Santander Consumer (UK) Plc against Renata Dikmone (Sheriff Appeal Court Civil) [2026] SACCIV 27 (23 April 2026)

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SHERIFF APPEAL COURT [2026] SAC (Civ) 27 DUN-A229-19 Sheriff Principal G A Wade KC Temporary Sheriff Principal B Mohan Appeal Sheriff I M Fleming

OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by SHERIFF PRINCIPAL G A WADE KC in the appeal in the cause SANTANDER CONSUMER (UK) PLC Pursuer, Appellant and Cross-Respondent against RENATA DIKMONE, as executrix dative of the late RAMUNAS DIKMONAS Defender, Respondent and Cross-Appellant Pursuer, Appellant and Cross-Respondent: Tosh; DWF LLP Defender, Respondent and Cross-Appellant: Absent 23 April 2026 Introduction [1] This opinion should be read in conjunction with the opinion of this court on the merits of the appeal dated 3 September 2025. The dispute which formed the subject matter of the proceedings related to the purchase of an Audi Q7 motor vehicle by the late Mr Ramunas Dikmonas on 24 October 2018. The vehicle developed faults and Mr Dikmonas sought to reject it on the basis that it was not of satisfactory quality nor fit for purpose at the point of sale. A question arose as to whether he was entitled to exercise his right to reject the vehicle under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ("the 2015 Act"). The respondent and cross-appellant ("the respondent") in the present appeal is Mr Dikmonas's executrix dative, Ms Dikmone. [2] The case has a lengthy procedural history for a variety of reasons. Following sundry procedure and the withdrawal of the respondent's agents, the respondent failed to appear at a continued peremptory diet on 16 March 2026. The case was continued for written

submissions to be lodged on behalf of the appellant and cross-respondent ("the appellant") by 1 April 2026 to address the court on disposal and expenses and to enable the court to be quorate for a disposal covering these matters. The respondent is no longer engaging in the process and did not appear or lodge any submissions when the case called before us on 15 April 2026. Relevant factual background and timeline [3] The factual background is laid out in full in paras [2] to [11] of our opinion of 3 September 2025 but as the timeline of events is relevant to our decisions on final disposal and expenses we have summarised the relevant dates for ease of reference. [4] Put shortly the vehicle was purchased via a credit intermediary with the appellant providing finance for the transaction by way of a credit sale agreement ("the Agreement"). The purchase price was £20,995. Mr Dikmonas paid a deposit of £8,000 and the appellant provided finance of £12,995. Mr Dikmonas was to repay the figure of £12,995, plus interest of £1,987.72, over the term of the Agreement, amounting to a total of £14,982.72. [5] The vehicle developed faults which Mr Dikmonas eventually reported to the appellant on 29 May 2019, more than 7 months after the Agreement had been entered into. He advised that he did not consider the vehicle to have been of satisfactory quality at the point of sale and sought to reject

it. He demanded a refund and stopped making payments to the appellant who served him with a default notice on 31 July 2019 and terminated the Agreement on 6 September 2019 at which point there was a balance outstanding to the appellant of £10,647.76. [6] The appellant raised proceedings at Dundee Sheriff Court on 25 September 2019 seeking the outstanding sum plus interest. Mr Dikmonas not only defended the action but also brought a counterclaim on 4 November 2019 seeking (i) declarator of reduction of the Agreement with the appellant on the basis of the alleged misrepresentations made by the employees of the seller of the vehicle; or (ii) declarator that: (a) the appellant was in breach of the Agreement by not providing a vehicle of satisfactory quality; (b) he had validly rejected the vehicle on 29 May 2019; and (c) he was entitled to damages as a result. [7] In the meantime the vehicle was returned to the appellant and was sold at auction. Costs of £525 were incurred to repossess the vehicle. The vehicle was sold for £12,272.01, which sum was applied to the balance due and outstanding under the Agreement. The net sale proceeds of £1,739.75 were then paid to Mr Dikmonas. All sums due to the appellant had been paid by 17 July 2020. Nevertheless the action at the instance of the appellant trundled on to proof which began on 20 September 2021. [8] The sheriff's judgment was

issued on 22 September 2022. In short, despite failing to deal with a preliminary objection raised by the appellant to evidence being led anent agency for which there was no record, the sheriff made a finding that the credit intermediary had been an agent of the appellant and that the car had been validly rejected by Mr Dikmonas. He certified the cause as suitable for the instruction of junior counsel and also certified Mr Bathgate and Mr Forrest as expert witnesses for the respondent. It was against this decision that the appeal was directed. Decision of the Sheriff Appeal Court [9] Following the appeal hearing this court held that the sheriff erred in holding that the credit intermediary had acted as an agent for the appellant in its dealings with the respondent as there were no averments on record in relation to the existence of an agency relationship. Thus any evidence to that effect ought to have been excluded in line with the appellant's preliminary objection with which the sheriff had failed to deal. Accordingly the findings in fact upon which the sheriff's decision had been based could not be supported. That being so finding in fact and law [2] could not stand. As those erroneous conclusions formed the basis of the sheriff's decision to assoilzie the respondent in the principal action and to grant decree in its counterclaim, the appeal was sustained. [10] The

respondent's cross-appeal also fell to be refused because the statutory right of rejection under section 24(5)(a) of the 2015 Act only applies where the trader had been given an opportunity to repair or replace the goods on one occasion. That opportunity was not afforded in this case. [11] At paras [37] to [41] of the opinion this court then discussed the disposal of the action because despite the court's analysis of the merits it did not necessarily follow, on the basis of the pleadings and the undisturbed findings in fact, that the appellant was entitled to decree as first craved. Final disposal and expenses [12] At the time of raising the action, the Agreement between the parties had not yet matured. Prior to the Agreement maturing or the action proceeding to proof, the appellant had repossessed the vehicle, auctioned it and recovered all sums due under the Agreement. This is acknowledged by the appellant on Record and at paragraph 3 of their recent written submissions. [13] In accordance with the Agreement the respondent was liable to pay the appellant £14,982,72 consisting of £12,995 credit and £1,987.72 in interest. The obligation was to repay that sum over 24 months from the date of the Agreement of 24 October 2018. The maturity date of the Agreement was 24 October 2020, which is agreed by the parties at Article 4 of Condescendence and Answer 4. [14] By the time of the

proof the appellant had recovered the vehicle, auctioned it and recovered all sums due under the Agreement. Mr Dikmonas had received the balance due on sale of the vehicle and accordingly the appellant was not entitled to payment of any further sums or indeed interest thereon. Neither party appears to have addressed this issue at any point before or during the appeal proceedings. Indeed even in its written submissions to this court dated 1 April 2026 the appellant sought, inter alia, decree as first craved under deduction of the sum of £12,272.01 and to dismiss the second crave as unnecessary. [15] Standing the foregoing we do not consider the appellant was entitled to the remedy craved by the time of the proof. Prior to the Record being closed, maturity of the Agreement or the proof, the appellant had recovered all sums due under the Agreement. The terms of the Agreement are incorporated brevitatis causa . There is nothing on Record, including within the Agreement itself, that would entitle the appellant to interest. The respondent satisfied all sums due to the appellant prior to probation (save, perhaps, any sums due for the costs of raising proceedings in terms of clause 9.3 of the Agreement). Accordingly, there being no relevant basis in the pleadings to justify declarator for interest, decree therefor falls to be refused. [16] Secondly we are not persuaded that this court

should grant declarator for the sums craved under deduction of the net sale proceeds as submitted by the appellant. Where bare declarator is sought, it must have a purpose and produce a practical result. The court has power to grant decree declaring the existence or non-existence of specific parties' rights and obligations. In such cases there must be a purpose behind seeking the declarator. There must be some dispute about the matter sought to be declared, and the declarator itself must be designed to achieve some form of practical result. Macnaughton v Macnaughton's Trustees SC 387; Keatings v Advocate General for Scotland & Others [2021] CSIH 25 , at paragraphs 51 - 53. [17] In this context declarator serves no such purpose and does not achieve a practical result. The appellant recovered the vehicle and auctioned it. All sums due were recovered more than 5 years ago, prior to the closing of the Record and well before the diet of proof. The respondent is deceased and no longer engaged in the process. On any view the counterclaim and the associated cross-appeal now fall to be refused for want of insistence. [18] In any event the effect of the previous decision of this court at paras [31] - [33] is that craves four to eight of the counterclaim must also fall given the terms of the respondent's third to eighth pleas-in-law in the counterclaim. [19] The focus of our decision in

allowing this appeal has been on the sheriff incorrectly assessing the facts and law anent agency and rejection of the vehicle. Before this court counsel for the respondent did not seek to rely upon any misrepresentation by the salesman at the point of purchase. While there are undisturbed findings in fact which relate to the respondent's first to third craves in the counterclaim, we have received no further submissions in relation to them or how they ought to be disposed of and therefore proceed on the basis that these craves must also fall for want of insistence. [20] We have considered whether we should simply grant decree of absolvitor in relation to all of the respondent's craves in the counterclaim on the basis of her non-appearance in terms of Sheriff Appeal Court ("SAC") Rule 18.4(3). However that rule requires the appellant to show cause for absolvitor rather than dismissal. Accordingly in our view the appropriate course in relation to the counterclaim is to assoilzie the appellant from craves four to eight and, thereafter, to dismiss the remainder of the counterclaim for want of insistence. [21] For these reasons, we do not consider the disposal sought by the appellant to be either competent or appropriate. In disposing of the substantive matter we shall therefore allow the appeal; recall the sheriff's interlocutor; refuse the appellant's craves in the principal

action; assoilzie the appellant from craves four to eight of the counterclaim and quoad ultra dismiss the remaining craves of counterclaim for want of insistence. Expenses [22] The appellant seeks the expenses of the appeal, the action and the counterclaim. Expenses ordinarily follow success, but it is always a matter within the court's discretion having regard to the whole circumstances including an assessment of the extent to which the action was necessary. We have had regard to the fact that, in terms of the Agreement between the parties the appellant was entitled to raise the action when it did, but it would appear that that entitlement was not sufficiently kept under review during the course of the proceedings either at first instance or on appeal. [23] The appellant repossessed the vehicle and recovered all sums due well before maturity of the Agreement, the closing of the Record and the matter proceeding to proof. Despite having been in receipt of the proceeds of sale of the vehicle in or around mid-July 2020 the excess balance was not returned to the respondent until late September 2020. Despite this, the appellant nonetheless insisted upon its action and continues to insist upon its crave including interest despite noting in the written submissions that interest is not due. [24] We have taken into account that a substantial part of the proof was taken up with

the counterclaim, but the counterclaim was, in effect, necessitated as part of the defence to the action at the instance of the appellant. Had the appellant abandoned the principal action after settlement in full had been achieved the respondent would have been better placed to consider the value, if any, in proceeding with the counterclaim. It is at best questionable whether the procedure following satisfaction of the appellant's rights in full was justified and served any useful function. [25] In light of the protracted procedural history of this matter, Mr Dikmonas having passed away and the respondent having failed to appear at the peremptory hearing or proceed with the cross-appeal to its conclusion, we consider it appropriate to approach the question of expenses in terms of what is in the interests of justice in bringing this matter to a close. In all the circumstances we shall make an award of expenses in favour of the appellant in respect of the proceedings at first instance up to the date of recovery of the sums due (17 July 2020) in terms of the Agreement only and thereafter we shall make no award of expenses to or by either party except in so far as already dealt with. [26] Having had regard to the previous interlocutors it would appear that at least five of them, including the sheriff's final interlocutor deal with expenses, sanction for counsel and certification of

Mr Bathgate and Mr Forrest as skilled witnesses. On 6 February 2020 the sheriff was addressed on the return of the vehicle to the appellant which had occurred that day. However it was not until 17 July 2020 that the vehicle was sold. On 19 February 2020 the respondent was found liable to the appellant in respect of an amendment process and on 6 May 2021 the court granted sanction for counsel for both parties from and including 8 April 2021 and ongoing from that date. Notwithstanding that finding the sheriff's interlocutor of 27 September 2022 following proof again certified the cause as suitable for the employment of junior counsel. Mr Bathgate and Mr Forrest were certified as experts and the appellant was found liable to the respondent in the expenses of the cause. [27] As that interlocutor is now to be recalled in its entirety and the expenses from 17 July 2020 fall to be dealt with on the basis that none are due to or by either party, the issue of certification and sanction requires to be looked at again. As the action commenced after 29 April 2019, the Act of Sederunt (Taxation of Judicial Expenses Rules) 2019 apply. Rule 5.3(5) provides that the court may only determine that the certification has effect for the purposes of work already done by the person where the court is satisfied that the party applying has shown cause for not having applied for certification before the

work was done. Rule 1.2(1)(a)(ii), provides that the rules apply to proceedings in the SAC. [28] The appellant's note of argument (at para [69]) and written submissions (at para [11]) simply refer to the underlying motion before the sheriff without expanding upon whether cause has been shown to justify retrospective certification. That is a matter for us to determine. In light of the appellant having insisted upon the action after 17 July 2020 and having failed to produce a CV or report from his expert , Mr Brock, until August 2021 we are not persuaded that sufficient cause has been shown as reliance was placed on his evidence and certification sought at a point when the underlying action was redundant and academic. [29] In relation to sanction for counsel we are not aware of the extent to which counsel was involved pre-17 July 2020. Given sanction has already been granted for counsel `s involvement on both sides we shall not interfere with any retrospective orders in that regard. [30] For those reasons we shall, i) uphold the appeal and recall the sheriff's interlocutor of 27 September 2022 for the reasons given in the opinion of this court dated 3 September 2025; ii) thereafter in relation to the principal action: - repel the pleas-in-law for the appellant and refuse the appellant's first and second craves; - repel the respondent's first, second, third and fourth

pleas-in-law; - assoilzie the respondent from the craves in the principal action; iii) thereafter in relation to the counterclaim: - repel the respondent's third to eighth pleas-in-law; - sustain the appellant's sixth and seventh pleas-in-law; - assoilzie the appellant from the respondent's fourth to eighth craves in the counterclaim; iv) dismiss the remainder of the respondent's counterclaim for want of insistence; v) find the respondent liable to the appellant for the expenses of the principal action until 17 July 2020 and thereafter find no expenses due to or by either party in respect of the principal action, the counterclaim and the appeal. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII URL: https://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotSAC/Civ/2026/2026sacciv27.html