Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice Supreme Court and Others ([2025] (15 December 2025) SCA 20/2025 (Arising in MA 09/2025)) [2025] SCCA 25 (15 December 2025)

contents of #navigation-content will be placed in [data-offcanvas-body] for tablet/mobile screensize and #navigation-column for desktop screensize. Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [{"id": "h1_1", "type": "h1", "title": " Ex Parte Secombe 60 US (19 How.) 9, 15 L. ed.565 (1857) arose out of disciplinary ", "children": []}, {"id": "h1_2", "type": "h1", "title": "proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota. David A. Secombe had been duly admitted in 1852 as an attorney and counsellor of the Territorial Supreme Court, entitling him to practise in that court and the district courts of the Territory. In February 1856, the Territorial Supreme Court issued an order removing him from his office as attorney and counsellor and prohibiting him from practising further in any territorial court. The order stated that Secombe had, \u201cby his acts as such in open court,\u201d violated provisions of Minnesota\u2019s revised statutes requiring attorneys to maintain respect due to the courts and to conduct themselves with fidelity. ", "children": []}] IN THE SEYCHELLES COURT OF APPEAL Reportable [2025] (15 December 2025) SCA 20/2025 (Arising in MA 09/2025) In the Matter Between The Bar Association of Seychelles Appellant (rep.by Mr. Khalyaan Karunakaran On behalf of Mr. Divino Sabino) v/s The Honourable Chief Justice Supreme Court 1st Respondent (rep.by Mr. Frank Elizabeth) Nadine Sonia Camilla Alleear 2nd Respondent (rep.by Mr. Frank Elizabeth) The Honourable Attorney General 3rd Respondent (rep.by Mr. Vinsent Perera and Mr. Adam Afif) Neutral Citation: Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice Supreme Court and Others (SCA 20/2025) [2025] (Arising in MA 09/2025) (15 December 2025) Before: Gunesh-Balaghee, Sichinga, Sharpe-Phiri, JJA Summary: Practice and Procedure – Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court - Whether power to admit an attorney-at-law is an administrative or judicial function – whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to an admission of an attorney – whether an appeal against the decision of the Chief Justice to admit an attorney lies to the Court of Appeal – Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles [CAP 42], Art. 119, 125(1)(c) and 125(7); Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules 1995, rules 2(1), 2(2), 3(a), 5, 6, 7(1), 8; The Legal Practitioners Act [CAP111], sections 1(a)(i), (ii), (iii), 2, 3, 5(1)(b), 12 Heard: 3 December 2025 Delivered: 15 December 2025 ORDER The appeal against the decision of Judge Brassel Adeline of 16 July 2025 refusing leave to proceed with judicial review of a decision of the 1st Respondent is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGMENT SHARPE-PHIRI, JA (Gunesh-Balaghee JA, Sichinga JA, concurring) Introduction This is an appeal brought by the Bar Association of Seychelles (‘the Appellant’) against the Chief Justice of Seychelles (‘the 1st Respondent’), Nadine Sonia Camilla Allear (‘the 2nd Respondent’) and the Attorney General (‘the 3rd Respondent’) seeking to challenge the Ruling of the learned Judge Brassel Adeline of the Supreme Court of Seychelles delivered on 16 July 2025. In that Ruling, the learned Judge refused the Appellant leave to proceed with judicial review to challenge the decision of the 1st Respondent admitting the 2nd Respondent as an attorney-at-law of the Seychelles in exercise of the Court’s powers under Section 3(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act. The learned Judge determined that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution of Seychelles (hereafter ‘the Constitution’) read with the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Court, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules (hereafter ‘Supreme Court Supervisory Rules’) to review a decision of the Chief Justice, which in the view of the Judge, effectively was a decision of the Supreme Court itself. The background The Appellant, an Association of attorneys-at-law duly registered under the Registration of Associations Act instituted an application on 10 February 2025, under MC No. 9 of 2025. The application sought to challenge, by way of judicial review, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution, the decision of the 1st Respondent to admit the 2nd Respondent as an attorney-at-law. The 2nd Respondent’s admission to practice as an attorney-at-law was made by order of the 1st Respondent dated 11 November 2024 under the authority of the powers vested in the Supreme Court under the Legal Practitioners Act. The Appellant’s contention is that the admission order was erroneous, constituted an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the Supreme Court’s powers and exceeded the powers conferred under the Legal Practitioners Act, and was therefore illegal. The relevant provisions of the Appellant’s application are reproduced hereunder: The Admission Order disclosed that the 2nd Respondent holds a law degree from the University of Mauritius Middlesex, was called to the Utter Bar of the Society of the Middle Temple in July 2019, was awarded a Postgraduate Diploma in Legal Practice by the BBP University in September 2022, completed a one-year pupillage in Mauritius and was sworn in as a Barrister before the Supreme Court of Mauritius on 22nd January 2021, on which basis, the 1st Respondent admitted her as an attorney-at-law under the Legal Practitioners Act, with full rights of audience before all the courts of Seychelles. Section 5(1)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act requires that any person who seeks admission as an attorney-at-law under sub-section 5(1)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act, must have served a pupillage period, for an aggregate of 2 years, in an approved chamber or as Registrar of the Supreme Court. Section 2 of the Legal Practitioners Act defines the expression ‘approved chambers’ as a chamber of an attorney-at-law of at least 5 years’ standing, practising in Seychelles, and approved by the Chief Justice for the purposes of the Legal Practitioners Act or the Department of Legal Affairs. Section 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act requires that admission to act as an attorney-at-law under the section must be for a specific matter or proceedings, or for a period not exceeding 6 months. In practice, admission under Section 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act was granted to experienced advocates or legal expects practising in a Commonwealth jurisdiction, who would not otherwise be eligible to practice law in the courts of Seychelles, and in all such instances, complying with the requirements of that section. The Petitioner avers as follows: i) the 2nd Respondent does not meet the criteria for admission under subsections 1(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) of the Legal Practitioners Act as she has not served a pupillage period in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act; ii) the 2nd Respondent does not meet the criteria for admission under section 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act, which requires that an applicant be an experienced advocate or legal expert; iii) in any event, the 2nd Respondent’s admission is inconsistent with Section 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act as it is not limited to a specific proceeding or period of time not exceeding 6 months. In the circumstances, the 1st Respondent’s decision to admit the 2nd Respondent as an attorney-at-law under subsection 5(1)(a) and/or section 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act, is illegal inasmuch as it is an error of law, or alternatively, an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the powers of the Supreme Court, or in excess of the powers of the Supreme Court under the Legal Practitioners Act. The Petitioner prays as follows: Grant leave to the Petitioner to proceed with this Petition, in accordance with Rules 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdictions over Subordinate Courts, Tribunal and Adjudicatory Authorities) Rules; Direct the 1st Respondent to produce all relevant records, in accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules; and After hearing the Petition – Grant a declaration that the order of the 1st Respondent dated 11 November 2024 purporting to admit the 2nd Respondent as an attorney-at-law under the subsection 5(1)(a) and /or section 12 of the Legal Practitioner Act, is an error of law, or alternatively, an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the powers of the Supreme Court, or in exercise of the powers of the Supreme Court granted under the Legal Practitioner Act, and is therefore illegal. Issue an order of certiorari quashing the aforementioned order of the 1st Respondent; and Grant such further orders or other relief as may seem just in the circumstances. The application was listed ex parte, but heard inter parte as the 2nd Respondent who had notice of the matter was present in court and objected to the grant of leave by virtue of Rule 7(1) of Court Supervisory Rules. The 2nd Respondent raised objections. Preliminary Objection by the Respondents The 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a preliminary objection on 27 February 2025, asserting that the Appellant's application was defective and incompetent for non-compliance with Rules 2(1), 2(2), and 3(a) of the Court Supervisory Rules as the application ought to have been commenced by petition supported by affidavit rather than the "Notice of Application." Counsel submitted that this flagrant procedural irregularity rendered the proceedings a nullity, depriving the court of jurisdiction. This position was affirmed in Gemuenden v Seychelles Investment Board (SCA 14/2024) and Choppy v Choppy SLR 161, where non-compliance with prescribed forms was regarded as fatal. Appellants response to Preliminary Objection Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Respondents' preliminary objections were purely procedural and failed to address whether the Appellant possessed sufficient interest to pursue judicial review. He refuted the contention that the proceedings mirrored the fatal error in Gemuenden v Seychelles Investment Board (SCA 14/2024), clarifying that the authority had established no requirement for a separate “leave to proceed” application distinct from the petition (supported by affidavit), and distinguished the instant case as properly instituted thereby. On the substantive leave application, counsel invoked Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules, emphasising Rule 8’s criteria of “sufficient interest” and “good faith,” citing Karunakaran v Constitutional Appointment Authority (SCA 33/2016) for the principle that leave filters out hopeless, frivolous, or vexatious claims, advancing only arguable matters fit for full hearing. He referenced section 3 of the Legal Practitioners Act, vesting admission authority in the Supreme Court, exercised by the 1st Respondent (Chief Justice) in that capacity. Decision of the Supreme Court Having heard the application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings, the learned Judge Adeline, of the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Appellant’s application sought the exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution of Seychelles and the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules. The learned Judge also recognised that the decision, which the Appellant claimed affected its interests, fell within the statutory powers and jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to section 3(1) of Part II of the Legal Practitioners Act. The learned Judge framed the central question for determination as: “Can the Supreme Court, in exercise of its Supervisory Jurisdiction over the Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities, review its own decision by way of judicial review?” The learned Judge noted that the Appellant seeking to invoke the Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction was effectively calling upon the Court to review its own decision admitting the 2nd Respondent as an attorney-at-law. In the opinion of the Judge below, the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution and the Court Supervisory Rules extended to subordinate courts such as Magistrates courts; tribunals such as the Family Tribunal and Employment Tribunal; and adjudicating authorities, such as Planning Authorities. Relying on his interpretation of Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules, the Judge below determined that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction under those provisions to accord the Appellant the reliefs sought. He held that any challenge to the Chief Justice’s decision, pursuant to section 3(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act which constitutes a decision of the Supreme Court, ought to have been pursued by way of an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s application, for want of jurisdiction and awarded costs to the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The Appeal Dissatisfied with Ruling of Judge Adeline of 16 July 2025, the Appellant has appealed to this court on the following seven grounds, reproduced verbatim: The learned Judge erred in law in concluding that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the application for judicial review. The learned Judge incorrectly held that the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution and the corresponding Rules applies only to subordinate courts, tribunals, and other adjudicating authorities, thereby precluding a review of a decision made under the Legal Practitioners Act, specifically, precluding a review of the decision of the Honourable Chief Justice to admit the 2nd Respondent as an attorney-at-law. The learned Judge fundamentally mischaracterised the nature of the power being exercised. The enrolment of an attorney-at-law is determined pursuant to statutory authority under the Legal Practitioner Act. While this power of admission is vested in the Supreme Court and exercised by the Honourable Chief Justice, the function is administrative (i.e., implementing statutory requirements and managing the Roll of attorneys), and not a judicial one. The learned Judge erred by conflating the administrative act of admission with the judicial functions of the Supreme Court, thereby, wrongly concluding the Court was being asked to review its own judicial decision. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that the enrolment process is administrative because it involves assessing qualifications, good character and other procedural factors specified by the Legal Practitioner Act, rather than the resolution of a legal dispute between parties in an adversarial context. Such decisions do not set legal precedent or resolve legal ambiguities in the manner of a judicial act. While the process may acquire quasi-judicial characteristics if a dispute arises requiring the hearing of evidence (e.g., concerning the recognition of a foreign qualification), the act of admission itself remains, by default, an administrative decision exercised under a statutory mandate. The learned Judge erred in failing to find that the Supreme Court, when exercising its administrative and procedural powers of admission under the Legal Practitioners Act, was acting as an “adjudicating authority” within the meaning of Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, and was therefore, subject to the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. The learned Judge’s finding that the proper recourse was an appeal to the Court of Appeal is an error of law. The Legal Practitioners Act establishes no right of appeal from a decision to admit a person as an attorney-at-law. By denying the availability of judicial review for an administrative act, while suggesting an unavailable appellate remedy, the learned Judge has effectively left the Appellant without any legal recourse to challenge a potentially unlawful administrative act. Consequently, the only avenue available to review the legality of the Supreme Court’s decision admitting the 2nd Respondent is a judicial review under the Rules. In dismissing the application on a preliminary jurisdictional point, the Judge failed to adjudicate on the substantive question of whether the Appellant had made out an arguable case on the merits fit for further consideration at a full hearing. In all the circumstances of the case, the learned Judge’s decision to dismiss the application for leave to proceed with judicial review was erroneous and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The Appellant prayed that the appeal be allowed, leave to proceed with judicial review be granted; the matter be remitted to the Supreme Court for hearing before another Judge; and it be granted costs and any other relief deemed fit by the court. Court’s Consideration of Appeal I have carefully considered the appeal and the submissions of the parties. For the sake of clarity and efficiency, I will address the first four grounds of appeal concurrently, as they arise from the same constitutional and statutory framework and involve a common underlying inquiry into the institutional authority of the Supreme Court. The central issues under these grounds are: i) Whether, in admitting the 2nd Respondent under the Legal Practitioners Act, the Supreme Court (acting through the Chief Justice) was exercising an administrative function, rather than a judicial one, such that the decision constitutes an administrative act subject to judicial review and supervisory control; ii) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules, to entertain an application for judicial review challenging the Chief Justice’s decision to admit an attorney-at-law under the Legal Practitioners Act, and whether that decision is amenable to supervisory review; iii) Whether, when exercising its statutory powers of admission under the Legal Practitioners Act, the Supreme Court functions as an ‘adjudicating authority’ within the meaning of Article 125(1)(c) and the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules and is thereby subject to its own supervisory jurisdiction. These grounds engage overlapping legal principles concerning the nature of the Court’s functions when assessing qualifications, applying statutory requirements, and issuing orders that confer or withhold professional status. A joint treatment of these grounds prevents artificial separation and allows for a coherent analysis of how the Constitution, the Legal Practitioners Act, and relevant comparative jurisprudence collectively delineate the Supreme Court’s role in regulating admission to the legal profession. Whether the power to admit is administrative or judicial The Appellant’s counsel contended that the lower court mischaracterised the power of admission under the Legal Practitioners Act as judicial rather than administrative. Although this power is vested in the Supreme Court and exercised by the Chief Justice, it involves the implementation of statutory criteria and management of the Roll through a non-adversarial evaluation of qualifications, character, and procedural compliance. Such decisions neither create legal precedents nor resolve disputes, and therefore retain an administrative character, notwithstanding any quasi-judicial elements arising in contested cases, such as recognition of foreign qualifications. Mr. Elizabeth opposed the characterisation of admissions as administrative, stressing that they constitute an inherently judicial function under section 3 of the Legal Practitioners Act. This function involves determining legal status with attendant rights and obligations through statutory interpretation, assessment of qualifications, pupillage equivalence, and character evaluation, all involving judicial discretion and carrying significant professional consequences. Counsel for the Respondent distinguished these judicial functions from purely administrative tasks such as the maintenance of the Roll or policy implementation. He underscored that the source of statutory power does not determine its character, citing judicial functions derived from statute, including granting bail and issuing search warrants. Moreover, he argued that the lack of adversarial proceedings does not render a function administrative, drawing analogies to probate and other uncontested judicial processes. The Appellant’s counsel further submitted that the learned Judge erred in conflating this administrative function with the Court’s judicial role, thereby failing to recognize that the Supreme Court qualifies as an “adjudicating authority” under Article 125(1)(c), of the Constitution making its decisions subject to supervisory jurisdiction. Counsel for the Appellant further submitted that the lower court erred in ruling that the Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution applies exclusively to subordinate courts, tribunals, and adjudicating authorities, thereby excluding review of decisions made pursuant to section 3(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act. He contended that the constitutional provision is explicit regarding its scope, relying on Article 125(7) of the Constitution which defines an “adjudicating body.” He submitted that every administrative decision made by such an adjudicating body is subject to review and challenge. In response to the Appellant’s contention that the Supreme Court acts as an “adjudicating authority” subject to its own supervisory jurisdiction when performing admission functions, the Respondent’s counsel argued that such a position would imply the Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction over itself, which is constitutionally impermissible. He emphasised that the Supreme Court is not a subordinate court or tribunal, but a superior court of original jurisdiction established under Article 125(2) of the Constitution, vested with supervisory authority over inferior bodies. The Court’s constitutional status remains uniform irrespective of the nature of the function it performs, including admissions. Further, it was submitted by the Respondent’s counsel that the Chief Justice falls outside the definition of “adjudicating authority” in Article 127(7) for several reasons: (i) as constitutional head of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice exercises inherent judicial powers rather than those of a separate body or authority; (ii) the term must be read in the context of “subordinate courts” and “tribunals,” which signify entities inferior to the Supreme Court; and (iii) equating the Chief Justice with an adjudicating authority would lead to absurd outcomes, subjecting core judicial acts, such as case assignments, practice directions, disciplinary decisions under section 16 of the Legal Practitioners Act, bail applications, case management, and taxation of costs, to self-review. These decisions, made in a judicial capacity under constitutional or statutory authority, are instead subject to appeal where applicable or internal judicial review mechanisms, not supervisory judicial review. On this basis, the Respondents submitted that the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 127(7) extends solely to subordinate courts, tribunals, and adjudicating authorities, excluding the Supreme Court itself. Counsel contended that the Appellant’s characterization of the Chief Justice as an “adjudicating authority” in admissions misconstrues the distinction between administrative or quasi-judicial decisions by subordinate bodies, which are reviewable, and the judicial decisions of Supreme Court judges, which are not subject to self-review. This aligns with the settled principle that the Supreme Court does not exercise supervisory jurisdiction over itself. The first question is whether, in admitting the 2nd Respondent under the Legal Practitioners Act, the Supreme Court was exercising an administrative function, rather than a judicial one. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles expressly defines “functions” to include both powers and duties, thereby adopting a comprehensive conception of institutional competence. A judicial function, within the constitutional framework, encompasses the powers and duties exercised by the judiciary in the administration of justice. When read together with Article 119 of the Constitution, vesting all judicial power in the judiciary, comprising the Supreme Court and any other courts established by law, it follows that a judicial function encompasses the full range of legislatively assigned powers and obligations that courts must discharge in giving effect to the law. The governing law is the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap 111, which prescribes the procedure for admission of attorneys-at-law. Section 3 of the Legal Practitioners Act provides that: “The Supreme Court may, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Chief Justice, admit as an attorney-at-law a person who is qualified for admission as such under this Act.” The Legal Practitioners Act vests the power of admission in the Supreme Court as an institution rather than in the Chief Justice in a personal capacity. Article 125(3) of the Constitution confirms that the Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice, Puisne Judges, and, where applicable, Masters. The statutory framework outlines distinct roles: normative and adjudicative authority over practitioner admissions resides with the Supreme Court, whilst the Chief Justice’s remit is confined to prescribing procedural rules governing the admission process. Beyond rulemaking, when considering an application, the Chief Justice must undertake several judicial assessments: statutory interpretation of the criteria under the Legal Practitioners Act (qualifications, pupillage requirements, and the like); evidential evaluation through review of certificates, academic records, and fitness documentation; assessment of the applicant’s moral suitability and professional integrity; and, upon satisfactory determination, issuance of a formal order admitting the applicant as an attorney-at-law, conferring rights of audience and directing entry onto the Roll. Thus, when the Chief Justice adjudicates an admission application, in my view, he or she acts not in an administrative capacity, but as the judicial head of the Supreme Court discharging powers constitutionally and statutorily vested therein. Although the Chief Justice bears significant administrative responsibilities, including judicial assignments, court management, and supervision of the judiciary’s administrative machinery, these responsibilities do not convert into administrative functions which the Constitution and legislation expressly allocate to the Supreme Court’s judicial authority. Where the Chief Justice presides over the admission process, the exercise is judicial in nature: it involves the application of statutory criteria, the evaluation of an applicant’s qualifications, and the making of an order that confers a professional status recognised by law. It is therefore an adjudicative act undertaken by the Court, not an administrative act undertaken by the Chief Justice personally. Having established this constitutional and statutory foundation, it is useful to consider how courts in comparable jurisdictions have approached the question of whether the act of admitting a legal practitioner constitutes a judicial or administrative function. The authorities reveal a consistent line of reasoning, recognising admission as an exercise of judicial power, informed by the nature of the function and the legal consequences that flow from it. I turn now to those decisions. In Ex Parte Garland 71 US (4 Wall) 333 (1867) US Congress enacted a statute requiring federal court attorneys to swear they had never supported the Confederacy. Augustus Garland, previously admitted to the Supreme Court bar but disqualified by his Confederate Congress service despite a presidential pardon, petitioned to continue practising without the oath. The central constitutional issue became whether Congress could impose additional qualifications on attorneys or exclude them from practice by legislative act. This required the Court to determine whether the admission and removal of attorneys were administrative tasks subject to legislative control or inherently judicial functions belonging solely to the judiciary. On this issue, the Court begins by defining the nature of an attorney’s relationship to the judiciary, stating that at page 378: “Attorneys and counsellors are not officers of the United States; they are not elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution for the election and appointment of such officers. They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character.” [Emphasis mine] This description immediately situates the process of admission within the judicial domain: the Court, not any external administrative body, confers the status of attorney through a formal order. The reference to an “order” is itself significant, as orders are quintessential judicial acts reflecting adjudicative authority. The Court further clarified that admission constitutes a judicial determination, observing at pages 378-379 that: “The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. By designating the act of admission as a “judgment,” the Court removed it from any sphere of routine administrative licensing. Characterising admission as an act of judgment is determinative. Judicial judgments, by definition, constitute exercises of judicial power, a function not undertaken by administrative bodies. Judicial judgments involve the exercise of discretion, evaluation of evidence, and the application of legal standards, all features that distinguish judicial power from administrative processing or certification. The Court’s language (similar to this Court’s language in paragraph 34 and 36 of this judgment) makes clear that admission requires the Court to assess the fitness and character of the applicant and to render a formal judicial conclusion on their entitlement to practise. The Garland Court, in reinforcing this point, cited the Court of Appeals of New York In the matter of the Application of Henry W. Cooper 22 NY 67 where it was held that: “Attorneys and counsellors,...are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the courts, and the latter in performing this duty inlay very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions.” That “...it has been well settled by the rules and practice of common law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.” This reasoning mirrors Seychelles’ Legal Practitioners Act, where section 3 admissions and section 10(1)-(2) suspensions/removals occur by Supreme Court order, quintessential judicial acts reflecting adjudicative authority rather than administrative rulemaking or record-keeping. Garland thus resolves that such functions lie at the core of judicial power, essential to judicial integrity. Most importantly, the Court in Garland noted the reciprocal nature of admission and exclusion, explaining at page 378 that: “From its entry the parties [attorneys] become officers of the court and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power and has been so held in numerous cases.” Through this formulation, the Court reinforced that the authority to control who may appear before it is inherent in the judicial function. Just as the Court may discipline or disbar an attorney only through judicial proceedings (as is the case in Seychelles), it likewise admits them through a judicial process. This pairing underscores that the power is not episodic or limited to misconduct inquiries; it arises fundamentally from the Court’s constitutional role in regulating those who act as its officers. In summary, Ex Parte Garland establishes a clear constitutional principle that directly resolves the question of whether the admission and removal of attorneys are administrative or judicial functions. The Court’s reasoning, anchored in its repeated characterisation of attorneys as “officers of the court,” admitted “by its order,” through an act constituting a “judgment”, leaves no ambiguity that these functions lie at the heart of judicial power. Admission requires the Courts to make determination of legal status, having assessed qualifications, character, and fitness; removal requires a judicial finding of misconduct after affording due process. Neither function can be reduced to an administrative act without lessening the significance / materiality of the act of admission. The Court treated the admission of attorneys not as licensing but as the exercise of an inherent judicial prerogative essential to maintaining the integrity and independence of the bar and, by extension, the administration of justice. This judicial understanding aligns with the Seychellois framework under the Legal Practitioner Act, where suspension or removal occurs only by order of the Supreme Court, the same adjudicative structure recognized in Garland. Ex Parte Secombe 60 US (19 How.) 9, 15 L. ed.565 (1857) arose out of disciplinary proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota. David A. Secombe had been duly admitted in 1852 as an attorney and counsellor of the Territorial Supreme Court, entitling him to practise in that court and the district courts of the Territory. In February 1856, the Territorial Supreme Court issued an order removing him from his office as attorney and counsellor and prohibiting him from practising further in any territorial court. The order stated that Secombe had, “by his acts as such in open court,” violated provisions of Minnesota’s revised statutes requiring attorneys to maintain respect due to the courts and to conduct themselves with fidelity. Secombe alleged that the order had been issued without prior notice, without any specific charge being communicated to him, and without an opportunity to be heard. He contended that the removal was unlawful and sought relief directly from the Supreme Court of the United States by petitioning for a writ of mandamus. The mandamus would compel the Territorial judges to vacate their order and restore him to practice. The critical issue before the U. S. Supreme Court was whether it had authority to review or overturn the Territorial court’s removal decision via mandamus. This, in turn, required the Court to consider the character of the removal power: was it an administrative or quasi-ministerial act that could be corrected by a superior court, or was it a judicial act, involving judicial discretion, judgment, and the court’s inherent authority to regulate its own officers? The Supreme Court held that attorney admission and removal are judicial functions grounded in common-law principles, and that the Territorial court acted within its judicial jurisdiction. As such, its decision could not be reviewed or reversed through mandamus. This case expressly affirms that the admission and removal of attorneys are judicial acts grounded in judicial discretion, not administrative functions. The Court begins by restating the common-law rule with absolute clarity. On page 13, Chief Justice Taney notes: “it has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed. The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one… but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion.” [Emphasis mine] The Court then considered whether territorial statutes regulating attorney qualifications diminished this inherent judicial power. The answer is no. On page 14, the Court explained that although Minnesota’s statute lists conditions for removal and some procedural aspects, the Legislature did not narrow a judicial function into an administrative one: “It is true that, in the statutes of Minnesota, rules are prescribed for the admission of attorneys and counsellors, and also for their removal. But it will appear, upon examination, that, in describing some of the offences for which they may be removed, the statute has done little, if anything, more than enact the general rules upon which the courts of common law have always acted; and have not, in any material degree, narrowed the discretion they exercised.” Thus, even where legislature purports to regulate the profession, the Court made it clear that statutes operate within, not over, the judicial power. The authority to decide who may practise remains judicial. The Court further elaborated that the assessment of whether an attorney had violated his duties were itself a judicial task. The Minnesota statute, like common-law principles, referred to duties such as “maintain[ing] the respect due to courts” and “conduct[ing] himself with fidelity.” These are inherently evaluative standards. The Court notes at page 14: “The statute…does not attempt to specify the acts which shall be deemed disrespectful to the court or the judicial officers. It must therefore rest with the court to determine what acts amount to a violation…and this is a judicial power vested in the court by the Legislature.” This aligns perfectly with Garland, (and to an extent, the Legal Practitioners Act) which emphasises that determining fitness to practise (both at the point of admission and discipline) is a judicial assessment involving character, conduct, and professional integrity, not a mechanical administrative decision. Crucially, at pages 13-15, the Court rejects the petition for mandamus on the ground that the lower court’s decision to remove an attorney is a judicial act, and higher courts cannot use mandamus to control the substance of such judicial decisions: “…it cannot be reviewed and reversed in this form of proceeding… where the decision was in its nature a judicial act, and within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion.” The Supreme Court held that, even assuming the Territorial Court erred by removing Secombe without notice, the act of removal was still a judicial act, not an administrative one. Because of this, mandamus could not be used to reverse or control it. Mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not to review or overturn judicial decisions. Any error in the removal proceedings was therefore an error of judicial procedure, which could not be remedied through mandamus. What the Court makes clear is that the appropriate remedy, if any existed, would have had to come through a mode of review applicable to judicial decisions, such as an appeal, provided such appellate jurisdiction existed over the Territorial Supreme Court’s judgments. The Court explicitly noted that mandamus could not substitute for appellate review, stating that only a superior court “possessing appellate power” may reverse a judgment of an inferior tribunal. In conclusion, the act of admitting an attorney entail evaluating statutory qualifications, assessing character and competence and issuing an order that confers a legal professional status, an order which, as Secombe and Garland both emphasise, is the hallmark of judicial power. Moreover, Secombe underscores that where a court acts within its judicial jurisdiction, even if the procedure adopted were imperfect, the act remains judicial and cannot be transformed into an administrative function. In Re Bruen 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918), in disbarment proceedings, the Washington Supreme Court upheld its exclusive judicial authority against a statute delegating disciplinary powers to a state board of bar examiners. The board had convicted Bruen of moral turpitude, struck his name from the roll of attorneys, and ordered forfeiture of his right to practise. Bruen challenged the statute as unconstitutional encroachment on inherent judicial powers. The Court emphatically reaffirmed courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over attorney regulation. It stated: “The inherent power of the court is the power to protect itself, the power to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy had been granted or not, the power to promulgate rules for its practice, and the power to provide process where none exists. It is true that the judicial power of this court was created by the constitution, but upon coming into being under the constitution, this court came into being with inherent powers. Among the inherent powers is the power to admit to practice, and necessarily therefrom the power to disbar from practice, attorneys at law.” The Court then explained the limited role of the legislature in this domain. While the legislature may, in the interest of maintaining uniform standards and preventing professional abuses, enact regulations concerning the practice of law, such regulations cannot displace or extinguish the judiciary’s inherent power. As the Court put it: “The cases are fairly uniform upon the proposition that admitting to practice, suspending, and disbarring are judicial functions. The legislative power, in the interest of uniformity of standard and to remedy and prevent mischiefs in the profession, may regulate and restrict this power, but cannot take it away. It may provide machinery for the administration of the regulation provided by the legislature, as in carrying into effect such regulations some agency is necessary. In this instance it has provided the machinery and agency of the state board of law examiners.” The foregoing authorities are unambiguous, admissions of attorneys-at-law necessitates a determination of legal status after scrutiny of statutory criteria, assessment of qualifications, appraisal of character and fitness, and consequently issuance of a formal order bestowing professional legal standing with rights, privileges and obligations on an attorney. This process is characteristic of judicial authority. Accordingly, as earlier intimated, this settles the matter that an admission of an attorney is a judicial function rather than an administrative one. In the present case, the 2nd Respondent’s admission as an attorney to the Seychelles Bar was effected through formal judicial process, commenced by way of petition filed on the Civil Side case number 75 of 2024, presented to the Chief Justice for adjudication and culminating in a court order dated 11 November 2024 (pages 25-26 of the record). The Chief Justice of Seychelles, presiding over the application pursuant to section 3 of the Legal Practitioners Act, exercised this authority as judicial head of the Supreme Court in discharge of a constitutionally vested judicial function, not in a personal or administrative capacity. Whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an admission? The next aspect is whether, under Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear an application challenging the Chief Justice’s decision to admit an attorney-at-law pursuant to the Legal Practitioners Act, and whether such a decision is subject to supervisory review. Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution which confers the Supreme Court with jurisdiction provides: ‘There shall be a Supreme Court which shall, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred by this Constitution have: (c) supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts, tribunals and adjudicating authority and, in this connection shall have the power to issue injunctions, directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as may be appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory jurisdiction;’ This provision expressly confers supervisory jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court over subordinate courts, tribunals, and adjudicating authorities. These subordinate courts are clarified under Schedule 2 of the Constitution (Principles of Interpretation) as meaning any court other than the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. Tribunals are recognised as creatures of Acts of Parliament, under Article 137 of the Constitution, but in a similar vein to the subordinate courts, are also inferior to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Article 125(7) defines an “adjudicating authority,” as ‘a body or authority established by law which performs a judicial or quasi-judicial function.’Adjudicating authorities are, in turn, clarified as bodies or authorities established by law, which perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The law by which such ‘adjudicating body’ is established, has been clarified by the Constitution, to mean any instrument that has the force of law and any unwritten rule of law. Such instrument that has the force of law, in the present case is undoubtedly the Legal Practitioner Act. As rightly submitted by the Respondent’s counsel, the constitutional provisions contemplate the Supreme Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction over bodies or authorities that are subordinate to it, such as administrative or quasi-judicial bodies that exercise powers outside the judicial hierarchy and does not include judges of the Supreme Court acting in their judicial capacity. The Judicial hierarchy, constitutionally comprising the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court, and Subordinate Courts, fundamentally uphold the rule of law through downward oversight of superior to inferior courts, tribunals and bodies. Article 125(1)(c)’s supervisory jurisdiction contemplates the Supreme Court regulating subordinate entities, not exercising self-review, as this would subvert the judicial hierarchy. Its purpose is supervision of inferior bodies whilst expressly excluding the Supreme Court's own decisions. No provision permits a judge of the Supreme Court to review the decision of another judge of equal jurisdiction under the Court Supervisory Rules. Accordingly, I find the Appellant’s contention that the learned Judge Adeline could entertain a review application challenging the decision of the Chief Justice, who is a judge of the same court and not subordinate to the learned trial Judge or the Court itself, without merit. The Supreme Court is, therefore, clearly not amenable to supervisory jurisdiction in relation to decisions of the Chief Justice on admission of attorneys because the supervisory authority under the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules is intended to operate over bodies subordinate to it, for example the subordinate court or adjudicating bodies and not over itself. Based on the foregoing, I find that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th grounds have no merit and are dismissed accordingly. The question of remedy for the Appellant The question under the fifth ground is whether the Judge in the lower court erred by holding that the proper recourse against a decision of the Chief Justice on admission lay by way of appeal to the Court of Appeal in circumstances where the Legal Practitioner Act provides no right of appeal against a decision to admit an attorney-at-law. The further question is whether in consequence, judicial review is the only available remedy. The Appellant’s counsel submitted that the Legal Practitioners Act confers no such appellate rights in respect of decisions admitting persons as attorneys-at-law. Relying on The Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice and Others (SCA MA 06/2025) [2025] (MA 14/2025 arising in MC 35/2024) (18 August 2025), counsel for the Appellant contended that the Court of Appeal therein affirmed the absence of any inherent right of appeal in the absence of express statutory foundation. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that legislative silence as to a right of appeal in the Legal Practitioners Act for admissions, contrasted with express appeal provisions for disciplinary decisions under section 6A (8), indicates judicial review remains the only viable challenge mechanism. He submitted that the doctrine of legality requires all public bodies, including courts exercising statutory functions, to act within lawful bounds and be subject to appropriate review. Finally, he maintained that excluding admissions from supervisory jurisdiction would create an untenable immunity for fundamental administrative acts affecting rights and privileges, undermining the rule of law and public confidence in the legal profession’s integrity. In response to the Appellant’s contention, Mr. Elizabeth submitted that this ground mischaracterises the ruling of learned Judge in the court below ruling. He clarified that the Judge's principal finding was not that the Appellant should have pursued an appeal, although this may have been acknowledged in passing, but rather that judicial review is unavailable against the Chief Justice's decision to admit an attorney-at-law, as the Chief Justice was exercising a judicial, not administrative function. Counsel submitted that the absence of an appellate right does not confer jurisdiction for Judicial review, despite the Appellant’s argument that judicial review should be available to fill the gap left by the lack of appeal against decisions admitting attorneys-at-law. He maintained that the learned Judge’s determination was correct, irrespective of the availability of alternative remedies such as an appeal. Mr. Elizabeth asserted that by virtue of Article 125(1)(c) of the Constitution, judicial review is confined to decisions of subordinate courts, tribunals, and adjudicating authorities and does not extend to judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, irrespective of their appealability. The availability of judicial review hinges on the nature of the decision and the status of the decision-maker, not on the existence of alternative remedies. He relied on the English case of R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 KB 338, which establishes that the Court of King's Bench possess inherent supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals, not in an appellate capacity, but to ensure that they act within jurisdiction and comply with the law. Mr. Elizabeth also submitted that it was a fallacy to assume that every decision must be subject to some form of review or challenge. He submitted that when enacting the Legal Practitioners Act, the legislators made conscious choices about which decisions would be subject to appeal, and which would not. For instance, section 6A (8) of the Legal Practitioners Act provides for appeals in specific circumstances: where an attorney’s license has been suspended or whose application for renewal of a licence has been refused. In such instances, an attorney may appeal. Counsel submitted that it was significant that the provision allowed for appeals against suspensions or refusals to renew a license, but it does not provide for appeals against decisions to admit attorneys. Counsel submitted further that it was a deliberate intention of Parliament to limit the right of appeal to particularly categories of decisions. The inclusion of some categories and the exclusion of others reflect a legislative judgment about which decisions should be final and which should be subject to challenge. He insisted that the admission decision, when made by the Chief Justice in accordance with the statutory criteria should generally be final. He submitted that to allow appeals (or judicial review) against admission decisions would create uncertainty about the status of newly admitted attorneys, potentially discouraging qualified persons from seeking admissions, open the door to vexatious challenges and undermine the authority of the Chief Justice’s determination. Mr. Elizabeth further submitted that mechanisms exist to address potential improper admissions. He noted that, as a matter of good practice, the Appellant would ordinarily be consulted during the admission process. However, he pointed out that the Chief Justice has yet to promulgate rules under section 3 of the Legal Practitioners Act prescribing such consultation. Mr. Elizabeth contended that, where the Appellant harbours concern regarding an applicant's qualifications, it may raise them during the admission process, as it previously did in the matter of Joy Kanga. In that instance, the Appellant intervened by informing the Chief Justice of its apprehension, leaving the Chief Justice to halt Joy Kanga’s admission as an attorney. Mr. Elizabeth submitted that the Appellant should therefore maintain vigilance and intervene during the admission process, as it did with Joy Kanga, rather than seeking judicial review post-admission. He further contended that alternative remedies exist, disciplinary proceedings under Section 10 of the Legal Practitioners Act, which empower removal from the Roll of attorneys-at-law for misconduct, potentially encompassing misrepresentation of qualifications. Ordinarily, an order of the Supreme Court would lie to the Court of Appeal. Section 6A (8) of the Legal Practitioners Act makes provision for appeals in certain instances, such as where an attorney’s licence has been suspended or revoked, but no right of appeal exists against decisions to admit attorneys. In this case, despite the 1st Respondent’s order having been made in the exercise of judicial function, no right of appeal exists against admission under the Legal Practitioners Act. Therefore, I concur with the Appellant that in the present case, the Appellant was precluded from appealing the order of the 1st Respondent dated 11 November 2024. This raises concern given that the impugned proceedings in the lower court were conducted ex parte; that the Appellant was not a party and was thus denied an opportunity to raise its concerns during the admission process, as counsel for the Respondents suggested it might have been done. That notwithstanding, I agree with the Respondents’ counsel that the absence of an explicit appeal provision within the Legal Practitioners Act does not create a jurisdictional gap nor expand the scope of judicial review under the Court Supervisory Rules. It does not justify the implication of jurisdiction for the Court to review its own decisions where no such provision exists. The mere absence of an appeal mechanism does not, ipso facto, confer upon the Supreme Court the authority to conduct judicial review of the Chief Justice’s decision under the Supreme Court Supervisory Rules. Any such review is strictly limited by the Constitution and relevant statutory provisions. Therefore, the learned Judge below did err in holding that the recourse available to the Appellant was by way of appeal to the Court of Appeal against an admission decision of the Chief Justice. With due respect, this was a misdirection on the part of the lower court as there is no right of appeal under the Legal Practitioners Act. The Judge was, however on firm ground in holding that judicial review was not an appropriate remedy, in line with the reasons alluded to earlier. That said, this case exposes a structural silence in the statutory framework governing admissions to the Bar. While the absence of an appeal mechanism does not justify judicial innovation or jurisdictional expansion, it does raise legitimate concerns as to accountability, transparency, and access to constitutional redress. These are matters more appropriately addressed through legislative reform rather than judicial implication. In this regard, it would be prudent for the Seychelles Law Commission to consider whether the Legal Practitioners Act should be reviewed to provide a clear, constitutionally compliant mechanism, whether appellate or otherwise, for addressing grievances arising from admission decisions, while preserving judicial independence and institutional finality. Whether the appellant had an arguable case The Appellant submitted in the sixth ground that the court erred in failing to address the substantive issue of whether the Appellant had established an arguable case on the merits warranting further consideration at a full trial. Counsel contended that the lower court neglected to determine whether the Appellant possessed sufficient interest and standing to bring the application. Inviting the Court to infer sufficient interest, counsel relied on Bar Association of Seychelles and Nichole Tirant v President of the Republic and Ors (SCA 7 of 2004) [2004] SCCA 2 (10 June 2004), which concerned the lawful application of criteria for judicial appointment. Further, relying on Karunakaran v Constitutional Appointment Authority (SCA 33 of 2016) 2017 SCCA 9 (14 April 2017), Appellant’s counsel submitted that the criterion of “sufficient interest” in judicial review applications at the leave stage encompass standing or locus standi. On the authority of that decision, counsel contended that an applicant satisfying the sufficient interest threshold advances to the second criterion of “good faith,” namely, advancing an arguable case genuinely rather than frivolously. Upon fulfilment of both tests, counsel argued, the court orders progression to the substantive merits stage. To establish “good faith,” counsel invoked the English case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Office Ex-parte Doorga (1990) C. O. D. 109. Appellant’s counsel submitted that the Appellant is no mere busybody, but by statute, the Appellant shares with the Supreme Court the responsibility for establishing criteria qualifying persons as attorneys-at-law. He argued that should the judiciary fail in this duty, the Appellant possesses both interest and obligation to intervene, rectify the lapse, and uphold the rule of law, lest the admission requirements under the Legal Practitioners Act evade accountability. Counsel accordingly submitted that, in the instant case, the Appellant had evinced “good faith” by advancing arguable grounds, namely, querying how the 2nd Respondent could have been admitted as an attorney-at-law absent completion of the pupillage requirement prescribed under section 5(1)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act. In response, Mr. Elizabeth submitted that this ground was fundamentally misconceived. He contended that the learned Judge correctly identified jurisdiction as the threshold issue, namely whether the Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain judicial review of the Chief Justice's decision admitting an attorney-at-law. Counsel submitted that this constituted the proper approach, as jurisdiction invariably precedes merits, absent jurisdiction, a court must decline to proceed irrespective of substantive arguments. Mr. Elizabeth supported this position by citing Eric Njue v The Republic SCA15/2015 [2017] SCCA 43 (6 December 2017), where the Court of Appeal, affirms that principle:“…where a point goes to the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, it is the duty of the Judge or tribunal to draw attention to, and decide, the jurisdictional issue, even though it has not been raised by any of the parties.” Mr. Elizabeth further submitted that, if the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Chief Justice's admission decisions, as the Respondents contended, the existence of an “arguable case on the merits,” becomes immaterial, as a court bereft of jurisdiction cannot entertain proceedings however meritorious. Counsel contended that an application invoking non-existent jurisdiction is inherently hopeless and must fail at the leave stage, irrespective of substantive merits. Beyond the jurisdictional objections, Mr. Elizabeth submitted that the Appellant failed to establish “sufficient interest” in the subject matter of the petition, a finding within which the learned Judge concurred. Counsel contended that, although the Appellant’s views could be solicited during the admission process, it lacks legal standing to impugn individual admission decisions by judicial review. He argued that any general interest in upholding attorney qualifications does not confer locus standi to challenge specific admissions, as this would empower the Appellant to contest every such decision, engendering chaos and uncertainty. Under this ground, the Appellant contends that, in dismissing the application on a preliminary jurisdictional point, the learned Judge failed to adjudicate on the substantive question of whether the Appellant had made out an arguable case on the merits fit for further consideration at a full hearing. In the present case, the record indicates that after the Appellant filed its application for leave to proceed with judicial review, the Respondents raised a preliminary objection challenging the procedural form adopted by the Appellant in instituting the application before the Supreme Court. While considering both the preliminary objection and the substantive application for leave, the Supreme Court rightly identified the core issue as whether it possessed jurisdiction to entertain the matter at all. Having examined the statutory provisions relied upon by the Appellant in seeking leave for judicial review, this Court has arrived at the same conclusion as the lower court. The learned judge in the lower court was well-founded in holding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review its own decisions. There was therefore no need for the learned Judge to proceed to the hearing of the substantive hearing as alluded to by the Appellant. Matters of jurisdiction, particularly in the context of case management, demand careful and serious consideration. A court should, at an early stage of the proceedings and on a fair and objective basis, identify whether a matter has been improperly commenced and is bound to fail for want of jurisdiction. This promotes the principle of judicial economy and conserves not only the court’s limited institutional resources, but also those of the parties, sparing them unnecessary expense, delay, and procedural inefficiency. This responsibility may be triggered early by either an application from a party or by the court acting mero motu. In either event, such determination must be grounded in sound legal principles and exercised with scrupulous fairness and regard to justice. Jurisdiction is not a mere technicality; it goes to the very competence of the court to adjudicate the dispute before it. As underscored by the Indian Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v Chaman Paswan (1954) AIR 340 (SC), “It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the execution stage and even in collateral proceedings…” Against that settled principle, the Judge in the court below was on firm ground in addressing the jurisdictional defect as he did. This ground of appeal therefore has no merit. Although this Court has determined that the lower Court was not required to proceed to the merits following its finding of no jurisdiction, and further that no right of appeal lies under the Legal Practitioners Act against the 1st Respondent’s decision to admit an applicant, it cannot accept the Respondent’s submission that the Act confers absolute immunity upon the 1st Respondent’s decision regarding admission to the Roll of Legal Practitioners. While decisions on admission, properly made following consultation, merit finality to preserve the integrity of the Roll, judicial independence, and the rights implicated therein, this presumption remains subject to necessary safeguards. The Legal Practitioners Act contemplates a collaborative and consultative process between the Bar Association and the Chief Justice in admissions of attorneys-at-law. It requires that the judicial discretion exercised by the Chief Justice in this regard be exercised with prudence, transparency, and accountability, ensuring that decisions affecting entry into the profession are beyond reproach. Section 5 of the Legal Practitioners Act unequivocally expresses the legislative intention that both the Chief Justice and the Bar Association play integral and complementary roles in assessing an applicant’s qualifications, fitness and suitability for admission as an attorney-at-law. The Bar Association, entrusted with safeguarding the interests and welfare of its members, is vested under the Legal Practitioners Act with responsibilities that encompass establishing and maintaining standards for the admission of attorneys. In fulfilling this statutory mandate, the Bar Association functions not only as a representative body for practitioners, but also as an institutional guardian of the profession’s integrity. Moreover, it protects the public’s interest by ensuring competent legal representation and the due administration of justice. Accordingly, the Bar Association holds a direct, legitimate, and ongoing stake in decisions concerning the admission, licensing, suspension or removal of attorneys-at-law, and merits consultation in such matters. Where the requisite consultation with the Bar Association has not been undertaken, or where allegations arise regarding statutory breaches or improper exercise of judicial discretion, it would be inappropriate to regard such decisions as final and conclusive. In those instances, the presumption of finality must give way to the imperative of upholding accountability, legality, and procedural fairness in judicial decision-making, especially given the profound implications for the legal profession, the public interest, and the integrity of the justice system. Whether or not a miscarriage of justice has occurred The seventh ground of appeal is that the learned Judge’s decision to dismiss the application for leave to proceed with judicial review was erroneous and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Counsel contended that the lower court disregarded the precedent established in Bar Association of Seychelles and Nichole Tirant v President of the Republic and Ors (supra), and Minister Responsible for Public Administration (Faure) v Speaker of the National Assembly (Prea) (MA 126/2019) [2019] SCSC 1200 (9 May 2019), whose principles he argued, supported the Appellant’s position on “sufficient interest.” In response, Mr. Elizabeth submitted that the Ruling was impeccable: correct in law, grounded in sound constitutional principles, buttressed by authority, consonant with the proper ambit of judicial review, and aligned with established tenets of judicial organisation and comity. On the miscarriage of justice allegation, Mr. Elizabeth contended that such arises in circumstances including conviction of the innocent, denial of fair hearing; manifestly erroneous decisions causing grave injustice, or procedural irregularities vitiating legal rights. He maintained that no miscarriage of justice befell the Appellant: the learned Judge afforded full opportunity to it, to present its case; meticulously considered the arguments, delivered a reasoned ruling addressing the issues, applied correct legal principles, and reached a conclusion amply open on the law and facts. Counsel emphasized that an adverse ruling does not ipso facto constitute miscarriage of justice. The concept of miscarriage of justice is a complex doctrine, as this Court has previously acknowledged both in terms of its definition and the standard of proof required (See: Haron Ondicho Sagwe v R (SCA 2 of 2015) [2016] SCCA 15 (12 August 2016)). Typically, allegations of miscarriage of justice arise predominantly in constitutional or criminal proceedings. In either context, the foundation of such claims is procedural in nature. Accordingly, a party asserting a miscarriage of justice must demonstrate with clarity what specific procedural irregularity occurred, how it transpired and in what manner it resulted in a miscarriage of justice in the conduct of litigation. Guidance on the factors that ought to inform the Court’s evaluation of allegations of miscarriage of justice can be drawn from this Court’s pronouncement in the previous decision of Mellie v Government of Seychelles & Anor (SCA 3 of 2019) SCCA 40 (16 December 2019). Although the foregoing example principally concerns constitutional and criminal matters, it illustrates an important principle: a party alleging miscarriage of justice in the conduct of their case before court, must support such allegation with clear and cogent evidence. The guidance provided by the Constitutional Court in Mellie v Government of Seychelles & Anor (supra) exemplifies the nature of the particulars that should accompany such claims. The Appellant’s claim remains unsubstantiated and effectively rests on mere assertion. To the extent that the alleged miscarriage arises from the learned Judge’s dismissal of the Appellant’s application for leave to proceed with judicial review. I find no merit in this contention, as the issue has been addressed comprehensively. Accordingly, the seventh ground of appeal is without merit, and it fails. In view of the foregoing, I find that the learned Judge in the lower court was on firm ground when he dismissed the Appellant’s application for leave to proceed with judicial review, for the reason that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. There is, thus, no merit in the Appellant’s appeal. In obiter, before leaving this matter, it is appropriate to make one further observation. Nothing in this judgment should be understood as a determination on the merits of the 2nd Respondent’s admission as an attorney-at-law, which this Court has found is not amenable to appeal or judicial review within the present statutory framework. That question does not fall for determination before this Court. That said on the face of the record placed before us, and without making any binding or adverse findings, it may be observed that the materials disclose issues that would ordinarily warrant scrutiny under section 5(1)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act, especially in relation to the aggregate period of pupillage required prior to admission. The documentation indicates that the 2nd Respondent completed a one-year pupillage in Mauritius, which, on its face, appears substantially shorter than the cumulative period contemplated by the Act. This observation is made with the utmost respect for the office of Chief Justice and in full recognition of the heavy responsibilities borne by that office as the constitutional and statutory gatekeeper of the legal profession. The power of admission of attorneys-at-law is an important judicial function, carrying with it, not only on the rights of applicants, but the duty to safeguard the integrity of the Roll and public confidence in the administration of justice. It therefore calls for careful and exacting scrutiny, particularly, where statutory thresholds are concerned. Such vigilance serves not only the interests of the profession but also the broader administration of justice. The present observation is offered in that spirit alone, as a reaffirmation of the high standards that the office of the Chief Justice is entrusted to uphold in the discharge of this vital function. Conclusion and Orders I therefore make the following order that the appeal fails in its entirety and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. I further direct that a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Seychelles Law Commission for its consideration, with regard to whether the Legal Practitioners Act should be reviewed to address the absence of an express, constitutionally compliant mechanism for redress in respect of decisions relating to admission to the Bar. ________________ Sharpe-Phiri JA I concur: _________________ Gunesh-Balaghee JA I concur: ___________________ Sichinga JA Signed, dated and delivered on 15 December 2025. 27