Gamatis & Another v Bank of Baroda ((SCA MA 05/2025) - (Arising in SCA 16/2025) And (SCA 16/2025) - (Arising in CM 41/2024) [2025]15 December 2025)) [2025] SCCA 32 (15 December 2025)

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Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [] IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES ______________________________________________________________________________ Reportable [2025] (15 December 2025) SCA MA 05/2025 (Arising in SCA 6/2025) And SCA 16/2025 (Arising in CM 41/2024) In the Matter Between Julia Gamatis 1st Applicant/Appellant (rep. by Mr. Bryan Julie) Nathalie Gamatis 2nd Applicant/Appellant (rep. by Mr. Bryan Julie) And Bank of Baroda 1st Respondent (rep. by Mr. Guy Ferley) Marie Therese Bristol 2nd Respondent Court Appointed Auctioneer (Unrepresented) ______________________________________________________________________________ Neutral Citation: Gamatis & Another v Bank of Baroda (SCA MA 05/2025) – (Arising in SCA 16/2025) And (SCA 16/2025) – (Arising in CM 41/2024) [2025]15 December 2025) Before: Twomey-Woods, Robinson, André, JJA Summary: Immovable Property (Judicial Sales) Act — Possession of property during appeal — No appeal shall be against any judgment of adjudication, when unobjected to at the time of the adjudication — Immovable Property (Judicial Sales) Act, CAP 94, section 212 Heard: 4 December 2025 Delivered: 15 December 2025 ______________________________________________________________________________ ORDER 1. The appeal stands dismissed. 2. The application MA 5/2025 arising from SCA16/2025 stands dismissed. 3. I make no order as to cost. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________________ROBINSON JA (TWOMEY-WOODS, ANDRE JJA, CONCURRING) INTRODUCTION The proceedings in case CM No. 41/2024 took place under the Immovable Property (Judicial Sales) Act, CAP 94, hereinafter referred to as the "IPJS Act". The IPJS Act came into force on the 12 October 1877, and has been amended from time to time. The IPJS Act provides procedures for the Supreme Court to seize and sell the immovable property of an execution debtor, and to apply the proceeds of sale in or towards the discharge of the debt owing to the execution creditor. The appeal arises from the sale and adjudication of the land comprised in title number H12880 on which stands "one concrete block 2 story self-catering apartment approximately 30 x 15m. First floor comprises of 2 units 1 bedroom and a dripping pool. Second floor comprises of 2 bedroom and 1 dripping pool". Additionally, shrubs, flowers and bushes are planted on the land comprised in title number H12880. The land comprised in title number H12880 and all buildings and appurtenances situated thereon, as more fully described in this paragraph [2], are hereinafter referred to as the "Property". The Property is situated at Mare Anglaise, Mahe, Seychelles. The sale and adjudication of the Property took place on the 10 June 2025 at 10 a.m before the learned Judge of the Supreme Court. The Respondent, the execution creditor, is the adjudicatee of the Property, as no bid exceeded the mise à prix of Seychelles rupees Ten Million (SCR10,000,000/-). The "Judgment of Adjudication" was delivered in open court on the 27 June 2025. The Appellants, Julia Lysa Gamatis and Nathalia Dylis Gamatis, the execution debtors, are appealing the "decision of the Supreme Court of Seychelles in the matter of Commandment Case 41/2024 handed down on 10 June 2025", as per the notice of appeal filed on the 24 June 2025. The relief sought from this Court is to "[s]et aside the decision of the Supreme Court in Commandment Case 41/2024 for the adjudication and judicial sale of Parcel H12880 pronounced on 10 June 2025". THE FACTS LEADING TO THE SALE AND ADJUDICATION OF THE PROPERTY It is helpful to state the relevant facts leading to the adjudication of the Property before discussing the issues raised in the appeal. The seizure of the Property was preceded by a commandment dated 22 July 2024, served on the Appellants, requiring them to pay a debt amounting to Seychelles rupees Eight Three Hundred and Million Eighty-One Thousand and Six Hundred and Fifty-Five (SCR 8,381,655/-) plus interest and costs. On the 27 September 2024, since the Appellants did not make the required payment, ushers of the Court Messrs. Raoudy and Gangadoo seized the Property in the presence of the Appellants under a special authority dated the 10 September 2024 (see section 4). The memorandum of seizure dated 30 September 2024 (section 5), prepared by ushers of the Court Messrs. Raoudy and Gangadoo, indicated that the amount owed was Seychelles Rupees Eight Million Four Hundred Forty-One Thousand Eleven and Thirty Cents (SCR 8,441,011.30), excluding interest, which would be calculated and adjusted on the day of sale. The memorandum of seizure also stated that this amount remained unpaid despite the commandment issued on the 22 July 2024. The Respondent deposited a memorandum of charges (cahiers des charges) dated 26 November 2024, at the Supreme Court registry (section 21). Dodin J scheduled the reading of the memorandum of charges (cahiers des charges) for the 10 December 2024 (section 24). The memorandum of charges, among other things, set out the conditions of sale under which the Property was to be sold (section 21). Article 1 of the "Conditions of Sale" contained in the memorandum of charges stated that the sale of the Property will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the IPJS Act. Article 2 states that, so far as relevant, the Property will be sold to the highest bidder and for cash. The Appellants were given the opportunity to examine the memorandum of charges (section 21) and could have applied to the learned Judge by way of petition for rectification and amendment (section 30). The Appellants made no application for any change to any of the conditions of sale. The memorandum of charges was not read on the 10 December 2024, due to the absence of the learned Judge. The case was adjourned to the 15 January 2025. On that date, Mr. Elizabeth, the Counsel of record for the Appellants, withdrew his appearance and was replaced by Counsel Mr. Ryan Laporte. Judge Dodin then scheduled the reading of the memorandum of charges for the 12 February 2025. On the 12 February 2025 at 10:30 a.m, the memorandum of charges was read before Dodin J, assisted by the orderly of court, Miss Sinon, in the presence of Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Ferley, and Counsel for the Appellants, Mr. Laporte (section 29). Dodin J then scheduled the sale and adjudication of the Property for the 26 March 2025 at 11 a.m. The Appellants applied for a postponement of the sale (section 36 of the IPJS Act), paragraph [13] of this judgment refers. On the 26 March 2025, Mr. Laporte withdrew as Counsel for the Appellants, and Mr. Bonte appeared for them on the same date. On the 24 March 2025, the Appellants filed an application (MA60/2025) seeking an order to postpone the sale and adjudication of the Property. On the 16 April 2025, case CM No. 41/2024 was assigned to the learned Judge. On the 23 April 2025, the learned Judge dismissed the application to postpone the sale, ruling that she was not convinced the Appellants had presented sufficient grounds for the postponement. I discuss the learned Judge's ruling in more detail below. Mr. Bonte's last appearance for the Appellants was on the 23 April 2025. The sale and adjudication of the Property were rescheduled for the 10 June 2025 at 10 a.m. On that date and time, the sale and adjudication of the Property occurred before the learned Judge in open court (section 38). An affidavit filed on the 10 June 2025 and an email dated 9 June 2025 are part of the record of appeal. The Appellants and one Steven Baker swore to the affidavit on the 9 June 2025. The email, sent by the Development Bank of Seychelles to info@venliavillas.com, was addressed to Mr. Baker and Miss Gamatis. These documents were not before the learned Judge on the 10 June 2025 — the date of the sale and adjudication of the property — as indicated in the proceedings of that day (paragraph [16] of this judgment refers). I address both items below, noting that they do not constitute evidence in the case CM No. 41/2024. I reproduce the contents of the affidavit so far as relevant — "We, Julia Lysa Gamatis, Nathalie Dylis Gamatis and Steven Baker, hereby make oath and say as follows: That we are deponents abovenamed and the defendant in the said matter. That we have been issued with a commandment to seize our property H12880. That we have approached the Development Bank of Seychelles a loan facility for the purpose of settling the loan with Bank of Baroda and to restructure our finance. That as per the letter from DBS we have been assured that the loan is being processed. (copy attached) That we are hereby applying to this Honourable Court to stay the sale as the debt will be paid entirely as stated above. That the statements contained above are true and correct to the best of our knowledge, information and belief." I rehearse the proceedings regarding the sale and adjudication of the Property, which occurred before the learned Judge, in open Court, on the 10 June 2025, at 10 a.m, as they are crucial to the determination of the issues raised in the appeal — at pages 157 to 160 of the record of appeal, as follows — "SITTING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SEYCHELLES ON TUESDAY 10TH JUNE AT 10.00 AM BEFORE HER LORDSHIP N. BURIAN – JUDGE TRANSCRIBED BY SANDRA CEDRAS THE UNDERSIGNED COURT REPORTER INTERPRETED BY NELCY JOUBERT, COURT ORDERLY MARIE-THERESE BRISTOL. BANK OF BARODA Vs JULIA GAMATIS & ORS COMMANDMENT CASE 41 OF 2024 Mr. Guy Ferley for the Plaintiff Court: We are just checking if there is anybody outside who has come for the sale. I see that you have filed your bill of cost and it has been taxed. Mr. Ferley: Yes. Court: In the sum of 16.606, is that correct? Mr. Ferley: Yes. Court: Twice in the nation and twice in the Gazette. Mr. Ferley: Yes. Court: Which I see you have provided copies to the Court as well. So I am satisfied that the requirements under the Act in respect of publication has been met. So just for the record purposes. As the memorandum of charges, the property that is being sold today is H12880 situated at Mare Anglaise on which according to the memorandum of charges there is a building one concrete block of two self-catering apartment approximately 30 x 15 square meters, First floor comprises of two units, one bedroom and pool. Second floor comprises of two bedrooms and one dripping pool along with a plantation of flowers and bushes. Mr. Ferley: That is indeed the position. Court: And the mise a prix for today's sale is set at 10 million rupees. Mr. Ferley: Indeed your Ladyship. Court: If you are ready then we will open. Mr. Ferley: We are ready to proceed. Court: We will open the bid as the mise a prix which is 10 million rupees. Is there anyone in todays' room who has come to bid for 10 million rupees for the sale of parcel H12880. As there is nobody who is here this morning to bid for the property at the mise a prix, therefore the mise a prix has not been met and therefore the property would be adjudicated to the Bank being the Bank of Baroda. Mr. Ferley: Much obliged. Your ladyship may an order be made that the Respondents hand over the keys to the buildings or deposit them at the Court because they are still occupying the building. Court: Mrs Gamatis, the Bank the property has been adjudicated to the Bank which means that if you have any keys in your possession, you will need to deposit the same at the court registry to hand over to the Bank, is that clear? Respondent: Yes. Court: Mr. Ferley I will give you a date for the judgment of adjudication. In the meantime please speak to the Bank for them to make payment to your office in respect of any stamp duty registration. And fees that will need to be paid so that you can provide me with confirmation that has been paid to your office and then I will give you a date for the delivery of the judgment of adjudication. Mr. Ferley: So the only that they only need to pay is the stamp duty. Court: Stamp duty and of there is registration fees that they require from you then yes. Mr. Ferley: Yes I will do that. … Court: Very well. Matter is set down for judgment of adjudication for the 24TH OF JUNE AT 8: 30 A. M. Yes Madame? Respondent: I get the document from another bank that it is going to refinance the loan but I already gave it to my lawyer. Mr. Ferley: If that is the case, they can contact the Bank and they will resolve. Court: Yes the property has today already been adjudicated to the Bank however if you want to make a proposal to the Bank, you can still contact the Bank. If the Bank is prepared and this goes through then they will not proceed with the judgment of adjudication but it depends on what this document is. As far as my rule is concerned, I have done my part, the property has been adjudicated to the Bank but if there is any negotiations between you and the Bank outside of that, you are free to do so." [Emphasis supplied] The Appellants have placed considerable emphasis on their argument that another bank was willing to refinance the loan. The Appellants argued that this constitutes an objection under section 212 of the IPJS Act. This issue is further addressed below. I have not considered matters arising after the 10 June 2025, as the Appellants are appealing the decision made on the 10 June 2025 — the date of the sale and adjudication of the Property. THE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS The four grounds of appeal are reproduced verbatim hereunder — "Ground 1 The learned Judge erred in passing down the Order, as he failed to consider that the Appellants were denied their constitutional right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed under article 19 (7) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. Material evidence and critical documents were not disclosed or presented by the Appellants' legal representative at the material time, thereby undermining the fairness of the proceedings. Ground 2 The learned Judge erred in failing to consider that the Appellants' legal representative did not file the necessary and appropriate applications on their behalf. This omission directly resulted in the Court issuing an unjust Order for judicial sale to the Appellants prejudice. Ground 3 The learned Judge erred in failing to take into account key and probative evidence, notably a notarised affidavit and a formal refinancing update letter from the Development Bank of Seychelles. This evidence, if properly considered, would have materially affected the outcome of the matter. Ground 4 The learned Judge erred in allowing the judicial sale to proceed in contravention of Section 26 of the Immovable Property (Judicial Sales) Act (Cap 94), which empowers the Court to postpone or cancel a sale for sufficient cause, including procedural irregularities." Submissions on behalf of the Appellants At the hearing of the appeal, this Court granted the Appellants leave to combine their four grounds of appeal, as the main argument presented by these grounds is the claim that the Appellants were denied the right to a fair hearing in accordance with article 19 (7) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution"). Thus, they argued that the adjudication of the Property in favour of the Respondent should be declared null. The Appellants' argument is based on three factors, namely — that the learned Judge on the 10 June 2025, at the time of the sale and adjudication of the Property, failed to consider material evidence, namely a "refinancing update letter" dated 9 June 2025, from the Development Bank of Seychelles. The Appellants claimed that their Counsel, Mr. Bonte, gave the letter to a court officer, with instructions that it be placed before the learned Judge. They claimed that the judgment did not refer to that letter, which was later found in the court file after the judgment. The Appellants argued that this oversight resulted in procedural unfairness, as the letter should have been treated as a formal objection requiring the learned Judge to pause or to inquire further. They also claimed that their ability to object on the 10 June 2025 at the time of sale and adjudication was hindered by the absence of their Counsel, Mr. Bonte, who was appearing before the learned Chief Justice. that the learned Judge refused an adjournment on the 24 June 2024, which would have allowed the Appellants to find new Counsel after their Counsel, Mr. Bonte, failed to act and was absent. They argued that they had to proceed without Counsel in a complex property and constitutional case. As a result, they were deprived of two important opportunities to object before the judicial sale, resulting in irreversible prejudice. that the learned Judge disregarded medical evidence filed at and emailed to the Registry of the Supreme Court on the 27 June 2025, which explained the unavoidable absence of the Appellants. They claimed that this undermined the principles of fairness and natural justice. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent In the skeleton heads of argument presented on behalf of the Respondent, it is argued that — the learned Judge was correct not to consider materials that were not presented as evidence in court. With respect to the affidavit, the skeleton heads of argument pointed out that one Steven Baker, who also swore to the affidavit was not a party in the case CM 41/2024 and the averment at paragraph 2 of the affidavit is wrong because Mr. Baker does not co-own the Property. the email from the Development Bank of Seychelles sent to Mr. Baker and Miss Julia Gamatis did not confirm that the Bank had approved a loan for Mr. Baker and Miss Julia Gamatis. the court had ruled on the postponement of the sale under section 36 of the IPJS Act prior to the sale and adjudication of the Property on the 10 June 2025. on the 10 June 2025, at the time of the adjudication of the Property in favour of the Respondent, no objections were raised by the Appellants. Analysis of the arguments of the Appellants and Respondent As the IPJS Act is inspired by French law on "de la saisie immobilière", the Seychelles' Court should look to French doctrine and jurisprudence for guidance, provided that they do not conflict with Seychelles' written law. Article 2A of the Civil Code of Seychelles concerns the application of civil law jurisprudence, stating that the principles of civil law jurisprudence remain valid unless they are inconsistent with the Civil Code of Seychelles. A careful consideration of the oral and written submissions from both parties shows that they are primarily based on section 212 of the IPJS Act. The Respondent argued that the Appellants cannot appeal the decision because they did not raise any objections at the time of the sale and adjudication of the Property. On the other hand, the Appellants argued that the "refinancing update letter" from the Development Bank of Seychelles and the affidavit served as their objection, which the learned Judge did not consider. They also claimed that they expressed their objection at the time of the sale and adjudication by indicating that another bank would give them a loan to pay the debt, but the learned Judge also ignored this objection. Section 212 of the IPJS Act provides — "Possession of property pending appeal 212 No appeal shall be against any judgment of adjudication, when unobjected to at the time of the adjudication. The fact of any objection shall be recorded by the Judge, on the day of adjudication, upon the memorandum of the cahiers des charges. In the case of appeal, the adjudicatee may take possession, notwithstanding such appeal, and, in such a case, if he is afterwards disposed, he shall be entitled to claim and recover, by way of privilege ranking over all other privileges, upon the price of the property, his outlay for the maintenance of the property, and such claim for outlay shall be subject to revision and approval by a Judge." [Emphasis supplied] Section 212 of the IPJS Act expressly excludes a right of appeal when unobjected to at the time of the adjudication. Such an exclusion is allowed by article 120 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. Article 120 (1) and 120 (2) of the Constitution makes the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court, subject to other provisions of the Constitution or an Act. See, for instance, the authorities of Finesse v R (SCA 1 of 1995) [1995] SCCA 27 (20 April 1995), Adrienne v Shelly Beach Properties Ltd SCA 10/1999, the majority judgment in Tony Lablache & Anor v Josianne Vital SCA 26/2023 Arising in CA 02 of 2023 (dated 3 May 2024) and Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice and Others SCA MA 06/2025 (dated 18 August 2025). The question of whether the IPJS Act, which came into operation in 1877, qualifies as an Act under the Constitution needs to be briefly addressed. In the majority judgment of Tony Lablache & Anor [supra], the Court of Appeal stated — "the word 'Act' in Article 86 of the Constitution must be interpreted as including any Act which was in force prior to the date of the coming into force of the Constitution and that any other interpretation would lead to incongruous results." In accordance with the findings in the majority judgment of Tony Lablache & Anor [supra], the IPJS Act is considered part of the "existing law" and must qualify as an Act under article 120 (2) of the Constitution. I address the issue raised under section 212 of the IPJS Act, which is as follows — whether the Respondent's argument that the Appellants are barred from appealing under section 212 of the IPJS Act due to their failure to object to the judgment of adjudication at the time of adjudication is valid. It is unclear when the "judgment of adjudication" should be considered made for the purposes of section 212 of the IPJS Act. In the case of Balcarran Bundhoo v State of Mauritius 2005, PRV 72 2007, MR 247, Privy Council Appeal No 72 of 2005 (a case of persuasive authority), the Lords of the Privy Council addressed a similar issue under section 207 of the Sale of Immovable Property Act Cap 202 (2 November 1868) of Mauritius. Section 207 of the same Act closely resembles section 212 of the IPJS Act. Section 207 of the Sale of Immovable Property Act of Mauritius provides — "207. Possession of property pending appeal No appeal shall lie against a judgment of adjudication which is not objected to at the time of the adjudication. The fact of an adjudication shall, on the day of adjudication, be recorded by the master on the memorandum of the cahier des charges. Where an appeal is lodged, the adjudicatee may take possession pending the appeal, and where he is afterwards dispossessed, he may claim and recover, by way of privilege, ranking over all other privileges, on the price of the property, his outlay for the maintenance of the property. The outlay claimed under subsection (3) may be revised and approved by the Master." [Emphasis supplied] I am reproducing sections 43 and 44 of the Sale of Immovable Property Act of Mauritius, as they are relevant to the discussion in the case of Balcarran Bundhoo [supra]. Sections 43 and 44 of the same Act provide the title of the adjudicatee and delivery of the title deed, respectively. These provisions read as follows — "43. Title of adjudicatee The title deed of the adjudicatee shall consist of — the memorandum of charges drawn up in the manner specified in section 20, and any amendment which has been ordered to be made to it; the memorandum of adjudication. [and] 44. Delivery of title deed The Master shall not deliver the title deed of adjudication until the purchaser has — deposited with him the costs claimable by him and the amount payable by way of duty on the registration and transcription of the title deed; and proved to the satisfaction of the Master that he has — fulfilled all the conditions of the memorandum of charges incumbent on him; and paid all the taxed costs of sale and produced the receipts". Sections 43 and 44 of the IPJS Act closely resemble sections 43 and 44 of the Sale of Immovable Property Act of Mauritius. These two provisions of the IPJS Act provide — "43. Title of the adjudicate The title deed of the adjudicatee shall consist simply of the memorandum of charges drawn up in the manner prescribed by section 21, together with any modification which may have been ordered to be made thereon, and also of the memorandum of adjudication. No other incidental proceedings need be inserted thereon. [and] 44. When to be delivered to purchaser The aforesaid title deed shall not be delivered by the Judge until the purchaser shall have deposited in the Registrar's hands the costs claimable by the Judge, as also the amount payable by way of stamp duty and registration and transcription fees in respect of the title deed, nor until the purchaser shall have proved to the satisfaction of the Judge that he has fulfilled all the conditions of the memorandum of charges incumbent upon him at the time being and especially that he has paid all the taxed costs of sale, the receipts for which he shall be bound to produce to the Judge." Their Lordships stated at paragraph 23 in the case of Balcarran Bundhoo [supra]— "23. There remains the section 207 point. It is not entirely clear from the Record whether, for section 207 purposes, the judgment of adjudication in favour of the State should be treated as made on 31 October 2002, when it was announced, or on 12 November 2002, when it was formally transcribed. If the latter is the appropriate date, Mr Bundhoo's objection, made manifest by his notice of appeal of that date, would have complied with the section. But Mr Bundhoo's notice of appeal, which describes the judgment of adjudication in favour of the State as having been "delivered" on 31 October 2002, seems to accept that that was "the time of the adjudication" (see section 207(1)). If that is right, then Mr Bundhoo's appeal would stand barred by section 207. Their Lordships' favour 31 October 2002 as being the relevant date for section 207 purposes. Subsection (1) refers to "the time of the adjudication"; subsection (2) says that the objection must be recorded "on the day of adjudication". This language seems apt to refer to the actual day on which the bidding takes place and the adjudication is announced and somewhat inapt as a reference to some later day when the events of the sale are transcribed into the official books maintained by the Master." I have read the findings of the Lords of the Privy Council carefully in the case of Balcarran Bundhoo [supra] on the question of when the "judgment of adjudication" should be treated as made for the purposes of section 207. Their Lordships concluded that the judgment of adjudication in favour of the State should be treated as made at the time the adjudication was announced, rather than when it was transcribed, based on the reasons stated in their judgment. I accept the conclusion reached by their Lordships, which I apply to section 212 of the IPJS Act with respect to when the "judgment of adjudication" should be treated as made for the purposes of section 212 of the IPJS Act. Section 212 of the IPJS Act refers to the "time of the adjudication" and states that "the fact of any objection shall be recorded by the Judge on the day of adjudication, upon the memorandum of the cahiers des charges." Furthermore, the language used in section 212 of the IPJS Act expressly refers to the actual day on which the bidding occurs. In this case, the bidding at the instance of the Respondent took place on the 10 June 2025, as confirmed by the Supreme Court's proceedings on that date (paragraph [17] of the judgment refers). The notice of appeal indicated that the judgment of adjudication was delivered on the 10 June 2025, which is accepted as the date of adjudication in accordance with section 212 of the IPJS Act. I now consider the submissions of the parties. I have carefully examined the record of appeal, the facts leading to the sale and adjudication of the Property, the arguments presented by the parties, and the relevant legal provisions (particularly section 212 of the IPJS Act), and the case of Balcarran Bundhoo [supra]. I conclude that the Respondent's objection claiming that the Appellants are barred from pursuing the appeal due to their failure to object to the adjudication at the time of the sale, as required by section 212 of the IPJS Act, is well-founded. I find the facts presented by the Appellants do not constitute an objection under section 212 of the IPJS Act. Consequently, I conclude that the Appellants are barred by section 212 of the IPJS Act. The reasons for my conclusions are as follows. The Appellants, in their application (MA60/2025), sought an order postponing the sale and adjudication of the Property scheduled for 10 June 2025 at 10:00 a.m. At the time of this application, Mr. Bonte was their Counsel of record. In the supporting affidavit, the Appellants indicated that they had engaged with the Development Bank of Seychelles to secure a loan and had received assurances that the loan would be approved and ready for disbursement by the end of May 2025, thereby settling the debt in full. The learned Judge dismissed the application on the grounds that— "[6] in the instant case, I must agree with Counsel for the Execution Creditor that it is insufficient to simply aver in the affidavit that the DBS has agreed to grant the Respondent a loan without providing any supporting documents to back up this averment The Respondent applied for a postponement since 25th March 2025 and subsequently filed an additional affidavit on the 9th April 2025, however it is unfortunate to note that despite being given time to file a supplementary affidavit, no additional evidence or compelling reasons were provided to substantiate the claim that the Respondent had been guaranteed a loan to cover the debt which could have convinced this Court that a postponement was justified in the cirumstances." By the 10 June 2025, the Appellants had not secured any loan from the Development Bank of Seychelles. On that date, following the adjudication of the Property in favour of the Respondent, the Appellants made a vague and unsubstantiated statement suggesting that another bank had agreed to finance the loan. Aside from this vague and unsubstantiated statement, the Appellants did not raise any objections. While I acknowledge that the "refinancing update letter" and the affidavit are not evidence in this case, it is noted that had they been presented to the learned Judge at the time of the sale and adjudication, they would not have met the requirements for an objection under section 212 of the IPJS Act. Counsel for the Respondent pointed out that the "refinancing update letter" stated that the loan was still in the application process. Additionally, as correctly pointed out by Counsel for the Respondent, every application before a learned Judge incidental to the seizure or sale of immovable property shall be made by petition setting forth summarily the grounds upon which such application is made and the parties against whom the same is made (section 53 of the IPJS Act). It is clear that the issue with respect to the loan from the Development Bank of Seychelles has become irrelevant in light of subsequent events. At the hearing of the appeal, Counsel for the Appellants informed this Court that the Appellants had not secured a loan from the Development Bank of Seychelles. In relation to the appeal SCA 16/2025, the following miscellaneous applications were filed, namely (i) SCA MA 4/25 – filed on 7/7/25: Julia Gamatis & Or v Bank of Baroda; (ii) SCA MA 3/25 – filed on 8/8/25: Julia Gamatis & Or v Bank of Baroda; (iii) SCA MA 7/25 – filed on 8/8/25: Julia Gamatis & Or v Bank of Baroda; (iv) SCA MA 8/25 – filed on 8/8/25: Julia Gamatis & Or v Bank of Baroda; (v) SCA MA 9/25 – filed on 8/8/25: Julia Gamatis & Or v Bank of Baroda; (vi) SCA MA 12/25 – filed on 11/9/25: Julia Gamatis & Or v Bank of Baroda. During the hearing of these miscellaneous applications, the Appellants indicated to this Court that they were attempting to secure a loan from the Seychelles Credit Union to purchase the Property. However, during the hearing of the appeal, Counsel for the Appellants stated that it is unlikely the Appellants will be able to secure a loan from that Bank. Upon a thorough consideration of the record of appeal, it is unclear what objections the Appellants could have raised at the time of the adjudication, whether they were represented by Counsel or not. I now turn to the other arguments put forward by the Appellants. I find it unnecessary to consider their claims with respect to the learned Judge's failure to allow them adequate time to secure legal representation and the learned Judge's disregard of medical evidence. These issues arose after the sale and adjudication of the Property. For the reasons stated above, grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the appeal stand dismissed. MA 5/2025 arising from SCA 16/2025 — application to adduce new evidence on appeal The Appellants filed an application seeking an order to adduce new evidence on appeal. The evidence they wish to adduce includes a "refinancing update letter" from the Development Bank of Seychelles and an affidavit, both of which the Appellants heavily relied on at the hearing of the appeal. However, I find that the application does not satisfy the legal requirements for adducing new evidence on appeal, and the documents the Appellants wish to adduce do not assist their case. This is enough to dispose of the application, which stands dismissed. THE DECISION Therefore, I make the following orders — The appeal stands dismissed. The application MA 5/2025 arising from SCA16/2025 stands dismissed. I make no order as to cost. ___________________ F. Robinson, JA I concur ________________ Dr. M. Twomey-Woods, JA ANDRE JA (CONCURRING ADDITION) [1] I agree with my learned sister’s reasoning on the operation of section 212 of the IPJS Act. I write separately only to underline the legal limits on this Court’s jurisdiction in such appeals. [2] For the sake of clarity, nothing in this judgment should be construed as expanding or relaxing the statutory bar contained in section 212 of the IPJS Act. The determinative question is whether an objection, within the meaning of section 212, was made at the time of adjudication. [3] Where the statute expressly conditions or excludes the right of appeal, the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction is correspondingly limited. The Court cannot revisit the merits of an adjudication under the guise of broader notions of fairness or equity. [4] The judicial function must remain confined within the parameters set by the Act, and any modification of those parameters lies within the province of the Legislature. _____________________________ ANDRE JA Signed, dated, and delivered at Ile du Port on 15 December 2025. 11