Barnard Patel Attorneys and Another v Chester (16255/2018) [2022] ZAGPPHC 163 (3 March 2022)
- Citation
- [2022] ZAGPPHC 163
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- Mbongwe
- Case number
- 16255/2018
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- Mbongwe
- Case number
- 16255/2018
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the Defendants, as attorneys who took over the Plaintiff's claim, ought to have acquired knowledge of the existence of the claim against the Lodge during the period of their mandate. The correspondence discovered in the Plaintiff's discovery affidavit referenced the potential claim, and standard legal practice requires subsequent attorneys to obtain and review the client file from previous attorneys. The Defendants' denial of knowledge lacks merit and may indicate negligence. The particulars requested by the Defendants were either irrelevant to the preparation for trial or privileged, particularly regarding the mandate given to previous attorneys. The Plaintiff's refusal to furnish the requested further particulars was justified, and the application to compel was dismissed.
Court disposition
Application dismissed with costs awarded against the Applicants.
Orders
- The application is dismissed.
- The Defendants/Applicants are ordered to pay the costs.
02
Material facts
Parties
Barnard Patel Attorneys
Applicant Counsel: Adv T. CooperStephan Le Roux
Applicant Counsel: Adv T. CooperConraad Robert Chester
Respondent Counsel: Adv SwiegersAmounts and remedies
- Total Damages Claimed by Plaintiff: ZAR 4,050,000
- Past Medical and Hospital Expenses (estimate): ZAR 100,000
- Past and Future Loss of Earnings (estimate): ZAR 2,500,000
- Future Medical Expenses (estimate): ZAR 450,000
- General Damages (estimate): ZAR 1,000,000
03
Procedural history
Posture
Interlocutory Application / Application to Compel Further Particulars Prior to Trial
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the Plaintiff is obliged to furnish the further particulars requested by the Defendants under Rule 21(4).
- 02
Whether the requested particulars are necessary for trial preparation or are privileged information.
- 03
Whether the Defendants ought to have acquired knowledge of the Plaintiff's claim against the Lodge during their mandate.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The Applicants (Defendants in the main action) argued that the Plaintiff should be compelled to provide further particulars they requested, as these are necessary for their trial preparation. They contended that the particulars relate to the Plaintiff's prior instructions to other attorneys and the existence of a potential claim against the Lodge, which they deny having knowledge of. They asserted that the Plaintiff never mentioned the Lodge or a possible claim against it to them, and that the requested information is relevant to their defence.
- Respondent
- The Respondent (Plaintiff in the main action) opposed the application, arguing that the requested particulars are either irrelevant to the issues for trial or constitute privileged information. He maintained that the particulars sought are not necessary for the Defendants to prepare for trial and that the Defendants, as subsequent attorneys, ought to have acquired knowledge of the claim against the Lodge from the discovered correspondence and the client file. The Respondent further argued that the mandate given to previous attorneys is privileged and not binding on the current mandate.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Schmidt Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd v Pedrelli 1990 (1) SA 398 (D) at 402–403
The court is not bound by the pleadings when considering requests for further particulars and may go beyond them to ensure fairness.
- 02
General legal practice principle
Where a subsequent attorney is instructed to take over a claim, it is standard practice to communicate the new mandate to the previous attorney and obtain the client file, thereby acquiring knowledge of all relevant claims.
- 03
General costs principle
Costs generally follow the outcome of the matter.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the Defendants, as attorneys who took over the Plaintiff's claim, ought to have acquired knowledge of the existence of the claim against the Lodge during the period of their mandate. The correspondence discovered in the Plaintiff's discovery affidavit referenced the potential claim, and standard legal practice requires subsequent attorneys to obtain and review the client file from previous attorneys. The Defendants' denial of knowledge lacks merit and may indicate negligence. The particulars requested by the Defendants were either irrelevant to the preparation for trial or privileged, particularly regarding the mandate given to previous attorneys. The Plaintiff's refusal to furnish the requested further particulars was justified, and the application to compel was dismissed.
Obiter and limits
- The advice given to the Plaintiff by previous attorneys regarding the claim against the Lodge is immaterial to the current mandate.
- The Plaintiff had two claims, one against the Provincial government and one against the Lodge, and the previous attorneys were expressly committed to pursuing only the former.
Court disposition
Application dismissed with costs awarded against the Applicants.
- The application is dismissed.
- The Defendants/Applicants are ordered to pay the costs.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 16255/2018
In the matter between:
BARNARD PATEL ATTORNEYS First Applicant
(Registration Number: 2010/015078 /21)
STEPHAN LE ROUX Second Applicant
and
CONRAAD ROBERT
CHESTER Respondent
In re: the matter between:
CONRAAD ROBERT CHESTER Plaintiff
BARNARD PATEL ATTORNEYS First Defendant
(Registration Number: 2010/015078/21)
STEPHAN LE
ROUX Second Defendant
JUDGMENT
MBONGWE J:
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an opposed interlocutory application to compel the Respondent (the Plaintiff in the main action) to furnish certain outstanding further particulars the Applicants (the First and Second Defendants in the main action) had requested, but were refused by the Respondent on the grounds of either irrelevance or privilege. For brevity, the parties are referred to herein as in the main action.
FACTUAL MATRIX
[2] The Plaintiff instituted action proceedings against the Defendants on 27 February 2018 claiming damages. The facts or occurrences constituting the basis upon which the Plaintiff relies for its claim are set out in his particulars of claim as follows:
2.1 At all material times hereto, the Second Defendant was:
2.1.1 employed by the First Defendant;
2.1.2 acting in the course and scope of his employment with the
First Defendant, alternatively, in the furtherance of the
interests of the First Defendant and in particular during the
period 19 September 2013 to April 2016.
[3] During about 15 January 2012, the Plaintiff was admitted to the Life Riverfield Lodge (ââthe Lodgeââ) as a high risk suicidal patient.
[4] The Plaintiff, acting personally, and the Lodge represented by the Second Defendant, entered into an oral agreement (ââthe agreementââ) the material express, alternatively tacit or further alternatively implied terms were that:
4.1 the Lodge would admit the Plaintiff for purposes of the assessment,
diagnose the cause of and, within the remit of their field of
expertise, treat the Plaintiffâs complaints/condition, (ââthe
Undertakingââ);
4.1.2 the Lodge would perform the Undertaking for reward and with the
requisite degree of skill and expertise;
4.1.3 the Lodge would make available to the Plaintiff:
4.1.3.1 the hospital, medical and nursing facilities, equipment and
apparatus reasonably required for purposes of performing the
care.
4.1.4 the Lodgeâs legal duty of care to the Plaintiff enjoined it to:
4.1.4.1 provide treatment of, inter alia, mental health disorders,
including general psychiatry as well as drug and alcohol
rehabilitation;
4.1.4.2 provide treatment with the degree of skill and expertise then
possessed and exercised by reasonable members of the nursing
fraternities;
4.1.4.3 ensure that the protocols in place for suicidal patients are
adhered to;
4.1.4.4 ensure that high risk suicidal patients, such as the Plaintiff are
regularly observed and activities monitored and supervised
within the Lodge;
4.1.4.5 ensure that high risk suicidal patientsâ freedom within the Lodge
are restricted;
4.1.4.6 ensure that high risk suicidal patients do not gain access to
unsupervised areas of the Lodge which were not defined as safe,
contained and under supervision.
4.2 As a result of the Lodgeâs negligent breach of the Agreement and legal
duty of care, the Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide on 20 January
2012 and sustained injuries consisting of inter alia:
4.2.1 fractured pelvis with extensions of the fractures into acetabulum
on the right hand side;
4.2.2 fractured mandible;
4.2.3 fractured the spinous processes of the cervical spine;
4.2.4 fractured left tibia and fibula and right femur. (ââthe medical conditionââ)
[5] On about 19 September 2013, and at Pretoria, the Plaintiff acting
personally and the First Defendant represented by the Second Defendant
and Madelien Sillands duly authorised thereto, concluded a written
agreement (ââthe Written Agreementââ).
5.1 The material express, alternatively tacit or further alternatively implied
terms of the Written Agreement were as follows:
5.1.1 the First Defendant would investigate, if meritorious, institute and
prosecute a medical negligence claim/s on behalf of the Plaintiff for
payment of his damages which the Plaintiff may be entitled in
consequence of his medical condition (ââthe mandateââ);
5.1.2 in execution of the mandate, the First Defendant would exercise the
degree of skill and expertise then possessed and exercised by
reasonable attorneys in the circumstances;
5.1.3 the First Defendant would execute the Mandate for reward.
5.2 In execution of the Mandate, the First Defendant, inter alia:
5.2.1 brief counsel to prepare the Particulars of Claim and Summons and
cause this action to be instituted in the High Court, Gauteng Division
on behalf of the Plaintiff under case number 2969/2015 against the
MEC for Health, Gauteng Province. (ââthe Action);
5.2.2 acquire knowledge of the existence and liability of the Lodge towards
the Plaintiff arising from the Agreement, breach thereof and breach of
the legal duty of care resulting in the Plaintiffâs medical condition.
[6] Despite and in breach of the Written Agreement and Mandate and in particular
during the period 19 September 2013 to April 2016 the First Defendant:
6.1 Failed to investigate the Plaintiffâs medical condition and the
circumstances surrounding the cause of his condition at all alternatively in a reasonable and adequate manner.
6.2 Failed to commission a report from the appropriate medical expert before
the action.
6.3 Failed to obtain the Plaintiffâs patient file from the Lodge to determine the
circumstances surrounding the Plaintiffâs condition.
6.4 Failed to take adequate and timeous steps to bring proceedings against the Lodge.
6.5 Failed to take any alternatively adequate regard for the evidence
concerning the admission of the Plaintiff to the Lodge and breach of legal
duty of care towards the Plaintiff.
6.6 Permitted the Plaintiffâs claim against the Lodge to become prescribed in terms of the Prescription Act, 1969 (Act 68 of 1969).
6.7 Failed to execute the Mandate timeously, reasonably, and with the
requisite degree of care and skill.
[7] As a result of the breach of the Agreement, the Plaintiff has suffered
damages in the sum of R4 050 000,00 which amount is calculated and
computed as follows:
7.1 Past medical and hospital expenses: R100 000.00
(a) The amount claimed is an estimate.
(b) Vouchers supporting these expense will be discovered and made
available in due course.
7.2 Past and future loss of earnings R2 500 000.00
(a) The amount claimed is an estimate.
7.3 Future medical expenses: R450 000.00
(a) conservative treatment consisting of Consultations, physiotherapy
and Medication â R100 000.00
(b) Consultations with an occupational Therapist R50 000.00
(c) Consultation with a psychiatrist and psychotropic medication â
R50 000.00
7.4 General damages: R1 000 000.00
(a) The amount is an estimate.
(b) The estimate makes provision for pain, suffering, loss of amenities of
life and disfigurement. It is not practicable to apportion an amount to each head of damages.
TOTAL R4 050 000.00
[8] The Plaintiffâs claim against the Lodge became prescribed on the 19 January 2015.
THE DEFENDANTSâ
REQUEST FOR FURTHER PARTICULARS
[9] Aside the further particulars that have been requested and furnished, the Defendants seek, in the present application, further particularity the Plaintiff contend are extraneous to the provisions of Rule 21(4) and has, consequently, refused to furnish same reasoning that the particulars requested are not necessary for the Defendants to prepare for trial and/or are privileged information.
ANALYSIS
[10] It is common cause that the Plaintiff had prior to appointing its current attorneys, consecutively employed the services of three other firms of attorneys, including the First Defendants, to pursue his claim.
[11] The request for the specific further particulars withheld by the Plaintiffâs attorneys comes, on the face of it, as a consequence of common cause knowledge by the Defendants and their attorneys that the Plaintiff had previously instructed other firms of attorneys to pursue his claim and/or, from the contents of the correspondence between the Plaintiff and his erstwhile attorneys that has been disclosed in the Plaintiffâs discovery affidavit, and/or pertains to pleaded facts relating to the circumstances of the occurrence of the events set out in para 4, above.
[12] The Plaintiff alleges to have instructed the First Defendant, who was
represented by the Second Defendant and another person, on the 19
September 2013 to pursue his claim as detailed above. The claim against
the Lodge, having arisen on 20 January 2012, was due to become prescribed and did prescribe on the 19 January 2015 while in the hands of the First Defendant.
[13] The request for the unfurnished further particulars leading to the present application arose mainly from allegations by the Plaintiff that the first Defendant was instructed to;
âinvestigate, if meritorious, institute and prosecute a medical
negligence claim/s on behalf of the Plaintiff for payment of his
damages which the Plaintiff would have been entitled to in
consequence of his medical conditionââ (ââthe agreementââ);
and that;
In the execution of its mandate, the First Defendant ââcould and
should have acquired knowledge of the existence and potential
liability of the Lodge towards the Plaintiff arising from the
agreement, breach thereof and breach of the legal duty of care
resulting in the Plaintiffâs medical conditionâ¦ââ
[14] Central in this matter and the requested particulars is Defendantsâ denial of knowledge of the existence of a possible claim against the Lodge. This denial is amplified by the admission sought in the request for further particulars that the Plaintiff has never mentioned the Lodge or a potential claim against the .Lodge to the Defendants.
[15] The Court, in considering the request for further particulars, is not bound by the pleadings, but can go beyond them [see Schmidt Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd v Pedrelli 1990 (1) SA 398 (D) at 402 â 403]. On the authority of this principle, I consider the rule of legal practice, with specific reference to the practice of attorneys, that where a subsequent attorney is instructed by a client to take over the further prosecution of a claim that is already being attended to by another attorney on behalf of the client, the subsequent attorney communicates the mandate he has received and send a termination of mandate to the attorney already handling the matter and call for the handing over of the clientâs file.
[16] Needless to state that the newly instructed attorney then peruses the file to acquaint himself with the matter so as to map the way forward. It would and should have been during this process that the Defendants should have come across the correspondence discovered in the discovery affidavit of the Plaintiff wherein reference is made to a potential claim against the Lodge, and gained knowledge of the existence of that claim.
[17] The adverse advice contained in that correspondence to the Plaintiff is immaterial and it may well be that the Plaintiff had approached the First Defendant as a result of the advice contained in that correspondence; to instruct another attorney for his claim against the Lodge. The relevant part of the advice given to the Plaintiff in that correspondence reads thus;
âMy voorstel is da tons focus op die nalatigheid saak teen die hospital.
Dit staan jou natuurlik vry om die saak teen Riverfield Lodge na ân
ander prokureur te verwys om te hoor of hulle jou sal bestaan. Indien
jy dit doen, pleit ek by jou om voor die tyd die koste implikasie met
hulle te bespreek.ââ
[18] The existence of the claim against the Lodge would and should, therefore, have come to the knowledge of the First Defendant during the period September 2013, when the mandate was given and accepted, and 19 January 2015. It is noted that the First Defendants had been handling the plaintiffâs matter until April 2016 (para 1.5.2 on page 005-7 on caselines). The ââexistence of a potential claim against the Lodgeââ was or ought to have been within the knowledge of the Defendants, as alleged by the Plaintiff. The Defendantsâ allegation that ââthey are in the dark as to how they could have acquired knowledge of the existence and potential liability of the Lodge towards the .plaintiffââ lacks merit and may point to negligence.
[19] Furthermore, the details of the mandate the Plaintiff may have given to his erstwhile attorneys are, as it were, privileged information. The mandate to the Defendants could have been different and in line with the recommendation that the Plaintiff instructs another attorney for the matter concerning the Lodge. Thus, to seek to rely on what the mandate to Plaintiffâs erstwhile attorneys was, is disingenuous.
[20] Worst still is that, reading from the discovered correspondence the Defendants rely on, the Plaintiff had two claims â the one against the Provincial government the âformerâ attorneys of the plaintiff were expressly committed to pursuing.
CONCLUSION
[21] Iâm inclined to agree with the Plaintiffâs refusal to furnish the requested further particulars in the circumstances of the facts and the findings thereon and, in particular, the finding that the Defendants ought to have gained knowledge of the existence of the Plaintiffâs claim against the Lodge. The application accordingly stands to be dismissed.
COSTS
[22] The general principle is that costs follow the outcome of the matter.
ORDER
[23] In light of the findings in this Judgment the following order is made:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The Defendants/ Applicants are ordered to pay the costs.
M.
MBONGWE J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA.
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: Adv T. Cooper
Instructed by:
Savage Jooste & Adams Inc
Kingâs Gate, 5 10th Street
Cnr Brooklyn Road & Justice Mahomed Street
Menlo Park
Pretoria.
For the Respondent: Adv Swiegers
Instructed by: Van Zyl Johnson Inc
c/o Schoeman Attorney
Golf Gardens Office Park, Unit 2
Cnr John Vorster & Marco Polo Street
Highveld x 2
Centurion.
Date of hearing: 06 September 2021.
JUDGMENT ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED TO THE PARTIES/ LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES ON THE 03RD MARCH 2022.
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