Walker v. Walker's Trustees and Others [1916] ScotLR 56 (04 November 1916)

Walker v. Walker's Trustees and Others [1916] ScotLR 56 (04 November 1916)

Section 37 of the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874 abolishes the distinction between conquest and heritage, and the incidents of heritage, including courtesy, now apply to conquest; the pursuer is entitled to courtesy out of all lands and heritages in which his deceased wife was infeft at her death.

Citation
[1916] ScotLR 56
Parties
Pursuer: James Walker; Defenders: James Walker junior and another (trustees of Mrs Walker) and others
Jurisdiction
Scotland
Judgment Date
04 November 1916
Procedural Posture
Civil / Appeal (reclaiming Note) From Lord Ordinary's Interlocutor
Outcome
appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Courtesy, Conquest, Heritage, Conveyancing (scotland) Act 1874
Family Law Succession Law Courtesy Conquest Heritage Conveyancing (scotland) Act 1874

Case Brief

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Parties

James Walker

Pursuer

James Walker junior and another (trustees of Mrs Walker) and others

Defenders

Procedural Posture

Civil / Appeal (reclaiming Note) From Lord Ordinary's Interlocutor

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether section 37 of the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874 abolishes the distinction between conquest and heritage for the purposes of courtesy
  2. 2 Whether a widower is entitled to courtesy out of property acquired by his wife by purchase (conquest)

Ratio Decidendi

Section 37 of the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874 abolishes the distinction between conquest and heritage, and the incidents of heritage, including courtesy, now apply to conquest; the pursuer is entitled to courtesy out of all lands and heritages in which his deceased wife was infeft at her death.

Court Disposition

appeal allowed

Orders

  • Interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary recalled in so far as it sustained the second plea-in-law for the defenders and dismissed the conclusion as regards courtesy.
  • Second plea-in-law for the defenders repelled.