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South Africa Judgment

Competition Tribunal

African Rainbow Capital Fund v Fledge Capital (Pty) Ltd (LM236Nov17) [2018] ZACT 78 (8 May 2018)

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Source document

01

Holding and result

The Tribunal found that, although the merger created potential for coordinated conduct and information exchange between competing firms in the bond origination and short-term insurance markets, these risks were sufficiently mitigated by the conditions imposed. Specifically, the ARC Fund would not influence the appointment of Betterlife board members, and no individual would serve on the boards of both Betterlife and the other relevant firms. The Tribunal also found no adverse public interest effects, including on employment or B-BBEE compliance. Accordingly, the merger was approved subject to the agreed conditions.

Court disposition

Merger conditionally approved subject to annexed conditions.

Orders

  • The proposed transaction is approved subject to the conditions annexed to the order.
  • ARC Fund shall not influence the appointment of Betterlife board members.
  • No individual may serve on the boards of both Betterlife and Ooba, lndwe, or Alexander Forbes.

02

Material facts

Parties

African Rainbow Capital Fund

Applicant Counsel: Lizel Blignaut

Fledge Capital (Pty) Ltd

Respondent

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Merger Review / Conditional Approval

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicant argued that the transaction would enable Fledge Capital to become an accredited B-BBEE investment entity and inject significant capital into the business. The ARC Fund sought to expand and diversify its investment portfolio. The parties contended that the conditions agreed upon would prevent any anti-competitive information exchange or coordinated conduct between competing firms.
Respondent
The respondent, represented by the Competition Commission, raised concerns about potential coordinated conduct and information sharing between Ooba, Betterlife, lndwe, and Alexander Forbes post-merger. The Commission required structural and behavioural conditions to ensure that ARC Fund would not influence the appointment of directors to Betterlife and that no individual would serve on the boards of both Betterlife and the other relevant firms, thereby mitigating the risk of anti-competitive conduct.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998

    Mergers must not facilitate coordinated conduct or the sharing of competitively sensitive information between competitors.

  2. 02

    Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998

    Public interest considerations, including employment and B-BBEE compliance, must be assessed in merger reviews.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The Tribunal found that, although the merger created potential for coordinated conduct and information exchange between competing firms in the bond origination and short-term insurance markets, these risks were sufficiently mitigated by the conditions imposed. Specifically, the ARC Fund would not influence the appointment of Betterlife board members, and no individual would serve on the boards of both Betterlife and the other relevant firms. The Tribunal also found no adverse public interest effects, including on employment or B-BBEE compliance. Accordingly, the merger was approved subject to the agreed conditions.

Obiter and limits

  • The Tribunal noted the importance of structural and behavioural remedies in addressing competition concerns arising from mergers involving complex shareholding and board appointment arrangements.
  • The Tribunal emphasised that public interest considerations, such as B-BBEE compliance, can be positively advanced through merger transactions when appropriate conditions are imposed.

Court disposition

Merger conditionally approved subject to annexed conditions.

  • The proposed transaction is approved subject to the conditions annexed to the order.
  • ARC Fund shall not influence the appointment of Betterlife board members.
  • No individual may serve on the boards of both Betterlife and Ooba, lndwe, or Alexander Forbes.

Source and reliance status

Competition Tribunal

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Competition Tribunal

Judgment

[2018] ZACT 78

COMPETITION

TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

Case No: LM236Nov17

In the matter between

African Rainbow Capital Fund

Primary Acquiring Firm

And

Fledge Capital (Pty) Ltd

Primary Target Firm

Panel

: Mr Enver Daniels (Presiding Member)

: Mrs Medi Mokuena (Tribunal Member)

: Prof Fiona Tregenna (Tribunal Member)

Heard on

: 25 April 2018

Order Issued on : 25 April 2018

Reasons Issued on : 8 May 2018

REASONS

FOR DECISION

Approval

[1] On 25 April 2018, the Competition Tribunal ("the Tribunal") conditionally approved the large merger between the African Rainbow Capital Fund ("ARC Fund") and Fledge Capital (Pty) Ltd ("Fledge Capital").

[2] The reasons for the approval follow.

Parties to the transaction and their activities

Primary acquiring firm

[3] The primary acquiring firm is the ARC Fund, an investment fund that forms part of the African Rainbow Capital Group ("ARC Group").

The ARC Group is a South African investment group with controlling and non-controlling interests in a number of entities.

[4] Of relevance to the current transaction is the ARC Fund's interests in the following financial service providers: Ooba (Pty) ltd ("Ooba"), lndwe Broker Holdings (Pty) ("lndwe") ltd and Alexander Forbes Limited ("Alexander Forbes").

Primary target firm

[5] The primary target firm is Fledge Capital, an independent investment entity not controlled by any single firm. Fledge Capital has a number of investments in a wide range of industries, relevant to the proposed transaction is its non­ controlling interest in Betterlife Group Limited ("Betterlife"). Betterlife is a financial services provider.

Proposed transaction and rationale

[6] In terms of the proposed transaction, the ARC fund will subscribe for a number of newly issued shares in Fledge Capital, diluting the existing shareholders' interests in the process. Post-transaction, ARC will hold a controlling interest in Fledge Capital.

[7] The transaction allows Fledge Capital to become an accredited B-BBEE investment entity and will inject a significant amount of capital

into the entity. The ARC Fund wishes to expand and diversify its investment portfolio through this acquisition.

Relevant market and impact on competition

Horizontal assessment

[8] The Commission evaluated the activities of entities in which the merging parties have either a controlling or non-controlling interest and found a number of horizontal overlaps. Ultimately, the Commission raised concerns that the merger may facilitate coordinated conduct between Ooba and Betterlife in the market for bond origination services and between Ooba, lndwe, Alexander Forbes and Betterlife in the short-term insurance products market.

[9] Fledge Capital is entitled to appoint a representative onto the board of directors of Betterlife, while the ARC Fund is entitled to appoint members onto the Ooba, lndwe and Alexander Forbes boards respectively. Post-merger, the ARC Fund would thus be entitled to appoint or influence the appointment of directors onto the boards of competing firms, representing a potential platform for sharing of competitively sensitive information. To address these concerns, the parties have agreed that therepresentative of Fledge Capital on the board of Betterlife will be chosen by the founding shareholders of Fledge Capital and not by the ARC Group. Further, the ARC Group will not exercise any influence over the founding shareholders when they appoint this representative. Lastly, the merging parties have agreed that no person may serve or be appointed to the board of Betterlife if they serve or are appointed to the boards of lndwe, Ooba and/or Alexander Forbes.

Public interest

[10] The Commission was satisfied that the proposed transaction was unlikely to adversely impact employment or any other public interest concern. We accordingly agreed with the Commission's analysis.

Conclusion

[11] In light of the above, we conclude that the information exchange concerns that may arise from the merger have been sufficiently addressed by the conditions. Further, no public interest issues arise from the proposed transaction.

Accordingly we approve the proposed transaction subject to the conditions annexed hereto.

Mr Enver Daniels

Ms Medi Mokuena and Prof Fiona Tregenna

8 May 2018

Date

Tribunal Researcher:

Jonathan Thomson

For the merging parties: Lizel Blignaut of ENS Africa

For the Commission:

Raksha Darji

Grashum Mutizwa

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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