LAMB v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2018] NZCA 257

LAMB v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2018] NZCA 257 [17 July 2018]IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA236/2016[2018] NZCA 257BETWEEN TANIA JOY LAMBAppellantAND THE ATTORNEY-GENERALRespondentHearing: 9 March 2017Court: Kós P, French and Williams JJCounsel: Appellant in personS Leslie for RespondentJudgment: 17 July 2018 at 2 pmJUDGMENT OF THE COURTThe application for recall is declined.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Kós P)[1] Ms Lamb applies to recall a judgment of this Court delivered 7 June 2017.1In that judgment this Court allowed the Attorney-General's appeal against a decisionof the High Court,2 granting Ms Lamb's extension of time to seek review of anAssociate Judge's decision striking out her claims.3 This Court's judgment was sealed1 Attorney-General v Lamb [2017] NZCA 955, [2017] NZAR 955.2 Lamb v Attorney-General [2016] NZHC 849.3 Lamb v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 2066.on 25 August 2017. Ms Lamb then sought and was declined leave to appeal to theSupreme Court on 29 August 2017.4[2] On 20 September 2017 this Court received further material from Ms Lamb,which is treated as an application to recall this Court's judgment. In a minute issuedthe following day Kós P determined that Ms Lamb identified no basis on whichjudgment should be recalled, this Court being functus officio following the SupremeCourt's decision declining leave.[3] On 15 May 2018 Ms Lamb renewed her efforts and filed a further applicationto recall this Court's 7 June 2017 judgment. We deal now with that application.[4] In Slavich v R we addressed a similar application for recall following theSupreme Court's declination of leave to appeal.5 We declined the application andsaid:6 it would very rarely be appropriate for this Court to recall one of itsdecisions where the Supreme Court had pronounced upon it.And:7This Court's inherent power to revisit its decisions is exercised only inexceptional circumstances when required by the interests of justice. This isnot such a case.[5] We add that in circumstances where a judgment has been sealed, as thejudgment in issue here was, that will usually preclude a recall application.8 Again,"exceptional circumstances" must be demonstrated by the applicant for recall of sucha judgment.9[6] Ms Lamb in the present application raises three principal grounds for recall:this Court's judgment was fraudulently or otherwise improperly obtained becauseMs Lamb had filed amended statements of claim in the High Court which the4 Lamb v Attorney-General [2017] NZSC 128.5 Slavich v R [2011] NZCA 586.6 At [4].7 At [5] citing R v Smith [2003] 3 NZLR 617 (CA).8 Wagg v Squally Cove Forestry Partnership [2013] NZCA 612 at [4].9 At [4].Attorney-General had not sought to strike out; certain authorities and statutoryprovisions (notably s 28 of the Limitation Act 1950) were not brought to this Court'sattention; and this Court failed to consider Ms Lamb's claim for breach of fiduciaryduty.[7] Nothing here discloses "exceptional circumstances". Both pleadings (asoriginally filed and amended) were before the Court when it made its decision onMs Lamb's appeal. Ms Lamb relies particularly (though not exclusively) on s 28 ofthe Limitation Act. At best for her that provision concerns relief from theconsequences of a mistake. But it is not applicable to a self-induced mistake (here herown mistake in not commencing proceedings against the Accident CompensationCorporation in time). Finally, this Court expressly noted in its judgment that Ms Lambwas pursuing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, so there is nothing in her third pointeither.Result[8] The application for recall is declined.Solicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent