Gonzalves v Seychelles Investment Board ([2025] (15 December 2025) SCA 25/2025 (Arising in MA 155/2025 and MC 63/2025)) [2025] SCCA 22 (15 December 2025)

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Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [] IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES Reportable [2025] (15 December 2025) SCA 25/2025 (Arising in MA 155/2025 and MC 63/2025) In the Matter Between Steven Gonzalves Appellant (Self-Represented) And Seychelles Investment Board Respondent Neutral Citation: Gonzalves v Seychelles Investment Board (SCA 25/2025) [2025] (Arising in MA 155/2025 and MC 63/2025) (15 December 2025) Before: Fernando President, Robinson, Sichinga, JJA Summary: Practice and Procedure — Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court — Whether an appeal lies as of right to the Court of Appeal against an order refusing leave to proceed with judicial review — Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles [Cap 42], articles 120 (1) and 120 (2), 136 (2), 125 (1) (c); Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules 1995, rules 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8, Courts Act [Cap 52], section 12 (1) and (2); The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023, Rule 18 (8) Heard: 1 December 2025 Delivered: 15 December 2025 ORDER The appeal stands dismissed. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________________ ROBINSON JA (FERNANDO PRESIDENT, SICHINGA JA (CONCURRING)) THE BACKGROUND On the 11 November 2025, during the case management proceedings, the Court asked Mr. Gonzalves, the Appellant, whether he would be representing himself at the hearing of the appeal. The Appellant replied that he did not think so, as noted at page 2 of the case management proceedings. At the hearing of the appeal on the 1 December 2025 at 2 pm, the Appellant informed this Court that he represents himself and was ready to proceed with the appeal, having carefully prepared for it. He also informed this Court that Mr. Bonte, his Counsel of record before the Supreme Court, had assisted him in preparing the appeal. The Appellant, the petitioner then, filed an application for judicial review (MC 63/2025) by way of petition dated 17 July 2025, accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by him on the 18 July 2025, pursuant to the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals, and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, which came into force on the 24 April 1995, S.1. 40 of 1995, for orders of injunction, declaration and certiorari. The Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, which came into force on the 24 April 1995, S.1. 40 of 1995, are hereinafter referred to as "The Rules 1995". The Appellant filed another judicial review application, MA 155/2025, by way of notice of motion accompanied by an affidavit. The affidavit, sworn to by the Appellant on the 18 July 2025, contained the same averments as the affidavit, which accompanied the petition in the application MC 63/2025. The learned Judge heard both applications together and, in an order delivered on the 16 October 2025, dismissed them. The order of the learned Judge reads as follows (reproduced verbatim hereunder) — "[1] For the record, I know that there is MA155/2025, which is a notice of motion for leave to apply for judicial review filed on the 17th July 2025, in fact, the main case MC63/2025, filed on the 17th July as well, both the main case and the MA were filed on the same date. In the main case as well, there is an application for leave to proceed with Judicial Review. [2] In the MA, there is no compliance with the rules more specifically that a copy of that decision sought to be canvassed certified copy has to be attached. That is not there and the same applies to the main case, which is compiled a whole bunch of documents, none of which is a copy of the decision. [3] In fact at the Applicant/Petitioner says, the decision that he seeks to overturn, show as illegal and unreasonable, is a public announcement that was made. [4] Further, I note that the formatting of the Petition, is not in the accepted format and time was given for same to be addressed by counsel. For the record, Mr. Bonte is not present today for reason that the Petitioner states that he is held up urgently in another matter. [5] We have stated numerous times that counsel has to attend to their cases and if they cannot attend, they have to give excuses as to why they cannot attend, not only as a matter of courtesy, but it is a matter of respect for the court process. Furthermore, I have gone through the causelist for today and do not see any cases listed with Mr. Bonte appearing in any of the other Courts. [6] Ruling to be served on counsel and Mr. Gonzalves." THE APPEAL The Appellant, dissatisfied with the learned Judge's order dismissing both applications MC 63/2025 and MA 155/2025, lodged a notice of appeal on the 17 October 2025. The main arguments raised by the grounds of appeal are as follows — the learned Judge erred in dismissing the Appellant's case without ensuring that the Respondent's preliminary objection had been correctly served on the Appellant. Neither the Appellant nor his Counsel, Mr. Bonte, received the preliminary objection. Additionally, the learned Judge failed to address the issue of service, noting that the Respondent's Counsel was absent at the hearing on the 1 October 2025. the learned Judge erred in dismissing the applications without affording the Appellant an opportunity to be heard, thereby violating his right to a fair hearing as guaranteed under article 19 (7) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. The issues in this appeal In this appeal, we deal with the application MC 63/2025, which has been filed by way of petition accompanied by an affidavit in pursuance of Rule 2 (1) of The Rules 1995, which provides — "2 (1) [a]n application to the Supreme Court for the purposes of Rule 1 (2), shall be made by petition accompanied by an affidavit in support of the averments set out in the petition." We have thoroughly considered the record of appeal and the Appellant's skeleton heads of argument. The appeal was heard ex parte in view of the issues identified for determination in the appeal, which are as follows — first, the Appellant did not comply with the statutory requirement set out in Rule 8 of The Rules 1995. The Appellant has lodged a notice of appeal as of right, pursuant to article 120 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles and section 12 (1) of the Courts Act; and the second issue, ex facie the petition, concerns whether the purported announcement made by the Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation, the national television channel, around April 2025 — stating that the Seychelles Investment Board had decided to re-tender Plot B3 in Zone B of the Victoria Waterfront Development — constitutes a decision over which the Supreme Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Rule 1 (2) of The Rules 1995. First, we deal with the two issues stated at paragraph [7] of this judgment. Second, our consideration of the Appellant's arguments will depend on the conclusions we reach with respect to these two issues. The issue of leave to proceed under Rule 8 of The Rules 1995 On the 11 November 2025 at 10 am, during the case management proceedings, the Court informed the Appellant that, at the hearing of the appeal, he would have to address the issue of why he did not seek leave from the Supreme Court to appeal to this Court the order refusing leave to proceed under rule 8 of The Rules 1995. At the hearing of the appeal, from a question from this Court as to why he did not seek leave from the learned Judge under Rule 8 of The Rules 1995 to appeal the order refusing leave to proceed, the Appellant stated that an officer of the Supreme Court had advised him that following the dismissal of his applications, he could either file an appeal or an application to set aside the order. The Appellant chose to file an application to set aside the order. At page 153 of the record of appeal, there is an email from Miss Valmont informing the Appellant that the said application would not be heard because the judicial review applications had been dismissed. At this point, we observe that the learned Judge should have made an order refusing leave to proceed instead of dismissing the applications for judicial review. In our opinion, this may have contributed to the confusion surrounding the appeal being lodged as of right. It is noted that the Appellant has asked the learned Judge, among other things, to make an order granting leave to proceed with judicial review. The learned Judge in the order dismissing the applications stated that "both the main case and the MA were filed on the same date. In the main case as well, there is an application for leave to proceed with Judicial Review", at paragraph [1] of the order. Given the circumstances, for the purposes of this appeal, we will treat the learned Judge's order dismissing the applications as an order refusing leave to proceed with judicial review. However, this approach does not help the Appellant, as the issue of seeking leave under Rule 8 of The Rules 1995 still needs to be addressed. In Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice and Others SCA MA 06/2025 (dated 18 August 2025), this Court, consistent with its earlier decisions, stated that judicial review is a two-stage process: the leave stage and the merits stage. Before the petitioner can proceed to the substantive hearing, the petitioner should first obtain leave to proceed with judicial review under The Rules 1995. In the case of Bar Association of Seychelles, this Court explains — "52 …rule 1 (2) of the Rules 1995…provides that the Rules 1995 provide the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court in respect of an application for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over subordinate courts, tribunals and adjudicating authorities. 53. The case-law from the Seychelles Court has underlined that the law governing judicial review is stipulated in the Rules 1995, and that judicial review is a two stage procedure, i.e before an applicant can proceed to the substantive hearing itself, the applicant must first have obtained leave to proceed with judicial review under the Rules 1995: see Gemuenden v Seychelles Investment Board SCA 14/2024, dated 18 December 2024, Airtel (Seychelles) Ltd v Review Panel of the National Tender Board and another SCA 70/2018, dated 13 August 2021, Registrar of the Supreme Court v Public Service Appeals Board and others SCA CL 6 of 2020, dated 30 April 2021, and Karunakaran v Constitutional Appointment Authority SCA No. 33 of 2016, dated 14 April 2017. In the Registrar of the Supreme Court v Public Service Appeals Board and others SCA CL 6 of 2020, dated 30 April 2021, the Court of Appeal explained the procedure at the leave stage as follows, at paragraphs 8 to 10 of the judgment — "8. Under Article 125 (1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts, tribunals and adjudicating authorities. Judicial Review is governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction Courts, Tribunals, Adjudicating Bodies) Rules 1995 (the "Rules"). Application for Judicial Review undergoes two stages: the leave stage and the merits stage. The Rules applicable to leave stage are Rules 2-6. Rule 5 provides that the petition made under Rule 2 shall be listed ex-parte for the granting of leave to proceed. Rule 6 provides two matters to be considered when deciding whether to allow or reject the application for judicial review: whether the petitioner has sufficient interest in the subject matter and whether the petition is being made in good faith. 9. At the leave stage therefore, the petition is listed ex-parte and the Court considers matters referred to by Rule 6. The Respondent under Rule 7 may take notice of application being registered under Rule 5 at any time and object orally or in writing to the grant of leave to proceed, or if leave to proceed had been granted object to the application at any time before the time fixed by Rule 12 for filing objection. 10. It was correctly stated in the case of Derrick Chitala v Attorney General (1995) ZR that the purpose of the leave stage is to eliminate claims that are frivolous, vexatious or hopeless. In R v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex-parte Cheblak [1991] 1 WLR 980 Lord Donalds explained that the process operates as a filter to eliminate unarguable cases and if an arguable issue emerges, the Courts grant the leave (Island Development Company v Marine Accident Investigation Board (MA90/2019, arising in MC19/2019) [2020] SCSC 37)." We hold the view that, regardless of the circumstances, if the Appellant had sought leave to appeal under Rule 8 of The Rules 1995, the learned Judge would still have refused to grant such an order. If that had been the case, an appeal to this Court regarding the order refusing leave to proceed would have resulted in the same outcome, as this judgment indicates that the Appellant had an unarguable case. Rule 8 of The Rules 1995 provides — "8. Where the Supreme Court refuses to grant leave to proceed, the petitioner may appeal to the Court of Appeal within 14 days of the order of refusal with leave of the Supreme Court first had and received." The following jurisdictional issue arises for determination with respect to Rule 8 of The Rules 1995 — whether the Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal without the Appellant having first fulfilled the procedural requirements set out in Rule 8 of the Rules 1995. This Court relies on Rule 18 (8) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023, as amended, to raise the jurisdictional issue, which stipulates — "(8) [n]otwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the Court in deciding the appeal shall not be confined to the ground set forth by the Appellant — Provided that the Court shall not, if it allows the appeal rest its decision on any ground not set forth by the Appellant unless the respondent has had sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground." The Appellant argued in his skeleton heads of argument that section 12 (2) of the Courts Act provides the statutory basis for leave. The jurisdictional issue to be determined is unaffected by the facts of the case. Case law from the Court of Seychelles endorses the following interpretation of the term "jurisdiction" contained in Halsbury's Laws of England/JUDICIAL REVIEW (VOLUME 61 (2010))/CONTRIBUTORS JUDICIAL REVIEW (VOLUME 61 (2010)) at para. 623, which is relevant to the question at issue — ""jurisdiction" is the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by statute, charter or commission under which the court is constituted, and may be extended or restricted by similar means. If no restriction or limit is imposed, the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the claims and matters of which the particular court has cognisance, or as to the area over which jurisdiction extends, or it may partake of both these characteristics…". Also material to the meaning of jurisdiction are the remarks made in the Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd 1926 37 CLR 393 at p. 408 per Isaacs; Braun v R 1997 112 NTR 31 at p. 39, per Kearney and Thomas JJ, quoted with approval in the case of Eric Njue v R SCA No. 15 of 2016, dated 6 December 2017 — "The "jurisdiction" of a court is its authority to take cognisance of, and to decide, proceedings brought before it; its jurisdiction delimits its area of competence and authority. The concept is one of authority or capacity; and the essence of an inquiry into "jurisdiction" in this sense is as to its limits — whether a court has power to hear and determine the particular case". Article 120 (1) and 120 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles provides — "120 (1) There shall be a Court of Appeal which shall, subject to this Constitution, have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from a judgment, direction, decision, declaration, decree, writ or order of the Supreme Court and such other appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred upon the Court of Appeal by this Constitution and by or under an Act. (2) Except as this Constitution or an Act otherwise provides, there shall be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from a judgment, direction, decision, declaration, decree, writ or order of the Supreme Court." Section 12 of the Courts Act so far as relevant, provides — "12 (1) Subject as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law, the Court of Appeal shall, in civil matters, have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from any judgement or order of the Supreme Court given or made in its original or appellate jurisdiction. (2) (a) In civil matters no appeal shall lie as of right— (i) from any interlocutory judgment or order of the Supreme Court; or … (c) Should the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal under the preceding paragraph, the Court of Appeal may grant special leave to appeal…" [Emphasis supplied] The argument made by the Appellant in his skeleton heads of argument that section 12 (2) of the Courts Act provides the statutory basis for leave is misconceived. Further, it is unclear why this argument is being made, as the Appellant did not seek leave under section 12 (2) of the Courts Act. Be that as it may, we state that this jurisdictional issue was recently addressed in Bar Association of Seychelles [supra]. This Court concluded that section 12 (2) (a) (i) of the Courts Act does not provide the statutory basis for leave following an order of the learned Judge refusing leave to proceed under The Rules 1995. This Court determined that rule 8 of The Rules 1995 unambiguously provides the practice and procedure with respect to an appeal against the refusal of leave to proceed with judicial review. Robinson JA, who delivered the judgment of the Court, with Twomey-Woods and Andre JJA concurring, reasoned as follows — "54. Based on the Rules 1995 and the cases cited above1, I determine that rule 8 of the Rules 1995 unambiguously provides the practice and procedure with respect to an appeal against the refusal of leave to proceed with judicial review. Rule 8 of the Rules 1995 provides that where leave to proceed with judicial review has been refused, the person seeking that leave to proceed may appeal to the Court of Appeal, but subject to leave of the Supreme Court "first had and received". An application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to rule 8 of the Rules 1995 must be made within 14 days of the order of the Supreme Court refusing to give leave to proceed. In light of my determination that the practice and procedure for appealing from the decision of the learned Judge, who refused to grant leave to proceed, are governed by rule 8 of the Rules 1995, I do not accept the argument presented by Counsel for the Applicant that section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act applies to the case. There is no compelling reason to invoke these provisions of the Courts Act, and the application approach test and order approach test. It is noted that the Applicant lodged a notice of appeal before the learned Judge had delivered his ruling on the application for leave to appeal. Subsequently, the Applicant withdrew the notice of appeal. I think the Applicant pursued an application for special leave under section 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act in order to save the Applicant's appeal." [Emphasis supplied] Based on Rule 8 of The Rules 1995 and the authorities cited above, we hold that an appeal as of right to this Court does not lie against the refusal of leave to proceed with judicial review. Rule 8 of The Rules 1995 provides that where leave to proceed with judicial review has been refused, the person seeking that leave to proceed may appeal to this Court, but subject to leave of the Supreme Court "first had and received." Hence, we hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as of right against the refusal of leave to proceed. We recommend that when the learned Judge refuses leave to proceed with an application for judicial review, the learned Judge should explicitly inform the petitioner that the petitioner has the right to appeal against the order to the Court of Appeal, in accordance with Rule 8 of The Rules 1995. The issue of whether the learned Judge was correct in refusing leave to proceed with judicial review We have chosen in passing to address the following issue — whether the learned Judge was correct in refusing leave to proceed with judicial review. The issue requires this Court to consider whether there was a decision over which the Supreme Court may exercise supervisory jurisdiction. The Appellant submitted a stand-alone bundle of documents along with the applications. This bundle included exhibits marked "A" to "I". It is noted that the documents referred to as exhibits have not been exhibited in terms of Rule 2 (2) of The Rules 1995. With respect to an application for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over subordinate courts, tribunals, and adjudicating authorities, under Rule 2 (1) of the Rules 1995, Rule 2 (2) provides that the petitioner shall "annex to the petition a certified copy of the order or decision sought to be canvassed and originals of documents material to the petition or certified copies thereof in the form of exhibits". [Emphasis supplied] The affidavit of the petitioner stands in lieu of evidence. Halsbury's Laws of England/JUDICIAL REVIEW (VOLUME 61 (2010))/CONTRIBUTORS JUDICIAL REVIEW (VOLUME 61 (2010)) states the following with respect to the nature of judicial review, at paragraph [602] — "Judicial review is the process by which the High Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions or who are charged with the performance of public acts and duties..." Counsel for the Respondent before the Supreme Court made oral submissions, highlighting in the main that there was no certified decision exhibited to the affidavit supporting the application. The learned Judge noted, among other points, the Appellant's failure to comply with Rule 2 (2) of the Rules 1995, as he did not exhibit any certified copy of an order or decision to the affidavit in support. It is observed that the Appellant was adamant before the Supreme Court and at the hearing of the appeal that his cases were not based on a written decision of the Respondent, but that instead they were based on a television announcement stating that the Seychelles Investment Board was moving forward with the waterfront project, which, in our view, clearly does not constitute a decision for the purposes of The Rules 1995. We agree with the learned Judge's conclusion that there is no decision over which the Supreme Court can exercise supervisory jurisdiction. Thus, the learned Judge was correct in denying the Appellant leave to proceed with judicial review on this basis, among other things. In light of our finding in passing, we find the arguments raised by the Appellant in his grounds of appeal to be misconceived. The Appellant's case is unarguable ex facie the petition. DECISION We make the following orders — The appeal stands dismissed for the reason that we have no jurisdiction to hear and determine it as an appeal as of right. 1 Paragraphs [52] and [53] of the Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice and Others, SCA MA 06/2025, at paragraph [12] of this judgment should be read together with paragraphs [54] and [55] of the same judgment, at paragraph [22]. 6