MIDDELDORP v AVONDALE JOCKEY CLUB INC [2019] NZHC 1447

MIDDELDORP v AVONDALE JOCKEY CLUB INC [2019] NZHC 1447 [25 June 2019]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2018-404-1900[2019] NZHC 1447UNDER Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016IN THE MATTER OF an application for Judicial ReviewBETWEEN VINCENT JACOB MIDDELDORPApplicantAND AVONDALE JOCKEY CLUBINCORPORATEDRespondentHearing: On the papersAppearances: P David QC and C Boswell for the ApplicantG M Coumbe QC and D Bullock for the RespondentJudgment: 25 June 2019JUDGMENT OF GORDON J[As to costs]This judgment was delivered by meon 25 June 2019 at 11 am, pursuant tor 11.5 of the High Court RulesRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarDate:Solicitors: Wilson Harle, AucklandLee Salmon Long, AucklandCounsel: P David QC, AucklandG Coumbe QC, AucklandIntroduction[1] On 26 April 2019, I gave judgment in favour of the respondent, the AvondaleJockey Club Inc (the Club), against the applicant, Mr Middeldorp.1[2] Mr Middeldorp, a member of the Committee of the Club, applied for judicialreview seeking declarations that decisions of the Committee were made without a legalbasis under the Rules and Regulations of the Club (the Rules) and/or in breach of theClub's legal obligations. Mr Middeldorp alleged that the Committee suspended himfrom office on two occasions when it had no power to do so under the Rules. Healleged alternatively that the Committee breached its legal obligations to act fairly,with a proper basis and in good faith when making the two decisions to suspend himand had no objectively supportable factual foundation for those decisions.[3] Mr Middeldorp also alleged that the Committee did not act in good faith or fora proper purpose in the best interests of the Club in declining applications formembership by 14 applicants. Finally, he alleged that the Committee had operatedsince 2014 without the required number of members and had not followed the properelection process in breach of the requirements of the Rules.[4] I gave a decision in favour of Mr Middeldorp only on the ground that there wasno power in the Rules to suspend him from the Committee. But, I refused to make adeclaration in my discretion as Mr Middeldorp had not suffered serious prejudice;there was no practical utility in making the declaration as the suspension decisions hadbeen carried out and nothing further needed to be reconsidered as a consequence ofthe Court's decision; the Club was in the process of developing new rules which wouldcontain a power to suspend committee members; Mr Middeldorp had delayed; and hisconduct disentitled him from relief. I found against Mr Middeldorp on all the othergrounds of review.1 Middeldorp v Avondale Jockey Club Inc [2019] NZHC 901.[5] In my judgment, I indicated a preliminary view that the Club was entitled tocosts on a 2B basis.2 The parties have been unable to come to an agreement on costs.The Club seeks costs and disbursements as set out in Annexure A to this judgment.The law[6] Costs are at the discretion of the Court.3 The High Court Rules 2016 provideguidance as to how the discretion might be exercised.4[7] The general principle is that the party who fails with respect to a proceedingshould pay costs to the successful party.5 When applying the scale costs regime, theCourt must consider each formal step individually for the purposes of assessing theappropriate time band. A blanket approach is not appropriate.6[8] Ultimately, the overriding consideration when exercising the discretion toaward costs is that any award ought to do justice between the parties.7Costs claimed and opposition[9] Ms Coumbe QC, for the Club, seeks scale costs in the amount of $25,422. Thesteps are all listed as 2B. The Club also seeks a 10 per cent uplift on the scale costsfor each of the steps, with the exception of step 11 (memorandum for costs). Thisamounts to total costs of $27,875 (as set out in Annexure A).[10] Additionally, Ms Coumbe submits that a total of $717.15 in disbursementsshould be awarded for court filing, photocopying and courier fees.[11] In response, Mr David QC, for Mr Middeldorp, submits that costs should eitherlie where they fall or be awarded to the Club on a 2B basis with a 50 per cent reduction.In support of those two options he notes that Mr Middeldorp was successful on the2 The proceeding had already been classified as category 2 for the purposes of costs: see Middeldorpv Avondale Jockey Club Inc, above n 1, at [202], n 49.3 High Court Rules 2016, r 14.1(1).4 Rules 14.2–14.7.5 Rules 14.2(1)(a).6 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2007] NZCA 544 at [35].7 Packing In Ltd (in liq) v Chilcott (2003) 16 PRNZ 869 (CA) at [5].issues of amenability to judicial review and the illegality of the suspensions (althoughI did not ultimately grant relief on that latter issue).[12] As far as scale costs are concerned, Mr David opposes the inclusion of step 32(defendant's preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle) in the scalecosts calculation. Any scale costs calculation would therefore be $20,070 (but with a50 per cent reduction if the Court does not order that costs should lie where they fall).[13] Mr David also seeks costs for the preparation of a costs memorandum.[14] Mr David's submissions are silent as to disbursements.Preliminary matters[15] There are two preliminary matters. The first is the disclosure of the withoutprejudice correspondence between the solicitors for the parties on the issue of costs,attached to the Club's costs memorandum. The second is the Club's replymemorandum, which was filed without leave.[16] First, as to the without prejudice correspondence: the correspondence betweenthe parties is in fact marked "without prejudice save as to costs". In relation to writtenoffers made prior to trial regarding settlement of a claim, r 14.10 provides that the facta written offer is made to another party without prejudice except as to costs must notbe communicated to the court until the question of costs is to be decided. The sameprinciple must apply to proposals to settle costs. The Club makes it clear that thecorrespondence is relied on for the purpose of the Court's determination of the claimfor the preparation of its costs memorandum. I consider that I am able to take thecorrespondence into consideration in determining that issue.[17] Secondly, regarding the Club's reply memorandum: in my substantive decisionI did not make provision for a reply memorandum. The Club did not seek leave to filea further memorandum either before or at the time it was filed. Nor did the Club seekleave subsequent to the filing of its reply memorandum after Mr David raised thematter with the Registrar. Accordingly, I disregard the Club's reply memorandum anddo not take it into account in determining costs.Issues[18] The following are the issues for determination:(a) Should costs lie where they fall?(b) What are the scale costs?(c) Should the Court award increased costs to the Club?(d) Should the Court reduce any costs payable to the Club?(e) What disbursements should be allowed?Should costs lie where they fall?[19] Mr David's primary submission is that the outcome overall would supportorders that costs should lie where they fall. I do not accept that submission.[20] Overall, the Club was the successful party. Whilst Mr Middeldorp wassuccessful on whether the Committee decisions were amenable to judicial review andhis illegality argument, I did not ultimately grant any of the relief he sought. The Clubwas partially successful, "yet success on more limited terms is still success".8 For thisreason, the Club is entitled to costs.Scale costs[21] Rule 14.2(1)(c) of the High Court Rules provides that: costs should be assessed by applying the appropriate daily recovery rate tothe time considered reasonable for each step reasonably required in relation tothe proceeding or interlocutory application [22] Presently, the proceedings are categorised as category 2, the appropriate dailyrecovery for which is $2,230.9 Rule 14.5 then provides:8 Weaver v Auckland Council [2017] NZCA 330 at [26].9 High Court Rules, r 14.3 and sch 2.14.5 Determination of reasonable time(1) For the purposes of rule 14.2(c), a reasonable time for a step is—(a) the time specified for it in Schedule 3; or(b) a time determined by analogy with that schedule, if Schedule3 does not apply; or(c) the time assessed as likely to be required for the particularstep, if no analogy can usefully be made.(2) A determination of what is a reasonable time for a step undersubclause (1) must be made by reference—(a) to band A, if a comparatively small amount of time isconsidered reasonable; or(b) to band B, if a normal amount of time is consideredreasonable; or(c) to band C, if a comparatively large amount of time for theparticular step is considered reasonable.[23] There are two issues I must decide as to scale costs. First, whether step 32(defendant's preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle) should beincluded in the scale costs calculation on a 2B basis. Secondly, whether either partyshould be awarded costs for step 11 (memorandum for costs).Step 32: Defendant's preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle[24] The parties agree that 2B is the appropriate classification. However,Mr Middeldorp does not agree to the inclusion of step 32 in scale costs.[25] In the schedule to the Club's memorandum for costs, the Club lists step 32 as"Defendant's preparation of authorities bundle and chronology". However, step 32 asit appears in sch 3 of the High Court Rules allocates two days for the "Defendant'spreparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle". Mr Middeldorp saysthe Club did not prepare a list of issues nor did it provide any nominations for thecommon bundle (instead saying that it would rely on the exhibits to the affidavit of itsmain witness as the common bundle); therefore, it is not entitled to claim for this step.On the other hand, the Club submits that, whilst there was no common bundle, itproduced a substantial bundle of authorities and a detailed chronology that was akinto a list of issues.[26] In my view the Club is not entitled to the full two days' allocation for step 32.A chronology is not akin to a list of issues, rather it is a document associated withsubmissions. As Mr David points out, costs for the preparation of a chronology isalready claimed by the Club under step 33 (preparation for hearing/of submissions).[27] However, I am prepared to allow some costs for the Club's preparation ofauthorities (which Mr Middeldorp did not file with his submissions). But I do notconsider that 2B is appropriate for this step. A step should be categorised as band B ifa normal amount of time is considered reasonable and band A if a comparatively smallamount of time is considered reasonable.10 Step 32 is more appropriately a 2A step($2,230) in this case.Step 11: Memorandum for costs[28] Both parties seek costs for preparing a costs memorandum under step 11.[29] Whilst there has been some divergence in the court's approach to awardingcosts on application for costs, it is well established that such costs may be awarded.11For costs purposes, an application for costs is to be treated no differently from anordinary interlocutory application. In Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa InternationalLtd, the Court of Appeal held that there is to be no order for costs made in respect ofa costs application where neither side's position as to costs is completely upheld.12[30] The solicitors for the Club, in their correspondence with the solicitors forMr Middeldorp, advised that they considered that the Club had a basis to claim anuplift but would be willing to resolve costs on a 2B basis, being costs of $24,530 plusdisbursements of $717.15.[31] Mr Middeldorp's solicitors responded that there should be no claim under step32, resulting in 2B scale costs in the sum of $20,070. With a 50 per cent reduction, anoffer of payment of costs of $10,035 was made.10 Rule 14.5(2).11 Body Corporate Administration v Mehta (No 4) [2013] NZHC 213 at [85].12 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd, above n 6, at [62].[32] Up to this point in my judgment, I have not completely upheld either party'ssubmissions on costs. I have re-categorised step 32 to 2A (rejecting both the Club'sand Mr Middeldorp's submissions on that point). Accordingly, I calculate scale costsin the amount of $22,300 as set out in Annexure B. This reflects the steps as soughtby the Club, but step 32 is on a 2A (rather than 2B) basis.[33] I therefore decline to award costs for the preparation of a costs memorandumto the Club as it has not been completely successful when compared to its proposal tosettle (although the reduction is relatively small).[34] For Mr Middeldorp, as well as not completely upholding his position on scalecosts, for reasons expressed later in this judgment, I also decline to completely upholdhis position regarding a reduction in costs. Therefore, Mr Middeldorp is not entitledto costs for preparing his costs memorandum.Should the Court award increased costs?[35] The Club seeks increased costs under r 14.6(3)(b) on the basis that the partyopposing costs (Mr Middeldorp) contributed unnecessarily to the time and expense ofthe proceeding. Accordingly, the Club seeks a 10 per cent uplift on each step.13[36] Ms Coumbe relies on three grounds for increased costs.Mr Middeldorp's alleged meritless bias/predetermination argument[37] First, Ms Coumbe submits Mr Middeldorp's claim of bias/predetermination (inthe context of the claim of a failure of the Committee to meet its natural justiceobligations in making its suspension decisions) was scantly pleaded and without merit.Mr Middeldorp elected not to cross-examine the two relevant witnesses for the Club.Ms Coumbe submits the Club was put to expense in preparing pleadings, submissionsand affidavits for both witnesses in response to Mr Middeldorp's claim of bias. Shesays, absent cross-examination, the factual dispute could not be resolved, andMr Middeldorp could not discharge his onus.13 With the exception of step 11 (memorandum for costs) which I have declined to award in anyevent.[38] In response, Mr David submits that contemporaneous documentary evidencewas provided in support of Mr Middeldorp's position. Thus, Mr Middeldorp did notneed to cross-examine the two witnesses to discharge his onus of proof (in theory).While I did not accept that the documentary evidence supported Mr Middeldorp'sposition, I do not consider that in itself warrants an uplift in scale costs.Mr Middeldorp's omission of documents[39] Secondly, Ms Coumbe submits that Mr Middeldorp's initial affidavit omittedmany relevant documents which ought to have been in his possession or control, suchas his written apology. Other documents were exhibited in incomplete form. Also,Mr Middeldorp's affidavit contained an incomplete narrative. Therefore, a full factualaccount in Mr Boyle's affidavit on behalf of the Club and provision of more documentswas necessary.[40] In response, Mr David submits it was for Mr Middeldorp to decide how to runhis case, including the factual material and documents he considered relevant. He wasnot obliged to include all the material the Club considered relevant. There is merit inMr David's reply. I decline an increase on this basis.Mr Middeldorp's untimetabled further affidavit[41] Thirdly, Ms Coumbe submits that Mr Middeldorp's untimetabled furtheraffidavit presented an incomplete picture of the Club's constitution reform project.She says this necessitated a further affidavit in response from Mr Boyle.[42] In response, Mr David submits Mr Middeldorp's further affidavit did notrequire a response from the Club. The further affidavit provided the Court with up-to-date information before the hearing. For example, Mr Boyle, in his affidavit, hadstated his intention to propose a new constitution to the Club's members. It wasapparent that the Club would rely on this to say that the declarations sought byMr Middeldorp would have no practical utility. However, Mr David says, no newrules had in fact been put to the membership nor had a timeframe for this been adopted.It was necessary for Mr Middeldorp to bring the Court up to date on this issue. Hadhe not done so it would have been necessary for the Club to file an updating affidavit.[43] While I accept that, in his affidavit in response to Mr Middeldorp's furtheraffidavit, Mr Boyle did add some additional information to that which was containedin Mr Middeldorp's further affidavit, I do not consider that Mr Middeldorp's furtheraffidavit contributed unnecessarily to the time and expense of the proceeding. Thekey word is unnecessarily.[44] I decline to increase costs on any of the grounds submitted by Ms Coumbe.Should there be a reduction in costs?[45] Mr Middeldorp seeks a reduction in the Club's scale costs pursuant to r 14.7 ofthe High Court Rules, which provides in relevant part:14.7 Refusal of, or reduction in, costs the court may refuse to make an order for costs or may reduce the costsotherwise payable under those rules if—(d) although the party claiming costs has succeeded overall, that party hasfailed in relation to a cause of action or issue which significantlyincreased the costs of the party opposing costs; or(f) the party claiming costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time orexpense of the proceeding or step in it by—(ii) taking or pursuing an unnecessary step or an argument thatlacks merit; or(g) some other reason exists which justifies the court refusing costs orreducing costs despite the principle that the determination of costsshould be predictable and expeditious.[46] Mr David submits a 50 per cent reduction in scale costs is warranted. Hesubmits there are three grounds for this.Mr Middeldorp's success on amenability and illegality[47] Mr David submits reduction is justified under r 14.7(d). He says that althoughthe Club was successful overall, it failed on the issues of whether the decisions of theCommittee were amenable to judicial review and illegality, both of which he submitssignificantly increased Mr Middeldorp's costs.[48] On the first issue, Mr David submits the Club's amenability argument lackedmerit so as to justify a reduction under r 14.7(f)(ii). He says the Club's pleadedposition in relation to amenability, namely that the decisions were not amenable tojudicial review, was without merit. The pleaded position was advanced across allclaims. However, the Club altered its position in its written and oral submissions. Itapproached the issue on the basis that the Court should be hesitant about intervening.[49] I do not accept that the adjusted position of the Club "significantly" increasedMr Middeldorp's costs (r 14.7(d)). The issue was one that involved legal submissionsonly and did not require the preparation of evidence. However, I do accept that bypleading a point that it did not pursue in full measure in its submissions, the Clubcontributed unnecessarily to the expense of the proceeding by taking an argument (apleaded position) that lacked merit. Mr Middeldorp was required to prepare hiswritten submissions, at least, on the basis of the pleaded position. But any reductionwill be modest as submissions were advanced on reviewability (although on a differentbasis from the pleaded position).[50] I next address whether costs should be reduced on the basis that Mr Middeldorpsucceeded on his illegality argument, namely that the Rules did not contain a power tosuspend a committee member. Mr David submits that the illegality argument wascentral to the case. If the Club had conceded this issue, the proceeding could havebeen limited to the issue of the membership applications, the composition/election ofthe Committee and the exercise of the Court's discretion.[51] As part of this issue, Mr David submits the Club's refusal to obtain a legalopinion about the lawfulness of its actions after the first suspension led to theproceeding and resulting cost. This would justify a reduction under either r 14.7(g) orin the Court's general discretion.[52] In anticipation of Mr Middeldorp's position that costs should be reduced,Ms Coumbe submits that the Club's position whether it had power to suspend hadmerit, was reasonably based and clearly arguable, despite the Court's ultimatedecision. It did not contribute unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding.[53] In support of his submission that had the Club obtained a legal opinion, theproceeding and resulting costs might have been avoided, Mr David refers to theMinutes of the Committee meeting of 13 February 2017. They record the resolution"That the Committee confirms the advice given V Middeldorp that the club will notobtain a legal opinion about his suspension and he is to serve out his penalty".[54] Mr David also relies on an email from one of the committee members toMr Boyle dated 11 September 2017 (prior to the second suspension) in which thecommittee member said:Whatever the approach taken, the entire Committee needs to have an abilityto force a Committee member to stand down or resign with a majority decisionof Committee. We don't have that at present, even if there is a conflict ofinterest arising out of any Club matter.[55] However, this overlooks the evidence of Mr Boyle. As the President of theClub, he consulted the Club's lawyer, Mr Coltman, as to the legality of suspendingMr Middeldorp. In his affidavit, Mr Boyle stated that:98. Mr Middeldorp couriered a note to me dated 9 January 2017 enclosingtwo letter [sic] of the same date. One was a letter from Mr Middeldorp to theClub's solicitor, John Coltman of Wynyard Wood, seeking a legal opinion asto whether the Rules permitted the Committee to suspend a member. Theother was a letter to me [56] Mr Boyle then referred to his consultation with Mr Coltman that followed, andhe annexed to his affidavit an email of 23 January 2017 to Mr Middeldorp which said:I have now conferred with John Coltman and can report the outcome of yourcorrespondence dated 9 January.The club's lawyers, having looked at your materials, the suspension resolutionof 28 November 2016 and heard an outline of my version of how theinvestigation into the complaint against you was handled by the Committee,see no reason why the club would obtain a legal opinion about the power ofthe Committee to suspend a Committee member.Informally John Coltman has indicated to me that in his opinion there is noapparent lack of power to suspend a Committee person as a sanction inconnection with a serious complaint that has been upheld, under the AJCConstitution.Accordingly the club will not be seeking a legal opinion at this stage.[57] Having regard to the informal legal advice, I do not consider it can necessarilybe said, as Mr David argues, that had the Club obtained a legal opinion the proceedingand resulting costs might have been avoided. Further, in relation to the later email ofthe committee member to Mr Boyle, the expressed view needs to be seen in the contextof the informal legal advice to the contrary.[58] However, the Club did fail in its case opposing Mr Middeldorp's claim that theClub had suspended him without a legal basis on two occasions. The question iswhether the Club's failure "significantly increased" Mr Middeldorp's costs (r 14.7(d))or whether a reduction is justified under 14.7(g) or in the Court's discretion.Calculating the reduction[59] It is difficult to be absolutely precise as to how much preparation and courttime related to the two issues on which the Club was unsuccessful.14 As I have alreadynoted, the reduction for the amenability argument should be modest.[60] As to the illegality argument, much of the evidence filed in relation to thiscause of action would, in any event, have required consideration for the purposes ofthe Court deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion to grant the relief sought15(in the event the Club had conceded the suspensions were unlawful).[61] This was one of five causes of action advanced over a one-day hearing. In myview, the 50 per cent reduction sought by Mr Middeldorp is excessive.14 See Semple v Wilson [2018] NZHC 1703 at [45].15 Refer Middeldorp v Avondale Jockey Club Inc, above n 1, at [201] which sets out the reasons fordeclining to grant relief.[62] Overall, a total reduction of 15 per cent is appropriate for both the arguments(amenability and illegality) on which the Club failed. This results in total costs of$18,955 (calculated by $22,300 x 0.85).Disbursements[63] The Club seeks a total of $717.15 (GST-exclusive) in disbursements for courtfiling fees, courier and photocopying as set out in Annexure A.[64] The costs memorandum for Mr Middeldorp is silent as to disbursements. Inany event, absent express agreement, I consider the reasonableness and necessity ofthe items and amount claimed in disbursements.[65] Rule 14.12 of the High Court Rules provides:14.12 Disbursements(1) In this rule,—disbursement, in relation to a proceeding,—(a) means an expense paid or incurred for the purposes of theproceeding that would ordinarily be charged for separatelyfrom legal professional services in a solicitor's bill of costs;and(b) includes—(i) fees of court for the proceeding:(ii) expenses of serving documents for the purposes of theproceeding:(iii) expenses of photocopying documents required bythese rules or by a direction of the court:(iv) expenses of conducting a conference by telephone orvideo link; but(c) does not include counsel's fee.relevant issue, in relation to a disbursement, means the issue inrespect of which the disbursement was paid or incurred.(2) A disbursement must, if claimed and verified, be included in the costsawarded for a proceeding to the extent that it is—(a) of a class that is either—(i) approved by the court for the purposes of theproceeding; or(ii) specified in paragraph (b) of subclause (1); and(b) specific to the conduct of the proceeding; and(c) reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding; and(d) reasonable in amount.(3) Despite subclause (2), a disbursement may be disallowed or reducedif it is disproportionate in the circumstances of the proceeding.[66] For expenses to be recoverable, they must fall within the r 14.12(1) definitionof "disbursement" and satisfy the requirements under r 14.12(2)–(3).[67] First, the expenses for which disbursements are sought fall within the definitionof "disbursements" under r 14.12(1)(b)(i) and (iii). I am also satisfied that courier feesfall within the r 14.12(1)(a) definition and are generally recoverable.16[68] Secondly, I am satisfied that the disbursements sought were specific to theproceeding, reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount. As to the photocopyingand printing expenses, Ms Coumbe says the Club produced a substantial bundle ofauthorities and Mr Boyle's affidavit ran into the hundreds of pages and included anumber of colour copy exhibits. She adds that the courier costs primarily related tothe sending of documents from the Club to its solicitors in connection with thepreparation of its evidence. Whilst no receipts have been provided for the expenses, Iam satisfied that the amount claimed is reasonable and not disproportionate in thecircumstances of the proceeding.[69] Accordingly, I award disbursements for the GST-exclusive amount of $717.15.16 See Mawhinney v Waitakere City Council HC Auckland CIV-1999-404-1850, 26 September 2007at [12] as cited in Sutton v Canterbury Regional Council [2015] NZHC 1000 at [39].Result[70] The Club is entitled to costs of $18,955 (15 per cent reduction in scale costs of$22,300) and disbursements of $717.15. I make an order for costs and disbursementsin the total sum of $19,672.15 as set out in Annexure B to this judgment.___________________________________Gordon JAnnexure A — Costs as claimed by the Avondale Jockey Club IncScale costsStep Description Category 2 Band B Sum Plus 10 percent uplift2 Commencement ofdefence by defendant$2,230 2 $4,460 $4,906.0030 Defendant's preparationof affidavits$2,230 2.5 $5,575 $6,132.5032 Defendant's preparationof authorities bundle andchronology$2,230 2 $4,460 $4,906.0033 Preparation for hearing $2,230 3 $6,690 $7,359.0034 Appearance at hearing $2,230 1 $2,230 $2,453.0035 Second counsel $2,230 0.5 $1,115 $1,226.5011 Memorandum for costs17 $2,230 0.4 $892 $892.00$25,422 $27,875.00Disbursements (GST-exclusive)Description Sum (GST-exclusive)Court-filing fees $95.65Photocopying $475.50Couriers $146.00$717.15Total (claimed): $28,592.1517 An uplift is not sought in respect of step 11 (memorandum on costs).Annexure B — Costs as awardedScale costsStep Description Category 2 Band B Sum 15 per centreduction2 Commencement ofdefence by defendant$2,230 2 $4,46030 Defendant's preparationof affidavits$2,230 2.5 $5,57532 Defendant's preparationof authorities bundleand chronology18$2,230 1 (Band A) $2,23033 Preparation for hearing $2,230 3 $6,69034 Appearance at hearing $2,230 1 $2,23035 Second counsel $2,230 0.5 $1,115$22,300 $18,955Disbursements (GST-exclusive)Description Sum (GST-exclusive)Court-filing fees $95.65Photocopying $475.50Couriers $146.00$717.15Total (awarded): $19,672.1518 Step 32 is awarded on a 2A basis for the reasons outlined above at [24]–[27].