Petrea Cooney against City of Edinburgh Council (Sheriff Court Civil) [2026] SCEDIN 31 (13 March 2026)

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SHERIFFDOM OF LOTHIAN AND BORDERS AT EDINBURGH [2026] SC EDIN 31 EDI-B1333-25 JUDGMENT OF SHERIFF O'CARROLL in the cause

PETREA COONEY Appellant against

CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL Respondent Appellant: Sutherland; Burness Paull LLP Respondent: Stewart; CEC EDINBURGH, 13 March 2026 The sheriff, having resumed consideration of the appeal, sustains the respondent's first plea-in-law; repels the appellant's pleas-in-law; dismisses the appeal; finds the appellant liable to the respondent in the expenses as taxed occasioned by the appeal.

NOTE Introduction [1] This is a statutory appeal under paragraph 18, Schedule 1 to the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 ("the 1982 Act") against the respondent's decision dated 12 August 2025 refusing the appellant's application to renew a licence for a Short Term Let ("STL") for a property in the Meadowbank area of Edinburgh (the "property"). It is a top floor flat in a tenemental building comprising six flats and a common stair. Statutory background [2] Article 4 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (Licensing of Short-term Lets) Order 2022 ("the Licensing Order") designates short-term letting as an activity for which a licence under Part I of the 1982 Act is required. That came into force on 1 March 2023. Prior to that date, a licence was not required for STL premises though other regulatory mechanisms existed, such as planning control. [3] Paragraph 18(7) of Schedule 1 of the 1982 Act provides: "The sheriff may uphold an appeal only if he considers that the licensing authority, in arriving at their decision ­ (a) erred in law; (b) based their decision on any incorrect material fact; (c) acted contrary to natural justice; or (d) exercised their discretion in an unreasonable manner." [4] Paragraph 18(9) of that Schedule prescribes the sheriff's powers of disposal: "(9) On upholding an appeal under this paragraph, the sheriff may-- (a) remit the case with the

reasons for his decision to the licensing authority for reconsideration of their decision; or (b) reverse or modify the decision of the authority". [5] As regards the duties and powers of the licensing authority, paragraph 5(1) of that Schedule provides: "(1) Where an application for the grant or renewal of a licence has been made to a licensing authority they shall, in accordance with this paragraph-- (a) grant or renew the licence (b) ... (c) refuse to grant or renew the licence." [6] Paragraph 5(3) of that Schedule is key. It provides in part: "(3) A licensing authority shall refuse an application to grant or renew a licence if, in their opinion-- ... (c) where the licence applied for relates to an activity consisting of or including the use of premises or a vehicle or vessel, those premises are not ... suitable or convenient for the conduct of the activity having regard to-- (i) the location, character or condition of the premises or the character or condition of the vehicle or vessel; (ii) the nature and extent of the proposed activity; (iii) the kind of persons likely to be in the premises, vehicle or vessel; (iv) the possibility of undue public nuisance; or (v) public order or public safety; or (d) there is other good reason for refusing the application; and otherwise shall grant the application" Background [7] The appellant has used the property for STL activity since

2010. The respondent, acting as a planning authority, granted a certificate of lawfulness of existing use on 28 May 2021. [8] In September 2023, the appellant applied to the respondent for the first time for a STL licence for the property. All such applications to the respondent, acting as the licensing authority under the 1982 Act, are delegated to the respondent's Licensing Sub-Committee ("the Committee"). That application followed the coming into force of the Licensing Order. Several neighbours lodged written objections. [9] Having heard representations from the objectors and the appellant's agent, the Committee granted the appellant's application for an STL for 1 year. The objectors did not appeal. [10] The appellant submitted an application to renew the Licence on 27 February 2025. Neighbours again lodged objections. The application was referred to the Committee for determination. The Committee held a hearing on the renewal application on 12 August 2025. The Committee refused the renewal application. On 21 August 2025, the respondent sent the appellant's agent a statement of reasons ("the reasons") as required by statute (Schedule 1(17) of the Act). Submissions [11] A brief summary of the parties' detailed written submissions will suffice for present purposes. Appellant [12] The reasons showed that the respondent relied only on two factors (i) and (iv) of paragraph

5(3)(c)(i) - (iv) of Schedule 1 of the 1982 Act: being (i) the "location, character or position of the premises" and (iv) "the possibility that the use of those premises would cause undue public nuisance". [13] As regards factor (i) the respondent acted unreasonably. There were no relevant changes in circumstances relevant to that factor between the grant of licence in March 2024 and the date of decision. The respondent's STL policy stated that an existing STL licence is likely to be renewed unless there had been a change in circumstances. There were none. Further, the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable given the material before it. The property benefitted from a certificate of lawful use, so was certified as suitable for the activity of short term letting. In addition, respondent's enforcement officer stated no enforcement issues arose. Furthermore, the respondent failed to provide adequate reasons for reaching a different decision from its March 2024 decision on that ground of refusal despite that having been squarely addressed by the appellant's agent in the written submissions. Wordie Properties Co v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT 345 sets out the appropriate test for adequacy of reasons, which this decision failed. [14] As regards factor (iv), the respondent exercised its discretion unreasonably, misunderstood material facts, misunderstood the legal meaning of

public nuisance and failed to give adequate reasons. In short, the matters complained of by the objectors could not in law amount to a public nuisance. The neighbouring properties owned by the objectors and the common parts are not public places and the neighbours are not an identifiable class of the public. It was unreasonable for the Committee to conclude that a public nuisance was possible standing the evidence from its own enforcement officer that all complaints had been investigated and the officer had no concerns from an enforcement perspective. The Committee was not entitled to prefer "the lived experiences" of the objectors over the objective evidence of the enforcement officer. The respondent failed to provide adequate reasons. Respondent [15] The respondent relied on its written submissions. In determining whether or not a licence should be granted, the licensing authority is entitled to decide what is relevant to its consideration and what weight should be given to the relevant circumstances. This court is not entitled to substitute its own decision for that of the respondent. The duty of the Committee deciding the licensing matter is to act in a reasonable manner and balance different factors apportioning to each such weight as it deems proper. The court may only overturn a decision of the licensing authority if it is so unreasonable no reasonable authority could

have so decided. It was for the Committee to consider the material before it, attaching such weight as it saw fit. The test for adequacy of reasons is that set out in Wordie Property. [16] The appellant misunderstood the law and also the decision of the Committee. In terms of Schedule 1(5), the primary task of the Committee is to determine whether the premises are suitable or convenient for the conduct of the activity. In so doing, it must have regard five factor. The appellant by focusing on only the terms of the factors misconstrues the statute. Furthermore, the respondent is mistaken in asserting that only factors (i) and (iv) were considered by the Committee. The Committee considered all five factors, finding all except factor (v) relevant. [17] The Committee was entitled to find the evidence demonstrated the possibility of undue public nuisance experienced by a section of the public: being neighbouring occupants of the property. Unlike English law, there is no clear distinction between public and private nuisance in Scots law. As regards adequacy of reasons, the reasons on this issue were clearly set out, cogent and satisfy the Wordie Property test. The decision of the Committee cannot be said to have been unreasonable in the sense that it was a decision that no reasonable licensing Committee could have reached. This court should refuse the appeal. Discussion [18] Dealing

first with the terms of Schedule 1(5)(3) to the 1982 Act, in my view, the submissions of the respondent are correct. That is, the task of the licensing authority (in the respondent's case, a function performed by the Committee) when considering an application for a STL licence is to reach an opinion as to whether the premises are suitable and convenient for the conduct of short-term letting. It must refuse a licence if the premises is not suitable and convenient for the purpose of short-term letting. When considering suitability and convenience, the Committee must have regard to various factors being: the location, character and condition of the premises; nature and extent of the short-term letting; who is likely to be in the premises; possibility of undue public nuisance; public order and safety. There is also a catch-all basis for refusal (not relied on in this appeal), if there be other good reason. If the Committee does not form the opinion that the premises are not suitable or convenient and does not form the opinion that there is another good reason for refusing the application, the Committee shall grant a licence. [19] It is obvious and agreed by both sides that the Committee has a duty to take account of all relevant factual material placed before it. That material was the written application, the written and oral submissions made in support of that application, the

fact that a licence had been granted the previous year, the certificate of lawful use, the written note from the respondent's own enforcement officer, the written objections made by a number of neighbours in the same common stair, the oral submissions made to the Committee by some of those objectors and the oral information provided by officials at the hearing. The task of the Committee was to weigh and assess that material. It is common ground that the weight to be attached that material and the significance of other balancing factors is for the Committee to assess, acting in a reasonable manner: see for example Hughes v Hamilton District Council 1991 SLT 628; Rannachan v Renfrew District Council 1991 SLT 625. In an appeal against such a decision, this court is not entitled to substitute its own views on the merits for that of the Committee. The decision of the Committee stands unless it is shown that the Committee has gone wrong in one of the ways specified in Schedule 1(18)(7). So far as the reasonableness of a decision, the test is the rather familiar one being whether the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have so decided: Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223 . That again was common ground between the parties in this case and does not require further explication. Undue public nuisance [20] As regards

the expression "the possibility of undue public nuisance", I am unpersuaded that the use of that term by the legislature was intended to import into Scots law the English law as regards nuisance and its division between private and public nuisance. As Sheriff Jamieson put it in Elliot v McCandlish 2025 SC KL 92 at [22] and [23]: "The law of Scotland does not divide nuisances into public and private as does the law in England and Wales ... There are differences in the law of nuisance as between Scotland and England and Wales. Case law from England and Wales may be useful but must be treated with care having regard to those differences ..." I respectfully agree with those statements. [21] In Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 , 57 the Lord President said as follows: "I deduce that the proper angle of approach to a case of alleged nuisance is rather from the standpoint of the victim of the loss or inconvenience rather than from the standpoint of the alleged offender; and that, if any person so uses his property as to occasion serious disturbance or substantial inconvenience to his neighbour or material damage to his neighbour's property, it is in the general case irrelevant as a defence for the defender to plead merely that he was making a normal and familiar use of his own property. The balance in all such cases has to be held between the freedom of the proprietor to use his property as

he pleases and the duty on the proprietor not to inflict material loss or inconvenience on adjoining proprietors or adjoining property; and in every case the answer depends on considerations of fact and of degree. I cannot accept the extreme view that in order to make a relevant case of nuisance it is always necessary for the pursuer to aver that the type of user complained of was in itself nonnatural, unreasonable and unusual. Especially when (as in this case) the so-called `locality' principle applies it must be accepted that a certain amount of inconvenience, annoyance, disturbance and even damage must just be accepted as the price the pursuer pays for staying where he does in a city tenement. The critical question is whether what he was exposed to was plus quam tolerabile when due weight has been given to all the surrounding circumstances of the offensive conduct and its effects. If that test is satisfied, I do not consider that our law accepts as a defence that the nature of the user complained of was usual, familiar and normal. Any type of use which in the sense indicated above subjects adjoining proprietors to substantial annoyance, or causes material damage to their property, is prima facie not a reasonable use." [emphases in the original] [22] I respectfully adopt that explanation. Those dicta emphasise that what constitutes a nuisance is in every case a matter of fact

and degree, that a nuisance may arrive in many different guises and the correct approach is concerned with what is more than tolerable to those on the receiving end of the conduct, in the context in which the alleged nuisance occurs. [23] No Scottish authoritative source for the meaning "undue public nuisance" was advanced by the parties. There is no definition of that term in the 1982 Act or the Licensing Order. The use of the adjective "undue" might be thought to be otiose since the definition of "nuisance" already incorporates a similar sense: plus quam tolerabile. An alternative view, and one gives weight to the way in which Parliament has cast the legislation, is that the use of the adjective "undue" is intended to emphasise that the licensing authority retains a wide discretion when considering matters of nuisance, obliging it to make an evaluative judgement as to the seriousness and extent of any public nuisance that may be extended. As to the word "possibility" that is clearly intended to direct the licensing authority to consider whether the proposed activity has the potential to cause undue nuisance to the public even if such a nuisance has not yet been proven to occur. [24] In my view, it is a matter for the licensing Committee in all such cases, to decide whether the effects or anticipated effects of the STL constitute a nuisance and if so whether that is or would

be sufficiently widespread as to constitute a public nuisance. That is, the question as to whether use of the premises for the specified activity might cause the possibility of undue nuisance, and one that affects the public or a class of the public, will in each case be highly fact specific. Thus, in the Bengal Dish Ltd case, a case concerning the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 rather than the 1982 Act, the court held that in the specific circumstances (which the report shows were not straightforward), which included the fact that the number of objectors had dwindled to one, the problems posed by late-night music did not amount to a public nuisance. Contrariwise, in the unreported case of Harrison v Aberdeen City Council [2026] SC ABE 18 , a decision of Sheriff Miller (as he then was) concerning the STL legislation, the sheriff upheld the decision of the licensing authority to refuse a STL licence even though there was only one objector to the STL licence application. The court held that though there was just one objector, the Committee was entitled on the material before it to conclude that there was created by the STL the possibility of a nuisance (principally waste management and parking) to some of the public, being residents in the street. In the English case of Attorney General v PYA Quarries Ltd (No.1) 1957 2 QB 169 , considered by the sheriff principal in Bengal

Dish, the court decided that for the purposes of English law, a public nuisance may be proved by the cumulative effect shown to have had on people living within its sphere of influence; what is the relevant class of the public is a matter of fact in every case. Significance of previous licence [25] As regards the fact that this appeal concerns an application for renewal, as the appellant correctly conceded during the appeal hearing, that fact does not create any expectation, still less a right, that the licensing authority will renew the licence. Though the respondent had a policy that on renewal, if there were no changes in circumstances, the licence was likely to be granted, that did not amount to a right. It was common ground that a licensing authority, when approaching the question of renewal, must consider afresh whether to grant a licence. There is nothing in law to prevent a licensing authority from refusing to renew a licence in such a case. The licensing authority is not permitted to fetter its discretion even in cases where there has been no change in circumstances. Again, as was accepted by the parties, after discussion during the appeal hearing, the fact that a particular matter was before the previous Committee which granted a licence does not mean that that same matter cannot be considered afresh by the Committee considering an application for renewal. All that

follows from the statutory obligations placed on the respondent as a licensing authority. [26] However, it is plain that if the premises have previously been licensed, that fact has to be taken into account by the Committee considering the application for renewal. [27] In addition, where a licensing authority has refused to renew a licence, it may be that a duty arises to adequately explain its reasons for doing so. In R v Birmingham City Council ex parte Sheptonhurst Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 1026, a case involving applications for renewal of sex shop licences, the Court of Appeal held that where there had been no relevant change of circumstances since the previous grant of licence, providing it gave due weight to the fact that the licence had previously been granted and gave rational reasons for now refusing the renewal, the licensing authority was entitled to refuse the application for renewal. Planning considerations [28] As for the legal significance of the certificate of lawful use for the activity, licensing of which is sought, that is a relevant matter which the licensing authority requires to take into account. A certificate of lawful existing use is one which is granted by the local authority acting as a planning authority rather than as a licensing authority. The certificate certifies that the use of the premises complied with planning law at the time of the application

for that certificate and provides immunity from planning enforcement action for that specific use. However, the existence of such a certificate does not in any way bind the hands of the local authority acting as a licensing authority or compel it to grant a licence for the activity in question. The considerations which apply on the one hand to planning permission (or certificate of lawful use) and licensing of activity on the other hand are separate and distinct. A certificate of lawful use is not time-limited, unlike a licence. The existence of planning consent (or certificate of lawful use) says nothing about the way in which that activity has been conducted or will be conducted in practice. Adequacy of reasons [29] So far as the adequacy of reasons is concerned, the parties agreed the appropriate standard is that found in Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1948 SLT 345. It is worth restating the well-known dicta of Lord Emslie at page 348: "All that requires to be said is that in order to comply with the statutory duty imposed upon [the administrative authority, it] must give proper and adequate reasons for [its] decision which deal with the substantial questions in issue in an intelligible way. The decision must, in short, leave the informed reader and the court in no real and substantial doubt as to what the reasons for it were and what were

the material considerations which were taken into account in reaching it.". [30] I turn now to consider the decision of the licensing authority made through the Committee as expressed in its statement of reasons which cover five pages. [31] At the outset, the reasons clearly set out all the material taken into account: see above at para [19]. The reasons summarised the substance of the objections: noise and disturbance of various kinds caused by the use of the premises by short-term visitors day and night, anti-social behaviour by those guests, inadequate repair arrangements, a party in the stairwell, smoking by guests at the front door, cigarette smoke in the stair, littering and significant security concerns. [32] The submissions on behalf of the applicant were summarised being: the objections were the same as those considered previously when the licence was initially applied for and there had been no change of circumstances; all material matters had been investigated and resolved; all safety certification and licence requirements had been properly adhered to; the short term residents had strict instructions to avoid noise; inspections had been carried out by the local authority revealing no concerns; the applicant was fully co-operative; there was a 24 hour contact number; there was no public nuisance; the guests were not responsible for the security concerns. [33] In my

view, the procedure followed by the Committee was unimpeachable. Both parties were fully heard. The reasons show that the Committee was fully engaged in the decision-making process, had before it all relevant material and only that material was taken into account. [34] Turning then to the decision of the Committee, that is expressed in a single paragraph on page 3 headed "Decision" as follows: "The decision of the Committee was that the application be refused on the grounds that the premises were not suitable for the activity of short-term letting having regard to the location, character or position of the premises and the possibility that the use of those premises would cause undue public nuisance in terms of the [1982 Act], schedule 1 paragraphs 5(c)(i)-(iv) as applied by the [Licensing Order]". [35] I reject the primary submission of the appellant that in making its decision, the Committee concerned itself only with the content of sub paragraphs (i) and (iv) and did not take account of the provisions of sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii). That is because the decision expressly refers to sub-paragraphs "(i) - (iv)", that is all four of those sub-paragraphs, not just two of them. Any doubt that might have been created by the reference only to "location and character or position of the premises" and "public nuisance" is removed later where the Committee reiterates that the

objectors' submissions raised concerns relevant to the provisions of Schedule 1 paragraphs 5(c)(i) - (iv), that is all four of the sub-paragraphs. Further, removing any doubt, the Committee makes express reference to the "nature and extent of the proposed activity" (sub-paragraph (ii)) and finds that the activity of short-term letting would "have a negative impact such that the premises was unsuitable due to the frequency of guests changeover which was markedly different from long-term residence". The Committee also makes specific reference to "the kind of persons likely to be in the premises" (sub-paragraph (iii)) when it explains that: "the majority of the Committee accepted the submissions of the objectors that STL guests are likely to be persons who are on holiday, keep irregular hours and have a lack of familiarity with reasonable expectations of appropriate conduct given the otherwise long-term residential nature of the tenement building and this had a bearing on the suitability of the premises for STL." Thus, while the precise expression of the "Decision" found at page 4 of the reasons could have been better put, it is plain when the reasons are read as a whole, as they must be, that the Committee clearly had in mind its statutory role which was to decide whether the premises were suitable having regard all the factors in Schedule 1(5)(3) (four of which were relevant to

its decision). The statement of reasons, taken as a whole, could have left the informed reader in no substantial doubt as to which parts of the legislation it applied. The Committee is not a court of law; it is a lay decision-making body. An excessive technical approach to examination of the expression of reasons is inappropriate. [36] Returning to the statement of reasons, the Committee decided that the criterion in sub-paragraph (i) was relevant in that the premises were located in a tenemental building and had a shared entrance with neighbours who lived in close proximity to the premises. It obviously had in mind the representations made to it by those same neighbours as regards the deleterious effects on them of the short-term letting of the premises on the top floor. So far as sub-paragraph (iv) was concerned (the possibility of the creation of an undue public nuisance), at page 4, it is plain that the Committee took into account: the type of accommodation being tenemental accommodation; the premises being located at the top floor; frequent and unpredictable visits by short-term users of the property at various times of the day and night causing noise and disturbance to the others living on the stair; that those users would be likely to have a lack of familiarity with reasonable expectations of appropriate conduct given the otherwise long-term residential nature of the

tenement building; and certain security considerations: all being relevant to consideration of whether there would be the possibility of an undue public nuisance. [37] At page 5 of the statement of reasons, the Committee states that it was satisfied that: "the neighbouring residents represented an identifiable class of the public and that the adverse impact of short-term letting was more than would be reasonably expected or tolerable in a residential tenement". In my view, the Committee was entitled in law and fact to decide that the material placed before it was evidence of a nuisance and that the five objectors from three of the neighbouring flats represented an identifiable class of the public, in the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, it was entitled to conclude on the material placed before it that the adverse impact was more than reasonably expected or tolerable in such a setting. That is obviously a reference to the statutory consideration to which the Committee was bound to have regard. So the Committee decided on the material before it that the use of the premises for the activity of short-term letting gave rise to the possibility of undue public nuisance. That was a judgement for the Committee to make, which it was entitled to make. [38] In making that decision, it is clear from the reasons at page 5 that the Committee took into account fully the submissions

made by the applicant's agent which are referred to above. However, the Committee evidentially preferred the submissions of the objectors (whose "lived experience" informed their submissions), to the submissions of the applicant. The Committee expressly rejected the contention of the applicant that the concerns raised by the objectors were spurious and unreasonable. In so doing, in my opinion, the Committee did not act unreasonably. The matters considered by the Committee were all relevant to the question that it had to consider. Having heard opposing contentions, the Committee was fully entitled to prefer the contentions of the objectors to those of the applicant. Contrary to what is asserted in the appeal to this court, there is nothing unreasonable in the Committee preferring the account given by the objectors detailing their "lived experience" to the report from its own enforcement officer the applicant's submissions. It is entirely a matter for a Committee to decide between those contentions and to place such weight as it considers appropriate on the material placed before it. Preferring the contentions of the objectors who placed their objections in writing, who appeared before the Committee in person and who were questioned by Committee members, is not the mark of a Committee acting unreasonably. [39] As regards the fact that the premises benefited from a certificate of

lawful use, the reasons make it clear that it was aware that such a certificate was in place and that that fact was taken into account. I deal above with the significance of that fact in law. That fact did not create in law any presumption in favour of licensing but was simply one matter to be taken into account, the weight of which was a matter for the Committee. The Committee appears to have given that factor limited weight and to have preferred the material concerning the matters raised by the objectors. That was entirely a matter for the Committee. [40] As regards the fact that the premises had previously benefited from a licence, I deal above with the significance of that fact in law. The Committee was fully aware of that and deal with it at page 5 stating: "The Committee noted submissions [from the applicant] that similar concerns [to those raised by the objectors] had been raised when the initial licence was applied for. It considered that this application needed to be considered on its individual merits. Having found the issues raised by objectors to be credible and continuing during the period when the property was subject to licence conditions concluded that the licensing of the property had been ineffective in addressing those concerns." [41] Thus, the reasons demonstrate that, the Committee was aware that as a matter of law, notwithstanding a previous licence, the

application in question had to be considered afresh on its own merits. Second, on the material in front of it, the Committee rejected the submission that there had been no change in circumstances since the last licence had been granted. On the contrary, the Committee accepted the submissions of the objectors that the type of problems resulting from the use of the premises as a short-term let continued during the course of the term of the license previously granted and that there were new instances of that type of problem. The Committee was entitled to find that that was new material relevant to the grant of a renewal licence. The fact that the nature of the problems identified by the objectors was similar in some respects to what had occurred previously did not mean those problems could not amount to a change of circumstances. On the contrary, the fact that those problems were continuing despite the existence of the licence conditions led the Committee to the conclusion that the licensing of the property had been ineffective in addressing those problems. That was not an unreasonable conclusion. [42] The ultimate conclusion of the Committee was that in its opinion, the property was not suitable for letting short-term having regard to the location, character and condition of the premises, the nature and extent of the proposed activity, the kind of persons likely to be in the

premises and the possibility of undue public nuisance and so it refused to renew the licence. In my view, the manner in which the Committee came to that opinion and the basis for that decision was lawful and rational. The reasons for reaching that decision have been put in a conspicuously cogent manner which demonstrate that all relevant matters been taken into account and that the basis for the decision was lawful and not unreasonable. The reasons as expressed could not leave the informed observer in any real and substantial doubt as what the reasons were and the material considerations taken into account. None of the grounds on which this court would be entitled to uphold an appeal set out in Schedule 1 paragraph 18(7) to the 1982 Act are established. This appeal accordingly is refused. Expenses [43] The parties agreed that expenses would follow success. I therefore find the appellant liable to the respondent in the expenses occasioned by the appeal, as taxed. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII URL: https://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotSC/2026/2026scedin31.html