Reihana v Accident Compensation Corporation

IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD AT CHRISTCHURCH Decision No. 35/2002 IN THE MATTER of the Accident Insurance Act 1998 AND IN THE MATTER of an appeal pursuant to Section 152 of the Act BETWEEN TONI COLIN REIHANA (AI 309/01) Appellant AND - ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION Respondent HEARD at Christchurch on 29 November 2001 APPEARANCES Mr T C Reihana in person Miss M Ahern, counsel for respondent RESERVED JUDGMENT OF JUDGE M J BEATTIE [1] The issue in this appeal is whether this appellant has received a decision from the respondent which could now be the subject of a review and if necessary appealed to this Court. [2] This appeal arises as a consequence of the decision of a Reviewer dated 22 June 2001 in which the Reviewer held that there was no jurisdiction to consider either of the two review applications filed by the appellant on 6 July 2000 and 18 July 2000 respectively. [3] At the material time, the appellant was in receipt of weekly compensation as a consequence of an injury he suffered in August 1993. In April 2000, the respondent requested that the appellant attend an appointment with Dr W Turner, Occupational Physician, for the purposes of obtaining an up to date assessment of the appellant’s injury. 309 01 Reihana.doc (jed) 2 [4] For reasons which need not be referred to here, the respondent accepted that the appellant had good reason not to be able to attend the appointment that had been made and it was left to him to arrange a further appointment time with Dr Turner. [5] Although there was subsequent discussion between the parties it seems that no appointment was made and the next development was for the appellant’s Case Manager advising by letter dated 23 June 2000 that the appellant’s weekly compensation was being suspended because of his failure to arrange an appointment with Dr Turner. Quite correctly that letter gave advice of a right of review to the appellant and he duly exercised that right by lodging an application for review on 6 July 2000. [6] On receipt of that application for review, the respondent realised that its action of suspension was precipitate in that it had given no warning to the appellant of its intention to take this course of action. It therefore advised the appellant by letter of 6 July that his weekly compensation was being reinstated. The appellant was advised that it was being reinstated whilst a further appointment was arranged with Dr Turner and that he would be advised about the time and date. [7] That letter advised of a right of review and the appellant duly lodged an application for review on the same day. [8] In response to that application for review the respondent wrote to the appellant on 12 July 2000, advising that as it had revised the decision to suspend weekly compensation and had reinstated his entitlements, his application for review was considered invalid and it would not proceed further. That letter also gave a right of review which the appellant promptly exercised by lodging an application for review on 20 July 2000. [9] Those are the essential facts of the procedural chain with which the Court needs to be concerned for the purposes of this appeal. However, it also needs to be stated that this appellant and the respondent had been engaged in a running battle for a number of years and that this is the tenth appeal between the parties that has reached this Court. Thus it can be seen that there is a certain flavour to the two review applications that this appellant lodged. 309 01 Reihana.doc (jed) 3 [10] As I have noted it was the decision of the Reviewer stating in effect that there was nothing to review since the appellant’s weekly compensation had been reinstated, that brought forward the appeal to this Court from that decision. [11] When the appeal came before me for hearing, I pointed out to the appellant that the substantive issue which he had been entitled to question had been resolved in his favour and therefore what was it that he was seeking to achieve by proceeding with this matter. [12] The appellant’s response to that was that he wished this Court to censure the respondent and his Case Manager in the way that they had treated him over the question of him being required to be examined by Dr Turner. [13] Whilst it is not ordinarily the function of this Court to censure, and it does not intend to do so on this occasion, it is somewhat ironic that the appellant’s Case Manager should not be attuned to Mr Reihana and the rocky relationship which has existed. For some reason the Case Manager kept on indicating to the appellant that he was required to attend Dr Turner because he was an Occupational Diseases Physician. As Mr Reihana was not suffering from any occupational disease, nor indeed any disease, he was somewhat perplexed at this request and I can understand where he was coming from when he started to get bloody minded. [14] I propose to make no further comment but simply to confirm that there is no issue for this Court to determine in an appeal from the review decision of 22 June 2001 as the primary decision of the respondent, which had affected the appellant’s rights to an entitlement under the Act, had been remedied by the respondent itself by it rescinding that decision and reinstating the appellant’s weekly compensation. [15] For the avoidance of doubt, unless there is a “live” issue on a substantive question relating to a decision of the respondent, as the term decision is defined in s13 of the Act, no appeal can be had or be entertained. [16] For this reason therefore the present appeal has no substance, and indeed the letters from the respondent which formed the basis for an application for review ought not to have been so labelled as they were not decisions within the meaning of the Act. 309 01 Reihana.doc (jed) 4 [17] This appeal is dismissed. DATED at WELLINGTON this 30th day of January 2002 M J Beattie District Court Judge 309 01 Reihana.doc (jed)