R v KASMEER LATA [2018] NZCA 615

R v KASMEER LATA [2018] NZCA 615 [19 December 2018]NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION ORIDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 204OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA244/2018[2018] NZCA 615BETWEEN THE QUEENAppellantAND KASMEER LATARespondentHearing: 24 October 2018Court: Brown, Courtney and Katz JJCounsel: B J Horsley for AppellantK A N Trotter for RespondentJudgment: 19 December 2018 at 12.30 pmJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The appeal is allowed.B The sentence on the lead charge of six years and 11 months' imprisonmentis quashed and is substituted with a sentence of ten years andthree months' imprisonment.C The minimum period of imprisonment of three years and five months isquashed and substituted with a minimum period of imprisonment offive years.D The concurrent sentences on the charges under s 98AA(1)(a)(i) of theCrimes Act 1961 of six years and 11 months' imprisonment are quashedand substituted with concurrent sentences of ten years and three months'imprisonment.E The concurrent sentence on the fourth charge is unchanged.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Brown J)Introduction[1] For a period of 18 months from the date of her daughter's 15th birthdayMs Lata facilitated the prostitution of her daughter with the consequence that sheengaged in sexual activity with paying clients on approximately 1,000 occasions.Ms Lata pleaded guilty to four charges:(a) a representative charge of being a parent or guardian of a child underthe age of 18 delivering that child to another person with intent that thechild or the child's labour be exploited;1(b) two representative charges of entering into a dealing involving a personunder the age of 18 years for the purpose of the sexual exploitation ofthe person;2 and(c) receiving earnings from commercial sexual services provided by aperson under 18 years.3[2] After allowing both a discount for lack of prior convictions and to recognisethe extent to which prostitution was "normalised" in Ms Lata's own upbringing, andapplying a full discount of 25 per cent for her guilty pleas, Muir J imposed concurrentsentences of six years and 11 months' imprisonment on the first, second and thirdcharges.4 The Solicitor-General appeals against the sentence on the basis that it ismanifestly inadequate and wrong in principle, contending that the starting point taken1 Crimes Act 1961, s 98(1)(i): maximum penalty 14 years' imprisonment.2 Section 98AA(1)(a)(i): maximum penalty 14 years' imprisonment.3 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, ss 21 and 23: maximum penalty seven years' imprisonment.4 R v Lata [2018] NZHC 707 [Sentencing notes] at [53]. A concurrent sentence of two years and11 months' imprisonment was imposed in respect of the fourth charge.for the lead offence of nine years and six months' imprisonment was too low toproperly reflect the criminality and culpability inherent in Ms Lata's conduct.We address the circumstances of the offending in detail in our discussion of counsel'ssubmissions.Sentencing in the High Court[3] It was common ground that the first charge was the lead charge and that thesentences for that and the second and third charges should be concurrent. The Judgecommenced by identifying the following aggravating features of the offending:5• the sexual nature of the exploitation;• Ms Lata's breach of trust;• the complainant's vulnerability;• the gravity and scale of the offending;• the level of planning and premeditation; and• the harm to the complainant.[4] Noting that neither counsel specifically identified any mitigating factors of theoffending, the Judge considered that the most that could be said was that the deliveringup of the complainant for exploitation was for purposes, at least in part, related to theprovision of financial support for Ms Lata's family, a factor which the Judge took intoaccount.6[5] Drawing on observations made in R v Decha-Iamsakun that the offending ofselling a woman as a slave was as bad as committing rape,7 the Crown likenedMs Lata's offending to that in serious rape cases falling within band 4 of R v AM5 At [19]–[29].6 At [30].7 R v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141 (CA) at 148, the only case identified under s 98 ofthe Crimes Act.(CA27/2009),8 which attract sentences of between 16 to 20 years' imprisonment.9The Judge noted the Crown submission as follows:10Having regard to the lower maximum sentence for s 98(1) offending (14 yearsas opposed to 20 years for rape) the Crown says that a starting point of10–14 years could be contemplated for the lead charge in this case, but thenacknowledges that it is possible to envisage worse offending before suggestinga final starting point of 10–12 years by analogy with offending in rape band 4.[6] While not agreeing entirely with the defence submission that the analogy withrape cases was dangerous and likely to generate confusion, the Judge viewedthe Crown's comparison as not entirely helpful. He considered that the best way toproceed was to consider the range of offending that could fall under the section and toplace the offending in that range, only considering the rape cases as something of across-check to the sentence ultimately arrived at.11[7] In proposing a starting point of five years imprisonment,12 the defencesubmitted that the offending should be in the lower-middle band of the sentencingrange, reasoning that s 98 should be regarded as one offence with each way of dealingwith the vulnerable person representing different levels of seriousness within anavailable spectrum.13[8] While rejecting some type of internal hierarchy within the various s 98(1)subsections, the Judge viewed the application of s 98(1)(i) in this way:[37] Looking then at the range of potential offending under s 98(1)(i), itneed not, as I have already identified, involve a sexual element. A parent whodelivers up their child to undertake non-sexual services for no or exploitativerates of remuneration commits an offence under that section. Such offendingwould typically fall towards the bottom of the range. But where delivery upis of a young person for sexual services, that must always, in my view, be aseriously aggravating factor which takes the offending to at least the middlelevel of the range. When, in addition, the young person involved has notattained the legal age of consent, is required to engage in full penetrative sex,is presented with no practical option but to prostitute himself or herself, isseverely socially isolated so as to limit his or her options to disengage and isas traumatically affected as the complainant in this case, the offending, in my8 R v AM (CA27/2009) [2010] NZCA 114, [2010] 2 NZLR 750.9 At [90(d)].10 Sentencing notes, above n 4, at [33].11 At [34].12 Citing Hastie v R [2011] NZCA 498.13 Sentencing notes, above n 4, at [35].view, comfortably falls within the upper middle band, even absent violence orthreats of violence. [9] After discussing a number of New Zealand14 and English15 decisions, andnoting the Sentencing Council for England and Wales' Sexual Offences DefinitiveGuideline,16 the Judge concluded:17[41] Having considered all of these authorities, in my view a starting pointof nine years and six months' imprisonment is appropriate for the lead offencein this case. This offending is undoubtedly among the more serious capturedby s 98(1)(i) particularly having regard to the duration of the offending, thevulnerability of the complainant, the number of sexual contacts into which shewas forced, and the level of harm she has suffered. However, I accept that onecan envisage more serious offending as, for example, if there had been morethan one victim, or the victim(s) were younger, or there was violence, orthreats of violence involved. "Headroom" must be recognised, therefore, inthe event that offending with these additional characteristics were to comebefore the Court.(Footnote omitted.)[10] In respect of the fourth charge under the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 theJudge considered a starting point of four years was appropriate.18 He rejected theCrown contention that because money is not necessarily inherent in the Crimes Actcharges an uplift was warranted. He viewed the submission as artificial for the reasonthat the Crimes Act 1961 offending would almost inevitably involve the receipt ofsome compensation for the delivering up or inducement of the child.19 Applying thesame discounts as for the other three charges a sentence of two years and 11 months'imprisonment was imposed to be served concurrently.20 A minimum period ofimprisonment of three years and five months was imposed in respect of the Crimes Actcharges.2114 Doling v Police HC Tauranga CRI-2010-470-12, 18 March 2010; and R v Wales [2012]NZHC 138.15 R v Dunkova [2010] EWCA Crim 1318, [2011] 1 Cr App R (S) 40; and R v Demarku [2006]EWCA Crim 2049, [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 83.16 Sentencing Council Sexual Offences Definitive Guideline (effective from 1 April 2014).17 Sentencing notes, above n 4.18 At [49].19 At [50].20 At [54].21 At [52].The Solicitor-General's case[11] Mr Horsley launched his argument for the Solicitor-General by focusing on therecognition of the requirements of the Sentencing Act 2002 (the Act) in the Judge'sinitial observations:[12] In sentencing the defendant, I must have regard to the purposes andprinciples of sentencing as set out in the Sentencing Act 2002. Of particularrelevance to this very serious offending is the need to denouncethe defendant's conduct, to hold her accountable for the harm done to thevictim and to deter her and others from committing the same or similaroffences. I am, nevertheless, obliged to impose the least restrictive outcomeappropriate in the circumstances.(Footnote omitted.)[12] Mr Horsley made the point that the allusion in the final sentence to s 8(g) ofthe Act was inapt because the directive to impose the least restrictive outcomeappropriate in the circumstances is in accordance with the hierarchy of sentences andorders in s 10A. In the present case there was no question that imprisonment, whichis the most restrictive outcome in s 10A, was the only appropriate outcome.While referring unnecessarily to s 8(g), the Judge had omitted to refer to otherdirectives in s 8 which were of particular moment in this case.[13] Acknowledging that there had been error on the part of counsel for the Crownin proposing a starting point as low as ten years, Mr Horsley drew attention to s 8(c)and (d) which provide that in sentencing an offender the Court:(c) must impose the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence if theoffending is within the most serious of cases for which that penalty isprescribed, unless circumstances relating to the offender make thatinappropriate; and(d) must impose a penalty near to the maximum prescribed for the offenceif the offending is near to the most serious of cases for which thatpenalty is prescribed, unless circumstances relating to the offendermake that inappropriate; [14] Emphasising the preposition "within" in s 8(c), Mr Horsley submitted that themaximum penalty does not need to be "reserved for the most devilish instance of crimethat judicial imagination can conceive",22 but it can and should be used where the22 R v Beri [1987] 1 NZLR 46 (CA) at 48. See also R v Xie [2007] 2 NZLR 240 (CA) at [26].offending is within a broad band or bracket comprising the "worst class of casesencountered in practice".23 While recognising that there will almost inevitably be"worse cases" imaginable and variations of gravity within the broad band, it was hiscontention that any case that falls within such a band qualifies for the maximumpenalty.[15] Mr Horsley identified the following aggravating features of the totality ofMs Lata's offending:(a) the offending involved sexual exploitation (and therefore a breach oftrust of the worst kind under s 98(1)(i));(b) the offending was on a grand scale — the complainant was forced toprostitute for 18 months, which involved over 1,000 clients;(c) the sexual exploitation involved full penetrative activity;(d) the complainant was under the legal age of consent for the majority ofthe offending, and did not consent to the sexual activity in anymeaningful sense;(e) the exploitation involved unprotected sex;(f) the exploitation resulted in pregnancy and abortion;(g) the complainant was required to participate in sexualised videos andphotographs, which were then posted publicly;(h) the complainant was isolated and particularly vulnerable due to herimmigration status, inability to attend school and confinement withinthe house;(i) the offending involved high-level commercial gain;23 Shailer v R [2017] NZCA 38, [2017] 2 NZLR 629 at [64], citing R v Beri, above n 22, at 48.(j) the earnings were mostly withheld from the complainant, and this wascoupled with unreasonable demands for rent and bill payments,creating a debt-bondage situation; and(k) the effect on the complainant was profoundly damaging.[16] His conclusion was that the wealth of aggravating features made this offendingextremely serious, undoubtedly putting it within the upper end of the sentencing range,such that a starting point at or close to the maximum was warranted. While accepting,as the Judge considered, that one could imagine offending with additional aggravatingfeatures — such as the use of violence, multiple victims or a younger victim — it washis submission that the lack of those features did not detract from the placement of thisoffending within the broad band of worst cases.[17] Mr Horsley then proceeded to address the Judge's cross-check approach withreference to rape offending, arguing that the analogy with rape offending was directlyin point given the exploitative nature of the charge. He also considered the SexualOffences Definitive Guideline of the Sentencing Council for England and Wales andundertook an analysis of authorities in England and Australia. We do not traverse thedetail of those submissions because it is unnecessary to do so in view of the approachwe have taken.Respondent's submissions[18] Mr Trotter's primary submission was that the Judge had reasoned correctlyfrom a first principles basis and adopted an appropriate global starting point forthe offending. The end sentence reached was clearly within range and there was nojustifiable basis for this Court to impose a higher sentence on appeal. He argued thatthe appellant's contention, that the offending was of the worst of its kind, could not besustained for the three reasons which the Judge identified:24(a) the complainant's age;24 Sentencing notes, above n 4, at [30] and [41].(b) the lack of actual or threat of violence; and(c) the differentiation between pure commercial gain and financial gain inthe context of family needs.[19] While recognising the relevance of the first factor is a matter of degree,Mr Trotter submitted that it could not be suggested that sexual exploitation of a childunder 12 years of age for example was of the same level of seriousness as that of a15 year old. He emphasised there is no minimum age for consent in New Zealand law.In any event he said that in this case it could not be safely or categorically suggestedthat the complainant did not consent to the sexual activities, both because of her ageand to the extent to which she was emotionally "guilt-trapped" to work as a prostituteby her mother. It was that emotional manipulation that was the operative cause, therebeing no physical detention of or assault on the complainant.[20] Concerning the third factor Mr Trotter submitted there was a sadintergenerational element to the offending which needed to be viewed through the lensthat Ms Lata herself was brought up in a similar way.[21] In a similar fashion to the Solicitor-General's submissions, Mr Trotter thenaddressed the relevance of the rape sentencing cross-check before reviewing in somedetail the overseas authorities. He concluded that the starting point adopted by Muir Jwas broadly consistent with comparable authorities in England and Australia.Discussion[22] It cannot credibly be suggested that the offending in this case did not reach thes 8(d) threshold of being "near to" the most serious of cases of a parent delivering achild for exploitation by another person. In our view, the issue is whetherthe offending was of such a nature as to warrant inclusion in the s 8(c) category of themost serious of cases for which the maximum penalty must be imposed. The answerto that question first requires a careful analysis of the facts. The following review issourced from the summary of facts which was the basis of Ms Lata's guilty pleas.[23] The complainant moved to New Zealand in April 2014, together with ayounger brother and Ms Lata, entering on visitor visas which expired. As a result ofnot having a valid visa to remain in New Zealand, the complainant was not able toenrol in any schools here. As the Judge observed, the complainant's socially isolatedposition rendered her more vulnerable to her mother's manipulations.25[24] When Ms Lata asked her to work as a prostitute in order to raise money for thefamily to start a business and to have food to eat the complainant initially refused.However, Ms Lata informed her that if she did not do this, the family, including heryounger brother, would not have a place to live and would starve. Ms Lata told herthat she would only have to do this for a period of one month.[25] Ms Lata then posted an advertisement on Craigslist offering the complainantfor sexual services and stating erroneously that she was 18 years old. Ms Lata alsoarranged for the complainant to be advertised in the New Zealand Herald.Those advertisements stated that the complainant was one of two "HOT SEXY bustyIndian girls" and that she was 18 years old.[26] On the complainant's 15th birthday Ms Lata arranged for the complainant tomeet her first client, a man in his 50s who came to the family's home. Ms Lata dressedthe complainant in a short skirt, straightened her hair, and did her make-up.The complainant did not want to go through with the arrangement but Ms Latacoached her on how to have sex. That first client had sexual intercourse withthe complainant and paid Ms Lata around $200 for one hour. He proceeded to cometo the family home every two weeks to have sex with the complainant.[27] When the complainant told Ms Lata she did not want to continue to work as aprostitute, Ms Lata asked her to pay rent and bills to live at the family home.She began by asking the complainant for money for rent and groceries. She then askedfor money to cover the internet, electricity and water bills, and for moving and lettingfees. Ms Lata knew that the complainant would have to continue to work as aprostitute in order to pay the rent and bills.25 At [26].[28] Ms Lata continued to arrange for men to come to the family home in order tohave sexual intercourse with the complainant for payment. She ensured that thewindow blinds were always closed and did not allow the complainant to play outsideon weekdays, as she was concerned that the neighbours would observe their activity.[29] However, the neighbours began to suspect that the house was being operatedas a brothel and advised Auckland City Council. Ms Lata and the complainant thenmoved to another address. Because it was an apartment, clients could not be broughtthere so Ms Lata would organise for the complainant to have sexual intercourse withclients at various motels or at the clients' homes.[30] Ms Lata also arranged for an advertisement for the complainant to be placedon a website called New Zealand Girls, which is an online escort agency. As part ofthe advertising Ms Lata organised for the complainant to attend two photoshoots withphotographers from New Zealand Girls. For these photoshoots, the complainant wasrequired to undress and put oil on her body. Hundreds of photos and a number ofvideos were taken of her in various states of undress and in provocative poses.Ms Lata paid for these photoshoots with money earned from the complainant'sprostitution. Photos from these photoshoots were placed on New Zealand Girls,showing the complainant's naked body. The accompanying advertisement stated thatthe complainant was 20 years old.[31] Ms Lata organised appointments for as many as five men per day to havesexual intercourse with the complainant. Often Ms Lata would remain outside whilethis took place. The complainant also had some regular clients that would visit her ona weekly basis. Ms Lata would take half of her earnings from each appointment. Thecomplainant used her share of the earnings to pay for rent and bills that Ms Latademanded from her.[32] Around mid-2015 the complainant discovered that she had fallen pregnant toone of the clients. Ms Lata told her that she had to get an abortion and that she had tokeep working as a prostitute in order to pay for the abortion. In August 2015,the complainant attended a local clinic and had an abortion.[33] The complainant worked as a prostitute under the direction of Ms Lata fromher 15th birthday to 30 November 2016, when the complainant presented atthe Whangarei Police Station and disclosed the offending. In that 18 month period itis estimated that she engaged in sexual activity with paying clients on approximately1,000 occasions. The rate charged ranged from $180–$200 per hour, $100–$120 forhalf an hour and $80–$100 for 20 minutes. The majority of her clients paid $100 for20 minutes. In total, it is estimated that the complainant generated approximately$100,000 in earnings over the 18 month period of the offending, at least half of whichwas retained by Ms Lata and a co-defendant.[34] Unsurprisingly the complainant's victim impact statement makes harrowingreading.26 On occasion the complainant self-harmed in an attempt to escape heremotional pain by the distraction of physical pain. She attempted suicide. On somedays, she has experienced so much anxiety that she is reluctant to get out of bed beingworried that, if she were to go outside, she would encounter someone who had been aclient. She does not trust other people and is isolated even from her family because,as can happen when a complaint is laid against a parent, her siblings blame her forMs Lata's imprisonment.[35] The Judge's view of the nature of the harm to the victim is noteworthy:27It clearly approaches the most serious level realistically able to becontemplated, taking into account the complainant's on-going history ofself-harm, her suicide attempt and her continuing sense of betrayal anddistrust.We endorse that assessment.[36] We are also in agreement with the Judge's response to the submission on behalfof Ms Lata that the offence under s 98(1)(i) requires the existence of a parent-childrelationship such that a breach of trust is inherent in the offending. On this issuethe Judge stated:28That may be the case but what is not inherent is the severity of the breach oftrust because the offence itself is not, as I have indicated, limited to parents26 The Judge's description: Sentencing notes, above n 4, at [9].27 At [29].28 At [21].who prostitute their children. For those who do, the breach of trust is, in myview, far greater than where a parent, for example, forces a child into serviceof a non-sexual kind.[37] The sexual exploitation in this case was both intensive and prolonged.As the Judge accepted it necessitated high and continuous levels of premeditation andplanning.29 It was a gross breach of a mother's trust appropriately described bythe Judge as egregious.30 As he poignantly explained:31At a point in the complainant's life when her mother should have beenproviding her with protection and stewardship in her transition to adulthood,she instead manipulated her into agreeing to engage in prostitution andeffectively "pimped her out" for 18 months.The deprivation caused by the absence of her mother's love and support as a child anda teenager is palpable in the victim impact statement.[38] Thus far we have viewed the case through the same lens as the Judge.Where we part company with his assessment is at the point where he in effect placeda cap on the appropriate starting point in order to accommodate "headroom" for futurecases:32This offending is undoubtedly among the more serious captured by s 98(1)(i),particularly having regard to the duration of the offending, the vulnerabilityof the complainant, the number of sexual contacts into which she was forced,and the level of harm she has suffered. However, I accept that one canenvisage more serious offending as, for example, if there had been more thanone victim, or the victim(s) were younger, or there was violence, or threats ofviolence involved. "Headroom" must be recognised, therefore, in the eventthat offending with these additional characteristics were to come before theCourt.[39] We do not consider that the maximum penalty is reserved for offending whichincorporates every conceivable aggravating characteristic. If that approach were to beadopted, then, always anticipating a more serious case of offending, sentencing wouldbe rendered asymptotic and the maximum penalty would never be imposed.29 At [28].30 At [20].31 At [20].32 At [41].[40] As this Court explained in Shailer:33[64] First, we agree with Mr Horsley's submission that the maximumpenalty has never been reserved for the worst case imaginable. It has alwaysbeen available for the "worst class of cases encountered in practice".That approach was then reinforced with mandatory effect by the enactment ofs 8(c) in 2002. At the time of enactment the then Justice Minster describedthe purpose of the Bill as to "[leave] no doubt at all, in the judicial mind, thatwhen you have the worst type of offending in any category the maximumsentence will then be applied".(Footnotes omitted.)[41] In our view, the gravity of Ms Lata's offending is not to be discounted for thepurposes of identification of a starting point on account of the fact there was only onevictim in the person of her only daughter. Nor in weighing comparative seriousnessshould the mere presence of an act or threat of physical violence tip the scales againstthe scenario where a young woman is psychologically compelled to endure 18 monthsand 1,000 episodes of unwanted sexual activity.[42] Consequently, we conclude that the Judge erred when, in order toaccommodate headroom for hypothetical cases which included characteristicsadditional to those present in the instant case, he selected a starting point of nine yearsand six months' imprisonment, which was approximately two-thirds of the maximumpenalty.[43] We agree with Mr Horsley's submission that that starting point was manifestlyinadequate. As he put it at the conclusion of his written submission:The combination of aggravating factors places this offending, broadly, withinthe range of the most serious cases, and therefore justified a starting point ator close to the maximum. In comparing the approach to sentencing for similaroffending in other jurisdictions, a starting point of at least 12 years'imprisonment should have been adopted.[44] It is necessary to recognise that upon a successful appeal bythe Solicitor-General the sentence is adjusted by no more than the minimum extentnecessary to remove the element of manifest inadequacy.34 Hence as this Court33 Shailer v R, above n 23.34 Sipa v R [2006] NZSC 52, (2006) 22 CRNZ 978 at [9].recently observed in Solicitor General v Hutchison,35 where the Crown had acceptedthat a sentencing indication starting point of 12 years was within range:[11] As this is a Solicitor-General sentence appeal,36 we regard thatconcession as being an upper band for sentencing. As Adams on CriminalLaw notes:37Where the Court finds a sentence should be increased on the groundsof manifest inadequacy or error of principle, the increase will not beto the level that would have been imposed were the appellate Courtthe original sentencing Court. Rather, it is to the maximum extentrequired to remedy the manifest inadequacy. The sentence shouldonly be increased to the level which accords with the lowest range ofappropriate sentences [45] However, in the particular scenario where the offending is assessed as fallingwithin the category of the most serious of cases, the traditional conservative approachreflected in Sipa is not able to be accommodated by the selection of a starting point atthe lowest end of an available range. In that uncommon circumstance, the onlyavailable penalty is that mandated by s 8(c).[46] That was the course followed by this Court in Chen v R where, after setting outthe principles in s 8(a) to (d) of the Act, it was said:38[183] These principles require this Court to convey the message thatlarge-scale importation and sale of methamphetamine into and inNew Zealand will attract the stern maximum penalty which Parliament has setfor such offending. Allowing the Solicitor-General's appeal this Court set aside sentences of 12 years and17 years' imprisonment and substituted the maximum sentence of life imprisonmentin each instance.[47] As it is our conclusion that the totality of the aggravating circumstances ofMs Lata's offending places this case squarely within the category of the most seriousof cases, it follows that even though this is a Solicitor-General appeal, like Chen the35 Solicitor General v Hutchison [2018] NZCA 162.36 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 246.37 Simon France (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at[SAB5.09(h)].38 Chen v R [2009] NZCA 445, [2010] 2 NZLR 158.sentencing response must be the maximum prescribed penalty. There is nothing aboutthe circumstances relating to Ms Lata that make that course inappropriate.[48] The Solicitor-General raised no issue with the percentage discounts whichthe Judge allowed. Hence we apply a discount of 2.5 per cent for Ms Lata's lack ofprior convictions and to recognise the extent to which prostitution was "normalised"in her own upbringing.39 The full 25 per cent discount for the guilty pleas is alsoallowed.[49] Consequently, the end sentence on the charge under s 98(1)(i) will be ten yearsand three months' imprisonment. A new minimum period of imprisonment of fiveyears will be imposed in relation to this charge. The concurrent sentences on thecharges under s 98AA(1)(a)(i) will also be ten years and three months' imprisonment.There is no change to the sentence on the fourth charge.Result[50] The appeal is allowed.[51] The sentence on the lead charge of six years and 11 months' imprisonment isquashed and is substituted with a sentence of ten years and three months'imprisonment.[52] The minimum period of imprisonment of three years and five months isquashed and substituted with a minimum period of imprisonment of five years.[53] The concurrent sentences on the charges under s 98AA(1)(a)(i) are quashedand substituted with concurrent sentences of ten years and three months'imprisonment.[54] The concurrent sentence on the fourth charge is unchanged.Solicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for Appellant39 Sentencing notes, above n 4, at [45].