Bothma Financial Services (Pty) Ltd t/a The Interface Financial Group v Thaba Swart (Pty) Ltd and Others (556/2018) [2018] ZAGPPHC 582 (29 June 2018)
- Citation
- [2018] ZAGPPHC 582
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- DT Skosana
- Case number
- 556/2018
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- DT Skosana
- Case number
- 556/2018
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the plaintiff was deregistered and dissolved at the time of instituting action, rendering the summons a nullity. As a result, summary judgment could not be granted on a process initiated by a non-existent entity. The issue raised by the defendants was considered triable and warranted further ventilation at trial. The court declined to address the secondary defence regarding the excipiability of the particulars of claim, as the primary issue was dispositive for the summary judgment application.
Court disposition
Application for summary judgment dismissed; defendants granted leave to defend.
Orders
- The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
- The defendants are granted leave to defend the plaintiff's claim.
- The costs of this application are costs in the cause.
02
Material facts
Parties
Bothma Financial Services (Pty) Ltd t/a The Interface Financial Group
PlaintiffThaba Swart (Pty) Ltd
DefendantDaniel Diederick Swart
DefendantLouis De Wet
DefendantHerman Timothy Rammilo Moeketsi
DefendantAmounts and remedies
- Claimed Amount: ZAR 2,067,825
03
Procedural history
Posture
Summary Judgment Application / Application for Summary Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the plaintiff, being deregistered at the time of issuing summons, could validly institute proceedings.
- 02
Whether the summons issued by a deregistered company is a nullity.
- 03
Whether the defendants have raised a triable issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The plaintiff argued that deregistration-in-process is distinct from final deregistration and that the company was not dissolved at the time of issuing summons. Counsel relied on documents suggesting the process was not complete and that the company was restored prior to the hearing.
- Respondent
- The defendants contended that the plaintiff was deregistered and dissolved as of 15 November 2017, rendering the action a nullity. They relied on documentary evidence and case law to argue that any action taken by a deregistered company is void. They also raised a defence regarding the excipiability of the particulars of claim, but the court did not address this issue.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Newlands Surgical Clinic v Peninsula Eye Clinic 2015 (4) SA 34 (SCA)
Actions taken on behalf of a deregistered company are void and of no effect.
- 02
Companies Act 71 of 2008
Section 82(3) of the Companies Act empowers CIPC to remove a company from the register for failure to file annual returns.
- 03
Companies Act 71 of 2008
Section 83 of the Companies Act provides that removal from the register results in dissolution of the company, but does not affect liability for acts prior to removal.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the plaintiff was deregistered and dissolved at the time of instituting action, rendering the summons a nullity. As a result, summary judgment could not be granted on a process initiated by a non-existent entity. The issue raised by the defendants was considered triable and warranted further ventilation at trial. The court declined to address the secondary defence regarding the excipiability of the particulars of claim, as the primary issue was dispositive for the summary judgment application.
Obiter and limits
- The status of the plaintiff at the time of institution of action may have rendered it incapable of issuing summons, and all subsequent processes based thereon are of no consequence.
- The issue raised by the defendants is a triable one and may be affected by further ventilation at trial.
Court disposition
Application for summary judgment dismissed; defendants granted leave to defend.
- The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
- The defendants are granted leave to defend the plaintiff's claim.
- The costs of this application are costs in the cause.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA]
CASE NO: 556/2018
In the matter between;
BTHMA FINANCIAL SERVICES (PTY)LTD
t/a
THE INTERFACE FININCIAL GROUP
Plaintiff
and
THABA SWART (PTY)
LTD
First Defendant
DANIEL
DIEDERICK SWART
Second Defendant
LOUIS
DE
WET
Third Defendant
HERMAN
TIMOTHY RAMMILO MOEKETSI
Fourth defendant
JUDGMENT
SKOSANAAJ
[1] This matter concerns an application for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs claim against the defendant. The plaintiffs claim in turn is based on an agreement in terms of which the plaintiff purchased accounts receivable from the first defendant. As for the rest of the defendants, the claim against them is based on personal guarantees and indemnity that they signed in favour of the plaintiff in terms of which they bound themselves as primary and principal debtors in respect of all amounts owed by the first defendant in terms of the main agreement.
[2] After the defendants had entered appearance, the plaintiff brought this application for summary judgment in terms of which it claims the total amount of R2 067 825-00 plus the applicable interest thereon as well as the cots against the defendants.
[3] In opposition of the application, the defendants filed an opposing affidavit in which it raises two defences namely that the action by the plaintiff is a nullity in that the plaintiff was deregistered as a company at the time of the issuance of the summons and had been also dissolved as on 15 November 2017. Second, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs particulars of claim were excipiable in that the disapproval of the receivables was not based on one of the grounds set out in clause 6(1)(a) to (g) of the main agreement and that its receivables had to be claimed separately and grounds set out for each such claim.
[4] It was argued by counsel for the plaintiff in respect of the first ground of opposition that the company registration authority (CIPC) recognizes two different processes namely, deregistration-in-process and deregistration-final. The deregistration-in-process simply meant that certain formal requirements for the continued registration of the company were not complied with and there is a process underway or an intention to deregister the company. On the other hand, counsel for the defendants contended that what is crucial is the status of the plaintiff at the time of the institution of the action which was in January 2018. Having annexed a wrong document to its opposing affidavit, the defendants handed up another document which shows that the plaintiff was in deregistration as on 15 November 2017 and that such status was only rectified 2 days before the hearing of this matter, being 12 June 2018.
[5] Defendants' submission was based on the judgment of the full court of this Division delivered by Mavunda J under case no. A893/14 on 13 May 2016 where the decision of Newlands Surgical Clinic v Peninsula Eye Clinic 2015 (4) SA 34 (SCA) at 41 G-1 was followed to the effect that all subsequent actions purportedly taken on behalf of a deregistered company are void and of no effect. I agree with this submission.
[6] Counsel for the plaintiff further relied on the document which is not part of the papers to support his contention that a company in deregistration-in process cannot be regarded as dissolved and/or deregistered but such process simply signifies an intention to deregister the company in the future. His submission is not supported by the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 82(3) of the Companies Act no. 71 of 2008, grants the CIPC power to remove a company from the Companies register if, among other things, it has failed to file annual returns for 2 or more years in succession and, upon demand by the CIPC has failed to give satisfactory reasons for such failure or to show satisfactory cause for the company to remain registered.
[7] The reason for deregistration of the plaintiff as appears on the document handed up to me is that the plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of filing annual returns and/or payment of the prescribed fees. The above named section of the Companies Act empowers the registration authority to remove such company from the register. Section 83 of the same Act on the other hand provides that the effect of removal of a company from a register is that such company is regarded as having been dissolved with an exception which is not relevant for the purposes of this case. However, such removal and/or dissolution does not affect the liability of the directors or former directors or shareholders of the company in respect of any act or omission that took place before the company was removed from the register.
[8] In my view therefore, the status of the plaintiff as at the time of the institution of the action, may have rendered it incapable of issuing the summons and therefore such summons may have been a nullity. It follows therefore that summary judgment may not be based on summons that are a nullity. It does not help the plaintiff to argue that the first defendant is similarly affected by its status by virtue of the document that was mistakenly attached to its opposing affidavit. The plaintiff is the dominus litis and if it was non-existent as a company at the time of the issuance of the summons, all subsequent processes based thereon are of no consequence.
[9] The view I have taken above is not final, this being summary judgment proceedings as it may be affected by the further ventilation of the issues at the trial. I am however convinced that the issue raised by the defendants is a triable one, It follows that, in view of the approach I have taken, it is not necessary to deal with the second issue or defence raised on behalf of the defendants.
[10] Consequently, I make the following order:
[10.1] The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
[10.2] The defendants are granted leave to defend the plaintiffs claim.
[10.3] The costs of this application are costs in the cause.
DT
SKOSANA
Acting Judge of the High Court
Pretoria
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