Laughland v. Millar, Laughland, & Co. [1904] ScotLR 41_325 (19 February 1904)
A contract between a director and managers to share a bonus voted by shareholders, where the director did not disclose his interest and agreed to support the bonus in exchange for a personal share, is a corrupt agreement contrary to public policy and fiduciary duty. Such a contract cannot be sued upon, and subsequent shareholder inaction does not amount to ratification.
- Citation
- [1904] ScotLR 41_325
- Parties
- Pursuer: David Laughland; Defender: Millar, Laughland, & Company; Defender: Edward Millar; Defender: William Laughland
- Jurisdiction
- Scotland
- Judgment Date
- 19 February 1904
- Procedural Posture
- Civil / Appeal (inner House, Court of Session)
- Outcome
- appeal sustained, action dismissed, defenders assoilzied
- Legal Topics
- Pactum Illicitum, Director's Duties, Fiduciary Duty, Ratification, Public Policy
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
David Laughland
Pursuer
Millar, Laughland, & Company
Defender
Edward Millar
Defender
William Laughland
Defender
Procedural Posture
Civil / Appeal (inner House, Court of Session)
Legal Issues
- 1 Is a contract between a director and managers to share a bonus voted by shareholders, where the director did not disclose his interest, enforceable?
- 2 Does subsequent shareholder knowledge and inaction amount to ratification of such a contract?
Ratio Decidendi
A contract between a director and managers to share a bonus voted by shareholders, where the director did not disclose his interest and agreed to support the bonus in exchange for a personal share, is a corrupt agreement contrary to public policy and fiduciary duty. Such a contract cannot be sued upon, and subsequent shareholder inaction does not amount to ratification.
Court Disposition
appeal sustained, action dismissed, defenders assoilzied
Orders
- Action dismissed
- Defenders absolved from liability
Full Case Text
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