Ahmed v R ((SCA CR 05/2025) And (SCA CR 06/2025) [2025] (Arising in CR 53/2018) (15 December 2025)) [2025] SCCA 33 (15 December 2025)

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Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [] IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES Reportable [2025] (15 December 2025) SCA CR 05/2025 And SCA CR 06/2025 (Arising in CR 53/2018) In the Matter Between Nizam Uddin Ahmed Appellant (rep. by Mr. Frank Elizabeth) And The Republic Respondent (rep. by Mrs. Lansinglu Rongmei) Neutral Citation: Ahmed v R (SCA CR 05/2025) And (SCA CR 06/2025) [2025] (Arising in CR 53/2018) (15 December 2025) Before: Twomey-Woods, Robinson, André, JJA Summary: Prohibition in Trafficking in Persons — Elements of trafficking in persons, "act"; "means" and "purpose of exploitation" — Prosecution did not discharge the legal burden borne by it — Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014, Act 9 of 2014, sections 3 (1) (d), (e) and (g), 5 (1) (b) and 5 (2) Heard: 1 December 2025 Delivered: 15 December 2025 ORDER 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The convictions in all counts are quashed. 3. The sentences in all counts are set aside. 4. The Appellant is acquitted of the offences charged. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________________ Robinson JA (Twomey-Woods JA, André JA, concurring) INTRODUCTION This is an appeal against the judgment delivered on the 28 November 2024 in a case of trafficking in persons under the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014, Act 9 of 2014 (hereinafter referred to as "Act 9 of 2014"). The Appellant, Mr. Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, was charged jointly with one Mr. Serge Larue for the offences of trafficking in persons under Act 9 of 2014. The Appellant and Mr. Larue were charged in their capacities as directors of DNS RISING FARM (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED, hereinafter referred to as "DNS Rising Farm". On the 29 August 2018, the Appellant and Mr. Larue each pleaded not guilty to seven counts of trafficking in persons under Act 9 of 2014. It was undisputed that DNS Rising Farm is a company registered on the 19 April 2017 under the Companies Act 1972, as amended. This is confirmed by exhibit D5 (D), a document titled "GOVERNMENT OF SEYCHELLES COMPANIES REGISTRY CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION". According to exhibit D5 (C), the original directors of DNS Rising Farm are (i) the Appellant, who holds 44 shares, (ii) Mr. Larue, a businessman with 46 shares, and (iii) Dave Dine, also a businessman, who holds 10 shares. A document titled "DNS RISING FARM (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED ARTICLE OF ASSOCIATION", has been subscribed to by all three directors and is exhibit D5 (D). According to the Memorandum of Association of DNS Rising Farm, dated 31 March 2017, and registered with the Registrar of Companies on the 19 April 2017 (exhibit D5 (C)), the objects for which DNS Rising Farm is established include, among other things, the following — "(a) to promote and invest in farming and other food production activities; (b) to carry out farming of vegetables, fruits, root crops and spices; (c) to import and operate shops for distribution retail wholesale and trade generally in agricultural and meat products including but not limited fruits, vegetable, spices cereals poultry and bovine products (d) to export agricultural products including but not limited to fruits vegetables root crops and spices; (e) to import farm machinery tools and equipment and other similar machinery and equipment and tools for sale…;". (Verbatim) Mr. Larue accepted a conditional offer by the Attorney General, under section 61 (A) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CAP 54) on the 30 May 2019, to turn State witness. Along with the "Conditional Offer", there is an "Amended Formal Charge" dated 31 May 2019. The "Conditional Offer" was made to Mr. Larue on the following conditions — "2. In view of paragraph (1) above, the Attorney General wishes — a. To obtain evidence from you; and b. Examine you as a witness in any case relating to or arising out of the facts involved in CB No. 63/09/18 CPS and also in CR. No.53 of 2018 which is pending before the Supreme Court. c. That you lead evidence and provide information as a witness for the Republic in CR. No. 53 of 2018 which is relating to and arising out of criminal case in connection with CB. No. 63/09/18 CPS with regard to the person known to the Republic namely, Nizam Uddin Ahmed, Bangladeshi national and resident of Port Glaud, Mahe and/or any other person that may otherwise be implicated in the said case. 3. In view of paragraph (2) above, the Attorney General wishes to offer the following: Subject to paragraph 4, that you will not be tried and the charges against you will be withdrawn in connection with the above mentioned case in CR.53 of 2018 or in case relating to CB N O. 63/09/18 CPS. 4. This offer is made on the following conditions: a. That you will make full and true disclosure of whole of the circumstances and give honest statement that are within your knowledge and outlining all your activities relating to the offence of Trafficking in Persons of 7 Bangladeshi nationals contrary to Section 3 (1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5 (1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 in connection with the case in CR 53 of 2018 or in any case relating to CB No. 63/09/18 CPS and also the offence of Trafficking in Persons related activities of above mentioned person namely, Nizam Uddin Ahmed, Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe and/or any other person that may otherwise be implicated and that are within your knowledge, relative to or in connection with the commission of any offence by the said persons and/or any other persons in connection with the facts of this case. b. That you will assist the Republic as witness in any Court cases that you have been summoned as a witness in relation to the case in CR 53 of 2018 which is pending before the Supreme Court or in any case relating to CB No. 63/09/18 CPS." On the 13 June 2019, the Republic withdrew the seven offences of trafficking in persons under Act 9 of 2014, against Mr Larue. Mr. Larue, PW-11, gave evidence for the Republic. Subsequently, the Appellant was charged, in his capacity as a director of DNS Rising Farm, in an "Amended Formal Charge", dated 31 May 2019, for seven offences of trafficking in persons under "Section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2)", of Act 9 of 2014. The "Amended Formal Charge" reads as follows — ʺCOUNT 1 Statement of offence Trafficking in Persons contrary to Section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5 (1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act. Statement of offence Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe as Director of DNS Rising Farm (Proprietary) Limited at Grande Anse, Mahe trafficked Mr. Ajharul, a Bangladeshi national from Bangladesh into Seychelles on the 21st March 2018 by way of recruiting the said Mr. Ajharul by fraud and deception whereby misrepresenting as to the financial incentive and conditions of work and thereafter exploiting the said Mr. Ajharul by forced labour and to practices similar to slavery using threats and subjecting to coercion. COUNT 2 Statement of offence Trafficking in Persons contrary to Section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act. Particulars of offence Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe as Director of DNS Rising Farm (Proprietary) Limited at Grande Anse, Mahe, trafficked Mr. Ahmed Oli a Bangladeshi national from Bangladesh into Seychelles on the 4th May 2018 by way of recruiting the said Ahmed Oli by fraud and deception whereby misrepresenting as to the financial incentive and conditions of work and thereafter exploiting the said Mr. Ahmed Oli by forced labour and to practices similar to slavery using threats and subjecting to coercion. COUNT 3 Statement of offence Trafficking in Persons contrary to Section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act. Particulars of offence Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe as Director of DNS Rising Farm (Proprietary) Limited at Grande Anse, Mahe, trafficked Mr. Alamin, a Bangladeshi national from Bangladesh into Seychelles on the 8gth February 2018 by way of recruiting the said Alamin by fraud and deception whereby misrepresenting as to the financial incentive and conditions of work and thereafter exploiting the said Mr. Alamin by forced labour and to practices similar to slavery using threats and subjecting to coercion. COUNT 4 Statement of offence Trafficking in Persons contrary to Section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act. Particulars of offence Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe as Director of DNS Rising Farm (Proprietary) Limited at Grande Anse, Mahe, trafficked Mr. Mahabub Alam, a Bangladeshi national from Bangladesh into Seychelles on the 8th February 2018 by way of recruiting the said Mr. Mahabub Alam by fraud and deception whereby misrepresenting as to the financial incentive and conditions of work and thereafter exploiting the said Mr. Mahabub Alam by forced labour and to practices similar to slavery using threats and subjecting to coercion. COUNT 5 Statement of offence Trafficking in Persons contrary to Section 3(1) (d), (e), & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act. Particulars of offence Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe as Director of DNS Rising Farm (Proprietary) Limited at Grande Anse, Mahe, trafficked Mr. Md. Romzan Shaik, a Bangladeshi national from Bangladesh into Seychelles on the 8th February 2018 by way of recruiting the said Mr. Md. Romzan Shaik by fraud and deception whereby misrepresenting as to the financial incentive and conditions of work and thereafter exploiting the said Mr. Md. Romzan Shaik by forced labour and to practices similar to slavery using threats and subjecting to coercion. COUNT 6 Statement of offence Trafficking in Persons contrary to Section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act. Particulars of offence Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe as Director of DNS Rising Farm (Proprietary) Limited at Grande Anse, Mahe, trafficked Mr. Roton Mirdha, a Bangladeshi national from Bangladesh into Seychelles on the 8th February 2018 by way of recruiting the said Mr. Roton Mirdha by fraud and deception whereby misrepresenting as to the financial incentive and conditions of work and thereafter exploiting the said Mr. Md. Roton Mirdha by forced labour and practices similar to slavery using threats and subjecting to coercion. COUNT 7 Statement of offence Trafficking in Persons contrary to Section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act. Particulars of offence Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a Bangladeshi national, residing at Port Glaud, Mahe as Director of DNS Rising Farm (Proprietary) Limited at Grande Anse, Mahe, trafficked Mr. Md. Abdur Razzak, a Bangladeshi national into Seychelles on the 8th February 2018 by way of recruiting the said Mr. Md. Abdur Razzak by fraud and deception whereby misrepresenting as to the financial incentive and conditions of work and thereafter exploiting the said Mr. Md. Abdur Razzak by forced labour and practices similar to slavery using threats and subjecting to coercion.ʺ On the 28 November 2024, the Appellant was convicted of six offences of trafficking in persons under "section 3(1) (d), (e) & (g) as read with Section 5(1) (b) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2014 and punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act". The Appellant was acquitted on count 7 because the Prosecution failed to provide evidence in support of count 7 against Mr. Md. Abdur Razzak. The Appellant was sentenced as follows, at paragraphs [24] to [30] of the judgment — "[24] He shall serve 4 years of imprisonment suspended for 2 years on each of the six counts that he stands convicted, these terms of imprisonment shall be concurrent with one another. [25] Additionally, he shall pay a fine of SCR20,780 on count 1, which shall be paid as compensation to the Complainant Mr. Ajharul under S 151 (1) (B) of the criminal Procedure Code. [26] On count 2, a fine of SCR 13, 853, which shall be paid as compensation to the Complainant Mr. Ahmed Oli under S 151(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [27] On count 3, a fine of SCR 20, 780, which shall be paid as compensation to the Complainant Mr. Alamin under S 151(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [28] On count 4, a fine of SCR 20, 780, which shall be paid as compensation to the Complainant Mr. Mahabub Alam under S 151(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [29] On count 5, a fine of SCR 20, 780, which shall be paid as compensation to the Complainant Mr. Romzan Shaik under S 151(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [30] On count 6, a fine of SCR 13, 853, which shall be paid as compensation to the Complainant Mr. Roton Mirdha under S 151(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [31] The total payment of compensation shall be paid by the 19th May 2025, failing which the convict shall serve a term of 6 months' imprisonment under each count." The Appellant also filed an appeal in SCA 6/2025 against the activation of the default sentence imposed by the learned Judge, which he has since withdrawn. GROUNDS OF APPEAL The Appellant has challenged the judgment on four grounds of appeal, reproduced verbatim, as follows — ʺGROUNDS OF APPEAL GROUND 1 That the learned Chief Justice erred in law and in fact in finding that the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the "act" element under Section 3(1)(a) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act. The evidence led by the prosecution did not establish that the Appellant personally recruited, transported or received the virtual complainants into Seychelles. All complainants testified that their recruitment occurred in Bangladesh, often by other persons or agents. That the learned trial judge failed to properly evaluate whether the accused's actions amounted to the required "means" under the Act, particularly deception and coercion. The circumstances cited, such as poor living conditions, delayed payment, or unsatisfactory work arrangements, do not legally constitute coercion or deception as interpreted under international and local trafficking jurisprudence. No threats, force, or fraudulent inducement by the Appellant were proved. That the conviction is unsafe as the trial court failed to establish the crucial nexus between the act, means, and the purpose of exploitation. The prosecution did not sufficiently prove that all three elements existed concurrently, as required under Section 3 of the Act. The court misapplied the conjunctive requirement, thus rendering the conviction unsatisfactory. GROUND 2 That the trial court erred in relying on foreign jurisprudence, which was distinguishable in fact and law, leading to an incorrect interpretation of the offence of trafficking in persons in a labour migration context. Several authorities cited by the court involved child victims, sexual exploitation, or physical confinement, which are materially different from the facts of this case. GROUND 3 That the trial court failed to give adequate weight to the defence dock statement and did not properly balance the absence of direct cross-examination with the credibility issues surrounding prosecution witnesses. The court's treatment of the accused's dock statement, while permissible, denied fair consideration of the Appellant's version and placed undue reliance on uncontested prosecution narratives. GROUND 4 The verdict is against the weight of evidence, and no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have reached the conclusion that the accused was guilty of trafficking in persons beyond a reasonable doubt.ʺ I have carefully examined the notice of appeal filed on 13 May 2025 and the skeleton heads of argument filed on 22 October 2025. I find that the Appellant has introduced new grounds of appeal in the skeleton heads of argument, which contravenes The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules, 2023. The new grounds of appeal are as follows — (i) ground 5 challenges the learned Judge's ruling regarding the submission of no case to answer; (ii) ground 6 claims that the learned Judge erred by conflating the actions of DNS Rising Farm with the personal actions of the Appellant; (iii) ground 7 claims that the learned Judge failed to properly apply the constitutional presumption of innocence, as enshrined in Article 19 (2) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, CAP 42; (iv) ground 9 claims that the learned Judge neglected to consider relevant comparative case law. In addition to the issue of new grounds of appeal introduced by Counsel for the Appellant in the skeleton heads of argument, I find that Counsel for the Appellant has also introduced new points while formulating the skeleton heads of argument related to the existing grounds of the appeal. I have confined the skeleton heads of argument to the original grounds of the appeal in accordance with The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules, 2023. I have not considered any points raised by the skeleton heads of argument which are not part of the existing grounds of appeal. The Appellant may not rely on these new grounds of appeal without leave of the Court of Appeal. Grounds 1 and 4 of the grounds of appeal The skeleton heads of argument for the Appellant have expanded the first ground of the appeal into four separate grounds. I have combined these four grounds into a single ground of appeal. Additionally, I have excluded any points from the four grounds that are not found in the original first ground. As stated above, this exclusion is necessary to avoid introducing new grounds of appeal without seeking leave of the Court of Appeal, which would violate Rule 18 (8) of the Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules, 2023. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant In relation to the first ground of the appeal, the Appellant's Counsel argued that the learned Judge made an error by not properly applying the three essential elements required to establish the offence of trafficking in persons. These elements are defined in Article 3 (a) of the Palermo Protocol and section 3 (1) of Act 9 of 2014, namely (i) an "action", (ii) a "means", and (iii) a "purpose" (of the intended action/means). Regarding the "act" element, Counsel for the Appellant argued that the learned Judge erred in finding that the Appellant personally committed the acts of recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, and receipt of the seven complainants. To support this argument, Counsel for the Appellant relied on the following evidence — (i) DNS Rising Farm submitted the applications for gainful occupation permits; (ii) the work permits were issued in the name of DNS Rising Farm acting as the employer; (iii) the Letter of offer and appointment issued to each complainant was in the name of DNS Rising Farm. With respect to the element of means, Counsel for the Appellant argued that the learned Judge erred in finding that the Appellant employed deception, fraud or any other prohibited means as defined in section 3 (1) of Act 9 of 2014. The evidence established that — (i) the recruitment process was conducted lawfully in accordance with both Bangladeshi and Seychelles law; (ii) work permits were properly obtained; (iii) the complainants voluntarily came to Seychelles; (iv) there was no evidence of threat, force, coercion, abduction or abuse of power by the Appellant personally. The Prosecution failed to prove that the Appellant knowingly or intentionally employed any prohibited means to achieve control over the complainants. The mere fact that working conditions may not have met expectations does not, without more, constitute the means of trafficking. With respect to the element of purpose, Counsel for the Appellant argued that the Respondent failed to establish that element. He argued that the learned Judge erred in finding that the Appellant harboured the requisite intention to exploit the complainants. The evidence demonstrated that: (i) the complainants were provided accommodation; (ii) the complainants had access to "cable television" (including watching the World Cup); (iii) food was provided; (iv) salaries were paid for at least the first three months; (v) the working conditions, while not ideal, did not amount to forced labour, slavery, or servitude. Overall, he argued that the Prosecution failed to adduce evidence demonstrating the Appellant's intention to exploit the complainants for forced labour, slavery or similar purposes. He submitted that the second and third elements are intrinsically intertwined. In other words, if the Prosecution fails to prove the means element, it becomes impossible to prove the purpose element of exploitation. As mentioned above, I have not considered any points raised by the skeleton heads of argument which are not part of the existing grounds of appeal, although I may have included them when summarising the submissions of Counsel for the Appellant. Submissions on behalf of the Prosecution Counsel for the Prosecution contended that the learned Judge applied the correct legal test. With respect to the act element, she argued that the Appellant recruited seven Bangladeshi migrant workers in Seychelles under the pretence of offering them work and financial incentives. The Appellant housed them in the same residence where he lived after confiscating their passports. According to Counsel for the Respondent, this involves "transportation", "receipt" and "harbour" in Seychelles. Concerning the element of means, Counsel for the Prosecution argued that the workers were misled under the pretence of proper work and salaries. However, their salaries were withheld, and the small amounts that were paid were sent directly to their families in Bangladesh. Additionally, the victims faced threats of deportation, and they were deprived of drinking water and adequate food. The working conditions were poor, and the living conditions at the house were also poor. These facts support the deception and the exploitation of the vulnerable migrant workers from Bangladesh, who faced language barrier and lacked a support system in both the local and English languages. Regarding the element of exploitation, Counsel for the Respondent argued that it has been established. She argued that the Appellant recruited workers by promising proper employment, but instead provided substandard accommodation, withheld their pay and delayed salary payments. She argued that these actions are not merely mistakes or inadvertent; instead, they demonstrate an intention to exploit the work and vulnerability of the complainant. Counsel for the Respondent also argued that the food provided was insufficient to the complainants who laboured all day without a place to rest and without access to drinking water. She claimed that the complainants were starving, that their freedom was taken away as their passports were locked up, and that they were given no money. Any small payments they received were sent directly to Bangladesh. She argued that these coercive tactics were used to break the complainants' spirits and make them feel worthless, which is a core psychological component of dehumanisation. Analysis of the arguments of the Appellant and Prosecution The Prosecution has charged the Appellant with trafficking in persons under section 3 (1) (d), (e) and (g) as read with section 5 (1) (b) of Act 9 of 2014 and punishable under section 5 (2) of the same Act. Section 2 of Act 9 of 2014 provides that "trafficking in persons" has the meaning as is in section 3 (1)". Section 3 (1) of Act 9 of 2014 defines trafficking in persons as follows — ʺ3(1) A person who recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives another person by any of the following means — (a) threat (b) use of force or other forms of coercion (c) abduction (d) fraud (e) deception, including any misrepresentation by words or conduct as to financial incentive or promise of reward or gain and other conditions of work (f) abuse of power or of another person's position of vulnerability; or (g) giving or receiving of payments or benefits, knowingly or intentionally, to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, For the purposes of exploitation, commits the offence of trafficking in persons and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, or such imprisonment and a fine not exceeding SCR500,000. Section 2 of Act 9 of 2014 provides that the word — "exploitation" includes — sexual exploitation; forced labour or services; subjecting a person to practices similar to slavery; involuntary servitude; fraudulent use of a person for removal of their organs or body parts; or forced marriage;" Section 5 (1) (b) stipulates that ʺan offence of trafficking in person is deemed to be aggravated if committed in any of the following circumstances — …(b) the offence is committed against more than one victim;…ʺ. Section 3 (1) defines trafficking in persons through a combination of three constituent elements, which are the actus reus or the material or physical element, which is split into two parts, and the mens rea or the mental element, as follows — (i) the actus reus of the offences, namely — (a) the acts of recruiting the complainants; (b) the wrongful means by which the acts of recruiting were achieved as set out in section 3 (1) (d), (e) and (g) of the Act 9 of 2014, which were the elements of (d) fraud, (e) deception, including any misrepresentation by words or conduct as to financial incentive or promise of reward or gain and other conditions of work (g) or giving or receiving of payments or benefits, knowingly or intentionally, to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person; (ii) the mens rea: the action and means must be intended for a purpose, namely exploitation, in the present case, through forced labour or services or practices similar to slavery. To constitute trafficking in persons under Act 9 of 2014, all three necessary elements must be present. However, there is an exception for cases involving children, as provided in the same Act. Since this case does not involve child trafficking, I will not elaborate on that exception. The statement of offence with respect to each count stated the means of (d) deception, (e) fraud, and (g) the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, knowingly or intentionally, to obtain the consent of a person who has control over another. It is noted with dismay that there are no particulars whatsoever with respect to these wrongful means in the particulars of offence in the "Amended Formal Charge". It should be noted that the statement of offence with respect to each count does not mention the wrongful means of (f) abuse of power or of another person's position of vulnerability, and there are no particulars regarding that means. Hence, I find that the learned Judge was wrong in considering that wrongful means in the judgment and in making a finding on it. I refer to means (g), which involves the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, either knowingly or intentionally, to secure the consent of a person who has control over another. Based on the particulars of offence provided, it is not stated what payments or benefits were given by the Appellant and to whom they were directed. An offence of trafficking in persons is not committed under section 3 (1) of Act 9 of 2014 if the payments or benefits are given to the trafficked persons. An offence is committed only if payments or benefits are given to achieve the consent of a person having control over the trafficked persons. Therefore, I will not take means (g) into consideration in the appeal, which, in any case, the learned Judge did not consider in the judgment. The Appellant did not raise any complaints about the "Amended Formal Charge" before the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, I emphasise that it is the duty of the Prosecution to file charges that meet the requirements outlined in section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Code and article 19 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. In the case of Ragain v R (CR SCA NO: 02/2012 [2013] SCCA 21), the Court of Appeal held that section 114 of the Criminal Procedure Code, along with the forms set out in the Fourth Schedule to the Code, "has now to be read subject to article 19 (2) (b) of the Constitution". I apply the law and legal principles to the facts of this case. Mr. Ahmed Oli, PW- 4. Mr. Oli arrived in Seychelles on the 4 May 2018, seeking job opportunities after being encouraged by friends. He contacted an agent in Dhaka, Bangladesh, for assistance in finding work. His older brother helped finalise the arrangements and managed the financial aspects, securing 365,000 Bangladeshi Taka by mortgaging their house. Mr. Oli believed he would find work in Seychelles and gradually repay the loan. Before a foreign worker travels to Seychelles for a job, the worker must complete a process in Bangladesh. Mr. Oli went to a recruiting agency because he wanted to work abroad. He did not know the agency's name; his family contacted it for him. He did not visit the agency to sign any papers. Three people came to his home, where Mr. Oli signed the papers and handed over his passport. He cannot remember exactly what he signed. These three people called him and said they would come to pick up his passport and paper. He knew he would be working as a farm worker at DNS Rising Farm, and he agreed. He got his work permit in Bangladesh. His employment document stated that he was going to Seychelles as a farmer. He received this document while in Bangladesh and read it. Before his arrival, he was told his salary would be $400, plus an extra $50 for food. He signed the contract in Bangladesh. When Mr. Oli arrived in Seychelles on the 4 May 2018, he met the Appellant at the airport. At that time, he did not know the Appellant very well. Mr. Ajharul Rislam, PW-5. Mr. Rislam testified that he arrived in Seychelles on the 22 March 2018 to work and earn money. He learned about Seychelles through Sadat, an agent from Dhaka, Bangladesh. Sadat informed him about an opportunity to work as a farm worker in Seychelles, and he accepted it. His father arranged for his passport. Before coming to Seychelles, he did not sign a letter of employment. He was informed that he would be doing farming work in Seychelles and would be working under the Appellant. He was told he would receive 400 United States dollars per month. In addition to this monthly payment, he was informed that he would be paid separately for overtime. The Appellant welcomed him at the airport and took him to his home. Upon arrival, Mr. Nizam provided him with a contract form that stated a monthly salary of 6,926.04 Seychelles rupees. Additionally, the Appellant stated that he would pay Seychelles rupees 1,200 for food and provide accommodation. Mr. Alamin, PW-6. Mr. Alamin testified that he arrived in Seychelles on the 7 February 2018 for work. He obtained his passport through an agent named Mr. Brutus in Bangladesh, paying 6,000 Bangladeshi Taka for it. Prior to his arrival, he was unfamiliar with the Appellant, whom he first met at the airport. The Appellant took him into a house in Port Glaud, where he found himself with four other people. The Appellant took his passport and informed him that he would earn a salary of $400, which is approximately 6,900 Seychelles rupees. Mr. Alamin stated that, before coming to Seychelles, he did not undergo any training in Bangladesh. He received at the airport in Bangladesh from a Bangladeshi person named Aloum an immigration clearance card, a passport, a gainful occupation permit, and a letter of appointment for his job. He signed the letter of offer and appointment at the Appellant's house, accepting its terms and conditions. Mr. Larue, PW-11, signed the Letter of offer and appointment as a director of DNS Rising Farm. Mr. Roton Mirdha, PW-7. Mr. Roton testified that he is a 26-year-old man from Bangladesh. He came to Seychelles on the 7 February 2018, to work as a farmer. An agent in Dhaka, named Mr. Sajath Hussein, introduced him to this job opportunity. Mr. Mirdha's family contacted Mr. Sajath, who informed them about the job in Seychelles. They paid Mr. Sajath 60,000 Bangladeshi Taka to help him obtain his gainful occupation permit (item P3). Mr. Sajath informed Mr. Mirdha that he would earn $400 per month. Mr. Mirdha did not know whom Mr. Sajath had contacted in Seychelles. His family arranged for his passport to be issued for travel to Seychelles. On the 7 February 2018, five people, including him, flew to Seychelles. The group included Maharungalam, Alamin and Ranjak. The Appellant welcomed them at the airport. After greeting them, the Appellant took them to his home in Port Glaud. Mr. Md Romzam Shaik, PW-8. Mr. Shaik testified that he arrived in Seychelles on the 7 January 2018, with the intention of earning money and working as a farm worker. He possesses a passport, which he obtained in Bangladesh through an agent named Salim Manti. He paid this agent 5,000 Bangladeshi Taka for the passport. He arrived in Seychelles via another agent, Mr. Haka. He was informed that he would be working for the Appellant in Seychelles, earning 400 United States Dollars per month, with 350 United States Dollars paid upfront and 50 United States Dollars to be paid later. This money was required for his travel to Seychelles, including his ticket, which the agent arranged. He also had his gainful occupation permit when he arrived in Seychelles. The agent in Bangladesh provided him with the gainful occupation permit. Mr. Mahabub Alam, PW-9. Mr. Alam testified that he came to Seychelles before, in 2015, where he worked for Jimmy Servina in Aux Cap for 15 months. While in Bangladesh, the Appellant contacted him for a two-year work opportunity in Seychelles. Mr. Hafiz, his agent, arranged the details with the Appellant, including preparing the necessary documents, processing the payment, and issuing a ticket. Mr. Alam received a gainful occupation permit and paid 300,000 Bangladeshi Taka for these arrangements. The payment arrangement was made through a bank loan, with assistance from his wife. The loan was obtained from BRAC Bank, specifically for foreign passengers, and required the submission of land and house documents as collateral. He has not yet repaid the loan. The work involved a salary of 400 United States Dollars, which included a food allowance. He did not sign an employment contract in Bangladesh. He only received the ticket and a gainful occupation permit for travelling to Seychelles. The means of deception for the purpose of exploitation I have considered the record of appeal thoroughly, the skeleton heads of argument presented on behalf of the Appellant and the Prosecution and the oral submissions presented at the hearing of the appeal. The definition of trafficking in persons under section 3(1) requires that the act element be carried out through specific means, and lists fraud and deception in this regard. The proceedings before the Supreme Court were conducted based on means of deception for the purpose of exploitation, namely (b) forced labour or services and (c) subjecting the complainants to practices similar to slavery. The learned Judge stated at paragraph [44] and [65] of the judgment — "[44] From the above facts, this court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who recruited all the virtual complainants was none other than the accused person. The DNS Rising Farm or Serge Larue could have been present during the course or after the recruitment of the victims, however they were not involved so as to show they had any role to play in bringing the virtual complainants to Seychelles. I therefore find proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused recruited them to Seychelles. Hence the Republic has proven the Act element beyond a reasonable doubt. … [65] In the present case it is apparent that deception took place on a number of level, such as the nature of the offer, the conditions under which the victim will work, or the power which the accused trafficker came to wield over them. All of the virtual complainants testified that they did not get the salary that they were recruited upon and that they were provided for in their contract. Moreover, their employment conditions were to be in accordance with the Employment Act and its Regulations and when they started working the virtual complainants found that they were not. All of them testified that their salaries were at some point in time not paid on time. They signed a contract and were supposed to receive a minimum wage of SCR6,926, but were only receiving USD 350 and they did not get the full SCR 1200 for food. When they recourse to seek a redress by claiming their dues they were either threatened into submission or ignored. They reported not receiving their August and May payments, as per legal requirements. They work Monday to Sunday and are entitled to overtime pay, but have not received it. [66] It is to be noted that low pay or absence of pay can be important in contributing to a conviction of trafficking in persons or allied crimes. Particularly low pay or absence of pay can contribute to proving this element." The learned Judge also found, among other things, that the means of deception involved the restriction of freedom, such as the confiscation of the complainants' passports, which I will consider. Having thoroughly considered the record of appeal, including all the evidence tendered in this case, I find no evidence to support the argument of Counsel for the Prosecution that the Appellant deceived the complainants into recruiting, transporting, or transferring them to Seychelles for the purpose of exploitation. I accept the argument of Counsel for the Appellant that the learned Judge did not correctly apply the three essential elements required to establish the offence of trafficking in persons. There is no evidence of any misrepresentation by the Appellant regarding financial incentives or working conditions made to the complainants. Despite coming to the finding that the Prosecution has satisfied the means of deception beyond a reasonable doubt, the learned Judge failed to identify the evidence which established the element of deception beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the act element, I find it incredible that the learned Judge concluded that "[44]…DNS Rising Farm or Serge Larue could have been present during the course or after the recruitment of the victims, however they were not involved so as to show they had any role to play in bringing the virtual complainants to Seychelles." The evidence in this case established that almost all documents concerning the recruitment of the complainants were made in the name of DNS Rising Farm and signed by Mr. Larue, a director of DNS Rising Farm. As pointed out by Counsel for the Appellant, for example, the applications for gainful occupation permits were submitted by DNS Rising Farm and signed by Mr. Larue, the work permits were issued in the name of DNS Rising Farm, and the Letter of offer and appointment issued to each complainant was in the name of DNS Rising Farm and co-signed by Mr. Larue. The learned Judge was wrong to conclude that the complainants were deceived about the nature of the work for which they were recruited to do in Seychelles. The evidence of the complainants did not show that they had been deceived about the nature of the work they were recruited to do. In fact, the evidence established that the complainants were recruited on various dates between 8 February 2018 and 4 May 2018, under gainful occupation permits "as Agriculture Worker with Dns Rising Farm". They continued to work until around the time when the Seychelles Police Force arrested the Appellant. The evidence also established that the complainants had offered themselves for work voluntarily as farmers. According to their evidence, they knew before coming to Seychelles that they were coming to work as farmers. Upon their arrival in Seychelles, the complainants were taken to a farm at Grand Anse, where they were required to work as farmers. There is no evidence that, when they arrived in Seychelles, they were required to do any other work. The complainants expressed concern about not receiving their salaries for three months. Some of them also claimed that a portion of their salaries was sent to Bangladesh. Additionally, they claimed they were promised Seychelles rupees 1, 200 for food, but received significantly less, which was insufficient to purchase enough food. Counsel for the Prosecution argued that these facts demonstrated that the complainants had been misled and deceived under the pretence of proper work and salary. The following evidence has established that the learned Judge was wrong in finding that the complainants were deceived regarding the financial incentives and the conditions of their work. The complainants signed the Letter of offer and appointment, thereby accepting the terms and conditions of employment. For the purposes of the appeal, I will consider only one letter of offer and appointment. The same considerations will apply to each complainant. So I will limit myself to considering the letter of offer and appointment for MD Romzan Shaik PW-8, dated 12 December 2017. The Letter of offer and appointment stated the following, among other things — "Subject: Letter of offer and appointment We are pleased to offer you employment as worker with DNS Rising farm for a period of two years. Effective 12 December on the following terms and conditions: Your salary will be SR 6926.40 per month (equivalent to USD 496.51) and will be subject to deduction of income tax of 15 %. Your work hours will be 48 hours per week. You may be required to work extra hours and when workloads demand negotiable between employer and employee for which you will also be paid overtime. Overtime will be paid at the rate of 1.5 for work done during weekdays, and Saturdays and the rate will be double (2) for work done on Sundays and Public holidays. You will be entitled to at least 24 consecutive hours rest in any period of 7 days." According to exhibit D8, a letter from the Ministry of Health dated 4 December 2017, a house leased by DNS Rising Farm was inspected by the Ministry and approved for use by nine Bangladeshi workers in relation to its application for a gainful occupation permit. The evidence established that the workers left for work at 7:30 a.m, and worked from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., with a lunch break from 12:00 p.m to 1:00 p.m. They occasionally worked overtime after 4 p.m., sometimes until 5 p.m to 6 p.m. They also worked on Saturdays and occasionally on Sundays. The complainants travelled by bus to and from the farm daily. There is no evidence to suggest that their freedom of movement in Seychelles was curtailed. The complainants were provided with boots, gloves and a raincoat as part of the necessary protective gear for farm work. They used mountain water for drinking and for farm work. They had a small room with a roof that served as their resting area on the farm. The evidence showed that they possibly used toilet facilities on a neighbouring farm. Mr. Mahabub Alam, PW-9, testified that Mr. Dine was the supervisor. Mr. Dine did not force them to work on the farm, but he did give instructions regarding the tasks that needed to be completed. According to the complainants' evidence, they spoke to Mr Dine and Mr. Larue about not having received their salaries for about three months. Further, according to the complainants' evidence, Mr. Larue collected the farm produce for sale every Friday. There is no evidence that Mr. Larue and Mr. Dine employed the means of deception. According to the complainants' evidence, the Appellant never came to the farm; they lived with him at the house. The Appellant did the paperwork for the farm. The evidence on record indicated that the Appellant paid the workers' salaries for three months. According to the complainants' payslips, each of them received a basic salary of Seychelles rupees 6,926.40. They were paid for overtime worked, and income tax was deducted from their earnings. In the first month of employment, since they had not completed a whole month, they were paid only for the days they worked. It is observed that neither the Prosecution nor the complainants seriously challenged any of the payslips presented. They did not seriously challenge the evidence regarding the amount of money paid for overtime and the basic salary of Seychelles rupees 6,926.40, which are stated in the Letter of offer and appointment. The Prosecution tendered the payslips primarily to demonstrate that the complainants had been paid for approximately three months. Mr. Oli, PW- 4, testified that in addition to receiving his wages for May 2018 directly from the Appellant, he had on several occasions been paid by Mr. Larue, stating that —"when there is a problem with salary, Serge Larue comes and gives us salary". The complainants testified that the Appellant told them to keep working and that their salaries would be paid. There is no evidence that the complainants believed they would never receive their overdue salaries if they stopped working. Furthermore, the complainants were never informed that they would not be paid. In this case, the learned Judge accepted the evidence of Mr. Larue, whom he found reliable. He accepted his evidence that — "[24] Mr. Nizam agreed to pay the workers until the land was on balance, but he had trouble paying the workers." According to the record of appeal, Mr. Larue testified that the Appellant had been paying the complainants' salaries for about three months. They had agreed that the Appellant would continue to pay the workers until the situation was "on balance". However, there were difficulties in making these payments. Mr. Larue testified that due to financial issues, the Appellant brought a container of potatoes to help address the situation. Mr. Larue stated that the Appellant was paying the complainants, but then later informed him that the workers were not receiving their salaries. The Appellant reassured him not to worry, as he was bringing in sweet potatoes to help cover their payments. According to Mr. Larue, this plan did not come to fruition as the Seychelles Police Force arrested the Appellant. Mr Larue testified that he paid salaries, which were overdue for about three to four months. I conclude that the learned Judge was wrong in how he assessed the evidence of Mr. Larue, whom he considered reliable. The evidence of Mr Larue, supported by the complainants, established that the arrangement initially operated within the boundaries of the Letter of offer and appointment. It was only after the Appellant faced financial difficulties that wage arrears and other issues began to arise. In my opinion, the evidence in this case showed more of an operational and financial dysfunction. The evidence does not show an intentional scheme of deception by the Appellant aimed at exploiting the complainants, as found by the learned Judge. The learned Judge at paragraph [92] of the judgment concluded that — "[92] In this present case the passports of all the virtual complainants were confiscated by the accused and placed under lock and key. It took a police search warrant to locate and retrieve them. The court is of the view that this imposed an unreasonable restriction on their freedom of movement that impeded their ability to escape or seek legal recourse. This being a tool of exploitation and keeping them in states of slavery." Counsel for the Prosecution argued that the Appellant withheld the complainants' passports, which she viewed as a means of controlling them. However, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, I believe the learned Judge was wrong in reaching the conclusion stated at paragraph [92] of the judgment. For instance, Mr. Oli, PW-4, stated that he never requested the return of his passport because he "did not need it". There is no evidence on record to indicate that the withholding of the complainants' passports led them to believe they had no choice but to submit to exploitation. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Appellant exercised any supervision over the complainants while they were at the house or after they left for work or other activities. The finding of the learned Judge that the Appellant's possession of the passports placed an unreasonable restriction on the complainants' freedom of movement, thereby hindering their ability to escape or seek help, is clearly not supported by the evidence. In the UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Evidential Issues in Trafficking in Persons in Cases, CASE DIGEST, 2017, it is stated that if difficult work conditions are the only circumstances in the mosaic of evidence, caution should be exercised in concluding that a severe crime of trafficking has been committed. Based on the learned Judge's errors, I find that the Appellant's conviction is unsafe. Hence, I find that the learned Judge was wrong to make the finding at paragraph [103] of the judgment — "[103] [t]he Court is of the view therefore that the element of means is proven in this case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the complainants in all the charges were recruited by the accused usage of deception, including any misrepresentation by words or conduct as to financial incentive or promise or reward or gain and other conditions of work in as means to recruit the virtual complainants and thereby exploiting them by forced labour and practices similar to slavery by using threats and coercion." For the reasons stated above, grounds 1 and 4 are allowed. Grounds 2 and 3 of the appeal The skeleton heads of argument presented on behalf of the Appellant do not address grounds 2 and 3 of the appeal. During the hearing of the appeal, learned Counsel for the Appellant did not present any submissions with respect to grounds 2 and 3, clearly indicating that the Appellant is not pursuing them. Therefore, grounds 2 and 3 stand dismissed. DECISION For the reasons stated above, I make the following orders. The appeal is allowed. 2. The convictions in all counts are quashed. 3. The sentences are set aside. 4. The Appellant is acquitted of the offences charged. _____________________ F. Robinson, JA I concur ________________ Dr. M. Twomey-Woods, JA Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 15 December 2025. ANDRE JA CONCURRING ADDITION [1] I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned sister Robinson JA. I am in full agreement with her reasoning, analysis, and conclusions, and with the orders she proposes. [2] I add these brief observations to emphasise the proper scope of appellate intervention in criminal matters. While this Court is ordinarily slow to interfere with findings of fact made by a trial court, it is nevertheless obliged to intervene where the trial court has misdirected itself in law, failed to consider material evidence, or reached conclusions that are not supported by the evidence on record. In such circumstances, the resulting conviction cannot properly be regarded as safe. [3] In the present appeal, the central issue is not whether the complainants experienced difficult or unsatisfactory working conditions, but whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the constituent elements of the offence of trafficking in persons as defined under section 3(1) of the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act 2014. As the judgment of Robinson JA demonstrates, the evidence failed in particular to establish the requisite element of means. [4] The seriousness of the offence of trafficking in persons cannot be overstated. However, the gravity of the allegation cannot relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof, nor justify a dilution of the statutory elements of the offence. Where those elements are not proved to the required standard, a conviction cannot stand. [5] For these reasons, and for the fuller reasons set out in the judgment of my learned sister Robinson JA, I agree that the appeal must be allowed, the conviction and sentence quashed, and the Appellant acquitted. [6] I further agree that, as a necessary consequence of the quashing of the sentence, any sums paid pursuant to the impugned sentence or compensation orders must be refunded forthwith. Dated this 15th day of December 2025 ____________________________ ANDRE JA 15