Davidson v. Cairns [1913] ScotLR 850 (11 July 1913)
A deposit-receipt in joint names is not a deed of trust under Act 1696, cap. 25, and thus the statutory limitation of proof does not apply; parties are entitled to lead parole evidence to establish the true ownership of the funds.
- Citation
- [1913] ScotLR 850
- Parties
- Pursuer: Hugh Cairns; Consenter: Robert Cairns; Defender: William Davidson; Defender: Clydesdale Bank, Limited
- Jurisdiction
- Scotland
- Judgment Date
- 11 July 1913
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Declarator / Appeal (reclaiming Motion) From Interlocutor Allowing Proof
- Outcome
- appeal refused; interlocutor adhered to
- Legal Topics
- Declarator of Trust, Deposit Receipt, Proof Requirements, Act 1696 Cap. 25, Agency Vs Trust
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Hugh Cairns
Pursuer
Robert Cairns
Consenter
William Davidson
Defender
Clydesdale Bank, Limited
Defender
Procedural Posture
Civil Declarator / Appeal (reclaiming Motion) From Interlocutor Allowing Proof
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a deposit-receipt in joint names constitutes a deed of trust under Act 1696, cap. 25
- 2 Whether parole evidence is admissible to prove beneficial ownership of funds in a deposit-receipt
- 3 Whether the statutory limitation of proof applies
Ratio Decidendi
A deposit-receipt in joint names is not a deed of trust under Act 1696, cap. 25, and thus the statutory limitation of proof does not apply; parties are entitled to lead parole evidence to establish the true ownership of the funds.
Court Disposition
appeal refused; interlocutor adhered to
Orders
- Proof of averments allowed in ordinary form
- Defender's pleas-in-law repelled
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