Rene v Anti-Corruption Commission Seychelles (SCA CR 07/2025) (Arising in CM 149/2024)) [2025] SCCA 27 (15 December 2025)

contents of #navigation-content will be placed in [data-offcanvas-body] for tablet/mobile screensize and #navigation-column for desktop screensize. Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [] IN THE SEYCHELLES COURT OF APPEAL Reportable [2025] (15 December 2025) SCA CR 07/2025) (Arising in CM 149/2024) In the Matter Between Sarah Zarquani Rene Appellant (rep. by Mr. Ryan Laporte) and Anti-Corruption Commission Seychelles Respondent (rep. by Mr. Michael Skelley and Ms. Michelle Nelson) Neutral Citation: Rene v Anti-Corruption Commission Seychelles (SCA CR 07/2025) [2025] (Arising in CM 149/2024) (15 December 2025) Before: Gunesh-Balaghee, Sharpe-Phiri, Sichinga JJA Summary: Appeal against the Ruling of Judge B. Adeline, delivered on the 22 day of April, 2025, declining to grant the Appellant’s application for an order of variation of the Restraint Order made in case XP 02/2023, to allow payment for cabinets at the cost of SCR26,000.00 and SCR63,510.00, and the white marble pyramid gravestone at the cost of SCR337,781.18. The same Ruling also declined to make an order for the return to the Appellant, of her personal wallet seized from her, for want of information justifying such order of return. Heard: 2 December 2025 Delivered: 15 December 2025 ORDER The appeal is dismissed and costs are awarded to the Respondent. JUDGMENT SICHINGA, JA (Gunesh-Balaghee JA, Sharpe-Phiri JA, concurring) Introduction The Appellant has appealed against the Ruling of Judge B. Adeline, delivered on 22 April, 2025, by which the Judge declined to grant the Appellant’s application for an order of variation of a Restraint Order made in case XP 02/2023, to allow payment for cabinets at the cost of SCR26,000.00 and SCR63,510.00; and payment for a white marble pyramid gravestone at the cost of SCR337,781.18. In the same Ruling, the Judge also declined to make an order for the return to the Appellant, of her personal wallet seized from her. The Appellant is seeking an order that the Ruling be set aside, the payments in contention be authorised and the Appellant’s wallet be returned. Background On 21 August 2023, an interim order, was granted by the Supreme Court, in the case of XP 20/2023, Ex parte Anti-Corruption Commission, following an application by the Respondent (plaintiff/complainant), made pursuant to Section 27(4)(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2006 (AMLA), seeking a restraint order in relation to identified property and all realisable property belonging to the Appellant. Furthermore, pursuant to the same Restraint Order, the Appellant’s personal wallet was seized, containing substantial sums of money in various international currencies, including, USD, Euro, Aud, Shekels, SGD (Singapore dollar), LKR (Sri Lankan Rupee) and MYR (Malaysian Ringgit). The Order of 21 August 2023 contained a provision permitting the court to make further orders for the payment of living and legal expenses of the Appellant, under Section 27(2) of the AMLA. Thus, pursuant to this provision, the Appellant made an application before Judge Adeline, for a variation of the Restraint Order, to cater to the following: Car maintenance costs, arising from three invoices issued by one Michel Armstrong, in the sums, SCR13,760.00, SCR18,200.00 and SCR9,200.00; Maintenance costs for the Appellant’s automated security gate, arising from two invoices issued by Modelco, in the total sum of SCR5,175.00; Tuition fees for the Appellant’s daughter, of AUD11,960.82; Compensation payment for the Appellant’s secretary for ‘long service’; Two quotations from Noble Con Enterprise (Pty) Ltd, for procurement and mounting of new floor cabinets in Appellant’s residence, in the sums of SCR26,600.00 and SCR63,510.00; and A quotation for a white marble pyramid gravestone, from Sahajanand Builders (Pty) Ltd, for the Appellant’s late husband (one of the former Presidents of Seychelles). The Appellant and Respondent entered into a Consent Judgment, on 18 March 2025, regarding the items in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv), above, and the Respondent agreed that the attendant payments be authorised. The Consent Judgment was endorsed and made the judgment of the court. Items (v) and (vi), on the other hand, were rejected by the Respondent, prompting the Appellant to make an application to court, that they too be allowed. Additionally, the Appellant also sought an order of court that her seized personal wallet be returned to her. Contentions before and decision of the Supreme Court The Appellant’s application for variation of the Restraint Order, in respect of the items rejected for consent, as well as the return of the Appellant’s wallet, by the Respondent, was heard and determined by Judge B. Adeline, of the Supreme Court, and a Ruling subsequently delivered on 22 April 2025. The Judge noted that the application before him was made pursuant to Section 27(6) of the AMLA, 2008. The learned Judge noted the evidence tendered by both parties in their respective affidavits, and considered the Appellant’s position that the rejected items should have been allowed, because: the cabinets were necessary for the Appellant’s storage of many of her personal items, since she had moved into a smaller house which did not have such storage facility, and a cheaper quality cabinet would not be able to keep her things safely; the payment for the white marble pyramid and gravestone was sought for a dignified memorial for her late husband to whom she owed a personal, emotional and cultural obligation as a surviving spouse, to ensure that the memorial was executed in a dignified manner. It was averred by the Respondent, on the other hand, that the payments sought by the Appellant were unjustifiable because she failed to provide information demonstrating why the cabinets, at that cost, were essential; and failed to provide information as to why the white marble pyramid and gravestone were now required, and comprised an ‘essential living expense.’ Submitting in support of the Appellant’s position, counsel for the Appellant contended that, based on the interpretation of Section 26(6) of the AMLA, 2008 the court had to entertain the payments for the rejected items, as this was just a matter of the court exercising its discretion in favour of allowing the said payments. In this regard, counsel placed great emphasis on the words “notwithstanding the generality”, as used in said Section 26(6), which he submitted meant that the court was empowered to exercise its discretion beyond entertaining requests that fell within “reasonable expenses” and “legal expenses”. That, therefore, the court could particularly authorise payment of the rejected items. Counsel for the Appellant, argued that allowing payments for the cabinets and gravestone would enable the Appellant settle her obligations, as well as prevent collateral hardship. Counsel for the Respondent, in response, argued that the Appellant’s affidavit evidence failed to show how such large expenditures, which exceeded the ambit of ‘living expenses’ and ‘legal expenses’, were justified. It was submitted that the very purpose of a restraint order was that, unless and until there is a conviction, nobody, including the court can decide on the appropriate level of pecuniary penalty order, and that is why the restraint order against the Appellant was against all her realisable assets. Counsel, in this regard, referred the court to paragraph 17(ii) of the Ruling of 21 August 2023, which read as follows: “While this order subsists, the court shall make further order allowing for the payment of living and legal expenses of Mrs. Rene as permitted under Section 27(2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2006 as amended.” Counsel for the Respondent assailed the Appellant’s proposition that the court had discretion to look beyond living and legal expenses, but argued that the scope of this discretion is defined by Section 27(2) of the AMLA, specifically the use of the words, “where the court thinks fit” and “where the court considers it essential to do so”. Further, he submitted that a court in exercising such discretion has to act with prudence in order not to defeat the purpose for which a restraint order exists, being to ensure that realisable property which is the benefit of criminal conduct is not dissipated to frustrate a pecuniary penalty order which may be made upon conviction. As regards the items for which payment was rejected, counsel for the Respondent submitted that the cost of the cabinet was unjustifiable and needed to be determined as necessary and reasonable by the court, in order to be acceptable; the appellant had not established that payment for the marble pyramid was urgently needed; “a fitting memorial” for a former president, costing over USD23,000.00 should not be funded by funds that are subject of a restraint order, as such funds should come from other sources, perhaps the government; and the Appellant failed to explain what steps she had taken in six (6) years, since her husband’s passing, to secure funding for such fitting memorial. On the Appellant’s assertion of collateral hardship, counsel for the Respondent stated that the Appellant did not produce any evidence demonstrating such collateral hardship or that she had no money and could not pay for many other expenses and that, therefore, the rejected items pertained to unreasonable expenditure, which fell outside the test for the court to exercise its discretion in favour of allowing the payments. After considering the parties’ arguments, Judge Adeline established that, in order to decide as to whether or not the rejected items should have been sanctioned, he needed to spell out the provisions of Section 27(1) and (2) of the AMLA, around which he established the arguments revolved. He reproduced the said provisions as follows: “27(1) The Court may by order (in this Act referred to as a “Restraint Order”) prohibit any person from dealing with any realisable property, subject to such conditions as may be specified in that order. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) a Restraint Order may make such provisions as the court thinks fit for living expenses and legal expenses of the defendant where the court considers it essential to do so.” The Judge found that, in essence, Section 27(2) does empower the court with a discretionary power to vary a Restraint Order, in force against realisable property where the court is of the view that it is essential to do so to provide for living and legal expenses, provided such expenses are reasonable. That being the case, there cannot be any ambiguity surrounding the court’s discretionary power under the section. The Judge was of the further view that there was no need for a debate about whether or not the court was conferred with a discretion to decide whether or not to entertain an expenditure from funds subject to a Restraint Order. However, with the objective of a Restraint Order in mind, such discretionary power should be exercised with care, caution and prudence, so as not to allow excessive spending that would dissipate the realisable assets subject to the restraint order, and thereby defeating the purpose for which the restraint order was imposed in the first place. Citing the case of Sharp v Wakefied [1891] AC 173, the learned Judge emphasised that the court was obligated to properly exercise its judicial discretion in order to preserve and protect the realisable assets subject to the restraint order and that That, judicial discretion has to be exercised according to rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion or humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal, regular and must be exercised within the limit to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. The learned Judge, thus, posed the question whether it would be within reason for the court to exercise its discretion and allow the expenditure for the cabinet and gravestone, that would cost a very large sum of money and take a big chunk of the realisable property subject to the Restraint Order. In answering this question, the learned Judge explained that for the gravestone, he believed that the former president, having been a prominent figure, should have had opportunities for funding of his gravestone in his honour from other sources than from funds subject to a restraint order and that the Appellant should have made efforts to tap into those other sources, government or otherwise, to be able to realise what she considered to be her personal, cultural and familial obligation, as a surviving spouse. He underlined that it was noteworthy, from the Appellant’s supplementary affidavit, that she had acknowledged that, with the prospective sale of her land, funds would become available to facilitate the expenditure of procuring a gravestone, and that this was an indication of the Appellant’s reckoning that an alternative funding facility would come her way for the rejected items, should the court decline to authorise payment for the same. With the foregoing, the learned Judge declined to grant the Appellant’s application for a variation of the Restraint Order to allow payments for the cabinets and gravestone, and accordingly dismissed it. Further, the learned Judge declined to make an order for the return, to the Appellant, of her personal wallet, for failure by the Appellant to provide necessary information justifying such return. The Appeal Dissatisfied with the Supreme Court Ruling of 22 April 2025, the Appellant has now appealed against the same, raising the following grounds: The learned Judge erred in law and on fact by failing to properly exercise discretion under Section 27(2) of the AMLA, by refusing the variation of the restraint order to permit payment for the wardrobes and memorial gravestone, which were reasonable, documented, and fell within the permissible scope of judicial discretion under the Act; The learned Judge failed to give adequate weight to the Appellant’s sworn affidavits and documentary exhibits, which demonstrated the necessity of the claimed expenses and justified them within a broader understanding of dignity, hardship and cultural obligation; The court erred in law by rejecting the memorial expense solely on the ground that government or third-party funding should be sought, noting the blanket restraint order on the Appellant in XP 02 of 2023; and The learned Judge erred by applying inconsistent and disproportionate reasoning resulting in a decision that was manifestly unfair, noting other court orders, for other expenses such as vehicle repairs and university tuition, based on similar levels of affidavit and documentary evidence, yet rejected the claims for wardrobes and a memorial without explaining any principled distinction, thereby breaching the principle of proportionality, fairness and natural justice, and reflects an arbitrary exercise of the discretion available. By way of relief, the Appellant has prayed that Judge Adeline’s Ruling of 22 April 2025, be set aside and that payments from the restrained funds be authorised. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant Submitting in support of ground one of the appeal, namely that the lower court failed to properly exercise discretion under Section 27(2) of the AMLA, by refusing the variation of the restraint order to permit payment for the rejected items, counsel for the Appellant contended that the object of a restraint order was to preserve property pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, and not to punish or impoverish or cause undue emotional distress to the Appellant and her family. Counsel submitted, further, that the controlling consideration was whether the proposed expenditure risked dissipation, being, unjustified depletion, concealment, or diversion of assets; that where expenditures are transparently documented and payable directly to vendors, the risk of dissipation is neutralised, and accordingly, judicial discretion under the section should be exercised to permit such controlled payments, rather than adopting a blanket refusal that undermines the balance between preservation and fairness. Counsel argued that the statutory phrase "without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)", in Section 27(2) of the AMLA, must be construed according to its plain and purposive meaning; that the same, operates to expand and not to limit the Court's discretion by clarifying that "living" and "legal" expenses are merely illustrative categories within a broader power to authorise any expenditure the Court considers just and essential. Counsel submitted that this formulation preserves the flexibility necessary for equitable relief in restraint proceedings. He also argued that accordingly, the true benchmarks for judicial exercise of discretion under Section 27(2) are reasonableness and prudential safeguards against dissipation of assets, not a narrow or exhaustive reading of permissible expenses. He argued that interpreting "living and legal expenses" as a closed list contradicted both the grammatical structure of the provision and its legislative intent to protect against undue emotional hardship arising from an interim restraint. Counsel for the Appellant, contended that the Restraint Order itself anticipated later variation for needs, confirming Section 27(2) as the mechanism, but the learned Judge treated "living" and "legal" expenses under the section as a ceiling, rather than as illustrative examples, thereby fettering the Court's discretion. He argued that the statutory phrase "without prejudice to the generality" preserves a wider residual power to make such orders as the Court "thinks fit" subject only to the safeguard of prudence. In this regard, counsel submitted that it was, therefore, open to the Court to authorise other necessary or dignitary expenditures, provided that appropriate mechanisms, such as direct vendor payments, caps, or escrow, were in place to prevent dissipation. Counsel further argued that, unlike closed-list statutory regimes found elsewhere, the drafting of Section 27(2) does not confine the Court's power to only two heads of expenditure, but rather, it preserves the broader authority under Section 27(1) and merely illustrates, and not limits, two common categories of relief. This interpretation, counsel submitted, aligns with orthodox canons of construction, ensuring that judicial discretion under restraint proceedings remains sufficiently flexible to accommodate equitable exceptions while maintaining strict control against misuse. It was, thus, submitted that the learned Judge misdirected himself on the scope of the Court's discretion under section 27(2) by treating "living and legal expenses" as an exhaustive ceiling, rather than as illustrative categories expressly introduced by the phrase "without prejudice to the generality" of section 27(1). Counsel argued that a restraint order is a draconian interim measure and must, therefore, be construed strictly and that its operation should remain anchored to the constitutional guarantees of property, as in Article 26 of the Constitution and fair hearing, as in Article 19(7). Counsel further argued that courts are required to interpret freezing provisions narrowly, applying the principle of proportionality to ensure that preservation of assets does not result in undue hardship or practical deprivation of livelihood and that, therefore, having accepted other items on affidavit (by consent), the lower court’s refusal of the need for a gravestone without addressing the proposed non-dissipation mechanics was disproportionate and inconsistent with the protective, not punitive, purpose of restraint. In respect of the second ground of appeal, being that the learned Judge failed to give adequate weight to the Appellant's sworn affidavits and documentary exhibits, which demonstrated the necessity of the claimed expenses and justified them within a broader understanding of dignity, hardship, and cultural obligation, it was submitted that the Court did not meaningfully engage with the Appellant's sworn affidavits and invoices, which demonstrated the necessity of a gravestone for her late husband: a respected public and historical figure and that as the surviving spouse, the Appellant bears both a moral and cultural duty to honour her late husband's memory and the refusal to permit such provision disregards that personal and dignitary dimension. Counsel contended that, that omission is material because, under Section 27(2), credible affidavit evidence supported by documentation is sufficient to justify limited, safeguarded access to restrained funds, unless a concrete risk of dissipation is shown. Counsel submitted that the court below identified no such risk and failed to balance the Appellant's emotional and cultural obligation and dignity interests against the broad, indefinite scope of the restraint order. It was counsel’s argument that, notwithstanding the issue of dissipation, the restraint order has remained in force since 2021, during which period the Respondent has filed successive amendments of charges, with no trial date fixed and no foreseeable conclusion and that in such circumstances, therefore, to maintain a blanket restraint indefinitely, without periodic judicial review, amounts to a continuing and unreasonable hardship. He also argued that the Appellant is left unable even to perform familial and dignitary duties, while the prosecution continues to alter its criminal case in CR 114 of 2021. Counsel submitted that, this situation defeats the purpose of Section 27(2), which was designed to mitigate the harshness of interim restraint, not to perpetuate it and that a construction that permits indefinite deprivation of livelihood and dignity without trial would be constitutionally untenable under Articles 19(7) and 26(1) of the Constitution, and contrary to the principle of proportionality recognised in appellate authority. Counsel proposed that a structured assessment should address three questions, which the Ruling did not do, namely: Proportionality: Are the amounts modest relative to the restrained estate and the restraint's objectives? Essentiality: Do the items meet dignitary obligations? Risk-mitigation: Can the Court neutralise dissipation risk by mechanics such as direct-to-vendor payment, capped amounts, staged release, or escrow? It was counsel’s submission that the Ruling does not show that these questions were considered, and that, that was a failure on the part of the court to apply the correct safeguards under the statutory discretion and that by not conducting this analysis, the court misdirected itself, in that, Section 27(2) asks whether the Court "thinks fit" to allow essential spending subject to prudence, not whether the items fall within a narrow, exhaustive list. He also submitted that ignoring proportionality, essentiality and safeguards is a failure to consider relevant matters, warranting appellate correction. Counsel contended that the Court had already, by consent, allowed non-trivial items such as vehicle repairs, gate/security, tuition, service compensation, insurance, on the same kind of affidavit and invoice material, and refusing a gravestone without a principled distinction was internally inconsistent and unfair. Counsel submitted that the Judge's reasons did not disclose an individualised analysis of these items relative to others already allowed. Counsel submitted, further, that jurisprudence condemns such undifferentiated treatment and requires reasons showing the relevant factors were weighed. Citing the case of Lepere v Lepere (2022) SCA 11/202 0[2022], counsel argued that appellate intervention is warranted where a first-instance court misdirects itself on the governing test or fails to individualise and give reasons. Counsel for the Appellant submitted on ground 3 and ground 4 of the appeal, simultaneously, being that the Court erred in law by rejecting the memorial expense solely on the ground that government or third-party funding should be sought; and that the court erred by applying inconsistent and disproportionate reasoning, resulting in a decision that was manifestly unfair, noting other court orders, for other expenses such as vehicle repairs and university tuition, based on similar levels of affidavit and documentary evidence. It was counsel’s contention that the Court erred by rejecting the memorial gravestone on the sole basis that the Appellant should seek government or third-party funding. That such reasoning is internally contradictory, in that, the court simultaneously recognises that all property is restrained, yet denies access to a modest, documented, and culturally significant expense by referring her to sources she is legally barred from pursuing. Counsel for the Appellant argued that the Court had already, on affidavit and documentary evidence of comparable weight, approved non-trivial expenses such as vehicle repairs, gate security, tuition fees, service compensation, and insurance payments, and to then reject the memorial supported by invoices, proportionate in value, and subject to proposed safeguards, without any principled distinction on the basis of reasonableness constituted an inconsistent application of discretion. He added that such inconsistency and absence of articulated reasoning rendered the decision arbitrary and plainly wrong, because a discretionary ruling must show that all relevant considerations have been weighed and irrelevant ones excluded. Counsel narrowed down the refusal, in casu, to one resting on an extraneous factor, being the possibility of government charity rather than statutory criteria under Section 27(2). It was submitted therefore that appellate correction is justified. Counsel contended that it was unclear what statutory or constitutional obligation the Government of Seychelles could possibly bear to construct a private memorial gravestone from public funds, nor why such an analogy was accepted without scrutiny. Further, he also argued that the learned Judge did not identify any legal or factual basis for assuming that the State was responsible for meeting private dignitary or familial expenses of citizens. Counsel submitted that, to the contrary, diverting personal obligations to taxpayers contradicted fiscal prudence. Counsel dismissed the suggestion that the Appellant should depend on public charity, while her own restrained funds remain frozen, as both illogical and inconsistent with the protective (not punitive) purpose of a restraint order. He argued that such reasoning substitutes statutory analysis with moral speculation and therefore amounts to a misdirection in principle. Counsel, further, submitted that in the context of a continuing restraint order with no trial date in sight, a refusal based on speculative alternative funding ignored the constitutional right to property and dignity. It was counsel’s contention that the restraint order was a blanket restraint and that the court's continued reliance on such a blanket restraint, despite the absence of any demonstrated dissipation risk and amid repeated amendments of charges since 2021, resulted in a continuing deprivation without adjudication. He argued that this is precisely the form of hardship and imbalance Section 27(2) was designed to mitigate through judicial variation. In this regard, counsel for the Appellant argued that the restraint order issued ex-parte in XP 02/2023 was expressed in blanket terms, applying to "all realisable property belonging to the Appellant, whether or not described or identified," and thus, went beyond what was necessary to secure any potential pecuniary penalty and had the practical effect of paralysing every aspect of the Appellant's personal and family life. He submitted that it deprived her of access not only to alleged proceeds but also to ordinary assets unrelated to any charge, thereby violating the principle of proportionality and the constitutional right to property under Article 26(1) of the Constitution. He argued that a restraint order is a preventive and not a punitive mechanism and that it must therefore be targeted, proportionate, and periodically reviewable, unlike in casu, where it is indefinite, unsupported by a clear asset schedule, and made without notice, thereby making it arbitrary in both form and effect. Further, counsel contended that having accepted other items on affidavit (by consent), the Court's refusal of the Appellant’s need for a cabinet, or a gravestone without addressing the proposed non-dissipation mechanics was disproportionate and inconsistent with the protective, not punitive, purpose of restraint. It was counsel’s final submission that just as the appellate court in Pillay v Republic & Arumagam (SCA CR 17/2024) [2025] SCCA 10 (22 April 2025), overturned the impugned bail order for being unsupported by evidence and contrary to natural justice, so too should this Court correct the misdirection in the interpretation and application of section 27(2) in this matter, where the lower court confined its discretion arbitrarily and failed to assess proportionality and hardship. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent Counsel for the Respondent, opened their submissions with a challenge on this very appeal. They submitted that the Appellant has no standing to pursue this appeal, as she failed to seek the leave of the Supreme Court to appeal its interlocutory decision. Counsel highlighted that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in civil matters is set out in section 12 of the Courts Act 1964 (as amended), and reproduced said the Section 12 as follows: “12(1) Subject as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law, the Court of Appeal shall, in civil matters, have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from any judgement or order of the Supreme Court given or made in its original or appellate jurisdiction. (2)(a) In civil matters no appeal shall lie as of right- (i) from any interlocutory judgment or order of the Supreme Court; or (ii) from any final judgment or order of the Supreme Court where the only subject matter of the appeal has a monetary value and that value does not exceed ten thousand rupees. (b) In any such cases as aforesaid the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant leave to appeal if, in its opinion, the question involved in the appeal is one which ought to be the subject matter of an appeal. (c) Should the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal under the preceding paragraph, the Court of Appeal may grant special leave to appeal.” With the above counsel submitted that the statutory provision was intended to create a filter to limit matters subject to appeal to those 'which ought to be the subject matter' of appeal. Further, that it also prevents the Court of Appeal from having to deal with a flow of appeals in respect of interlocutory decisions, which would otherwise hamper and delay the progress of litigation in the Supreme Court. Counsel classified a restraint order as one that is interlocutory in nature. He argued that applications to vary restraint orders are necessarily interlocutory and that, the restraint order itself will subsist until the conclusion of the relevant proceedings under which it is ordered or its discharge. Counsel also highlighted that the Appellant has the right to go back to the Supreme Court, at any time, to ask for further or alternative variations of the order, including a further application to the Supreme Court to vary the restraint order to allow for a less expensive gravestone for her late husband. They submitted that there is no 'finality' within the restraint proceedings in XP2/2023. It was the submission of counsel for the Respondent that, the relevant anti-money laundering legislation contains no statutory right of appeal in matters of restraint and that orders in respect of variations of a restraint order are inherently interlocutory. To this end, counsel cited as support the cases of Government of the United States of America v Montgomery ("Montgomery") [2001] UKHL 3 and Re O and Another (Restraint Orders: Disclosure of Assets) [1991] 2 QB 520 ("Re O"), wherein, restraint orders were reportedly expressly described and accepted by all to be interlocutory because of their temporary nature, within the overall criminal litigation. Counsel contended that a restraint order being rendered interlocutory due to its temporary nature finds expression in the Seychelles jurisdiction in Sections 4 and 5 of the Proceeds of Crime (Civil Confiscation) Act (Act 19 of 2008). He argued that those sections describe an interlocutory order as one in force until final disposal of the matter. With the above, it was counsel’s submission that the Appellant has neither sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court nor special leave to appeal from this Honourable Court within section 12(2) of the Courts Act and that in these circumstances, therefore, she is not entitled to pursue her appeal. Counsel then proceeded to address the issues raised in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, without necessarily addressing each ground specifically. The first issue that the Respondent addressed was the meaning of the Supreme Court's discretion within Section 27 of AMLA, and in this regard, counsel submitted, firstly, that Subsection (1) of Section 27 gives the Court a wide discretion to impose conditions and exceptions within its order, in the context of an order to 'prohibit' dealing with realisable property and that, the Judge is entitled to tailor the restraint order to meet the circumstances of the case. Secondly, he argued that subsection (2) provides a clear statutory steer to the Court in defining the scope of its discretion and that it does not impose a 'ceiling' but makes it clear that the Court may make such provision 'as it thinks fit... where the Court considers it essential to do so'. It was, thus, submitted that the statutory intention is clearly to permit variations when they are essential and that the statutory steer is plainly intended to serve to preserve realisable assets so as to protect the power of the Court to make a pecuniary penalty order upon conviction, while permitting the restrained person to make expenditure that is reasonable and necessary. Counsel added that permitted variations should not frustrate the fundamental purpose of the restraint order, which is to 'prohibit' dealing with property. Counsel then addressed the approach of the Seychelles Court of Appeal to interfering with the exercise of judicial discretion by the Supreme Court, and citing Rule 31 of the Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules, 2023, submitted that the Court of Appeal re-hears cases on appeal and shall have all the powers of the Supreme Court. Basically, it is in a position to question the reasonableness of the decision of the lower court. Counsel for the Respondent, thus, submitted that the proposed disputed items of expenditure were not "essential" for the Appellant's living or legal expenses, and therefore did not fall within the permissible scope of the Judge's discretion under section 27(2) of the AMLA. He argued that the proposed variations were not reasonable nor necessary within the broader discretion implicit within section 27(1), as such large items of discretionary spending, reflecting what was the choice and preference of the Appellant, were inconsistent with the purpose of the restraint order to prohibit dealing with realisable assets, and to preserve them pending a pecuniary penalty order for recovery by the state of criminal benefit. Counsel, further, submitted that the judicial discretion within section 27 plainly includes a discretion to refuse a request to vary the restraint order as well as a discretion to permit requested variation. He argued that the fact that an Applicant makes a request to spend restrained funds in a defined way does not oblige the supervising Court to permit such expenditure, regardless of cost. Counsel contended that the Court, in its discretion, must be entitled to consider the nature and amount of the proposed expenditure and whether it risks reducing what is 'realisable' with a view to making a pecuniary penalty order under part 5 of the AMLA. Counsel took issue with the Appellant’s use of the word 'dissipation', adding that it does not appear in the AMLA, although the statute creates a power to prevent a suspect from dealing with realisable assets. Counsel, thus, contended that the real issue for the Court is whether the proposed expenditure would result in a diminution of what is realisable and could be recovered under a pecuniary penalty order beyond what is "essential" to allow a defendant’s living and legal expenses. Accordingly, counsel submitted that the purchase of an expensive, personalised marble memorial and gravestone would convert the Appellant's liquid cash into something which is unrealisable by the State, as would be the case with the expensive bespoke wardrobes built for the Appellant's home to her personal specification, which would by their nature have little or no resale value. It was also counsel’s submission that, there is no basis for the Appellant’s suggestion that the Judge failed to give adequate weight to the Appellant's sworn affidavits and documentary exhibits. Counsel contended that in paragraph 2 of the assailed Ruling, that the learned Judge had regard to the Appellant's affidavit in support of the application dated 10 December 2024, her supplementary affidavit dated 28 March 2025, and all documentary evidence exhibited. He argued that, in fact, the supplementary affidavit was filed with the learned Judge's express leave, which was given on 20 March 2025, when the case was before him for oral submissions clearly demonstrating that the learned Judge was prepared to interrupt proceedings in order to give the Appellant the opportunity of filing a further affidavit and in so doing went outside the ordinary course to ensure that all evidence she wished to present in support of her application was before the court for its consideration. Counsel argued that the learned Judge's reasoning was not inconsistent or disproportionate as the variations granted (by consent) for other expenses were clearly accepted by the Court to be living expenses which were permissible in accordance with the court’s discretion under section 27(2). Counsel submitted that the distinction the court made between the agreed variations on the one hand, and the proposed variations regarding wardrobes and marble memorial, on the other, were reasonable, proportionate, fair and proper. He argued that the distinction was not drawn on the basis of the sufficiency of evidence in support of the proposed variations, but rather, on the basis of their nature and value, as the Ruling indicates and, thus, the Appellant's allegation of 'undifferentiated treatment' has no merit he also argued that the learned Judge's exercise of his discretion was proper and considered, and not arbitrary, and that he did not misdirect himself and he was entitled to come to the conclusions that he did. It was also counsel’s contention, that the learned Judge was entitled to consider whether funding for a marble memorial, befitting a former President (said by the Appellant to represent a 'respected public and historical figure'), might properly have come from public funds rather than lawfully restrained private funds. He argued that the Appellant failed to set out in her supplementary Affidavit what steps she had taken to secure public funding, and what reasons had been given (if so) for refusing to fund the proposed memorial. Counsel argued that there was no proper basis to conclude that the learned Judge considered factors which he should not have, or failed to consider relevant factors to which he should have given weight. It was the Respondent’s counsel’s final submission that the learned Judge did not exercise his statutory discretion within section 27 of AMLA in a manner which was unreasonable or improper. Further, he submitted that the Ruling herein assailed was a well-reasoned and reasonable decision by the Judge who had made and supervised the restraint order since August 2023, seeking to preserve the balance between the Appellant's right to living expenses with the need to preserve realisable assets for the purpose of recovering corruptly obtained funds for the benefit of the people of Seychelles. With the foregoing, the Respondent, prayed that the appeal be dismissed. Decision of this Court I have carefully considered the traversed judgment of the court below, together with the record of appeal and the parties’ arguments for and against the appeal herein. The issue before this Court is whether or not the learned Judge in the lower court was justified in declining to grant the Appellant’s application for an order of variation of the Restraint Order in Case XP 02/2023, so as to allow payments for cabinets and a white marble gravestone and for declining to order the return to the Appellant, of her personal wallet, which has since been seized in connection with the case. The Appellant raised four grounds of appeal, which I shall address in their order of appearance. However, before I embark on of addressing the substantive appeal, I should hasten to address a procedural question, raised by the Respondent and touching on the jurisdiction of this Court. I am of the view that the determination of said issue will have a significant bearing on whether or not I should proceed to address the substantive appeal. At the beginning of the Respondent’s submissions, counsel for the Respondent had submitted that the Appellant has no standing to pursue this appeal, as she failed to seek the leave of the Supreme Court to appeal its interlocutory decision. In arguing in this manner, counsel had placed reliance on Section 12 of the Courts Act, 1964 (as amended), which provides as follows: “(1) Subject as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law, the Court of Appeal shall, in civil matters, have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from any judgement or order of the Supreme Court given or made in its original or appellate jurisdiction. (2)(a) In civil matters no appeal shall lie as of right— (i) from any interlocutory judgment or order of the Supreme Court; or (ii) from any final judgment or order of the Supreme Court where the only subject matter of the appeal has a monetary value and that value does not exceed ten thousand rupees. (b) In any such cases as aforesaid the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant leave to appeal if, in its opinion, the question involved in the appeal is one which ought to be the subject matter of an appeal. (c) Should the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal under the preceding paragraph, the Court of Appeal may grant special leave to appeal. (3) For all the purposes of and incidental to the hearing and determination of any appeal, and the amendment, execution and enforcement of any judgment or order made thereon, the Court of Appeal shall have all the powers, authority and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Seychelles and of the Court of Appeal in England. (4) In this section the expression "civil matters" includes all non-criminal matters.” (Emphasis mine) Counsel for the Respondent had submitted that the provision above exists to prevent the Court of Appeal from having to deal with a flow of appeals in respect of interlocutory decisions, which would otherwise hamper and delay the progress of litigation in the Supreme Court. He argued that a restraint order being the subject matter of this appeal, and being interlocutory in nature, needed to be preceded by leave to appeal, in order to be entertained on appeal before this Court and since the Appellant has neither sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court nor special leave to appeal from this Court within section 12(2) above, she is not entitled to pursue her appeal herein. Counsel also considerably endeavoured to espouse how the Restraint Order in this appeal, is interlocutory in nature, and cited various authorities to demonstrate that. It is unnecessary to overemphasise that what the order in question is plainly interlocutory, a fact evident upon perusal of the record. Section 12 of the Courts Act, clearly falls under the heading “Appeals in civil matters,” while, what is before us is not purely a civil matter, but considered a criminal matter. Section 12(4) of the Courts Act, further confirms that the expression “civil matters” includes “all non-criminal matters”. In other words, Section 12 is not intended to be applied to “criminal matters”, such as the appeal now before us. That the appeal before this Court is a criminal matter, can also be gleaned from its Case/Cause number, being clearly, “Criminal Appeal SCA CR 07 of 2025 (arising in CM 149 of 2023 out of 02/23 & CR114/21).” Section 14, a counterpart to Section 12, was expressly enacted in respect of “criminal matters” and falls squarely under the heading, “Appeals in criminal matters” (as distinct from “appeals in civil matters”). Section 14, thus, provides as follows: “Appeals from decisions of the Supreme Court in criminal matters shall be governed by the Criminal Procedure Code and by any other law now in force or to be enacted.” (Emphasis mine) It is worthy of note that, unlike Section 12 of the Courts Act, which, inter alia, specifically provides that appeals from any interlocutory order of the Supreme Court, in civil matters, shall not lie as of right, there is no equivalent provision under Section 14, as regards criminal matters. In fact, all that Section 14 provides is that appeals from decisions of the Supreme Court in criminal matters shall be governed by the Criminal Procedure Code (“CPC”) and by any other law in force or to be enacted. The Section of the CPC which provides for appeals from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal, Section 342, unfortunately, does not prescribe that leave be obtained prior to lodgement of an appeal in the Court of Appeal. The only portions of the CPC, that seems to prescribe an application for leave prior to lodgement of an appeal is Section 280 of the CPC, in respect of the death sentence. In any event, the CPC does not appear to provide for a Restraint Order, or matters incidental thereto, as currently before this Court. This means that the primary legislation to look to, in trying to establish whether an appeal in respect of any incident relating to a Restraint Order, should be sanctioned by leave would be the AMLA. Under this Act too, no procedure is prescribed whereby an appeal in a criminal matter is to be preceded by leave of court. This being the case, it is safe to proceed on the assumption that the limitation in Section 12(2) of the Courts Act does not apply to criminal matters, because the section categorically refers to civil matters, and there is also a separate Section 14, of the same Act, which specifically caters for criminal matters. Overall, the Constitution, under Article 120, establishing the Court of Appeal and its jurisdiction, provides as follows: “(1) There shall be a Court of Appeal which shall, subject to this Constitution, have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from a judgment, direction, decision, declaration, decree, writ or order of the Supreme Court and such other appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred upon the Court of Appeal by this Constitution and by or under an Act. (2) Except as this Constitution or an Act otherwise provides, there shall be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from a judgment, direction, decision, declaration, decree, writ or order of the Supreme Court.…” (Emphasis mine) The import of Article 120(1) and (2) above, in our considered view, is that the Court of Appeal has been clothed with the authority to hear and determine any appeals from the Supreme Court, generally without any restrictions as to obtaining prior leave, be it in civil or criminal matters. However, this is subject to the Constitution itself, or where an Act of Parliament lawfully provides, otherwise. This exception is manifest in Section 12(2) of the Courts Act, for civil appeals regarding interlocutory orders, but not applicable in the case of criminal appeals regarding interlocutory orders of the Supreme Court. What paramountly governs criminal appeals around interlocutory orders of the Supreme Court, such as the Restraint Order in casu, is the Constitution, as read with Section 14 of the Courts Act and the AMLA, (and the appeal rules). Notably, none of these prescribes a requirement for prior leave before lodging such an appeal. In my view, Section 12(2) of the Courts Act, cannot be extended to criminal matters, as counsel for the Respondent contended. No such requirement exists for criminal matters and in my view was not the intention of the legislature. In light of the above, I find that the jurisdictional issue raised by the Respondent lacks merit and fails. I find, therefore that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the appeal herein. Now turning to the substantive appeal, the Appellant is alleging under the first ground of appeal that the learned Judge in the lower Court failed to properly exercise its discretion under Section 27(2) of the AMLA, by refusing the variation of the Restraint Order, permitting payment for the wardrobe and the gravestone. The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act, 2020 (Act 5 of 2020) replaced the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2006. The 2020 Act provides in Section 100(3) as follows: “(3) Any actions taken under the provisions of the Anti Money Laundering Act or the regulations made thereunder, or determinations and authorisations made thereunder and the guidelines issued in connection with money laundering and terrorist financing activities shall be continued under the provisions of the repealed Act or the regulations, determinations or authorisations made thereunder and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions made under them.” Section 27 of the AMLA 2006 provides the Court with a discretion to make and vary restraint orders. It provides: 27(1) The Court may by order (in this Act referred to as a “restraint order) prohibit any person from dealing with any realizable property, subject to such conditions and exceptions as may be specified in that order. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a restraint order may make such provision as the Court thinks fit for living expenses and legal expenses of the defendant where the Court considers it essential to do so.” The provision above, undoubtedly, clothes the Court with such broad latitude to determine how it will manage a restraint order given under the section. However, what is cardinal to establish is - What is the scope of this judicial latitude, and are there established standards to ensure it remains bounded, or is the court at liberty to act arbitrarily, without restraint or principled guidance? It is the disposition of the Appellant that the AMLA bestows a wide enough discretion upon the Supreme Court to grant the variation sought by the Appellant. The Appellant alleges that the thing to consider should be whether the proposed expenditure risked dissipation, unjustified depletion, concealment, or diversion of assets and that, where expenditures are transparently documented and payable directly to vendors, the risk of dissipation is neutralised, and accordingly, judicial discretion should be exercised to permit the variations, rather than adopting a blanket refusal that undermines the balance between preservation and fairness. The Respondent has rejected this, submitting that the statutory intention is to permit variations when they are essential, at the same time seeking to serve to preserve realisable assets so as to protect the power of the Court to make a pecuniary penalty order upon conviction, while permitting the restrained person to make expenditure that is reasonable and necessary. Counsel argued that the proposed variations were neither reasonable nor necessary, and further that, just because the Appellant made a request to spend restrained funds in a defined way, it was not automatic that the Court was to grant it, regardless of the cost. A determination of such opposites requires us to understand the discretion expected to be exercised by the Judge. It thus, begs the question, ‘What is discretion and what are the parameters of this discretion?’ The learned authors of Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition1, define and describe discretion as follows: “The exercise of judgment by a judge or court, based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law; a court’s power to act or not to act when a litigant is not entitled to demand the act, as a matter of right.” From the definition above, discretion is not something that a judge or court can exercise arbitrarily. There is a legitimate expectation that as a court, judge or tribunal exercises discretion, it should do so within the confines of the rules and principles of the law. This would essentially exclude factors such as being influenced by emotions, but rather reasonableness. Black’s Law Dictionary endeavours to define and describe ‘reasonableness’, and puts it thus: “It is extremely difficult to state what lawyers mean when they speak of ‘reasonableness.’ In part, the expression refers to ordinary ideas of natural law or natural justice, in part, to logical thought working upon the basis of the rules of law. In one sense, the word ‘reasonable’ describes the proper use of the reasoning power, and in another, it is no more than a word of assessment…” Clearly, the concept of reasonableness is one that cannot easily be condensed into one concise legal definition. Black’s Law Dictionary does, however, try to sum up reasonableness as something that is fair, proper or moderate, under the circumstances; or something done according to reason. Thus, the proper exercise of the discretion in approving a variation in a Restraint Order, in casu, if based on reasonableness would entail the court’s assessment of whether such variation would conflict with the main objective of satisfying the Restraint Order. The court, accordingly, should be looking ahead to foresee the potential impact of the variation on the Restraint Order, ensuring that enough assets remain to meet the objectives of the order if the variation is granted. Therefore, the variation would be allowed if it does not undermine the ability to satisfy the purpose for the Restraint Order. In other words, an assessment of the defendant’s realisable property should be done, and then a variation for reasonable living and legal expenses may be permitted. Put simply, discretion whose core is reasonableness is a balance between maintaining sufficient assets under the Restraint Order (protecting the public interest), while allowing some flexibility for the defendant’s legal and financial needs, without frustrating the restraint process. Would one then say that, in casu, the lower court had acted within the parameters of the discretion envisaged under the AMLA being, acting fairly, properly and moderately? The answer, in our view, is in the affirmative and this will be clearer as we tackle the subsequent grounds of appeal, below. In light of the above, ground one of the appeal herein, fails. Under the second ground of appeal, the Appellant alleges that the court below failed to give adequate weight to the Appellant’s sworn affidavit and documentary evidence, which evidence demonstrated the need for expenses and which justified them within a broader understanding of dignity, hardship and cultural obligation. The Respondent’s response to this was that, there is no basis for the Appellant’s suggestion that the Judge failed to give adequate weight to the Appellant's evidence. It was contended on behalf of the Respondent that the learned Judge in the lower court had regard to the Appellant's affidavit in support of the application dated 10 December 2024, her supplementary affidavit dated 28 March 2025, and all documentary evidence exhibited, plus her supplementary affidavit was filed with the learned Judge's express leave, which was given on 20 March 2025, when the case was before the Judge for oral submissions. This clearly demonstrated that the learned Judge was prepared to interrupt proceedings in order to give the Appellant the opportunity of filing a further affidavit and in so doing went outside the ordinary course to ensure that all evidence she wished to present in support of her application was before the court for its consideration. I have perused the record and confirm, from the proceedings, that the Judge in the Supreme Court had given the Appellant multiple opportunities to avail her evidence, justifying the expenditure she was seeking. Particularly minuted at page 68 of the Record of Appeal, is the Judge captured, granting leave to the Appellant to file a further affidavit so that she could determine the factual matters pertaining to her claim that the variation payments for the wardrobe and the white marble gravestones were, in fact, justifiable. This, the Judge did after having seen and considered the evidence that the Appellant had already tendered before court, but which appeared to be inadequate. It seems the Appellant holds the view that, because she asserts that she needs funds, then it should automatically follow that her request should be granted. In the face of invoking a Judge’s discretion (which is basically the judge deciding to act in the Appellant’s favour, not due to entitlement, but due to what is fair), the Appellant cannot present anything less than only that which convinces the court that her request is reasonable, prudent and fair. The Appellant raises the issue of hardship in her argument that the learned Judge failed to give adequate weight to her evidence. Hardship as a factor upon which a variation of a restraint order may rest, is not one that can just be casually alleged. A high standard of proof attaches to hardship in that, for an allegation of hardship to hold water, one must demonstrate it by things such as submitting detailed affidavits accompanied by documentation demonstrating real financial or operational needs, which should be reasonable. In addition, a person seeking to demonstrate hardship must show the lack of alternative resources, and the specific undue burdens caused by the order of restraint. In terms of the anticipated evidence, this would entail that such a person should produce financial statements or bank records showing depleted liquidity, inability to pay for essentials like living expenses, salaries or debts; imminent personal hardships like eviction threats, backed by rental arrear records, and creditor notices. This would operate to prove the restraint’s direct impact. The applicant would also have to detail post-order changes, by means of an affidavit or sworn verifications of no other means to meet their needs, demonstrating the alleged hardship. Instead, all that the Appellant had exhibited before the court below were mere quotations relating to the cabinet and the gravestone, nothing more. In other words, hardship should not be bare allegations or mere inconvenience, but substantial, unforeseeable and disproportionate to the order’s aims. The Appellant not only failed to demonstrate hardship to this standard, but also had alternative resources, the first being her parcel of land under sale, and the second being a government-sponsored memorial for her late husband, who was in fact once President of the Republic of Seychelles. I take judicial notice of the fact that the late president opted, of his free will, to be buried in a public cemetery (Mont Fleuri) near his late mother’s grave as family or presidency input in this Republic overrides tradition. Thus, the option for his remains to be buried at the State House Cemetery, reserved for presidents and dignitaries was always one that was available to the Appellant, but for the late president’s wishes not to be buried there. This, notwithstanding, we are of the considered view that the choice of a final resting place for the former president, outside and beyond the standard that may be offered by the State where a deceased president is buried at the State House Cemetery, does not form circumstances so urgent that attendance to putting up a gravestone would be so dependent on resources currently under the restraint order. Clearly, the nature of gravestone chosen by the Appellant is as a matter of preference and not necessity. I am, therefore, inclined to agree with counsel for the Respondent that there was no proper basis for the Appellant to conclude that the learned Judge considered factors which he should not have, or failed to consider relevant factors to which he should have given weight. Contrary to the Appellant’s allegation that the court failed to give adequate weight to her evidence, I find that, in fact, it was the Appellant that failed to demonstrate to the court below, through her evidence, that her claims satisfied the threshold of reasonableness, prudence and fairness. Only then could the court’s discretion tilt in her favour. On the strength of the foregoing, ground two of the appeal also fails. Turning to the third and final grounds of appeal, on which the Appellant submitted simultaneously, it is the Appellant’s position that the court below erred by rejecting the memorial expense on the ground that the government or third-party funding should have been sought, and that the Judge applied inconsistent and disproportionate reasoning as regards the cabinet and the gravestone. He argued, essentially, that the learned Judge’s decision was unfair compared to his decision as regards the Appellant’s vehicle repairs and university tuition. The Respondent contends that the Court’s decision was neither inconsistent nor disproportionate, as the variations granted (by consent) for other expenses were accepted by the Court to be living expenses which were permissible in accordance with the Court’s discretion. Further, it was submitted on its behalf that the distinction the Court made between the agreed variations on the one hand, and the proposed variations regarding wardrobes and marble memorial on the other were reasonable, proportionate, fair and proper. I am of the view that the issues raised under the third and fourth grounds of appeal have been adequately addressed in our analysis under the first two grounds and I will not be repeating most of those. I adopt the same reasoning as under these two grounds. Perhaps, by way of emphasis, it has been settled (with regard to the gravestone expenditure), that the Appellant had the option of going by the state funeral set at a certain standard, by the State or have her own private burial arrangements. The Appellant, in accordance with the wishes of her husband, opted to go for the latter. It is also a fact that since her husband’s death, in February 2019 now is when it has become of utmost urgency for her to procure a gravestone for his resting place, no doubt at an exorbitant price, and clearly a mere preference by the Appellant. In the Appellant seeking to recover detained funds for purposes of attending to such a preference, the question I ask at this juncture is, ‘was the exception allowing variations to a restraint order intended to cover a defendant’s personal preferences, regardless of how reasonable they may be?’ I do not believe so. As established earlier herein, the court’s discretion in cases of variations of restraint orders is not arbitrary and one of the factors that the court finds itself having to deliberate on in exercising its discretion reasonably, is what constitutes “living expenses”, as used in Section 69 of the AMLA, 2020. It should be understood that the rationale behind determining what qualifies as “living expenses” under a restraint order is to ensure that only reasonable expenses necessary for the defendant’s basic and reasonable lifestyle are permitted, while preserving the value of the assets/property/funds under seizure. This is so that, in the event that a defendant is found liable or convicted on a charge of money laundering at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the assets/property/funds seized will be applied for asset recovery by the State. Needless to say, the courts will always gravitate towards paying out expenses that help maintain or improve the value of the seized assets, rather than expenses that tend to deplete the assets. In a landmark English case, R v Luckhurst and Golding [2020] EWCA Crim 1579, the Court of Appeal addressed the question of what qualifies as living expenses under an order such as a restraint order, and provided guidelines to how courts could arrive at the answer. The court had the following to say: “There are obvious difficulties in attempting a definition of an objective standard of reasonableness in relation to living expenses. Members of the public who themselves enjoy different standards of living will have different perspectives. Moreover, any decision on what is reasonable for a given defendant is fact sensitive to the particular circumstances in which that defendant, and those for whom he may legitimately claim to have financial responsibility, find themselves. We do not therefore attempt any definition of reasonableness or seek to identify prescriptive principles. However, it may assist those who have to make these assessments if we identify the following list of non-exhaustive factors which are potentially relevant to the fact sensitive decision in each case: Whether the payment is necessary or desirable to improve or maintain the value of assets available to meet a confiscation order. Clearly it is a fulfilment of the legislative steer… if the expenditure is likely to preserve or enhance the value of realisable assets available for confiscation. The defendant's assets in relation to the size of any likely confiscation order. If it is clear that the level of expenditure sought will not diminish the value of the restrained assets below the likely level of a confiscation order, it is difficult to see how the expenditure could be characterised as unreasonable; allowing the expenditure would not interfere with the statutory purpose of the restraint order. There will be many cases in which it impossible to make the comparison because of the difficulty in trying to predict the likely extent of a confiscation order. Nevertheless, it may be possible and appropriate in some cases. The standard of living enjoyed by the defendant prior to the restraint order. This is not determinative, and as we have endeavoured to explain, there is no entitlement to maintain such lifestyle merely because it is that which has previously been enjoyed. Nevertheless, it must be kept firmly in mind that a restraint order will usually be made before the defendant has been convicted of any offence. It can be made when there is merely an investigation, in which case he may never be charged with an offence. If charged, he may be acquitted. The living expenses which he is to be allowed must give some weight to the fact that if innocent of any offence he would be entitled to continue to maintain his existing lifestyle. Affordability: the defendant's means at the time of the restraint order or variation application. When the restraint order is made, or a variation being considered, a defendant may by dint of events connected to the facts being investigated, or which give rise to charges, have a reduced income and be facing a more uncertain financial future than that enjoyed in the past. Some objective assessment of what is reasonable can be made on the basis of what expenditure someone in those circumstances and with those resources might reasonably be expected to make. In other words, affordability is a factor which can inform what is reasonable. A defendant may be in a position to make payments from capital, but a reasonably prudent person in his position, with his finances and uncertainties, would be expected to pare down spending rather than use up capital. To take an extreme example, a defendant facing years in prison might be inclined to spend all his capital to avoid it being confiscated when he would act more prudently if he had only his own future enjoyment of the assets to think of. That is not to say that drawing on capital will necessarily be unreasonable, even if it is not reflective of previous practice. The defendant's downturn in financial fortunes may itself be the result of the criminal accusations, and an innocent defendant may expect his finances to improve again when acquitted. This must be kept in mind when addressing affordability. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of the defendant's financial future can inform the answer to the question what a reasonable person would spend in his or her situation. The period of the restraint. A reduction in living standards may be more reasonable for a short period than for a longer one. What it may be reasonable to expect a defendant to put up with in the face of an imminent trial or confiscation hearing may not be reasonable for a defendant who faces a lengthy period of investigation before even being told whether charges will be brought, and if they are, a further delay before conclusion of the trial and any confiscation proceedings. Whether there is a prima facie case that the existing standard of living is the result of criminal activity; and if so, what standard of living would be enjoyed but for such criminal activity. As we have already observed, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the 2002 Act to treat a level of expenditure as reasonable if it were itself the result of criminal activity. That may appear to be the case when a restraint order is made or during its existence, notwithstanding that criminal liability will only be definitively established at trial. We are not suggesting that whenever dealing with the amount of living expenses allowances there should be a detailed examination of the strength of the prosecution case. However, we can envisage cases in which this may be a powerful factor. Suppose, for example, that a person has for years led a very modest existence, but is charged with drug dealing over a two-year period in which he has suddenly acquired a very extravagant lifestyle without any avowed or credible means of support other than the drug dealing which forms the subject matter of the investigation or prosecution which has given rise to the restraint order. That will be a factor tending to suggest that the appropriate level of expenditure permitted should be commensurate with his earlier modest lifestyle. The amount of the expenditure sought: an absolute level of unreasonableness…there is a level of expenditure which is above any objective standard which could be described as reasonable, irrespective of previous spending patterns. We do not think epithets such as "a Rolls Royce lifestyle" are helpful. What one is searching for by way of a cap is a level which is inconsistent with the statutory objective of preserving assets so far as possible for the purposes of enforcement of a confiscation order, taking into account the other factors which fall to be taken into account.” (Emphasis mine) Thus, in establishing living expenses as reasonable and payable, a court should address its mind to an objective standard of reasonableness, considering, the factors outlined above. When applied to the circumstances of the Appellant in casu, I come to the conclusion that her claim for payment of expenses for the cabinet and gravestone, at the excessive sums they are, is actually unreasonable. This is coupled with the fact that, from her own evidence, the Appellant had indicated that she has an alternative source of funds, being a parcel of land that she is/was in the process of selling. Where a defendant has assets available to meet living expenses which are not caught by the restraint order, he is expected to resort to those funds as he will not be allowed to draw on the restrained assets, was also established in the Luckhurst case. Therefore, where living expenses cannot be shown to be reasonable, or where there are other available assets, funds will not be made available from the restrained assets. This, is exactly the situation in the Appellant’s case. It was contended by the Appellant that, the learned Judge in the lower court agreed to some variations to the Restraint Order, yet rejected the claims for wardrobes and a memorial without explaining any principled distinction, and thereby breached the principles of proportionality, fairness, and natural justice, and reflects an arbitrary exercise of the discretion available. This, in my view, cannot be farther from the truth. I have perused the Ruling of the learned Judge and observed from paragraphs 23 to 29 that the Judge had adequately addressed the distinction between the allowed variations and the failed ones. The Judge can be seen explaining his discretion and what it entails; the objective of a restraint order and how it is balanced against variations; the reasonableness or lack thereof in granting the disputed variations; a note that the variations sought are unreasonably excessive; and a reference to the fact that the Appellant herself had deposed in her supplementary affidavit that she had valuable alternative property, the sale of which could cover the anticipated expenditure. The Judge then proceeded to give his position in paragraph 30 of the Ruling that he was dismissing the Appellant’s application for variation of the restraint order. For the reasons above, grounds three and four of the appeal also fail. Conclusion and Orders In view of the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety. The Ruling of 22 April 2025, delivered by Judge B. Adeline, is hereby upheld. Costs are awarded to the Respondent. ________________ Sichinga JA I concur: _________________ Gunesh-Balaghee JA I concur: ___________________ Sharpe-Phiri JA Signed, dated and delivered on 15 December 2025. 1 Bryan A. Garner (Ed), Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition [Thompson West, 2004] 19