VDT v VDU

In the FAMILY JUSTICE COURTS OF the republic of singapore [2020] SGHCF 15 Divorce (Transferred) No 3014 of 2017 Between VDT … Plaintiff And VDU … Defendant juDGMENT [Family Law] — [Matrimonial assets] — [Division] [Family Law] — [Custody] [Family Law] — [Maintenance] — [Wife] [Family Law] — [Maintenance] — [Child] This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports. VDT v VDU [2020] SGHCF 15 High Court (Family Division) — Divorce (Transferred) No 3014 of 2017 Tan Puay Boon JC 29, 30 August, 31 October, 6 November, 17 December 2019 6 October 2020 Judgment reserved. Tan Puay Boon JC: Introduction 1 The plaintiff (“Husband”) and the defendant (“Wife”) (collectively, “the parties”) were married on 15 October 2005 in Singapore. There are two children to the marriage, a daughter born in 2005 (“Daughter”) and a son born in 2010 (“Son”) (collectively, “the Children”). 1 Foot Note 1 × Statement of Particulars (Amendment No 1) at para 1(i). The Husband commenced the first set of divorce proceedings in August 2015, 2 Foot Note 2 × See FC/D 3779/2015. but the proceedings were discontinued. He filed for divorce on again 1 July 2017, and interim judgment (“IJ”) was granted on 6 March 2018, on the ground that that the Wife has

behaved in such a way that the Husband cannot reasonably be expected to live with her. 3 Foot Note 3 × FC/IJ 1119/2018 (“IJ”) at para 2(b)(ii). It bought to an end a marriage of about thirteen years. The ancillary matters (“AM”) hearings began on 29 August 2019. 2 The matters that lie for determination are the division of matrimonial assets, custody of and access to the Children, and maintenance of the Wife and Children. Background facts 3 The Husband is 56 years and 11 months old, 4 Foot Note 4 × Statement of Claim at para 2(a). and he works as a broker. The Wife is 48 years and 5 months old, 5 Foot Note 5 × Statement of Claim at para 2(b). and she is currently unemployed. The Children currently stay with the Wife in the matrimonial home located near Botanic Gardens (“Matrimonial Home”). The Husband has left the Matrimonial Home since September 2012, 6 Foot Note 6 × Husband’s 1st Affidavit of Assets and Means (25.07.2018) (“HAOM1”) at p 19. and is currently staying in the United Kingdom (“UK”). 4 At this juncture, it is useful to briefly touch on the Husband’s employment history. He was previously employed at Company [A] and was based in Singapore for the entire duration of the marriage, until he was made redundant in February 2017. 7 Foot Note 7 × Husband’s Affidavit for FC/SUM 309/2018 (22.02.2018) (“HA-309”) at para 28; Wife’s Affidavit for FC/SUM 309/2018 (24.01.2018) at

paras 10–11. His average gross monthly salary, based on his Notices of Assessment from the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, 8 Foot Note 8 × HAOM1 at pp 96–97. was about $79,000.00 in 2015 and $64,000.00 in 2016. He remained unemployed for about a year, before eventually finding employment again in another firm in February 2018 in the UK, where he has resided since, at a much lower salary. 9 Foot Note 9 × HAOM1 at p 38. The Husband stated that his net monthly salary at this new firm is approximately GBP5,600.00pm (~ $10,000.00pm). 10 Foot Note 10 × HAOM1 at p 4. 5 It is also necessary to mention the Husband’s marriage history. The marriage which is the subject of these ancillary proceedings is the Husband’s second marriage. The Husband has two children from his first marriage, who are 21 and 24 years old. 11 Foot Note 11 × HAOM1 at para 15. While the Husband was required to maintain these children, his obligation ceased when the children reached the age of 18. 12 Foot Note 12 × Husband’s Submissions (16.12.2019) (“HS-2”) at para 33(e). He currently gives his younger child from the first marriage, who is still in university, about GBP500.00pm. 13 Foot Note 13 × HAOM1 at para 15. 6 In addition, a few brief words ought to be said on the Wife’s employment history. When she met the Husband in 2004, the Wife was also working at Company [A]. 14 Foot Note 14 × Husband’s

Submissions (19.08.2019) (“HS-1”) at para 88. She left Company [A] in the same year, and from 2004 to 2012, she worked in two different companies. From 2012 until 2017, she was a full-time housewife. In 2017, she found employment with Organisation [B] as a Senior Vice-President, 15 Foot Note 15 × HS-1 at para 90. drawing a salary of $11,397.00pm. 16 Foot Note 16 × Wife’s 1st Affidavit of Assets and Means (27.07.2018) (“WAOM1”) at para 2. Notably, Organisation [B] was in a different industry from that of the companies where the Wife worked between 2004 and 2012. The Wife was let go from Organisation [B] in 2019. 7 The parties have, prior to the hearing, made numerous applications to the court. It is unnecessary to recite the entire procedural history of the divorce, save to highlight the following salient points. In FC/ORC 3372/2018, the parties were given joint custody over the Children. Care and control of the Children was granted to the Wife by consent. The Husband was also ordered to pay the Wife $13,300.00pm for maintenance of the Children, while no maintenance of the Wife was ordered. The Wife subsequently commenced proceedings for committal under FC/SUM 2754/2019, FC/SUM 348/2019 and FC/SUM 32/2020, owing to the Husband’s failure to pay interim maintenance. FC/SUM 2754/2019 was eventually withdrawn. Under FC/ORCs 145/2020 and 147/2020, the Husband was found to be in

contempt for not paying the maintenance amounts referred to under HCF/SUM 348/2019 and FC/SUM 32/2020, but his contempt was purged by making full payments of the said maintenance amounts. Division of matrimonial assets 8 I first consider the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets under s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“Charter”). 9 There are two methodologies of dividing matrimonial assets, as set out in NK v NL [2007] 3 SLR(R) 743 at [31]–[33]: the global assessment methodology and the classification methodology. The global methodology comprises four distinct steps: identification, valuation, division and apportionment (of the matrimonial assets). On the other hand, the classification methodology first divides the matrimonial assets into separate classes before applying the four steps above in relation to each class of assets. 10 Neither the Husband nor the Wife sought to divide the pool of matrimonial assets into distinct classes in their Joint Summary of Relevant Information (“JSRI”). 17 Foot Note 17 × Joint Summary of Relevant Information (19.8.2019) (“JSRI”) pp 8–13. I understand them to be relying on the global assessment methodology, and will adopt this methodology accordingly as I see no reason to use the classification methodology. Identification and valuation 11 The starting position for the date of the identification of matrimonial assets

is the IJ date, ie, 6 March 2018 (ARY v ARX and another appeal [2016] 2 SLR 686 at [31]). The starting point for the date of the valuation of the matrimonial assets is the date of the AM hearing, ie, 29 August 2019 (TND v TNC and another appeal [2017] SGCA 34 at [19]). However, specifically for bank accounts, the matrimonial assets are the money in the accounts, and not the accounts themselves (UZR v UZS [2019] SGHCF 28 at [11]). Therefore, the better date to value bank accounts would be the IJ date, and not the AM date. 12 The Wife argued that there should be a departure from this default position. According to her, the date for identification and valuation should both be the date when the Husband filed the writ for divorce, ie 1 July 2017. 18 Foot Note 18 × Wife’s Submissions (21.08.2019) (“WS-1”) at para 36. The identification date should be 1 July 2017 because the marriage must have ended when the Husband commenced for divorce the second time. 19 Foot Note 19 × WS-1 at para 38. Further, using a valuation date later than 1 July 2017 would be unfair as the Husband has reduced the value of matrimonial assets since the commencement of the divorce to the Wife’s detriment. 20 Foot Note 20 × WS-1 at para 41. 13 I do not accept the Wife’s argument. The marriage between the parties was only dissolved upon the grant of IJ, 21 Foot Note 21 × See FC/IJ 1119/2018 at para 2(b)(ii). and

not upon the filing of the writ of divorce. Further, the Husband’s dissipation of matrimonial assets is a matter that go towards identification and not valuation. In any event, the Wife herself recognised that the court has the power to claw back any asset dissipated by the Husband before and after the commencement of the divorce. 22 Foot Note 22 × WS-1 at para 42. 14 Accordingly, there is no reason to depart from the default position and I apply the approach in [11] above for the identification and valuation of the matrimonial assets, save where otherwise agreed by the parties. 15 The parties also did not agree on the applicable exchange rate. I therefore use the exchange rate on the AM date of 29 August 2019 of EUR1 = $1.54 23 Foot Note 23 × Exchange-rates.org/Rate/EUR/SGD/8-29-2019. and GBP1 = $1.69. 24 Foot Note 24 × Exchange-rates.org/Rate/GBP/SGD/8-29-2019 Agreed assets 16 The agreed assets are as follows: S/N Description Valuation ($) Wife’s Assets 1 Wife’s Assets 546,098.13 25 Foot Note 25 × Minute Sheet (30.08.2019) at p 8. Husband’s Assets 2 DBS Account -466 7.43 Assets with disputed values 17 The assets with disputed values are as follows: S/N Description Joint Assets 1 Matrimonial Home Husband’s Assets 2 Natwest Account -378 3 Natwest Account -957 4 Natwest Account -689 5 Contributory pension from Company [A] (“[A] Pension”) 6 Stock plan from Company [A] (“[A] Stock

Plan”) 18 I address the assets with disputed values in turn. (1) Matrimonial Home 19 The court-ordered valuer, RHT Chesterstons (“RHT”), valued the Matrimonial Home at $1,598.00 psf (or $5,780,000.00) as at 22 October 2019. 26 Foot Note 26 × HS-2 at para 64. The Husband was dissatisfied with this valuation and obtained a further valuation from Knight Frank, which found that the valuation of the Matrimonial Home should be at $1,733.00 psf (or $6,266,528.00) as at 4 December 2019. 27 Foot Note 27 × HS-2 at para 65. 20 It was not clear what the Husband wanted to achieve by furnishing the Frank Knight report. He did not appear to challenge the RHT report, but only sought to have such report “looked at in light of such a different market analysis by another company”. 28 Foot Note 28 × HS-2 at para 65. Likewise, the Frank Knight report does not “constitute an opinion on the fairness of the [RHT report]”. 29 Foot Note 29 × HS-2 at Annex 3, p 2. In the absence of a formal challenge to the RHT report, the Husband should not be allowed to furnish additional valuation reports just because he is unhappy with the RHT report. To do otherwise would encourage litigants to furnish numerous valuation reports, leading to protracted proceedings and unnecessary expenses. 21 From the market valuation of $5,780,000.00 which I adopt, I deduct the mortgage loan valued at $1,796,164.23 as at 18 March

2019 30 Foot Note 30 × Wife’s 2nd Affidavit of Assets and Means (04.04.2019) (“WAOM2”) at pp 113–114. to arrive at a net value of $3,983,835.77. (2) Natwest Accounts -378, -957 and -689 and [A] Pension 22 The Husband’s initial position concerning his Natwest bank accounts and his pension with Company [A], as indicated in the JSRI 31 Foot Note 31 × JSRI at p 13. and first set of submissions, 32 Foot Note 32 × HS-1 at para 146. is as follows: S/N Description Valuation ($) 1 Natwest -378 1,045,041.16 (GBP622,285.37) 2 Natwest -957 3,251.36 (GBP1,936.07) 3 Natwest -689 Nil 4 [A] Pension 791,240.03 (EUR513,792.23) 23 His position concerning the abovementioned assets subsequently changed to the following, as indicated in a letter from his solicitors to this Court dated 29 August 2019: 33 Foot Note 33 × Letter from Godwin Campos LLC dated 29.08.2019 at annexed p 3. S/N Description Valuation ($) 1 Natwest -378 168,585.32 (GBP100,386.65) 2 Natwest -957 1,920.58 (GBP1,143.64) 3 Natwest -689 840,415.14 (GBP500,437.75) 4 [A] Pension Nil 24 The Husband explained that the [A] Pension was withdrawn and the proceeds deposited into his UOB Account -855 on 14 February 2017. The proceeds were subsequently moved from UOB Account -855 to Natwest Account -378 on 27 July 2018, 34 Foot Note 34 × Letter from letter from Godwin Campos LLC dated 29.08.2019 at para 3. and from Natwest Account -378 to

Natwest Account -689 on 4 July 2019. 35 Foot Note 35 × Husband’s Supplementary Affidavit (25.10.2019) (“HAOM4”) at paras 8, 16. 25 Having perused the evidence, 36 Foot Note 36 × Minute Sheet (31.10.2019) at p 3. I accept the Husband’s explanation. However, as mentioned at [11] above, the pool of matrimonial assets is determined as at the IJ date, ie 6 March 2018. At this date, the proceeds of the [A] Pension (of EUR513,792.23) was still parked in UOB Account -855 . 37 Foot Note 37 × Husband’s 2nd Affidavit of Assets and Means (04.04.2019) (“HAOM2”) at p 715. I therefore include the balance in UOB Account -855 into the pool of matrimonial assets, and exclude the [A] Pensions and the balance in Natwest Account -689. 26 As regards Natwest Accounts -378 and -957, their balances should be taken as near to the IJ date as possible. I therefore adopt the balances in these accounts as indicated by the Husband in his first Affidavit of Assets and Means (“HAOM1”), which were GBP53,951.35 for Natwest Account -378 as at 1 March 2018 38 Foot Note 38 × HAOM1 at p 178. and GBP1,099.46 for Natwest Account -957 as at 16 May 2018. 39 Foot Note 39 × HAOM1 at p 185. (3) [A] Stock Plan 27 I accept the Husband’s evidence that the [A] Stock Plan was valued at $1,221,536.92 as at 19 August 2019. 40 Foot Note 40 × HAOM4 at p 60. Disputed assets 28 The disputed assets are as

follows: S/N Description Wife’s Assets 1 Dissipation by the Wife Husband’s Assets 2 UK Pension 3 Dissipation by the Husband (1) Dissipation by the Wife 29 The Husband submitted that the Wife has dissipated $279,877.37 between 31 March 2016 and 18 September 2018, 41 Foot Note 41 × HS-1 at para 189. which must be clawed back to the pool of matrimonial assets. 30 The Court of Appeal provided the following guidelines on how allegations of wrongful dissipation are to be addressed (TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) at [24]): [T]he issue is how the court should deal with substantial sums expended by one spouse during the period: (a) in which divorce proceedings are imminent; or (b) after interim judgment but before the ancillaries are concluded. We are of the view that if, during these periods, and whether by way of gift or otherwise, one spouse expends a substantial sum, this sum must be returned to the asset pool if the other spouse is considered to have at least a putative interest in it and has not agreed, either expressly or impliedly, to the expenditure either before it was incurred or at any subsequent time. Furthermore, this remains the case regardless of whether: (a) the expenditure was a deliberate attempt to dissipate matrimonial assets; or (b) the expenditure was for the benefit of the children or other relatives. The spouse who makes such a payment must be prepared to

bear it personally and in full. In the absence of consent, he or she cannot expect the other spouse to share in it. What constitutes a substantial sum is, of course, a question of fact and we do not propose to lay down a hard and fast rule in this regard, except to emphasise that it is not intended to include daily, run-of-the-mill expenses. [emphasis added] 31 As emphasized by the Court of Appeal, what constitutes a substantial sum is a factual question. Considering the lifestyle that the Wife has enjoyed, and that the family withdraws an average monthly sum of over $50,000.00 between 2015 and 2018, 42 Foot Note 42 × HS-2 at para 28. I am of the view that only withdrawals exceeding $50,000.00 should be clawed back. For example, if the Wife made three withdrawals of $49,000.00, $3,000.00 and $51,000.00, only the final withdrawal would be clawed back. The first two withdrawals, being less than $50,000.00 each, will not be clawed back. I therefore notionally add back a sum of $89,953.93, being the sum withdrawn by the Wife from POSB Account -635 on 18 September 2018, which was the only withdrawal that exceeded $50,000.00. (2) UK Pension 32 The evidence shows that the UK Pension was granted to the Husband for services rendered by him from 1 October 1986 to 31 March 2007, 43 Foot Note 43 × HAOM4 at p 81. for a total of 21 years. On the date at which the Husband stopped accumulating

the UK Pension, ie 31 March 2007, the accrued amount due to him was GBP36,860.22 per annum 44 Foot Note 44 × HAOM4 at p 89. (ie, that upon his retirement, tentatively indicated to be 1 October 2016, he would receive GGP38,860.22 per annum). It therefore appears that the earliest date this amount would be payable to the Husband is 1 October 2026. 45 Foot Note 45 × Wife’s Affidavit (29.08.2019) (“WAOM4”) at p 104. 33 The UK Pension is a matrimonial asset, notwithstanding that the amount accrued is not yet payable to the Husband. This is because the Husband’s entitlement to the UK Pension is in itself a chose in action, which falls within the definition of “matrimonial assets” under s 112(10) of the Charter: Chan Teck Hock David v Leong Mei Chuan [2002] SGCA 3 (“Chan Teck Hock”) at [17], [27]–[29]. 34 However, as earlier mentioned, the UK Pension was granted to the Husband for services rendered (largely) before the marriage. Since parties were only married in 2005, just 2 out of the 21 years’ of the Husband’s services occurred after the marriage. Accordingly, the amount of accrued pension to be added to the pool of matrimonial assets would be GBP3,510.50 per annum (being GBP36,860.22 x 2 / 21): Chan Teck Hock at [37]. However, it was not indicated for how many years the UK Pension would be available to the Husband after his retirement. In other words, while the multiplicand of

GBP3,510.50 per annum is known, the multiplier (in terms of the number of years) is not. It follows that the total amount of accrued pension to be added to the pool of matrimonial assets cannot be ascertained. I am thus constrained to adjusting the final division ratio in the Wife’s favour. (3) Dissipation by the Husband 35 When the Husband was retrenched in February 2017, he received a termination package of about $1.2m, which was deposited into DBS Account -466. 46 Foot Note 46 × HS-2 at para 30. However, as of end October 2018 (about 20 months later) this sum has been substantially used up. 47 Foot Note 47 × WS-1 at para 41(a)(i)–(ii). The Husband has also withdrawn his CPF money amounting to approximately $259,165.00 48 Foot Note 48 × HAOM1 at p 3. and transferred this sum to Natwest Account -378 on 10 September 2018. 49 Foot Note 49 × WS-1 at para 41(a)(v). 36 As mentioned at [11] above, bank accounts should be identified and valued as at the IJ date. Since the Husband’s CPF money was only withdrawn after the IJ date, it follows that such money would still be parked in the Husband’s CPF accounts as at the IJ date. I therefore add the $259,165.00 back to the pool of matrimonial assets. 37 I turn to the termination package. The Husband explained that the $1.2m has been spent on various categories of expenses. 50 Foot Note 50 × HS-2 at para 34. I note that for 12 months

following his termination in February 2017, the Husband did not find another job (because of a non-compete clause in his employment contract with the employer that retrenched him). 51 Foot Note 51 × HS-2 at para 32. Nevertheless, the Husband ought to provide some explanations for spending $1.2m over the course of 20 months (ie, about $60,000.00pm). 38 The Husband has explained that his money has been used on the following: 52 Foot Note 52 × HS-2 at para 34. Category Description Amount ($) 1 Income tax 234,935.63 2 Rental 28,000.00 3 Maintenance of the family 261,279.00 4 Daughter’s school fees 77,852.92 5 Family holidays 29,047.52 6 Repayment for Wife’s car accident 1,200.00 7 Holidays with relatives 42,515.06 8 Maintenance of children from his first marriage 115,725.54 9 Counselling fees 29,251.25 10 Repayment of loans to Husband’s parents 21,982.46 11 Overseas trips to look for jobs 44,665.72 12 Legal fees 96,061.98 13 Living expenses ~ 165,000.00 39 My analysis of the Husband’s explanations is as follows: (a) I can accept that category 1 is valid, since such payments were required by law. (b) I can also accept that categories 2 to 6 are valid, since these expenses were for necessities and/or to the benefit of the family. These expenses were incurred for the benefit of the family, and with full knowledge from the Wife. Such expenses, by their nature, must have been taken to

have been consented to by the Wife. They thus do not fall foul of the rule in TNL (see [30] above). (c) Concerning category 7, while the Husband is entitled to go on holidays with his relatives, I do not think that he should spend excessively on these trips. In my view, the Husband should only be allowed to spend up to $20,000.00 on overseas trips with his relatives. (d) Concerning category 8, while the Husband can, and should be allowed to, maintain his children from his first marriage, I do not think that he should spend excessively. This is because the Husband indicated that his maintenance of his children from his former marriage was not done out of a legal obligation, ie that it was voluntary. In contrast, there is a legal obligation for him to maintain the Wife and the Children. In his first affidavit of assets and means, the Husband stated that he gave his children GBP1,000.00pm for their university education. 53 Foot Note 53 × HAOM1 at paras 15(a)–(b). Over a course of 20 months (the duration in which the Husband was unemployed), this would amount to GBP20,000.00 (~ $30,800.00). I am willing to add in some further allowance in respect of the maintenance provided, but even then, the Husband should only be allowed to spend up to $50,000.00 on maintenance of the children from his first marriage. (e) I can accept that category 9 is valid, since the importance of counselling

for the Husband to deal with his emotional stress arising from the divorce 54 Foot Note 54 × Husband’s 3rd Affidavit of Assets and Means (31.05.2019) (“HAOM3”) at para 12. should not be understated. (f) Concerning category 10, there is the presumption that transfers from parents to children are presumed to be gifts and not loans (see Neo Hui Ling v Ang Ah Sew [2012] 2 SLR 831 at [23]). The money given to the Husband by his parents is thus presumed to be a gift. The Husband claimed that his parents lent him about GBP10,000.00 in September 2015 when he was struggling to pay rent after leaving the Matrimonial Home. 55 Foot Note 55 × HAOM3 at p 290. To show that the GBP10,000.00 was in the nature of a loan, the Husband merely pointed to his bank statements for DBS Account -466. However, the statements simply indicated that there were two cheque deposits into the account. 56 Foot Note 56 × HAOM2 at p 482. There was no explanation on the source of, or the purpose behind, the deposits. I am thus not convinced that the GBP10,000.00 was a loan. Accordingly, I do not accept the expense in category 10. (g) Concerning category 11, the Husband stated that he had to travel overseas to Paris, Pakistan, Dubai and London to find jobs after being retrenched from Company [A]. 57 Foot Note 57 × HS-2 at para 33(d). The Husband did not specify the number of trips taken, or the amount spent on each

trips, but a rough picture can be drawn from the Husband’s bank statements for his UOB Account -892. The bank statements show transactions made in Pakistan in April 2017, 58 Foot Note 58 × HAOM2 at p 1170. London in May 2017, 59 Foot Note 59 × HAOM2 at p 1187. Dubai in June 2017, 60 Foot Note 60 × HAOM2 at pp 1197–1998. London in July 2017, 61 Foot Note 61 × HAOM2 at p 1210. Dubai in July 2017, 62 Foot Note 62 × HAOM2 at p 1221. Pakistan in July 2017, 63 Foot Note 63 × HAOM2 at p 1222. Dubai in August 2017, 64 Foot Note 64 × HAOM2 at p 1239. Paris in September 2017. 65 Foot Note 65 × HAOM2 at pp 1254–1255. These transaction patterns match the Husband’s version on his travelling to these countries in search of a job. 66 Foot Note 66 × HS-2 at para 34(d). Strictly speaking, these transactions concerned leisure expenses such as shopping, restaurant etc, and it is not self-evident that these expenses were incurred in search of a job. However, I am willing to give the Husband the benefit of the doubt, since the Husband’s efforts at re-connecting with his old contacts in the industry would likely have taken place over a leisurely setting. I also keep in mind that these expenses could be considered a “necessity” insofar as they are incurred as part of the Husband’s pursuit for a job. Exercising my discretion in a broad-brush manner, I am of the view that the Husband was entitled to

spend up to $40,000.00 on his overseas trips to look for jobs (ie, $4,665.72 would be clawed back to the pool of matrimonial assets). (h) Concerning category 12, legal fees are generally not deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets, lest any cost order rendered be made nugatory: AQT v AQU [2011] SGHC 138 at [37]. Therefore, I do not accept that the expenses in category 12 is validly incurred. (i) Concerning category 13, the Husband stated that he paid for not just his living expenses, but also the expenses of the Wife and the Children. 67 Foot Note 67 × HS-2 at para 35. He explained that in spite of his unemployment, living expenses remained high because the family continued to maintain a high standard of living, 68 Foot Note 68 × HS-2 at para 36. and because the Husband wanted to entertain his ex-clients so as to maintain good relationships with them. 69 Foot Note 69 × HS-2 at para 37. In my opinion, the Husband’s explanation corresponds with the evidence. The bank account statements for UOB Account -892 showed numerous transactions in family venues, such as Golden Village, Sentosa and McDonalds; the statements also showed transactions in fine dining restaurants. However, even if the Husband’s explanation stands up to scrutiny, there must nevertheless be a cap on the amount that he could reasonably spend. Exercising my discretion in a broad-brush manner, and keeping in

mind the Husband’s employment history as well as the family’s standard of living, I find the Husband should be allowed to spend up to $150,000.00 on living expenses (ie, $15,000.00 would be clawed back to the pool of matrimonial assets). 40 Accordingly, from the $1.2m retrenchment package, I claw back the following sums: Category Description Amount clawed back ($) 7 Holidays with relatives 22,515.06 8 Maintenance of children from his first marriage 65,725.54 10 Repayment of loans to Husband’s parents 21,982.46 11 Overseas trips to look for jobs 4,665.72 12 Legal fees 96,061.98 13 Living expenses 15,000.00 Total 225,950.76 41 In sum, $259,165.00 is to be clawed back in respect of the Husband’s CPF money (see [36] above) and $225,950.76 is to be clawed back in respect of his retrenchment package (see [40] above). I thus notionally add back $485,115.76 (being $225,950.76 + $295,950.76) back to the pool of matrimonial assets. Disputed liabilities 42 The disputed liabilities are as follows: S/N Description Husband’s Liabilities 1 Income tax Wife’s Liabilities 2 Loan from Wife’s parents 3 Loan from brother 4 Citibank loan 5 Income tax 43 I address the disputed liabilities in turn. (1) Husband’s income tax 44 The Husband indicated in the JSRI that his income tax liability was $175,882.30, 70 Foot Note 70 × JSRI at p 16. but later claimed that his income tax liability was reduced to

$132,328.78. 71 Foot Note 71 × Minute Sheet (31.10.2019) at p 10. I accept his position, since the Husband’s reduced income tax liability will benefit the Wife by increasing the Husband’s net assets available for division. (2) Loan from Wife’s parents 45 The Wife claimed that she has had to borrow $114,400.00 from her parents 72 Foot Note 72 × JSRI at p 16. to meet the family’s finances. 73 Foot Note 73 × WAOM2 at para 68(b). She has furnished, in support of her claims, some cheques issued from her parents. 74 Foot Note 74 × WAOM4 at pp 63, 76; WAOM1 at pp 56–77. 46 Gratuitous transfers from parents to children are presumed to be gifts and not loans by virtue of the presumption of advancement: see [39(f)] above. Therefore, the $114,400.00 will be presumptively treated as a gift from the Wife’s parents, and not a liability. The Wife’s evidence in this regard was limited to the copies of the cheques from her parents. 75 Foot Note 75 × WAOM1 at para 34(a)(ii). This, without more, merely shows that money was given from the Wife’s parents. This does not show the nature of the money that was given. Therefore, the presumption of gift has not been rebutted. 47 Since the $114,400.00 was a gift, it is not a valid liability. I therefore decline to deduct the $114,400.00 from the Wife’s share of the matrimonial assets. However, I note the Wife’s evidence that she has applied the

$144,400.00 towards family expenses, and will take this sum into consideration when considering the Wife’s indirect financial contributions. (3) Loan from Wife’s brother 48 The Wife claimed that she has had to borrow $52,000.00 from her brother 76 Foot Note 76 × JSRI at p 16. to buy a new car for the family. 77 Foot Note 77 × WAOM4 at para 15. In support of her claim, she furnished a promissory note entered into between her and her brother for the aforementioned sum. 78 Foot Note 78 × WAOM4 at p 79. 49 The promissory note was dated 15 August 2019. 79 Foot Note 79 × WAOM4 at pp 79–80. This debt was thus incurred after the IJ date, which is the identification date for matrimonial assets and liabilities. Nor was there evidence that the $52,000.00 was received by the Wife and applied towards the purchase of the new car. I therefore decline to deduct the sum of $52,000.00 from the pool of matrimonial assets. (4) Citibank loan 50 The Wife claimed that she has had to borrow $57,000.00 from Citibank. 80 Foot Note 80 × JSRI at p 16. In support of her claim, she furnished a letter from Citibank dated 6 September 2018. 81 Foot Note 81 × WAOM4 at p 64. 51 It appears that the sum of $57,000.00 was given to the Wife on 27 August 2018. 82 Foot Note 82 × WAOM4 at p 64. This debt was thus incurred after the IJ date, which is the identification date for matrimonial assets and liabilities. I

therefore decline to deduct the sum of $57,000.00 from the pool of matrimonial assets. (5) Wife’s income tax 52 The Wife indicated in the JSRI that her income tax liability was $43,979.64, 83 Foot Note 83 × JSRI at p 16. but later claimed that his income tax liability was reduced to $4,724.42. 84 Foot Note 84 × Minute Sheet (31.10.2019) at p 10. I accept her position, since the Wife’s reduced income tax liability will benefit the Husband by increasing the Wife’s net assets available for division. Summary 53 In summary, the pool of matrimonial assets is as follows: S/N Description Valuation ($) Joint Assets 1 Matrimonial Home 3,983,835.77 Subtotal (A) 3,983,835.77 Wife’s Assets 2 Wife’s Assets 546,098.13 3 Dissipation by the Wife 89,953.93 4 Income tax liability (4,724.42) Subtotal (B) 631,327.64 Husband’s Assets 5 DBS Account -466 7.43 6 UOB Account -855 791,240.03 (EUR513,792.23) 7 Natwest Account -378 91,177.78 (GBP53,951.35) 8 Natwest Account -957 1,858.09 (GBP1,099.46) 9 [A] Stock Plan 1,221,536.92 10 Dissipation by the Husband 485,115.76 11 Income tax liability (132,328.78) Subtotal (C) 2,458,607.23 Total [(A) + (B) + (C)] 7,073,770.64 Division Direct contributions 54 The parties were in broad agreement that assets held in a party’s sole name was financed by that party alone. The controversy concerned the parties’ direct contributions towards the acquisition of the

Matrimonial Home. (1) The Matrimonial Home 55 The parties agreed on the extent of their mortgage payments between 2007 and 2015. 85 Foot Note 85 × WS-1 at para 63; HS-2 at para 77. They differed on how much they contributed in terms of the initial outlay and the mortgage payments between June 2015 and June 2017. (A) Initial outlay 56 The main controversy concerns a sum of $252,066.08 that the Husband allegedly transferred to the Wife by way of cheque. The Husband claimed that this sum represented his contributions towards the initial outlay. 86 Foot Note 86 × HS-2 at para 68. The Wife denied receiving such a sum. 57 The evidence showed that the Husband issued a cheque for $252,066.08 on 27 February 2007. 87 Foot Note 87 × HAOM1 at p 271. The Wife was ordered to disclose statements for her Standard Chartered bank account for February 2017, but the statements disclosed only went up to 17 February 2017. 88 Foot Note 88 × Husband’s Supplementary Affidavit (20.11.2019) (“HAOM5”) at p 57. The Wife then furnished an email from Standard Chartered stating that the Wife’s bank account statements for February 2007 cannot be retrieved. 89 Foot Note 89 × Wife’s Affidavit (30.10.2019) (“WAOM6”) at p 35. 58 On the evidence, I accept the Husband’s position. The cheque sum, when combined with the Husband’s other payment that was proven, lends credence to his position that the Husband and the

Wife would each be responsible for half of the initial outlays. 90 Foot Note 90 × HS-2 at paras 67–68. The evidential burden thus shifted to the Wife to show that the cheque was not issued to her, by showing her bank account statements. That she failed to do. 59 Accordingly, I deduct the sum of $252,066.08 from the Wife’s actual contributions towards the initial outlays of $630,232.15. I add this sum to the Husband’s actual contributions of $126,400.00. (B) Mortgage payments from 1 June 2015 to 31 June 2017 60 According to the Husband, $7,300.00 out of the money he sent the Wife monthly should be treated as his contributions towards the mortgage payments because he earmarked the $7,300.00 specifically for this purpose. 91 Foot Note 91 × HS-2 at para 78. The Wife explained that this $7,300.00pm needed to be applied towards household expenses instead, since the money given from the Husband to the Wife specifically for household expenses was not sufficient. 92 Foot Note 92 × WS-1 at 61 In my view, the Wife should not be allowed to use the $7,300.00 for a purpose different from what was intended by the Husband. If the Husband truly did not provide enough for the Wife and Children between 2015 and 2017, the Wife should have commenced proceedings for interim maintenance then, instead of waiting until January 2018 to commence interim maintenance proceedings. 62 I therefore accept that

the $7,300.00pm should be treated as the Husband’s contributions towards the mortgage payments. From 1 June 2015 to 31 June 2017 (25 months), this amounts to a total of $182,500.00. I add this sum to the Husband’s contributions for the period from 1 June 2015 to 1 July 2017. However, I do not deduct this sum from the Wife’s contributions for the same period, since the fact remains that she did apply her CPF money towards discharging the mortgage loan. In other words, the Husband’s direct contributions for this period will be increased by $182,500.00, while the Wife’s direct contributions remain the same at $204,923.63. (C) Mortgage payments from 1 July 2017 to 28 February 2018 63 The determination of the parties’ contributions ought not be limited to 31 June 2017. A spouse’s contributions ought to be considered up to the point where the marriage continues to “[exist] in any meaningful sense”: UWL v UWM [2019] SGHCF 17 at [42]–[44]. This generally refers to the IJ date, which in this case was 6 March 2018. Therefore, the parties’ contributions towards mortgage payments from 1 July 2017 to end February 2018 (another 8 months) should be taken into account as well. 64 For this period, the Wife applied $15,945.80 of her CPF money towards discharging the mortgage loan. 93 Foot Note 93 × WAOM2 at pp 98–101. I count this as the Wife’s contributions. However, the Husband was still

providing the Wife the monthly sum of $7,300.00 to pay for the mortgage loan for this period. I therefore also add $58,400.00 (being $7,300.00pm x 8) to the Husband’s contributions for this period. (D) Summary 65 The parties' contributions towards the acquisition of the Matrimonial Home is as follows: Wife’s Contributions ($) Husband’s Contributions ($) Initial outlay 378,166.07 378,466.08 Mortgage payments from 1 April 2007 to 31 May 2015 289,484.15 618,000.00 Mortgage payments from 1 June 2015 to 31 June 2017 204,923.63 187,850.00 Mortgage payments from 1 July 2017 to 28 February 2018 15,945.80 58,400.00 Total 888,519.65 1,242,716.08 Percentage 41.69 58.31 Apportioned value of Matrimonial Home 1,660,875.10 2,322,960.67 (2) Overall contributions 66 The parties’ overall contributions are as follows: Wife’s Contributions ($) Husband’s Contributions ($) Matrimonial Home 1,660,875.10 2,322,960.67 Wife’s Assets 631,327.64 Husband’s Assets 2,458,607.23 Total 2,292,202.74 4,781,567.90 Contributions ratio 0.32 0.68 Indirect contributions 67 The Husband submitted that the indirect contributions ratio should be 50:50. 94 Foot Note 94 × HS-1 at para 212. The Wife submitted that the indirect contributions ratio should be 80:20 between her and the Husband. 95 Foot Note 95 × WS-1 at para 76. 68 Having considered the evidence, I am of the view that both parties have made substantial indirect

financial contributions. Beginning with the Wife, she furnished evidence of her spending on the renovations of the Matrimonial Home when it was purchased. 96 Foot Note 96 × WAOM2 at para 54(a) and pp 423–493. The Husband himself recognised that the parties made roughly equal contributions since they moved into the Matrimonial Home until the Wife quit her job in 2012. 97 Foot Note 97 × HS-1 in para 200. Turning to the Husband, it was not disputed that the Wife stopped contributing to the household expenses since October 2012, when she left her job. 98 Foot Note 98 × WAOM2 at para 55. Regardless of how the Wife lost her job, the fact remains that the Husband contributed the bulk of family expenses from this point onwards until the marriage has broken down. Nevertheless, the Wife did appear to have applied some of her own money towards family expenses (see [47] above). Taking a broad-based view of the entire marriage, it appears to me that both parties have made substantial indirect financial contributions. It is thus impractical to embark on a comparison of which party has contributed more in this regard. 69 In relations to non-financial contributions, I am of the view that the Wife has put in more effort compared to the Husband. The Wife was a full-time housewife between 2012 and 2017. It follows that she would have been more involved in raising the Children. The Husband did not

appear to deny the fact that the Wife was the one who took charge of the Children’s welfare. 99 Foot Note 99 × HS-1 at para 208. However, I am not of the view that the Wife’s non-financial contributions “vastly outweigh” 100 Foot Note 100 × WS-1 at para 73. the Husband’s. The Husband did make time to interact with the Children, and did take part in household chores whenever possible. 70 In sum, both parties have made substantial indirect financial contributions, and it is in my view not feasible to make a comparison on whose contributions was greater. In terms of non-financial contributions, however, it could be reasonably concluded that the Wife has put in greater effort – but this in no way meant that the Husband has been derelict in his familial duties. 71 Based on my observations above, and exercising my discretion in a broad-brush manner, I arrive at an indirect contributions ratio of 40:60 between the Husband and the Wife. Overall contributions 72 In the present case, there is no compelling reason to depart from the general position that direct and indirect contributions are given equal weightage. 73 The parties’ average contributions ratio is as follows: Wife Husband Direct contributions 0.32 0.68 Indirect contributions 0.60 0.40 Average 0.46 0.54 74 I make a further adjustment to the average ratio to take into account the UK Pension (see [34] above) and arrive at a

final division ratio of 48:52 between the Wife and the Husband. Apportionment 75 There is agreement between the parties that the Wife should take over the Husband’s share of the Matrimonial Home. I therefore make an order for the Wife to buy over the Husband’s share in the Matrimonial Home. However, I note that the valuation of the Matrimonial Home was rather dated. Further, I take judicial notice of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the pandemic’s impact on the property market. Accordingly, I am of the view that for the purposes of apportionment (and only for this purpose), there should be a revaluation of the Matrimonial Home, and the Wife shall buy the Husband’s share of the Matrimonial Home based on this revaluation (at 0.52 x the revaluation value). The costs of the revaluation shall be borne equally by the parties. If the Wife is unable to buy over the Husband’s share within six months after the date of this judgment, the Matrimonial Home will be sold, and the net proceeds of sale will be divided between the parties in the proportions of 48:52 between the Wife and the Husband. 76 I turn to the assets held in the parties’ sole name, the aggregate value of which is $3,089,934.87. Using the division ratio of 48:52, this translates to $1,483,168.74 for the Wife and $1,606,766.13 for the Husband. To arrive at this division, the Husband is to transfer to the Wife $851,841.10 (being

$2,458,607.23 - $1,606,766.13). The transfer is to take place at the same time of the transfer of the Matrimonial Home to the Wife, or the completion of the sale of the Matrimonial Home, as the case may be. Custody and access Custody 77 The Wife submitted that no order of custody should be made, while the Husband submitted that there should be an order for joint custody. 78 Practically speaking, there is little (if any) difference between a “no custody order” and a “joint custody order”: CX v CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR(R) 690 (“CX”) at [18]. In either case, both parents continue to exercise custody over their children. Nevertheless, in cases where there is a dispute between the parents over the children’s upbringing, a joint custody order may be preferable: CX at [19]. 79 In the present case, I am of the view that a joint custody order should be made. There is a dispute concerning the Children’s education, with the Wife insisting that the Children continue their education in an international school in Singapore and the Husband arguing that a local school would be more than sufficient. This disagreement on the choice of schooling for the Children is clearly a dispute concerning the Children’s upbringing, as education is also a matter falling within a parent’s custodial power (CX at [33]). In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that a joint custody order will

be more appropriate, since it will be a reminder that both parties have a say over the Children’s education. 80 This brings me to the dispute concerning the Children’s education. The Wife submitted that the Children should be allowed to continue studying in an international school where they are thriving, and to transfer them elsewhere would be disruptive. 101 Foot Note 101 × WS-1 at paras 10–12. The Husband submitted that the Children should study in local schools instead, which are just as good as international schools but cheaper. 102 Foot Note 102 × HS-1 at para 79. Regard must be had to the reasonable views of the Husband, who is also a custodial parent. As a result, while the Wife is entitled to continue enrolling the Children in the international school, the Husband will not be made to bear the financial burdens of such a decision. I deal with this further below when assessing the maintenance of the Children. Access 81 The parties also disagreed on the Husband’s access terms. The Wife submitted that the access terms must “accord with the Children’s wishes”, 103 Foot Note 103 × WS-1 at para 22. which I interpret to mean that the Husband should not be allowed access to the Children if the Children does not want to meet the Husband. The Husband understandably disagreed. 104 Foot Note 104 × HS-2 at para 15. 82 I accept the Husband’s position. It is in the best interests of a

child for him to maintain links with both of his parents (see UYK v UYJ [2020] SGHCF 9 at [65]). The Children, being young, may not appreciate the importance of maintaining the links with the Husband, and thus it is not in their best interest to allow the Husband access only when the Children feel like meeting him. Moreover, the Husband has moved out of the Matrimonial Home and away from the Children since as early as 2012. The Children would thus have necessarily became somewhat estranged from the Husband, and there is a real possibility that the Children would be unwilling to meet with him. In the circumstances, to subject the Husband’s access to the Children’s wishes would not help improve their relationship. Any concerns about the Children being afraid of the Husband 105 Foot Note 105 × WS-1 at para 28. can be addressed by making access supervised, where necessary. 83 Accordingly, I set out the following access terms: (a) The Husband shall have video access twice a week. Keeping in mind the 7-hour difference in time zone, I am of the view that the three access sessions should take place on Friday and Sunday every week, between 7.00 pm to 7.30 pm Singapore time (ie 12.00 pm to 12.30 pm UK time). The duration of each session takes into account the attention span of a child of the Child’s age and can be increased as they grow older. Setting access at fixed timings would also

prevent any potential conflict between the Husband and the Wife on scheduling. The Husband is to give advance notice by 11.59 pm Singapore time (or 4 pm UK time) the previous day if he is not exercising his right to video access. The Wife is to give advance notice of 3 hours if the Children are unavailable for video access, and shall provide make-up access the next day at the same time. The first three video access sessions shall be supervised, and the fourth video access session onwards shall be unsupervised. (b) The Husband shall have three weeks of physical access during the Children’s summer vacation if they continue to attend international schools, or three weeks of physical access during the Children’s year-end holidays should they attend public schools. Given the ages of the Children, the Wife would have to accompany the Children if they are to go to the UK. Between the Wife and Children travelling to UK to meet the Husband, and the Husband travelling to Singapore to meet the Children, I am of the view that the latter arrangement is preferable. The Husband is to give the Wife a month’s notice before flying to Singapore so that parties have time to discuss the itinerary. However, I take judicial notice of the current travel restrictions imposed by the Singapore government in respect of foreign travellers. Therefore, physical access is to commence only when the travel

restrictions have been lifted. Parties can make mutual arrangements for the Children to visit the UK after 2021. (i) When the Husband is travelling to Singapore, the Husband is to bear the travel expenses by himself. For the time being, when the Children are not able to travel by themselves and the Wife will need to accompany them to the UK, the travel expenses for the Wife and the Children are to be borne by the Wife and the Husband in equal measures. However, the Husband will be liable for no more than $4,000.00 in travel expenses. Once the Children are able to travel to the UK by themselves, the Husband shall bear the Children’s travel expenses by himself (for the avoidance of doubt, if the Wife wishes to accompany the Children even though the Children can travel by themselves, the Wife shall bear her own expenses). (ii)  Considering that the Children have been, and continue to be, somewhat estranged from the Husband, the first physical access session after this issuance of this judgment will be supervised. Subsequent physical access sessions will be unsupervised. It is therefore to the interests of parties to work together, for the sake of the Children, to encourage the bonding between the Children and the Husband on every possible occasion until then. Maintenance Children 84 The Wife submitted that the Husband should be solely responsible for the Children’s monthly

expenses, estimated by the Wife to be $27,000.00pm. 106 Foot Note 106 × WS-1 at para 114. This sum is an aggregate of the Children’s share of the maid, car and household expenses, as well as their personal expenses. 85 Beginning with the maid expenses, I can accept that Children’s share of such expenses at $291.09pm per person 107 Foot Note 107 × WAOM2 at p 562. is reasonable. 86 Turning to the car expenses, I am of the view that the car expenses is more appropriately characterised as the part of the Wife’s expenses, and not the Children’s. While the Wife would undoubtedly use the car to ferry the Children around, I am convinced that the Wife’s personal use of the car would still be dominant. 87 With regard to the household expenses, the food expenses of $4,300.00pm is in my view on the high side. A more reasonable quantum to incur would be $3,600.00pm (or $1,200.00pm per person). Therefore, the reasonable monthly household expenses would be $2,174.16pm per person (being $2,407.49 (which is the Wife’s claimed household expenses) 108 Foot Note 108 × WAOM2 at p 565. - $1,433.33 (the Wife’s claimed food expenses) + $1,200.00). 88 I now deal with the Children’s personal expenses. First, the school fees and school-related expenses at $8,012.00pm 109 Foot Note 109 × WAOM2 at p 565, S/Ns 33–34. for both Children are on the high side. As mentioned above at [80], the Husband has a say

over the Children’s education. The views of the Husband in wanting to enrol the Children in local schools are not unreasonable. I therefore lower the reasonable amount of school fees and school-related expenses to $1,500.00pm for both Children. For the avoidance of doubt, this is separate from the tuition expenses of $814.00pm for both Children, which I am of the view is reasonable. If the Wife insists that the Children attend international schools, she would have to bear the additional expenses above the $1,500.00pm for both Children herself. 89 Secondly, the hobbies and tours and family outings expenses for both Children at $2,897.40pm and $1,666.00pm are on the high side. In my view, the reasonable hobbies expenses for both Children ought to be no more than $1,000.00pm, and the tours and family outing expenses for both Children no more than $750.00pm. 90 Third, the childcare expenses of $2,500.00pm, which concern travelling fees and food expenses, is in my view overlapping with the household expenses 110 Foot Note 110 × WAOM2 at p 560, S/N 1. and the Children’s transport expenses. 111 Foot Note 111 × WAOM2 at p 565, S/N 44. I thus lower the amount of reasonable childcare expenses to $250.00pm for both Children. Likewise, the furniture expenses also overlap with the household expenses. 112 Foot Note 112 × WAOM2 at p 560, S/N 4. I thus lower the amount of reasonable furniture

expenses to $200.00pm for both Children. 91 Fourth, the entertainment expenses of $354.00pm for both Children is in my view inflated. I lower the quantum of reasonable entertainment expenses to $200.00 for both Children. 92 Lastly, the miscellaneous expenses at $674.00pm for both Children is in my view inflated. I lower the quantum of reasonable miscellaneous expenses to $350.00pm for both Children. 93 Accordingly, the Children’s reasonable personal expenses are as follows: S/N Description Quantum ($) 1 School fees and school-related expenses 1,500.00 2 Pocket money 280.00 3 School snacks 200.00 4 Medical/Dental 559.00 5 Enrichment/Tuition 814.00 6 Hobbies/Sports 1,000.00 7 Tours and family outings 750.00 8 Insurance 306.00 9 Transport 100.00 10 Childcare 250.00 11 Clothing 284.00 12 Stemcord fees 25.00 13 Electronics/Toys 318.00 14 Furniture 200.00 15 Entertainment 200.00 16 Miscellaneous 350.00 Total 7,086.00 94 The Children’s reasonable monthly expenses would be as follows: S/N Description Quantum ($) 1 Children’s personal expenses 7,086.00 2 Children’s shares of household expenses 4,348.32 (2,174.16 x 2) 3 Children’s shares of maid expenses 582.18 (291.09 x 2) Total 12,016.50 95 I note that the Husband claimed that his current income is only $10,089.47pm. 113 Foot Note 113 × HS-2 at para 49. In support of his claim, he furnished pay slips showing that his monthly take-home

income was GBP6,076.00. 114 Foot Note 114 × HAOM4 at Tab J. However, as the Wife pointed out in her second Affidavit of Assets and Means, the Husband’s remuneration consists of not just salary but also four additional discretionary bonus payments. 115 Foot Note 115 × WAOM2 at para 77. (This was not addressed by the Husband in his third Affidavit of Assets and Means). Nevertheless, I take judicial notice of the COVID-19 pandemic, and its potential effect on the discretionary components of the Husband’s income. In my view, the Husband should only be responsible for three-quarters of the Children’s reasonable expenses, ie $9,000.00pm. This order for maintenance of the Children can be varied once the Wife finds employment. Wife 96 I now consider the Wife’s maintenance. She claimed maintenance of $14,123.84pm. 116 Foot Note 116 × WAOM2 at p 565. Having looked at the Wife’s claimed personal expenses, I am of the view that they are rather inflated. I have excluded tithing/donations and parent-related expenses, which are personal to the Wife in nature, and should no longer be borne by the Husband after the marriage ends. I have also excluded income tax as the Wife has ceased employment. I set out a tabulation of the Wife’s reasonable personal expenses below: S/N Description Quantum ($) 1 Medical/Dental/Physiotherapy 500.00 2 Personal

upkeep 500.00 3 Clothing 500.00 4 Sports 300.00 5 Facial/Manicures 200.00 6 Entertainment 500.00 7 Magazines 25.00 8 Insurance 657.00 9 Others 616.00 10 Travel 300.00 Total 4,098.00 97 I turn to the Wife’s claimed car expenses, which is in my view also rather inflated. I accept the Husband’s valuation of the car expenses, at $2,669.97pm. 117 Foot Note 117 × HS-1 at p 68. 98 The Wife’s reasonable monthly expenses would be as follows: S/N Description Quantum ($) 1 Personal expenses 4,098.00 2 Car expenses 2,669.97 3 Wife’s share of household expenses 2,174.16 4 Wife’s share of maid expenses 291.09 Total 9,233.22 99 The Wife is currently unemployed. Even then, the Husband should not be made wholly responsible for the Wife’s monthly expenses. While the Children cannot be expected to provide for themselves, the Wife can be expected to do so. (As mentioned above in [6], the Wife was able to obtain a new job in a new industry after five years of being out of the workforce for a salary of about $11,000.00pm). In my view, the Husband should only be responsible for $4,000.00 out of the $9,683.22 of the Wife’s reasonable monthly expenses. 100 I agree with the Wife that an award for lump-sum maintenance should be given, since it will ensure a clean break in at least one area between the parties. The Wife submitted that the multiplier should be four years. 118 Foot Note 118 × WS-1 at para

108. I am of the view that this multiplier is too generous, since the Wife can, and ought to, find employment within four years, given her employment history. That being said, I do take judicial notice of the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on the economy. Accordingly, a multiplier of 24 months would be in my view appropriate. The Husband should thus pay the Wife a lump-sum award of $96,000.00 (being $4,000.00 x 24). Conclusion 101 In sum, the Wife is to buy over the Husband’s 52% share of the Matrimonial Home based on the new valuation of the same. If the Wife is unable to buy over the Husband’s share within six months after the date of this judgment, the Matrimonial Home will be sold, and the net proceeds of sale will be divided between the parties in the proportions of 48:52 between the Wife and the Husband The Husband, in turn, is to give the Wife a sum of $851,841.10 in respect of the matrimonial assets and a further lump sum of $96,000.00 in respect of maintenance of the Wife. The transfer of the $851,841.10 is to take place at the same time of the transfer of the Matrimonial Home to the Wife, or the completion of the sale of the Matrimonial Home, as the case may be. The transfer of the $96,000.00 is to take place one month from the date of this judgment. 102 The Husband is also to give the Wife $9,000.00pm for maintenance of the Children with effect from the date of this judgment. The Husband can apply for a variation of the maintenance order once the Wife has found employment. Tan Puay Boon Judicial Commissioner Godwin G Campos, Cordeiro Celeste Magdalene and Suren Sandran (Godwin Campos LLC) for the plaintiff; Ho Mingjie Kevin, Lim Yanqing, Esther Candice and Thng Yu Ting, Angela (Braddell Brothers LLP) for the defendant.