MARTHA SARAH YOUNG AGAINST ARTHUR MACVEAN [2014] ScotCS CSOH_133 (26 August 2014)

MARTHA SARAH YOUNG AGAINST ARTHUR MACVEAN [2014] ScotCS CSOH_133 (26 August 2014)

The pursuer did not qualify as a secondary victim because her psychiatric injury was caused by being told of her son's death, not by direct perception of the aftermath of the incident. The court found that although the pursuer saw the aftermath, she did not know her son was involved at that time, and her shock and injury were triggered only upon being informed of his death. The control mechanisms established in Alcock and subsequent cases were not satisfied.

Citation
[2014] ScotCS CSOH_133
Parties
Pursuer: Martha Sarah Young; Defender: Arthur MacVean
Jurisdiction
Scotland
Judgment Date
26 August 2014
Procedural Posture
Personal Injury (damages) Action / Judgment After Proof (trial)
Outcome
Pursuer's claim as a secondary victim dismissed; damages limited to statutory heads (loss of society, etc.)
Legal Topics
Secondary Victim Claims, Psychiatric Injury, Damages for Nervous Shock, Road Traffic Incidents, Loss of Society, Quantum of Damages
Tort Delict Personal Injury Secondary Victim Claims Psychiatric Injury Damages for Nervous Shock Road Traffic Incidents Loss of Society +1 more

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Parties

Martha Sarah Young

Pursuer

Arthur MacVean

Defender

Procedural Posture

Personal Injury (damages) Action / Judgment After Proof (trial)

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the pursuer qualifies as a secondary victim entitled to damages for psychiatric injury under Scots law
  2. 2 Whether the pursuer's psychiatric injury was caused by witnessing the aftermath of the incident or by being told of her son's death
  3. 3 Assessment of quantum for various heads of damages

Ratio Decidendi

The pursuer did not qualify as a secondary victim because her psychiatric injury was caused by being told of her son's death, not by direct perception of the aftermath of the incident. The court found that although the pursuer saw the aftermath, she did not know her son was involved at that time, and her shock and injury were triggered only upon being informed of his death. The control mechanisms established in Alcock and subsequent cases were not satisfied.

Court Disposition

Pursuer's claim as a secondary victim dismissed; damages limited to statutory heads (loss of society, etc.)

Orders

  • Pursuer not entitled to damages for personal injury as a secondary victim
  • Damages awarded for loss of society and other statutory heads as agreed