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South Africa Ruling

Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley

Botes and Another v Hitachi Construction Machinery Southern Africa Co (PTY) LTD (205/2018) [2020] ZANCHC 4 (13 March 2020)

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01

Holding and result

The court found that the applicants’ arguments lacked merit. The Newport Finance judgment was applicable because the suretyship agreement in this case expressly addressed the position of sureties upon compromise with the principal debtor. The court’s judgment did not conflict with Tuning Fork, as that case involved a suretyship agreement without such stipulation. Regarding the admission of indebtedness, the court held that the business rescue practitioner, acting as the organ of the company, validly admitted the principal debtor’s liability, and the sureties are bound by such admission, consistent with the principle articulated in Two Sixty Four Investments v Trust Bank. The court concluded that there were no reasonable prospects of success on appeal.

Court disposition

Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.

Orders

  • The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

02

Material facts

Parties

Wiets Jacobus Botes

Applicant Counsel: Adv E L Theron SC

Martin Van Zyl

Applicant Counsel: Adv E L Theron SC

Hitachi Construction Machinery Southern Africa CO (PTY) LTD

Respondent Counsel: Adv J M Hoffman

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal Following Judgment on Surety Liability After Business Rescue.

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicants argued that the court erred by relying on the Newport Finance judgment, as the terms of the suretyship in this case differ materially from those in Newport. They contended that this resulted in a judgment conflicting with Tuning Fork (Pty) Limited t/a Balanced Audio v Greef and Another. Furthermore, they submitted that the business rescue practitioner lacked authority to validly admit the principal debtor’s indebtedness, and thus the applicants as sureties should not be bound by such admission.
Respondent
The respondent maintained that the Newport Finance judgment was directly applicable to the facts of this case, as the suretyship agreement expressly covered the position of sureties upon compromise with the principal debtor. The respondent further argued that the business rescue practitioner’s admission of indebtedness was valid and binding on the sureties, referencing the principle that sureties are bound by admissions made by the principal debtor, as established in Two Sixty Four Investments (Pty) Ltd v Trust Bank.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Newport Finance Company (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank Limited 2016 (5) SA 503 (SCA)

    Where a suretyship agreement expressly stipulates the position of sureties upon compromise with the principal debtor, the terms of the agreement govern the sureties’ liability.

  2. 02

    Two Sixty Four Investments (Pty) Ltd v Trust Bank 1993 (3) SA 384 (W)

    Sureties are bound by all admissions of liability made by the principal debtor, including those made by the business rescue practitioner or liquidator acting as the organ of the company.

  3. 03

    Tuning Fork (Pty) Limited t/a Balanced Audio v Greef and Another 2014(4) SA 521 (WCC)

    Where the suretyship does not stipulate the position of sureties upon compromise, the court must interpret the agreement in light of general principles.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that the applicants’ arguments lacked merit. The Newport Finance judgment was applicable because the suretyship agreement in this case expressly addressed the position of sureties upon compromise with the principal debtor. The court’s judgment did not conflict with Tuning Fork, as that case involved a suretyship agreement without such stipulation. Regarding the admission of indebtedness, the court held that the business rescue practitioner, acting as the organ of the company, validly admitted the principal debtor’s liability, and the sureties are bound by such admission, consistent with the principle articulated in Two Sixty Four Investments v Trust Bank. The court concluded that there were no reasonable prospects of success on appeal.

Obiter and limits

  • The principle that sureties are bound by admissions made by the principal debtor applies equally to business rescue proceedings as it does to liquidations.
  • The acceptance of a creditor’s claim by a business rescue practitioner or liquidator constitutes an admission binding on the surety where the suretyship so provides.

Court disposition

Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.

  • The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

Source and reliance status

Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley

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Judgment text

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Source document

Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley

Ruling

[2020] ZANCHC 4

Reportable:

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Circulate to Judges:

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IN

THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(NORTHERN CAPE HIGH COURT, KIMBERLEY)

CASE NO.: 205/2018

Date heard: 24-10-2019

Date delivered: 13-03-2020

In the matter between:

Wiets Jacobus Botes

1st Applicant/ 1st Respondent

Martin Van Zyl

2nd Applicant/ 2nd Respondent

And

Hitachi Construction Machinery

Respondent/Applicant

Southern Africa CO (PTY) LTD

CORAM: WILLIAMS J:

JUDGMENT

WILLIAMS J:

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against my judgment of 15 March 2019 wherein I ordered inter alia that the applicants (as sureties) pay the respondent (as creditor) the outstanding pre-business rescue debt and post-commencement

financing debt owing to the respondent after Blue Chip Mining and Drilling (Pty) Ltd (the principal debtor), had been released from its obligations to the respondent following the acceptance and implementation of a business rescue plan.

2. The grounds of appeal are briefly as follows:

2.1 That I erred in following the obiter dictum in Newport Finance Company (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank Limited 2016 (5) SA 503 (SCA), where the terms of the suretyship in casu are completely different to those considered in Newport. The result being a judgment in conflict with the judgment of Rogers J in Tuning Fork (Pty) Limited t/a Balanced Audio v Greef and Another 2014(4) SA 521 (WCC); and

2.2 That I erred in finding that the business rescue practitioner validly admitted the principal debtor’s indebtedness.

3. With regard to the first ground of appeal, there is no substance in the argument that my judgment is in conflict with the judgment in Tuning Fork. In that matter Rogers J was confronted with a situation where the suretyship did not stipulate the position of the sureties upon a compromise with the principal debtor. (See paragraphs 1 and 14 (iii) of the Tuning Fork judgment.)

4. The Newport judgment dealt with a situation as the one in casu. I have referred to its applicability herein in paragraphs 13 to 16 of the main judgment. I stand by my reasons in this regard.

I am therefore not of the opinion that an appeal on this ground would have a reasonable prospect of success.

5. With regard to the second ground of appeal i.e. the argument that the business rescue practitioner could not validly acknowledge or admit the indebtedness of Blue Chip, I refer in addition to my reasons in paragraphs 20 to 21 of the main judgment, to Two Sixty Four Investments (Pty) Ltd v Trust Bank 1993 (3) SA 384 (W) at p 387 thereof, where Leveson J stated the following:

“Lastly, on this aspect, clause 9 of the deed of suretyship provides that the surety is bound by all admissions of liability made by the principal debtor. It seems to me that the acceptance of the respondent’s claim, not merely by the liquidators, but by creditors in the second creditors’ meeting of the insolvent company, acting as the organ of the Company in a like sense to that used by Gower in his well-known text on Modern company Law, of the board of directors or the members in general meeting as the organ of the company, is such an admission. The applicant would be bound thereby.”

6. Although this pronouncement by Leveson J was said in relation to liquidations, the principle would be applicable to business rescue proceedings as well.

This ground of appeal also has no merit.

The following order is made:

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

CC

WILLIAMS

JUDGE

For Applicants: Adv E L Theron SC

(Respondents in main) Louw & Da Silva Attorneys

c/o Engelsman Magabane Inc

For Respondent: Adv J M Hoffman

(Applicant in main) Cliffe Decker Hofmeyer Inc

c/o Duncan & Rotman

Source wording is retained. Consult the source document for its original formatting and pagination.

Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Newport Finance Company (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank Limited 2016 (5) SA 503 (SCA)

Case cited

Tuning Fork (Pty) Limited t/a Balanced Audio v Greef and Another 2014(4) SA 521 (WCC)

Case cited

Two Sixty Four Investments (Pty) Ltd v Trust Bank 1993 (3) SA 384 (W)

Case cited

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