Lockhart's Trustees v. Lockhart [1921] ScotLR 519 (18 June 1921)

Lockhart's Trustees v. Lockhart [1921] ScotLR 519 (18 June 1921)

The context of the settlement, including the testator's description of provisions as for widowhood, the use of 'institute', and similarity of terms across bequests, established a reasonable presumption that the testator intended to confer only a liferent coupled with a fiduciary fee, not a full fee, to the second party.

Citation
[1921] ScotLR 519
Parties
Second Party: Dame Hilda Maud Macdonald Moreton or Macdonald Lockhart; First Parties: Lockhart's Trustees; Third Party: Charles Angus Macdonald
Jurisdiction
Scotland
Judgment Date
18 June 1921
Procedural Posture
Special Case / Judgment
Outcome
First question answered in the negative; second question answered in the affirmative.
Legal Topics
Liferent, Fiduciary Fee, Trust Disposition, Conveyance of Heritage, Interpretation of Testamentary Intention
Succession Trusts Liferent Fiduciary Fee Trust Disposition Conveyance of Heritage Interpretation of Testamentary Intention

Case Brief

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Parties

Dame Hilda Maud Macdonald Moreton or Macdonald Lockhart

Second Party

Lockhart's Trustees

First Parties

Charles Angus Macdonald

Third Party

Procedural Posture

Special Case / Judgment

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Is the second party entitled under the testator's trust-disposition and settlement to an absolute fee of the heritable estate?
  2. 2 Is the right of the second party limited under the direction contained in testator's trust-disposition and settlement to a liferent together with a fiduciary fee for the heirs called under the destination?

Ratio Decidendi

The context of the settlement, including the testator's description of provisions as for widowhood, the use of 'institute', and similarity of terms across bequests, established a reasonable presumption that the testator intended to confer only a liferent coupled with a fiduciary fee, not a full fee, to the second party.

Court Disposition

First question answered in the negative; second question answered in the affirmative.

Orders

  • Second party is not entitled to an absolute fee of the heritable estate.
  • Second party's right is limited to a liferent with a fiduciary fee for the heirs called under the destination.