Estate of the Late Dr. Hilda Stevenson Delhomme v The Government of Seychelles and Another ((SCA CL 02/2025) [2025] (Arising in CP 03/2024)) [2025] SCCA 35 (15 December 2025)

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Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [{"id": "h1_1", "type": "h1", "title": "Conclusion and Orders", "children": []}] IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES Reportable [2025] (15 December 2025) SCA CL 02/2025 (Arising in CP 03/2024) In the Matter Between Estate of the Late Dr. Hilda Stevenson Delhomme Appellant (rep. by Mr. Philippe Boulle) And The Government of Seychelles 1st Respondent (rep. by Mr. Vinsent Perera) Attorney General 2nd Respondent (rep. by Mr. Vinsent Perera) Neutral Citation: Estate of the Late Dr. Hilda Stevenson Delhomme v The Government of Seychelles and Another (SCA CL 02/2025) [2025] (Arising in CP 03/2024) (15 December 2025) Before: Gunesh-Balaghee, Sharpe-Phiri, Sichinga, JJA Summary: Compulsory acquisition of land – whether the time bar in Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation) Rules applied to Part III, Schedule 7 of the Constitution. Heard: 2 December 2025 Delivered: 15 December 2025 ORDER The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed in its entirety. There is no order as to costs. JUDGMENT SICHINGA JA (Gunesh-Balaghee JA, Sharpe-Phiri JA, concurring) Introduction This is an appeal by the Appellant (previously Petitioner), against a part of a judgment of the Constitutional Court (comprising Judge Vidot, Judge Burham and Judge Dodin), delivered on 27 March 2025, by which the Court dismissed the petition on a finding that it was time-barred. The petition was filed by Allen Hoareau, the co-executor of the estate of the late Dr. Hilda Stevenson-Delhomme, (hereafter ‘the deceased’) whose current residence is Mahe, Seychelles, and one Veronique Maryan Green) who is also co-executor. Background The deceased herein, was the owner of two parcels of land registered as Title Nos. V962 and V1099 in extent of 346,681 square metres and 6,332 square metres, respectively, situated in Beau Vallon, Mahe, Seychelles. On 31 March 1984, the 1st Respondent compulsorily acquired the two parcels of land, aforesaid, in national interest, pursuant to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1977. The said parcels of land have since been subdivided and now the Appellant seeks a return of the land that remains undeveloped, and compensation for the portions that have been developed and transferred to third parties. Pursuant to Paragraph 14(1) of Part III of Schedule 7 to the Constitution, the deceased by letter dated 8 August 1993, applied for compensation and return of the land parcels. The letter was written within the twelve (12) months prescribed, following the promulgation in 1993 of the Constitution. At the time of making her application, the deceased had already acknowledged payment of compensation made to her at the time of the compulsory acquisition. The 1st Respondent acknowledged receipt of that application on 30 May 1994, and Mr. J. A. Nourrice, the Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Community Development, at the time, issued a letter in reply on 8 November 1995, informing the deceased that the Ministry had received a large number of claims, and as the deceased’s application was not considered a priority, the Ministry would revert to her with a position on her application by 31 December 1996. On 4 January 2002, the deceased died, without having received any further communication from the Ministry, nor her having followed-up the issue, since the Principal Secretary’s letter of 8 November 1995. On 8 July 2002, the year of her demise, Veronique Green was appointed as executor of her estate. Unfortunately, since her appointment as executor, Mrs. Green, being resident outside the jurisdiction of Seychelles, could not administer any interest or affairs of the estate of her deceased mother, thereby prompting the appointment of the second executor herein, Mr. Hoareau, in January 2024, who filed the petition herein on 28 June 2024, following his formal appointment. In the petition before the lower court, the Appellant claimed: the return of 36 parcels of undeveloped land in extent of 132,042 square metres, which was still owned by the Government; and compensation in the sum of SCR433,147,354.00 for land, sold by the Government to third parties and land, which had been developed. These claims are based on the Petitioner’s allegations that the last communication from the Principal Secretary at the Ministry was merely deception intended to be used by the Government to abuse the constitutional right of the deceased and sell part of her land, to deprive her of her redress and remedy under the Constitution. Before the petition could be heard, the Respondents raised the following preliminary objections: “1. The Respondents submit that based on the averments contained in the petition, on the face of it, the application was time-barred, in terms of Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court Rules, in that: Annexure 8 which is the last communication to the person whose land was acquired and who passed away on 4 January 2002 (the deceased) was dated 8.11.1995; In said Annexure, it is stated that the relevant Ministry hopes to take a position regarding the claim by 31.12.1996; Thus, an application of this nature should have been filed within 3 months at least from 31.12.1996; Since the seeking of redress in relation to the relevant acquisition was time-barred against the deceased at the time of her death in 2002, the Petitioner being an executor of the estate of the said deceased was not entitled to make this application around 22 years after the death of the deceased and altogether around 27 years after the occurrence of the relevant event. The Respondents submit that the application is bad in law and/or misconceived, in that: The Petition is ambiguous as it does not clearly state whether this application pertains to a contravention of a Constitutional Right or enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution; Whereas Paragraph 11 of the Petition alleges that there was a violation of the undertaking in terms of Part III, Schedule 7 of the Constitution, it is averred at Paragraph 15 that the Petitioner is entitled to a constitutional right and the particular constitutional right is not specifically identified, therein. The Petitioner is estopped from making this application for the reason that the application and the relief (sic) sought are inconsistent with the will and/or the intention of the deceased, based on the averments contained in the petition. In particular: the application is inconsistent with the clear will of the deceased as reflected in Annexure 6 where it states that the deceased does not wish to complicate the objectives of the Government by asking for the return of the land…”; and The deceased’s conduct of not following up with the relevant claim after receiving Annexure 8, until her death in 2002 and her not initiating proceedings to enforce the provisions of Part III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, can be construed as her having abandoned the said claim.” Hearing and determination of the preliminary objections (Before the Constitutional Court) The Appellant had filed their arguments in response to the Respondent’s Preliminary Objections on 24 October 2024. In respect of the first preliminary objection, it was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the issue of the application being time-barred was decisively settled by the Court of Appeal in the case of Poole v Seychelles Government SCA CP 42/2013 at pages 7 and 9 that: “On the matter of Article 14(1)(a), Part III, Schedule 7 of the Constitution, we need to state as forcefully as possible that the sun will set on it only when the last timely application has been disposed of in good faith. And not before, that is destined to be the Day of Redemption of the past injustice. And no other.” Secondly, on the issue of the time bar, it was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that Part III, Schedule 7 of the Constitution makes specific provisions in Paragraph 14(4) authorising legal representatives of the deceased person to proceed thereunder. Regarding the second preliminary objection, it was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the point raised by the Respondents, which relates to the pleadings, failed to appreciate that Part III, Schedule 7 to the Constitution was sui generis and did not import the concept of a contravention of a constitutional right or enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution, referred to by the Respondents, within the context of the broad spectrum of the Constitution. That, Part III. Schedule 7 simply creates an obligation to state in terms of an undertaking to provide specific remedies set out in Schedule 7. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that, therefore, the pleadings should narrow themselves to evoking a breach of the constitutional obligation. That, therefore, the Petitioner’s remedy available before the Constitutional Court was to seek the provided forms of compensation to which the Petitioner was entitled under Part III, Schedule as prayed in the petition. Counsel for the Appellant denied that the pleadings revealed any misconception, as all relevant facts and legalities had been placed in the petition. Addressing the final preliminary objection, counsel for the Appellant submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the relevant fact was not that the deceased originally applied for financial compensation, but rather the fact that in breach of its obligation, the Government did not accept the claim for financial compensation or even proceed to negotiate for any compensation at all, as a result of which the Petitioner was at liberty and not estopped from seeking any form of remedy available before the Constitutional Court. Counsel for the Appellant called in aid the case of Seychelles Government and Attorney General v Moulinie SCA 16 of 2012, to fortify their argument that the right of the Petitioner to choose alternative remedies has been decisively settled. It was alleged by counsel for the Appellant that the Government was seeking to obtain a benefit from a blatant violation of the constitutional obligation and the Attorney General failing in his constitutional duty to safeguard the rights and interests of the citizens. The Constitutional Court considered the preliminary objections, the arguments submitted by both parties, and rendered its decision on the same. The second and third preliminary objections were dismissed, while the first one was upheld and the one in respect of which the appeal herein has been filed. Therefore, I shall focus on the ratio decidendi of the Constitutional Court, only as regards the issue of the application being time barred, in analysing the Court’s decision. The Court established that constitutional redress for land acquisition is governed by a special regime that overrides general rules pertaining to time limitations. Referring to the case of Government of Seychelles v Jumeau and Another SCA CL 01/21 – SCA CL 02/2021 AND SCA MA 17/2021, which the Appellant had cited, the Constitutional Court confirmed that government inaction prevents the application of time-bar. The Court went on to establish some facts, based on what it had reviewed on the record. It established that the deceased made an application within one year of the Constitution coming into force, in 1993. That, on 30th May 1994, the deceased had received confirmation from the 1st Respondent that her application was receiving attention and that she would be informed of the outcome in due course. That, from 1996 to the time of her death, there was no correspondence between the deceased and the 1st Respondent and there were no negotiations going on. The Court also noted that at the time that the deceased had made her application, she acknowledged payment of compensation made to her on the compulsory acquisition. That, it appeared from her letter that she was not seeking return of properties, but solely monetary compensation. At this, the Constitutional Court was of the opinion that by her statement, that she did not wish to complicate the objectives of the Government by asking for return of her land, but felt that she had been unfairly treated having lost her inheritance by compulsory acquisition without adequate compensation, the deceased was not reneging all claim of rights for return of her properties. The Court stated that it felt that the deceased was merely looking to negotiate on a platform of compensation, because it was stipulated in the certificate of the Minister, that the objective of land acquisition was in the national interest. The Court further found that, following the deceased’s passing, it appeared nothing was done by her executors. That, therefore, even if the 1st Respondent had wanted to negotiate, no one came forward. That, even after the deceased’s initial executor was appointed, there was no evidence on record of any communication between the executor and the 1st Respondent, with regard to the compulsory acquisition of the deceased’s parcels of land. This was followed by an appointment of an additional executor, who in turn filed the petition herein. The Court indicated that the question to be asked was whether there were ongoing negotiations from the time of lodging the application by letter dated 8 August 1993, to the time when the petition was filed. Citing the case of Jumeau, which the Court said was similar to the one now before this Court, the Court adopted the view that twenty (20) years silence was unreasonable time after a breakdown of negotiations. At this juncture, the Constitutional Court took note of the fact that, in casu, the time period in question was twenty-seven (27) years. Guided by the persuasive reasoning in the Jumeau case, the Court held that such an extensive lapse of time rendered the petition herein time-barred under Rule 4(1)(b) of the Constitutional Court Rules, due to inordinate delay. The Court also indicated that the administrative silence, after the last correspondence from the Ministry could well be interpreted that the silence meant that the application had been rejected and that the delay could have well been due to the fact that the deceased passed away and nobody came forward to revive the application. All in all, the Court found that the lapse of time was too significant and the executors could not now come for redress and enforcement of property rights. The Court emphasised that the delay was not merely a technical lapse, but reflected a substantial lapse in time, during which there had been clear failure and disinterest to take any steps to challenge the acquisition or to seek remedy provided for in the Constitution, save for the letter of 8 August 1993, from the deceased. That, even after 31 December 1996, when a decision was supposedly waiting to be communicated to the deceased and no such communication came forth, nothing was done until the filing of this petition. The Constitutional Court considered the petition herein, time-barred and accordingly upheld the Respondents’ preliminary objection. The Appeal Dissatisfied with the judgment dated 27 March, 2025, the Appellant has now appealed, raising the following grounds: The Constitutional Court erred in its finding that the petition is time barred under Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation) Rules. The ratio decidendi in the Poole v Seychelles Government & Anor SCA CP 42/2013 judgment 17th April 2015, to the effect that in respect of claims under Part III, Schedule 7 of the Constitution, the time bar in Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation) Rules did not apply, was completely misinterpreted by the Constitutional Court in relation to the preliminary objection raised by the Respondents. The finding of the Constitutional Court that in Poole v Seychelles Government & Anor, “the Court of Appeal found that the Government was not acting in good faith, and the time bar defence was invalidated,” is erroneous and a misconceived deduction of the reasoning in the said Judgment. The reliance of the Constitutional Court on the appeal judgment in Government of Seychelles v Jumeau (SCA CL1 of 2021) 2021 SCCA 68 (17 December 2021) to find that the petition in this appeal is time barred on the basis of non-compliance with Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation) Rules is unsound and flawed as the ratio decidendi in that appeal judgment was that the petition did not fall to be determined under Part III Schedule 7 to the Constitution as it had not complied therewith and was therefore subjected to the aforesaid Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation) Rules with which the Appellant had failed to comply as the relevant requirements thereunder were not met. The Constitutional Court fell in error by failing to distinguish the present petition from the finding in Government of Seychelles v Jumeau cited above as the present petitioner/appellant had complied with Part III Schedule 7 to the Constitution and thus, attracted the precedent set by the Court of Appeal in Poole v Seychelles Government & Anor, which excluded the application of Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation) Rules in such circumstances. The Constitutional Court erred in underpinning its adjudication on a flawed interpretation of a letter from the Government dated 8 November 1995, whereby the Court found that “by implication the first respondent considered compensation adequate”. The finding of the Constitutional Court that “even if the first respondent wanted to negotiate, no one came forward” is a surprising speculation in favour of the 1st Respondent which finds no justification within a fair and rational process of adjudication and analysis of the evidence that contains not an iota of facts which could even remotely suggest a will of the 1st Respondent to negotiate. The adjudication of the objections on the principle that the administrative silence can affect the right individual is ultra petita and furthermore the conclusion that the lack of communication between the petitioner and respondents “could well be interpreted that the silence meant that the application had been rejected” and that “it could be that the continued silence until now can be interpreted as acceptance that since compensation has been paid they would not push the matter further” are, with respect, presumptions made unfairly in favour of the Respondents, with no juridical foundation. The final conclusion of the Constitutional Court that “if the Petitioner was to argue that its claim was continuous until the claim is fully settled, such argument cannot succeed as such claim is transitional and temporary, but not perpetual” is again, with respect, disturbing to say the least for the Constitutional Court to raise an argument ultra petita and further without hearing counsel for the only apparent reason of making a finding against the Petitioner. The final paragraph of the judgment, which ends with a finding that the Petition is time barred is vague, ambiguous and lacks a basis in law to justify such a finding. By way of relief, the Appellant has prayed that this Court dismisses the objections which were upheld by the Constitutional Court. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant The Appellant submitted on grounds 1, 2 and 3 collectively. It was contended by Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Boulle, that the relevant part of the judgement relating to the first three grounds of appeal, is found at paragraph 12 of the judgement, where the Constitutional Court only quotes the concluding part of judgement in Poole vs Seychelles Government & Anor, which reads as below, but fails to import in the adjudication the ratio decidendi which leads to said conclusion: "On the matter of Article 14 (1) (a), Part 1I1, Schedule 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, we need to state as forcefully as possible that the sun will set on it only when the last timely application has been disposed of good faith. And not before. This is destined to be the Day of Redemption of the past injustices. And no other." Mr. Boulle submitted that the legal basis for the Court’s conclusion above is found at paragraph 23 of the Poole vs Seychelles Government judgement, which reportedly reads that: "Now as regards the second issue of time bar: this special and dedicated constitutional cause of action contains an in-built time bar. The action created by Article 14 (1), Part III of Schedule 7 relate to ...."all applications made during the period of twelve months from the date of coming into force of this Constitution ..." Accordingly, no other time-bar imposed by an ordinary Act of Parliament, or the Rules of the Supreme Court which are made by the Chief Justice for purposes of practice and procedure only, could be passed to derogate therefrom. The applicable time bar was whether the application was "made during the period of twelve months from the date of coming into force of this Constitution by a person whose land was compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1977 during the period starting June 1977 and the ending on the date of the coming into force of this Constitution and to negotiate in good faith." And no other." It was contended by Mr. Boulle that the above precedent plainly excludes the time bar under Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation) Rules or for that matter any other law relating to prescription or time bar. Counsel for the Appellant also argued grounds 4 and 5 of the appeal, collectively and to this end, contended that the said grounds relate to the finding of the Constitutional Court at Paragraph 18 of the Judgment, stating as follows: “In Government of Seychelles v Jumeau and A. G (SCA CL 1 of 2021) 2021 SCCA 68 (17 December 2021) which was a case of similar nature as the present, the court emphasized that 20-year silence was unreasonable." Mr. Boulle submitted that the Constitutional Court fell into error, by finding that the Jumeau case was "a case of a similar nature" to the petition before the Court and thus seeking to apply the finding in the Jumeau case which related to an adjudication under Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement and Interpretation of the Constitution) Rules. That, the determination under said Rule 4 in the Jumeau case came about after the Court of Appeal considered that the Appellant could not maintain a claim under the Constitution as stated at page 5 paragraph 17 of the Appeal judgement as follows: "We have perused through the record with a fine comb. We could not find any evidence establishing that the Respondent brought the application contemplated under the above cited provision within the twelve months period stipulated therein or at any time thereafter." Counsel argued that the final paragraph of the Jumeau judgement at paragraph 21 is also apposite in its statement, that, “the respondent having failed to bring himself within the protective wings of the Constitution, under which he sought refuge means he has no locus standi to bring the claims he did as contended by the learned Attorney General and we so hold." Mr. Boulle, thus submitted that, in the light of the above and the finding that the petitioner had complied with Schedule 7 Part 111 of the Constitution, all the findings in the Jumeau case which the Constitutional Court attempted to apply to the petition on appeal are misconceived. With regard to the sixth ground of appeal, it was contended that the letter of 8th November 1995, mentioned therein, exhibited at page 74 of the records, on the finding relating to the ground of appeal is found in at page 7 paragraph 10 of the Constitutional Court judgement (page 10 of the record) last paragraph which reads: "The 1st Respondent position is that Dr Stevenson-Delhomme had been compensated, thus the reason why in the letter from Mr. Nourrice, he considered her application as low priority, thus by implication suggesting that 1st Respondent considered the compensation adequate." Mr. Boulle submitted that while this ground may not relate directly to the issue of time bar, the adjudication kept going beyond pleadings or sworn facts, to bring in the above statement that imports irrational implications. He argued that this was injudicious and disturbingly in favour of the Respondent, thereby tainting the judgement with unreasonableness and lack of fairness. With respect to the seventh ground of appeal, Mr. Boulle submitted that this ground relates to the finding at paragraph 17 of the Constitutional Court judgement which on its own reading reveals a departure from adjudication norms to espouse once again the realm of speculation which lies far beyond the role of the court, which regrettably appears to only serve the sole purpose of discrediting the petitioner to bolster the case of the defence. The assailed finding in question is couched as follows: “However, after her death, it appears nothing was done by the executors. Therefore, even if the 1st Respondent had wanted to negotiate, no one came forward.” On ground eight of the appeal, Mr. Boulle’s submission was that this ground relates to the findings at paragraph 20 and more specifically paragraph 21 (6th line from the bottom) of the Constitutional Court judgement, in relation to which the submissions made under grounds 6 and 7 are apposite and relied upon. The finding in question reads as follows: “It could well be interpreted that the silence meant that the application has been rejected and the delay could have well been due to the fact that after Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme passed away, nobody came forward to revive the application.” With regard to ground nine of the appeal, Mr. Boulle submitted that the statement quoted in said ground that, "if the Petitioner was to argue that its claim was continuous until the claim is fully settled, such argument cannot succeed as such claim is transitional and temporary but not perpetual", is found at Paragraph 22 of the Constitutional Court judgement and suffices to reveal the flawed adjudication. On the final ground of appeal, assailing as vague and ambiguous, the finding by the Constitutional Court that the petition was time barred, it was Mr. Boulle’s contention that the said ground relates to the final finding of the Constitutional Court judgement at paragraph 40 which follows the statements found in paragraph 39 which reads as follows: "That being the situation, we feel that it is unfair to qualify the 1st Respondent as not being of good faith. On this point we are in total agreement with Counsel for the Respondent." Counsel for the Appellant, submitted that the above statement is as confusing as it is incoherent and fails to support the finding dismissing the petition. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent In response to the Appellant’s submissions regarding grounds 1, 2 and 3, of the appeal, it was contended by Counsel for the Respondents, that Rule 4 (1) of the Constitutional Rules provides that: "Where the Petition under Rule 3 alleges a contravention or a likely contravention of a provision of the constitution, the Petition shall be filed in the registry of the Supreme Court (a) In a case of an alleged contravention, within 3 months of the contravention…" It was further, contended by counsel for the Respondents, that sub rules (3) and (4) of Rule 4 provide that: "(3) Notwithstanding sub rules (1) and (2), a petition under rule 3 may, with leave of the Constitutional Court, be filed out of time. (4) The Constitutional Court may, for sufficient reason, extend the time for filing a petition under rule 3." Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court can only be invoked under either Article 46 or Article 130 of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, within that same breath, matters relating to Part III of Schedule 7 are procedurally regulated by the Constitutional Court Rules. These Rules (although subsidiary legislation), derive their validity directly from the Constitution through the authority vested in the Chief Justice to make rules governing practice and procedure before the Constitutional Court. The Respondents contended further, that the rule of law demands certainty and legal predictability, which necessitates the imposition of time limits on adjudication. That, permitting legal remedies to remain open indefinitely, undermines fairness, inviting abuse, where evidence has faded with time. That, accordingly, compliance with Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court Rules is not a mere procedural formality, but a jurisdictional prerequisite ensuring that constitutional petitions are brought within a reasonable and legally prescribed period. Counsel submitted that the twelve-month period under Article14(1) of Part III of Schedule 7 to the Constitution simply specifies the duration within which the application under the said provisions were to be received. That, the obligation imposed on the State, in terms of those provisions, is to consider such applications made and negotiate in good faith. Further, that to invoke the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court under Article 46, there should be a contravention or likely contravention of the provisions under Part III of the Constitution. Counsel submitted that a failure by the State to consider an application made and/or to negotiate would be considered a contravention. It was counsel’s further submission, that a judgment of the Court of Appeal cannot confer upon the Constitutional Court any special inherent jurisdiction to override the Constitutional Court Rules, nor can it disapply the limitation period established thereunder. That, the limitation contained in Rule 4, therefore, applies to all constitutional petitions alleging contravention of the provisions of the Constitution, including those invoking Part III Schedule 7. Counsel added that it is important to be guided by the maxim, “judicis est jus dicere, non-dare”. That, it is the duty of a judge to declare the law, not make it. That, where the law is expected to ensure equal treatment and non-discrimination, carving out expectations to prescription rules for certain categories of alleged contraventions undermines the rule of law and erodes legal certainty. That, therefore, the judgment in Poole v Seychelles Government & Anor, cannot be considered as having amended the Constitution or the Rules creating a binding precedent in that regard and to that extent, the judgment ought to be regarded as having been per incuriam. Counsel, applying their arguments to the case at hand, submitted that since it is not in dispute that the deceased’s final communication to the Ministry was dated 8 November 1995, where the Ministry indicated that it hoped to take a decision regarding her claim, by 31 December 1996, and in the absence of any communication thereafter until her demise in 2002, it could be inferred that either: The State failed to consider and/or negotiate the claim made by the deceased, with effect from 31 December 1996 and the deceased did not consider that her interests were being affected or likely to be affected due to said failure; or The deceased had decided to abandon her claim. It was, thus, counsel’s submission that in the circumstances, the Constitutional Court was correct to hold that the Petition was time-barred, having been filed well beyond the three-month limitation period and perhaps, crucially, having been filed without first seeking leave to file out of time under sub rules 3 and 4 of Rule 4. Responding to the Appellant’s submissions on grounds 4 and 5 of the appeal, counsel for the Respondents contended that it is manifestly clear that the Constitutional Court regarded the ratio decidendi in Government of Seychelles v Jumeau, to be one which is persuasive, rather than binding. That, the Constitutional Court in the present case, exercised its own independent judgment on the issue of delay and it did not mechanically apply the findings in the Jumeau case, contrary to the Appellant’s assertions. Counsel distinguished the Jumeau case from the circumstances in casu, by highlighting that in the Jumeau case, the Court was concerned with the delay of twenty (20) years in bringing the matter before the court after the breakdown in the negotiations. That, in casu, the absence of documents evidencing a conclusion of negotiations in 1995, does not necessarily establish that the matter remained unresolved between the deceased and the Respondents. That, the executor of the deceased, having instituted proceedings about twenty-two (22) years after the deceased’s demise, was not privy to any communication or agreement that may have existed between the deceased and the government representatives, at the material time. Counsel argued that the Appellant was relying solely on the absence of documentation to assert that the matter was never concluded, yet, conversely, the deceased’s own silence for more than six (6) years prior to her death is strongly indicative that she had abandoned her application. That, consequently, any right to claim under 14(a) of Schedule 7 did not survive her death, and the executor cannot now seek to revive a claim that had long become stale. Further to the issue of inordinate delay, the Respondent’s counsel contended that Appellant’s capacity to initiate proceedings as executor appointed in 2024 warrants more scrutiny. That, by Rule 14(4) of Part III of the 7th Schedule, where a person eligible to make an application/receive compensation was deceased, their personal representative could act in their stead. Counsel highlighted that, firstly, the deceased was alive within the twelve (12) month period within which an application was to be made; and secondly, at the time of her death, the deceased had not been declared eligible for compensation, other than the amount she had already received. That, in this regard, the executor did not have the capacity to bring an action under Rule 14(4). Counsel for the Respondent, furthermore, contended that an initial executor had been appointed for the estate of the deceased in 2002, and it was her responsibility to fulfil her functions and wind up the succession within a stipulated period. In terms of Section 24 of the Curatelle Act, 23 of 2021, an executor should fulfil the functions within twenty-four (24) months of the date of death of the deceased., In casu, the Appellant was appointed as executor in 2024, which meant that the deceased’s succession remained open for twenty-two (22) years. Further the petition before the Constitutional Court did not reveal whether or not the interests in the property in question were included in the inventory the executor was supposed to make. With this, counsel submitted that the present executor has no standing to initiate the action herein before the Constitutional Court, especially twenty-two (22) years after the death of the deceased. Submitting in response to ground 6 of the appeal, counsel contended that the deceased never challenged or disputed the position taken by the Government, which categorised the deceased’s application as one of low priority, and thus, by her subsequent silence, she had accepted the Government’s assessment and abandoned her claim. That the Court was, thus, not engaging in speculation, but drawing a legitimate and reasonable inference from the facts on the record, being: the Government’s last written communication setting out its position; and the deceased’s continued silence. That, such inference accords with established principles of law and equity- where a party, after receiving an administrative decision remains silent for an inordinate period, the presumption arises that the party has accepted the decision and waived further challenge. Counsel submitted that the doctrine of laches equally supports the conclusion that the right to litigate a matter long left dormant cannot be revived by a joint executor who came into the picture twenty-two (22) years after the death of the deceased owner and the fading of evidence. Counsel, thus, submitted that the Constitutional Court’s deduction that the deceased’s inaction implied acceptance of the adequacy of compensation and consequently abandonment of her claim was both reasonable and properly grounded in evidence. That, there is no basis for appellate interference with that finding. In response to ground 7 of the appeal, counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant had misconstrued an observation made by the Constitutional Court as a definitive finding of fact in raising this ground of appeal. That, the observation made by the Court was that the executor appointed on 8 July 2002 had made no attempt to communicate with the relevant Government authorities in relation to the application originally made by the deceased, and this observation stemmed from its analysis of the material placed before it. Counsel explained that the aforesaid observation was for the illustration of the prolonged period of inaction, following the appointment of the Executor. That, it was not a speculative or unfounded assumption in favour of the Respondents, as alleged by the Appellant. Counsel emphasised that, what remains apparent from the record, is the fact that the executor, appointed in 2002, remained inactive with respect to the claim for over twenty (20) years. That, the Court legitimately inferred as it did, from the uncontested chronology of events before it. Further, that on the other hand, given the responsibility of an executor to make an inventory of the succession, it was reasonably expected of the executor who was appointed soon after the deceased’s demise, to pursue the claim with the Government, if the contention was that the deceased’s claim had not been abandoned. In response to ground 8 of the appeal, counsel contended that by said ground, an executor appointed as late as 2024 and who was not privy to the original dealings between the deceased and government, was attempting to rely on the absence of documentary evidence to his advantage. That, given the circumstances before it, the Court was entitled to draw logical and reasonable inferences. Counsel, thus, submitted that the Court did not act ultra petita or beyond the scope of issues before it. That, its conclusion was limited to assessing whether, on the facts presented, the petition was time-barred, and the inference drawn from the silence between the parties was both reasonable and directly relevant to that assessment. On ground 9 of the appeal, counsel for the Respondent’s response was the Constitutional Court when making the statement that: “if the Petitioner was to argue that its claim was continuous until the claim is fully settled, such argument cannot succeed as such claim is transitional and temporary, but not perpetual”, did so in the course of its deliberations on the issue of prescription; and did not introduce a new issue, ultra petita, as alleged by the Appellant. Counsel submitted that, in considering whether the petition was time-barred, the Court was required to examine the nature of the right claimed and the observation that the claim was transitional and temporary was both logically and legally sound, as the notion of perpetual claims is incompatible with doctrines such as certainty, finality and evidentiary fairness, under the rule of law. That, it was, therefore, an analytical step within the Court’s determination on the issue of prescription. Finally, responding to the final ground of appeal stating that paragraph of the Judgment, which ends with a finding that the petition is time barred is vague, ambiguous and lacks a basis in law to justify such a finding, it was counsel’s submission on behalf of the Respondents that the Constitutional Court in its concluding remarks was deliberating on the issue of estoppel and the Appellant’s implied allegation of bad faith on the part of the Respondents. That, in doing so, the Court observed that where the deceased had taken no action during her lifetime, and subsequently by her executors. It was, thus, counsel’s submission that there was no ambiguity or vagueness in the Court’s reasoning and the Court’s statement formed part of a coherent chain of analysis leading to its conclusion that the petition was time-barred. Respondent prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs. Decision of this Court I have carefully considered the appeal herein and the parties’ arguments for and against the same. The nine grounds may be grouped into three principal issues: Whether the Constitutional Court erred in holding the petition time-barred under Rule 4. Whether the cases of Poole and Jumeau were misapplied; and Whether the Constitutional Court made material errors of fact or improper inferences. In tackling the first issue as to whether the petition was timed-barred, I consider the applicability of Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court Rules supra. The Constitutional Court relied on the Rule to hold that the petition had not been brought within a reasonable time. The Rule requires that constitutional applications be made within a reasonable time and, in any event, within three months of the alleged contravention. The Appellant argues that Rule 4 does not apply to claims under Article 14(1), Part III, Schedule 7, because in the case of Poole v Government of Seychelles (2016) the Court held that a claim is timely provided that the original application for compensation or return of land was made within the 12-month window following the Constitution’s entry into force. I do not agree with Mr. Boulle’s reading of the Poole judgment. In this respect it is pertinent to refer to paragraph 26 of the judgment in the Poole case where this Court stated the following: “26. The Constitutional Court in the present action has been under the same misapprehension as the Constitutional Court in the 1996 majority judgment in a crucial element for the determination of time bar. The majority judgment states that the letter dated February 1995 contained a clear and an unambiguous decision of the Government. If the present Court which relied on that statement had read the content of the earlier letter critically, it would have found as an undeniable objective fact that the wording in it was anything but clear and unambiguous. As at that date, the Government decision was hardly imprinted with the mark of finality. What both Courts missed are the three words in that letter “at this juncture.” The sentence reads: “at this juncture, I cannot take the matter any further.” We are quite sure that had this been brought to the attention of the Constitutional Court in the judicial review application No. 4 of 1996, there would have been a unanimous decision based on the minority decision. Further, if this had been brought to the attention of the Constitutional Court in the present case, the learned Judges would not have simply reproduced the operative part of the 1996 judgment and decided the present case on that basis. They would have seen the misapprehension and come to their own decision with respect to the relevant facts in issue.” A perusal of the judgment of Poole (supra) shows that the Court of Appeal was referring to the majority judgment of the Supreme Court where it found that: “30. In the instant case, however, the letter dated 16thFebruary 1995 contains a clear and an unambiguous decision of the Government. Unlike in the Wholly Pillay v. Government of Seychelles Constitutional Case No. 7 of 1994, there were no further negotiations ending with a ‘careful consideration.’ The final letter of 18thJanuary 1996 did not add to or subtract from the decision conveyed by the letter dated 16thFebruary 1995. Hence the mere continuance of correspondence after a clear and unambiguous decision had been made, in the hope that the State would revoke or vary that decision is a meaningless exercise as the Constitutional remedies commence as soon as there is a contravention or a likely Contravention. Such contravention cannot be made a continuing one by seeking to review the decision. The 30-day [now amended to 90 days] limitation period should therefore have commenced on 16th February 1995 and not on 18thJanuary 1996. Accordingly, I hold that the petition is time-barred under Rule 4(1)(a) of the Constitutional Court Rules, 1994, and is therefore dismissed with costs.” Therefore, in Poole this Court found that there was no breach of the time bar provision under Rule 4 of the Constitutional (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation of the Constitution) Rules because the Government was still in the process of considering the application made and had not finally determined that the respondents were not entitled to any compensation with the result that the cause of action giving rise to the claim had not yet materialised, and consequently the action could not have been time barred. In the present case, the Appellant had been informed that the Government would inform it by 31 December 1996 of its decision, but failed to do so. In the circumstances, the cause of action accrued in December 1996 so that pursuant to Rule 4 supra, the petition should have been lodged by March 1996. Since the petition was only lodged on 28 June 2024 (page 63 of the record refers), it follows that it has been brought in breach of Rule 4 and is therefore time-barred. In any event, even if one were to consider that the above Rule is not breached, the petition should not be entertained for the following reasons. There was an extraordinary and unexplained period spanning 22 to 27 years of inaction by both the deceased and her executors. The evidence on record is clear and not in dispute. The deceased clearly made a timely application in 1993. The whole difficulty arises from decades of silence, by both by Government and by the estate. Under the Constitution of Seychelles, the Constitutional Court is defined as the Supreme Court sitting with no fewer than two judges on constitutional matters. Article 129 refers. Its jurisdiction includes the power to declare unconstitutional acts or omissions void, enforce fundamental rights under Chapter III, through Article 46, or grant “any remedy available to the Supreme Court…as the Court considers appropriate.” In the case of Catherine Cilliers v Adriaan De Lange DC 137 of 2020, the Court emphasised that its “inherent jurisdiction” is part of its “Full judicial power…in all matters concerning the general administration of justice,” and that it may operate “where there is no express power.” The rationale is that equitable or inherent jurisdiction fills “gaps and loopholes of the law” to ensure fairness and justice, especially where statutory or common-law remedies are inadequate. Therefore, in constitutional matters, when the statute or as in this case, the Constitution does not provide a neat remedy, or the matter calls for ‘justice’ beyond rigid legal categories, the Court may lean on its equitable or inherent jurisdiction to provide relief. In that sense, constitutional jurisdiction can transform into equitable jurisdiction. Going by the evidence in casu, it is trite that equity does not aid those who sleep on their rights. See Jumeau v Government of Seychelles (2018), Attorney-General v Jumaye (1978), and common-law principles of laches. The learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England Equity Volume 16(2) (Reissue), 2015 Edition express the principle as follows, in paragraph 910: “A claimant in equity is bound to prosecute his claim without undue delay. This is in pursuance of the principle which has underlain the statutes of limitation 'equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent' or 'delay defeats equities'. A court of equity refuses its aid to stale demands, where the claimant has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by his unconscionable delay ('laches'). The defence of laches is, however, allowed only where there is no statutory bar. If there is a statutory bar operating either expressly or by way of analogy, the claimant is entitled to the full statutory period before his claim becomes unenforceable; …” The learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England supra, go on to state, in paragraph 911 that: “In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (1) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (2) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.” With respect to the doctrine on laches, therefore, two circumstances which are always important to consider, according to Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221 at 239, are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy. In casu, it is clear that there was a statutory time bar within which the Appellant was required to file their petition, but which time bar the Appellant had completely contravened and continued to contravene for about two decades later. Essentially, waiving their right to assert their claim and placing the Respondents in a position where it would not be reasonable to place them if the remedy by the Appellant were afterwards to be asserted. Unfortunately, despite the Appellant having been initially entitled to the full statutory period within which to lodge their petition, the entitlement became unenforceable soon after such statutory period expired and worsened by the two-decade further undue delay or inactivity. In the second issue, I consider whether the cases of Poole and Jumeau were misapplied to the circumstances in this case. With respect to the Poole v Government of Seychelles and Anor case, Mr. Boulle submitted in sum, that it states that the constitutional cause of action under Article 14(1), Part III, Schedule 7 is special and self-contained and has its own in-built time bar - the 12-month period from the coming into force of the Constitution within which the application must be made. In expanding his submission, counsel referred us to paragraph 23 of the said judgment, where it states that no other time bar imposed by ordinary law or rules of court can derogate from this, because Schedule 7 Part III is a special constitutional mechanism to address historical injustices under the Land Acquisition Act. Counsel contended that once a person has lodged a timely application, the State has a duty to “consider and negotiate in good faith”, the sun only sets when “the last timely application has been disposed of in good faith.” He submitted that Rule 4 did not apply to the matter under consideration. Mr. Perera, the learned Attorney-General, submitted that the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is always invoked via Articles 46 and 130, and is procedurally regulated by the Constitutional Court Rules, including Rule 4. Mr. Perera contended that the 12-month window in Article 14(1) governs only when applications must be lodged with the Executive. That, it does not exempt later court proceedings from general constitutional time limits. He submitted that the Constitutional Court Rules apply to this matter. He argued that this Court could not override the rules made under the Constitution. Therefore, Rule 4 should apply to this case, and the Poole case could be said to have been decided per incuriam. In Poole, the Appellant made his application within the 12 months constitutionally provided for. He filed his application under Article 130 (1) of the Constitution, wherein he alleged that the State had contravened its constitutional obligations contained in paragraph 14 (1) of Part III Schedule 7 thereof, by failing to return his land Parcel No. T627 compulsorily acquired on 18 October 1983, and to pay compensation in addition to the compensation already paid under the Land Acquisition Act, 1977 in terms of a judgment given by the Supreme Court in Civil Side Case No. 139 of 1985. I have carefully combed through the judgment of this Court in Poole. To the extent that it deals with the question of time limits, my understanding of that case is as I have stated at paragraph 76 above that the Government was still in the process of considering the application made and had not finally determined that the respondents were entitled to any compensation. In other words, the time bar provided in Article 14 is for the preservation of the cause of action within the twelve months prescribed. As such, this Court held at paragraph 25 of the Poole judgment that the application was made within the twelve months prescribed, and that the State was in breach of Article 14 (1) of the Constitution by failing to negotiate in good faith after the application was made. The Court was not asked to effect the wording of limitation in Rule 4. To argue that Rule 4 is inapplicable on the basis of Poole is thus misleading. The case of Poole can be distinguished from the instant case in that, in Poole, there was evidence of negotiations, while in casu, the matter did not even get to any negotiations and the deceased did not actively pursue the matter beyond the last correspondence that she had received from the Principal Secretary on 8 November 1995. This status continued on until the deceased’s death. Essentially, and going by the last correspondence from the Ministry, the deceased was supposed to lodge a case within three (3) months from 31 December 1996 (being the last day the Ministry assured her they would give her feedback regarding her matter/case. What this demonstrates, in my view, is that when the deceased did not take any further action, within three (3) months from 31 December 1996, she got caught up in the condition that excludes an applicant from being entitled to claim. Article 14(1) Part III, Schedule 7 states: “Past land acquisitions (1) The State undertakes to continue to consider all applications made during the period of twelve months from the date of coming into force of this Constitution by a person whose land was compulsorily acquired under the Lands Acquisition Act, 1977 during the period starting June, 1977 and ending on the date of coming into force of this Constitution and to negotiate in good faith with the person with a view to— (a)where on the date of the receipt of the application the land has not been developed or there is no Government plan to develop it, transferring back the land the person; (b)where there is a Government plan to develop the land and the person from whom the land was acquired satisfies the Government that the person will implement the plan or a similar plan, transferring the land back to the person; (c)where the land cannot be transferred back under sub subparagraphs (a) or sub subparagraph (b)— (i)as full compensation for the land acquired, transferring to the person another parcel of land of corresponding value to the land acquired; (ii)paying the person full monetary compensation for the land acquired; or (iii)as full compensation for the land acquired, devising a scheme of compensation combining items (i) and (ii) up to the value of the land acquired. (2) For the purposes of subparagraph (1), the value of the land acquired shall be the market value of the land at the time of coming into force of this Constitution or such other value as may be agreed to between the Government and the person whose land has been acquired. (3) No interest on compensation paid under this paragraph shall be due in respect of the land acquired but Government may, in special circumstances, pay such interest as it thinks just in the circumstances. (4) Where the person eligible to make an application or to receive compensation under this paragraph is dead, the application may be made or the compensation may be paid to the legal representative of that person.” The view I take is that Part III of Schedule 7 was a transitional justice mechanism, designed to address pre-1993 land acquisition grievances within a finite period. It was never intended to give rise to perpetual and dormant claims capable of revival decades later. To interpret it otherwise would risk serious disruption to land titles, compensation obligations, and public planning processes. The purpose of a transitional provision, therefore, cannot be overemphasised and to this end, it was clarified in the case of Britnell v Secretary of State for Social Security [1991] 2 All ER 726 at 729-730 that the purpose of a transitional provision is to facilitate the change from one statutory regime to another, making special provision for the application of legislation to the circumstances which exist at the time when it comes into force. This can clearly be seen by the wording in Article 14(1) above. According to the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England supra, it is trite that one feature of a transitional provision is that its operation is expected to be temporary, in that it becomes spent when all the past circumstances with which it is designed to deal have been dealt with. The English Courts, thus, cautioned as follows, in the case of IRC v Metrolands (Property Finance) Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 166 at 183, on appeal [1982] 2 All ER 557, where it was dealing with a transitional provision of the law: “One thing which is clear about [s 45] (4) and (8) is that the former is a permanent provision and the latter is a transitional one ... it would be very dangerous, in trying to get to the effect of the permanent provision, to attach too much weight to the particular wording of the transitional one.” 103. Turning to the case of Government of Seychelles v Jumeau supra, the Appellant submitted that it is distinguishable because the claimant in that case had not made an application under Schedule 7. A careful perusal reveals to me that the Appellant has a sound argument that factually and legally Jumeau is not “similar in nature” to the present case. In Jumeau, the claimant never satisfied the threshold of a valid Schedule 7 application. In casu that threshold is undisputedly met. The ratio of Jumeau is about lack of locus under Schedule 7 and the applicability of Rule 4. In the present case, the premise that the application complied with Schedule 7 was not in dispute. 104. I cannot fault the Constitutional Court for considering Jumeau because it was entitled to look at it for its persuasive value in establishing that the petition under its consideration was time barred under Rule 4(1)(b). 105. Whilst I would agree with the Appellant that Jumeau is not identical to the present case, I cannot fault the Constitutional Court considering it, in view of a 20-year silence. However, the Court’s statement that it was a “case of similar nature” is misleading. Jumeau remains instructive on the broader principles of equity, delay, and prejudice, all of which apply with equal force to constitutional matters. The Constitutional Court was entitled to draw on Jumeau for these general principles. Any overstatement of the similarity between the two cases does not undermine the correctness of the outcome. In view of the forestated, I would dismiss grounds one to five. 106. Turning to the issue of errors of fact and incorrect inferences as argued in grounds six to eight, the Appellant challenges certain passages of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in which the Court stated that - the Respondent considered the compensation adequate; silence on the deceased’s part was acceptance; and the deceased knowingly allowed the matter to lapse. 107. I take the view that while some of these inferences may lack strong evidential support, they are ultimately immaterial. The decisive and undisputed facts remain that – the last communication from the Respondent was in 1995; the death of the deceased was in 2002; the first attempt to litigate by the estate was in 2023; and the proper petition filed in 2024. There is no explanation for the delay by either the deceased or her executor. In these circumstances, even if the Constitutional Court’s inferences are set aside, the claim remains fatally compromised by the Appellant’s own inaction. On these considerations, I find no merit in grounds six to eight. 108. With regard to the issue of ultra petita raised in grounds eight and nine, I begin by stating that a court acts ultra petita when it grants relief that goes beyond what a party has requested in its pleadings or prayers. In other words, parties define the scope of the dispute. The court then must decide within those limits. If the court gives more, different, or additional relief than what was sought, it has acted ultra petita. 109. The Appellant attacks the Constitutional Court’s reasoning that administrative silence “could well be interpreted” as rejection, and silence “can be interpreted as acceptance, by the estate, that since compensation has been paid they would not push the matter further”. This first raises the question whether the Court was ultra petita? From the record, it can be deciphered that both sides clearly argued time bar, laches, delay, and abandonment. Whether silence amounted to rejection or abandonment is squarely within that issue. In my view, the Court was not ultra petita, it dealt with the consequences of an admitted long silence. 110. On the second inquiry, in assessing whether the inferences drawn by the Constitutional Court were fair and properly grounded, it must be noted that inferring acceptance from prolonged silence is generally inconsistent with recognised principles of Seychellois law. Article 1110(8) of the Civil Code stipulates that silence does not amount to acceptance unless such an implication necessarily arises from the prior dealings of the parties or the customs of a particular trade. While this is not a contractual dispute, the principle illustrates a broader evidential caution against treating silence as acquiescence. In the present context, the deceased’s lack of communication cannot reasonably be construed as acceptance that adequate compensation had been paid, particularly where the State had promised a decision and then never communicated further. There was no evidence of any subsequent communication from the deceased indicating satisfaction with the outcome, and ultimately, Schedule 7 itself has a remedial and protective purpose that does not favour imputing acceptance from silence. 111. On these considerations, I come to the conclusion that the Court stayed within the issue of time-bar/prescription/abandonment. 112. On whether the inferences are overly favourable to the State, I am inclined to the view that the Appellant’s complaint is legitimate. The findings lean heavily towards reading silence against the Appellant, without balanced consideration of the State’s own prolonged silence. 113. However, even if the Appellant did not expressly run a “continuous claim” argument, the natural implication of saying Rule 4 and prescription do not apply and the Respondents’ duty continues until “Day of Redemption” is that the claim has a continuous character. The Court, dealing with time-bar and prescription, was entitled to examine the nature of the right and say “this is transitional, not perpetual”. 114. The delay here, spanning more than two decades, is so extreme that equity will not assist the Appellant. Prejudice to the Respondent and third parties is obvious as land use and ownership may have changed. Some important valuation evidence from the 1980s cannot realistically be reconstructed, and witnesses and officials may no longer be available. In such circumstances, the claim is properly regarded as abandoned. Conclusion and Orders 115. While in my analysis I do not endorse all the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, I find that in the end the Constitutional Court arrived at the right decision to dismiss the Appellant’s petition. The Appellant’s arguments cannot overcome the fact that there was extraordinary and unexplained delay. The petition was, in substance and effect, fatally stale, and could not properly be entertained as it was brought in breach of Rule 4(1). In view of the foregoing, I find that the learned Judges of the Constitutional Court were perfectly entitled to find that the petition herein, was time-barred. There is, thus, no merit in the Appellant’s appeal. 116. The appeal fails in its entirety and is hereby dismissed. 117. The Constitutional Court judgment of 27 March 2025 is upheld for the reasons aforesaid. I make no order as to costs. _____________________ D. Sichinga JA I concur: ____________________ K. Gunesh-Balaghee JA I concur: ____________________ N. Sharpe-Phiri JA Signed, dated and delivered on 15 December 2025. Page 13 of 13