T v LAWYERS AND CONVEYANCERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL [2022] NZHC 1101

T v LAWYERS AND CONVEYANCERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL [2022] NZHC 1101 [19 May 2022]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDHAMILTON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAKIRIKIRIROA ROHECIV-2022-419-000021[2022] NZHC 1101BETWEEN TAppellantAND LAWYERS AND CONVEYANCERSDISCIPLINARY TRIBUNALRespondentJudgment: 19 May 2022JUDGMENT OF DOWNS JThis judgment was delivered by me on Thursday, 19 May 2022 at 10 ampursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/Deputy RegistrarSolicitors/Counsel:CWJ Stevenson, Wellington.PN Collins, Auckland.MJ Mortimer-Wang, NZLS.[1] Adjournments are often granted other than by judgment. This because theycontain no point of principle. This adjournment requires a short judgment.[2] T is a lawyer. T faces disciplinary action in the New Zealand Lawyers andConveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal.1 T sought interim name suppression (pendingdetermination of the charge(s)). The Disciplinary Tribunal declined suppression11 January 2022. T filed an appeal 2 February 2022. On 2 March 2022, and byagreement, Gault J fixed 24 May 2022 as the hearing of the appeal.[3] On 9 May 2022, Mr Stevenson filed this memorandum:I have been instructed by [T].I am currently collating the file and will be acting on the name suppressionmatter.I am unavailable on the scheduled date, 24 May 2022.Could the registry please contact me to allocate a new date.[4] In response, I issued this electronic Minute:I refer to Mr Stevenson's memorandum of 9 May 2022. The memorandumwrongly presupposes the Registry has an obligation to schedule a new date.I invite Mr Stevenson to recalibrate, and to provide more information insupport of an adjournment application—which is what is in issue. I also invitea response on behalf of the [Standards Committee].[5] Mr Stevenson replied to the Registrar by email to the effect he could notprovide much more information than that conveyed. On behalf of theStandards Committee prosecuting T, Mr Collins filed a memorandum inviting theCourt to hear the appeal as scheduled. I convened a telephone conference.[6] At the conference, Mr Stevenson said T approached him to represent him afterthe fixture had been allocated. Mr Stevenson said he could not accommodate thefixture as he would be on leave, with family, in the South Island. Mr Stevenson addeda considerable amount of material underlay the charge(s), which anyone arguing theappeal would need to get to grips with.1 Disciplinary Tribunal.[7] Mr Collins was sympathetic to Mr Stevenson's position. However, Mr Collinsexpressed concern about delay. He noted T's earlier lawyer, Charl Hirschfeld, advisedthe Disciplinary Tribunal 18 April 2022 he could no longer act. It followed T hadknown since mid-April he needed to arrange representation for the appeal hearing.Moreover, T failed to comply with Gault J's timetable directions in relation to theappeal. As Mr Collins observed, deadlines came and went "with silence".[8] I granted the adjournment despite these unsatisfactory features, and eventhough Mr Stevenson had presented the Court with a fait accompli. To have doneotherwise would have left T without counsel at the hearing of the appeal; no one elsecould pick up the brief and digest everything by 24 May. I also directed the Registrarto allocate a priority fixture.2 I explain my thinking here.[9] The Supreme Court has described the principle of open justice as "fundamentalto the common law system of civil and criminal justice", and as of "constitutionalimportance".3 This is why the identity of litigants is ordinarily known from thecommencement of proceedings, unless countervailing interests of sufficientimportance require otherwise.[10] The Disciplinary Tribunal operates according to these principles. Its startingpoint is open justice. But, by s 240 of the applicable legislation, it may suppress apractitioner's name if it is "proper to do so".4 So, lawyers enjoy no special treatment.Things could hardly be otherwise in a credible system of justice.[11] An appeal in relation to a refusal to grant name suppression, irrespective ofjurisdiction or case nature, typically results in continued suppression until the appealis determined. Otherwise, the appeal would be worthless to the appellant—and moot.This, of course, carries risk: a beneficiary of name suppression may not prosecute heror his appeal with diligence. Why hurry to a potentially adverse result when youalready have the benefit of interim suppression through filing an appeal? This explains2 In consultation.3 Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135; [2017] 1 NZLR 310 at [2].4 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006.why Courts tend to keep name suppression appeals on a tight leash. To do otherwisecould imperil the public interest, including confidence in the administration of justice.[12] I directed allocation of a priority fixture for these reasons...Downs J