalty four years' imprisonmentand/or a fine not exceeding $5,000.10 Crimes Act, s 66(2); and Arms Act, s 50(1)(b) — maximum penalty three years' imprisonmentand/or a fine not exceeding $4,000.11 Crimes Act, ss 246(1) and 247(1)(a) — maximum penalty seven years' imprisonment.12 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [40]–[41].[14] The Judge started by noting there is a presumption in favour of imprisonmentfor Class A drug dealing offending.13 He then turned to consider R v Fatu,14 which atthe time was the guideline judgment for offending involving the supply ofmethamphetamine. The Judge found that Mr Blance's offending sat within band fourof Fatu, which provided for the supply of very large commercial quantities of500 grams or more of methamphetamine, warranting a starting point of between10 years and life imprisonment.15[15] The Judge then turned to the specifics of Mr Blance's offending. Heconsidered that there were various aggravating features to this offending:16(a) There was a significant degree of premeditation and planning involvedin the offending.17(b) The number and frequency of supply and sales was high.18(c) The amount of methamphetamine involved was at the extreme end ofband four of Fatu. The Judge noted that the operation appeared to beone of the largest cases involving the supply of methamphetamine inthe Wellington area at the time.19(d) It was clear that the sale and supply of methamphetamine was forcommercial gain.2013 At [14]; and Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(4)(a).14 R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA). From 2005, Fatu governed sentencing formethamphetamine-related offending. In 2019, this Court issued its judgment in Zhang v R [2019]NZCA 507, [2019] 3 NZLR 648 where it reconsidered aspects of Fatu. Zhang became the newsentencing guideline judgment for methamphetamine-related offending. The Supreme Court inBerkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509, decided three years after Zhang, consideredthat there were some areas that needed further clarification, including the "significant role profile".The Supreme Court stated that Berkland was to apply to all following sentence appeals, to allsentencing appeals then on foot (including any applications for leave to appeal) and to casesdecided under Zhang only where the amendment of the significant role profile would result in amore favourable outcome for the appellant: see Berkland at [72].15 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [15] citing Fatu, above n 14, at [34].16 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [16].17 At [16(1)] citing Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(i).18 At [16(2)] citing Sentencing Act, ss 8(a), 8(b) and 9(d).19 At [16(3)] citing Fatu, above n 14; and Sentencing Act, s 8(a) and (b).20 At [16(4)] citing Fatu, above n 14, at [32].[16] The Judge noted that Mr Blance was the "mastermind" behind the operation.21[17] The Judge recorded that three other people charged as a result ofOperation Walnut had been sentenced.22 One of those persons was considered to be amid-level dealer and a starting point of five years and six months' imprisonment wasadopted for his offending involving 119 grams of methamphetamine.23 Anotheroffender was considered to be a street-level dealer and a starting point of four years'imprisonment was adopted for her offending, involving 36.1 grams of the drug.24 Athird offender was considered to be a middleperson between the drug dealers and theretail market.25 A starting point of three years' imprisonment was adopted for heroffending, involving 15.45 grams of methamphetamine.[18] The Judge noted that counsel had difficulty in identifying comparable casesthat did not also involve the importation or manufacture of methamphetamine.26 TheJudge referred to the various cases that had been identified involving supply, findingthe offending most similar to that in Murray v R and R v Le'Ca.27 In Murray, thisCourt upheld a starting point of 18 years' imprisonment for methamphetamineoffending involving the supply of approximately 8.44 kilograms of methamphetamineover four years, together with firearms offending.28 In Le'Ca, a starting point of18 years' imprisonment was adopted for the importation of 14.9 kilograms ofmethamphetamine, alongside other charges of possession of methamphetamine andcocaine for supply.29 The possession for supply was treated as the lead charge.30[19] Noting the social harm caused by methamphetamine, the Judge adopted astarting point of 18 years' imprisonment for the methamphetamine related charges.31He then applied an uplift of one year for the firearms and other charges, noting thatthe uplift appropriately "reflect[ed] society's condemnation of the unlawful possession21 At [17].22 At [18].23 R v McGoldrick-Savaii [2018] NZHC 233.24 R v Waiariki [2017] NZHC 2771.25 R v Svenson [2017] NZDC 22165.26 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [19].27 At [22], referring to Murray v R [2014] NZCA 189; and R v Le'Ca [2018] NZHC 274.28 Murray v R, above n 27, at [85].29 R v Le'Ca, above n 27, at [32].30 At [18].31 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [23].of such weapons".32 The starting point sentence was therefore 19 years'imprisonment.33[20] In considering personal mitigating factors, the Judge referred to a reportprepared by a Roger Brooking, which discussed Mr Blance's addiction to alcohol andillicit drugs. The Judge noted Mr Blance was "in remission" and that he wasconsidered to be a candidate for rehabilitation.34 The Judge also noted that Mr Blancehad a "challenging childhood", which, inter alia, contributed to him becoming a drugdealer.35 A discount of six months was afforded to Mr Blance. The Judge consideredthat such discount struck the balance between giving some credit for personal factorswhile recognising the gravity of the offending.36[21] While Mr Blance had not pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, the Judgeconsidered that a discount of four years (a little over 20 per cent) "reflect[ed] thechallenges that [had] been encountered in getting to the point where [Mr Blance] couldenter a guilty plea".37[22] Accordingly, Mr Blance was sentenced to 14 years and six months'imprisonment on the methamphetamine-related charges, excluding those forconspiracy. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on the conspiracy chargesand to one year's imprisonment for the firearms offending and for receiving the stolenproperty. All of Mr Blance's sentences were to be served concurrently.38[23] The Judge considered that the criteria for imposing an MPI had been "clearlyestablished", and he imposed an MPI of seven years and three months (50 per cent) inorder to denounce Mr Blance's conduct, protect the community from him and holdhim accountable for the harm caused by his offending.3932 At [26].33 At [27].34 At [30]–[32].35 At [32].36 At [33].37 At [36], citing R v Hessell [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607.38 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [40].39 At [38]; and Sentencing Act 2002, s 86(2)(a)–(b) and (d).An extension of time?The application[24] As noted, Mr Blance was sentenced on 22 June 2018. Under s 248(2) of theCriminal Procedure Act 2011, he was required to file any notice of appeal againstsentence within 20 working days after the date of the sentence appealed against.Mr Blance only filed his notice of appeal in this Court, as the first appeal court, on14 March 2023. The notice of appeal was therefore filed some four years and eightmonths' out of time.[25] On 12 July 2023, Katz J directed that the application for an extension of timeto appeal should be dealt together with the substantive appeal.Mr Blance's explanation for the delay[26] Mr Blance has filed an affidavit. He says that:(a) In the lead up to trial, he and his lawyer discussed the possiblesentencing outcomes if he were to enter guilty pleas to the chargesagainst him. He was told that the prosecution would likely advocatefor a starting point of around 28 years' imprisonment, given theamounts of methamphetamine alleged to be involved. He decided toapply for a sentence indication. Once the sentence indication wasreceived, he considered whether or not to accept the indication andplead guilty to the charges. His lawyer gave him advice on the benefitsof accepting the indication, which was based on the supply of15 kilograms of methamphetamine, and the desirability of "locking thatin". Mr Blance could see sense in his lawyer's advice. He decided toaccept the sentence indication. He and his lawyer agreed that theywould look at an appeal after sentencing, particularly if there was anyissue around the quantity of methamphetamine involved inthe offending.(b) Thereafter "everything happen[ed] really quickly". When it got tosentencing, he felt "really down and distracted" and very confused.(c) Once he was back in custody, he waited to hear from his lawyer abouta possible appeal. He called her after a couple of weeks and asked herabout it. She told him that she thought it was a good sentence, giventhat the Judge had stuck with the 15-kilogram amount. His lawyer toldhim that if he wanted to appeal, she could not be his lawyer.(d) He was not offered the contact details for any other lawyer and he didnot know any appeal lawyers himself. He did not know if his lawyerwas suggesting that there was no point in appealing, or that he couldnot appeal. He knew about the time limits for appeals, but he acceptedhis lawyer's advice because he trusted her.(e) He has had a limited education and the appeal process sounded prettycomplex from what little he had heard about it. He did not feelcomfortable "taking charge in that area and finding another lawyer orasking more legal questions". He and his lawyer talked about gettingready for parole instead, notwithstanding that it was some time away.(f) He did not know that his co-offender, Mr Berkland, had appealed hissentence. He barely saw Mr Berkland nor did he talk with him in anydetail until he (Mr Blance) joined the Māori Focus Unit at RimutakaPrison, where Mr Berkland was also being held. They were then heldtogether in custody for a period of some four to five months. On theday Mr Berkland received the Supreme Court's decision on hissentence,40 Mr Berkland told him about his appeal. Mr Berkland askedhim why he had not appealed. Mr Blance felt frustrated, because heconsidered that he should have appealed alongside Mr Berkland. Hadhe known that Mr Berkland was appealing, he would have pushed a lotharder to file a notice of appeal.40 Berkland, above n 14.(g) He discussed the matter with other prisoners and they told him he couldstill try and appeal. They told him to get a new lawyer and that it waspossible to appeal out of time. He spoke to his partner and asked her tocontact other lawyers. Once he had spoken with his new lawyer andshe had confirmed that he could seek leave to appeal out of time, hecompleted a legal aid application and asked for a notice of appeal tobe filed.Relevant law[27] Extension of time applications routinely reduce to two issues — first, why wasthe appeal filed late and, secondly, what merit, if any, does the prospective appealappear to have.41 The interests of justice are key.42 Relevant factors in consideringsuch applications can include the following:43(a) the wider interests of society in the finality of decisions;(b) the strength of the proposed appeal;(c) whether the liberty of the subject is involved;(d) the practical utility of any remedy sought;(e) the extent of the impact on others similarly affected and on theadministration of justice; and(f) any prejudice to the Crown.41 Slavich v R [2008] NZCA 116 at [14]. Slavich discussed applications for an extension of time inwhich to appeal under s 388(2) of the Crimes Act, identical in all material respects to s 248(4)(a)of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.42 Genge v R [2017] NZCA 466 at [21].43 R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA) at 587–589, affirmed by R v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA)at [102].Submissions[28] Mrs Cooper KC, on behalf on Mr Blance, submitted that Mr Blance's proposedappeal has merit, Mr Blance's liberty is at stake, there is no prejudice to the Crown orthird parties, and the issues on appeal are focused on sentence and do not engageconsiderations for witnesses or direct victims of Mr Blance's offending. She arguedthat it is in the interests of justice that Mr Blance be granted leave to appealhis sentence.[29] Mr Finn, for the Crown, noted that Mr Blance's application for leave to appealis well out of time. He argued that the major factor counting against the grant of leaveis the interests of society in the final determination of litigation. He argued that this isa powerful consideration in determining whether leave should be granted and thatspecial circumstances must be shown to justify a departure from the principle offinality. He acknowledged that whether such circumstances exist in Mr Blance's caserequires consideration of the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal.Analysis[30] There is undoubtedly a public interest in the finality of court proceedings.44The Criminal Procedure Act puts in place a time limit for the bringing of any appealbut it also expressly envisages that that time limit can be extended.45[31] There should generally be some explanation for why the appeal is late,particularly where the delay is lengthy.46 Here, Mr Blance essentially says that,following sentencing, he was advised by his then counsel that he had received a fairsentence and that in any event, if he did wish to appeal, she could not acceptinstructions. He says that he thought that he should not appeal and that instead, heought to focus on preparing for parole. Accordingly, he decided not to consider anappeal at that time and no notice of appeal was filed. He only became aware ofMr Berkland's appeal following the Supreme Court's decision, released on7 December 2022,47 and he appealed promptly thereafter.44 Cheung v R [2021] NZCA 175, [2021] 3 NZLR 259 at [51].45 Criminal Procedure Act, s 248(2) and (4).46 Lee, above n 43, at [115]; and Cheung, above n 44, at [53].47 Berkland, above n 14.[32] In our view, this is not a particularly convincing explanation for the lengthydelay that occurred. We have reached this view for the following reasons:(a) Mr Blance knew of the applicable time limit.(b) Mr Blance's notice of appeal initially raised only two grounds — first,that insufficient credit was given to him for his personal circumstancesand, secondly, that the minimum period of imprisonment had beenimposed in error. Neither of these grounds of appeal depended on anyassessment or knowledge of Mr Berkland's appeal.(c) Subsequently, Mr Blance sought to amend his notice of appeal. Hesought to argue that there was disparity in the roles attributed to himand to Mr Berkland which had affected the starting points adopted foreach of them.48 He sought leave to file an amended notice of appealraising this issue. This application was not opposed by the Crown. Hadthis ground of appeal remained in issue, it might have gone some waytowards explaining the delay because Mr Blance could not have knownwhat role would be attributed to Mr Berkland by the Supreme Court.However, in the event, the issue was not pursued. On the morning ofthe hearing, we received a memorandum from counsel advising that theground of appeal relating to the starting point adopted by the Judge andalleging disparity between Mr Berkland's role and Mr Blance's role,was abandoned.[33] We turn to consider the strength of Mr Blance's proposed appeal.[34] Mr Blance seeks to argue that he should have been given greater credit forpersonal mitigating factors. As noted above, a report was prepared by Mr Brooking.It was submitted at sentencing to address Mr Blance's personal circumstances. The48 The Supreme Court in Berkland, above n 14, recorded its view that there was a clear demarcationbetween Mr Blance's and Mr Berkland's roles. It noted that Mr Berkland had no executivediscretion and that he was effectively paid a wage in return for his services. It describedMr Berkland as Mr Blance's "risk-taking custodian" and as being "a highly trusted 'gofer', whoperformed important functions for his boss [Mr Blance] under close supervision": see [74]–[76].Judge considered that it was a comprehensive report, that it established that Mr Blancewas in poor health, that he had cognitive difficulties, that he was a candidate forrehabilitation and that he had taken initial steps to embark on his rehabilitation. Heaccepted that it also provided some insight into Mr Blance's "challenging childhood",his upbringing and the factors that had contributed to him becoming a major drugdealer.49 The Judge considered that there was a causal link between Mr Blance'spersonal circumstances and his offending. He referred to the case law relevant at thetime, which held that, in cases of serious drug dealing, personal mitigating factors didnot carry the weight they might otherwise carry, because of the gravity of suchoffending.50 The Judge nevertheless gave Mr Blance a discount of six months becauseof the matters raised by Mr Brooking in his report. This was little under three and ahalf per cent of the overall sentence imposed.[35] The position adopted by the Judge was consistent with the applicable law atthe time of sentencing. As noted in the Supreme Court in Jarden v R, in sentencingthose convicted of dealing commercially in controlled drugs, the personalcircumstances of the offender had to be subordinated to the importance of deterrence,albeit that this did not mean that personal circumstances could never be relevant.51[36] The Crown does not dispute that Mr Blance experienced a series of familytragedies at a young age, that he had a challenging upbringing and that as a result, hefell into patterns of anti-social behaviour. It nevertheless points out that Mr Blancewas able to start a family, and that he abstained from substance abuse and offendingfor a period, but acknowledges that he was subsequently assaulted and suffered headtrauma, which resulted in an observable change in his personality, mood and cognitivefunction. At that point, he began to consume methamphetamine and to suffer frommild cognitive impairment.[37] While the courts have more recently accepted that background factors such asmental illness, addiction and deprivation can and should mitigate sentences in49 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [30]–[32].50 At [31], citing R v Wang [2014] NZCA 409 at [28]. See also R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62 (CA)at [13]; and R v Wallace [1999] 3 NZLR 159 (CA) at [25].51 Jarden v R [2008] NZSC 69, [2008] 3 NZLR 612 at [12], discussed in Berkland, above n 14,at [95]–[96].appropriate cases where such factors have made a causation contribution to the subjectoffending,52 it was common ground before us that the leading decisions in this regardare not retrospective. Indeed, both this Court and the Supreme Court have been carefulnot to criticise judges who were simply applying what was, until the later cases weredecided, settled sentencing practice.[38] It is clear that the approach taken by Collins J when he sentenced Mr Blancein 2018 was consistent with then applicable sentencing practice. While Mr Blancemay have received a greater discount for his personal circumstances if he were beingsentenced today, it is noteworthy that even under the current approach to sentencing,Mr Blance's leading role in the offending that occurred would be highly relevant. Themore serious and carefully orchestrated the offending, the more the courts are likelyto emphasise the choice made by the offender to offend. The causative contributionof background factors will likely be reduced and other sentencing purposes, such ascommunity protection, will become more prominent.53[39] It is clear that Mr Blance played the pivotal role in the drug-dealing operationuncovered by Operation Walnut. While he undoubtedly suffered from an unhappypersonal background, there is force in the Crown's submission that he chose to becomenot just a drug dealer, but the mastermind and architect of what was, at the time,Wellington's largest methamphetamine distribution enterprise. He accrued significantassets in the process. His comments to the writer of the Provision of Advice to CourtsReport prepared at the time indicated his entrenched anti-social attitudes. His attempt,in his amended notice of appeal, to suggest that his role was the same or similar toMr Berkland's role suggests that until very recently, Mr Blance sought to underplaywhat occurred.[40] Standing back and considering the starting point adopted by the Judge, thediscounts allowed and the end sentence imposed, we do not consider that it canproperly be argued that the sentence imposed on Mr Blance was manifestly excessive.52 Zhang, above n 14, at [10(k)], [147], [159] and [162]; and Berkland, above n 14, at [108].53 Berkland, above n 14, at [111]–[112].[41] We turn to the minimum period of imprisonment imposed. Mr Blance seeksto argue that the Judge applied the minimum period of imprisonment of 50 per cent"mechanistically". He seeks to suggest that there was no factual analysis of thespecifics of his case or of the principles set out in s 86(2) of the Sentencing Act relevantto the imposition of minimum periods of imprisonment.[42] Mr Blance is correct that the Judge did not explicitly state why he imposed aminimum period of imprisonment of 50 per cent of the end sentence imposed.However, the Judge did outline the facts of Mr Blance's offending in some detail.Self-evidently, the offending engaged the relevant factors identified in s 86(2) — it ispatently clear that the size and sophistication of the drug dealing operation, andMr Blance's leading role in it, justified a materially higher measure of personalaccountability, general and personal deterrence, and denunciation, than would havebeen provided by the standard parole period. The Judge's discussion of the offendingand its significance earlier in his sentencing notes did not require repetition; nor wasan overt linkage to the relevant sentencing purposes required.[43] We are not persuaded that the proposed appeal has any real prospectof success.[44] We acknowledge that Mr Blance's liberty is at stake, but even if a furtherdiscount was to be allowed for personal circumstances, or the minimum period ofimprisonment was to be adjusted as suggested by Mr Blance's counsel, the differencesin the sentence imposed and in the minimum period of imprisonment would berelatively minor. Arguably, any reductions, even if appropriate, would amount to nomore than tinkering.[45] We accept that there is no prejudice to the Crown or third parties and that thereare no direct considerations for witnesses or victims. Nevertheless on balance, we arenot persuaded that it is appropriate to grant an extension of time within which to bringthe appeal.Result[46] The application for an extension of time within which to appeal is declined.Solicitors:Crown Solicitor, Wellington for Respondent