Carlos v IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another (A36/2004) [2006] ZALAC 11 (22 March 2006)

11

IN THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

HELD IN JOHANNESBURG

Case No: JA36/2004

In the matter between

SERGIO CARLOS APPELLANT

and

IBM SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD 1ST Respondent

ELIAS M HLONGWANE N.O 2ND RESPONDENT

________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

NKABINDE AJA

Introduction

[1] The appellant appeals against the judgment of the Labour Court in a review application brought in terms of s 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the Act”). The first respondent (“IBM” or “the employer”) had successfully applied to review and set aside the award issued by the second respondent (‘the commissioner’) in which he found in favour of the appellant. The dispute that culminated in the issue on appeal concerns the question whether IBM constructively dismissed the appellant (“Carlos” or “the appellant”).

The facts

[2] The background facts are for the most part common cause. Carlos was employed as a senior salesman by the first respondent. His salary changed from straight salary to what was referred to as the Commission Plan. During October 2000, the appellant’s immediate senior at work, a Mr Hassim, raised some concerns about the commission claimed by Carlos. He was of the view that the commission claimed by Carlos was not justifiable in relation to the comparative gains made by the sales division. He then addressed an e-mail to Carlos expressing such concern. The e-mail read:

“Sergio, I have a concern on the competitive winback claims you have submitted to the SIP office. In order for us to verify your claims can you please complete the following template for every customer situation where revenue is claimed against the competitive SSM template. The whole idea of the competitive SSM template is to be actively involved in closing business (new and existing) in Competitive situations.”

[3] Subsequent to the e-mail Carlos’ commission for November and December 2000 was withheld. The appellant being concerned about the fact that he was not going to be paid a commission for that quarter, raised the matter with senior management. Several meetings were scheduled to address the matter. Two of such meetings were held on 7 November 2000 and 13 December 2000. At the meeting held on 7 November 2000 Carlos advised Hassim that he sought legal advice regarding the latter’s e-mail. The issue of the commission was not resolved. At the meeting of 13 December 2000 Hassim requested Carlos to furnish all the information on all his claims in which payment had been made, particularly all accounts in which he had been involved. Carlos expressed concern that giving such information would be prejudicial to him. Hassim explained that the information was required, first, to verify Carlos’

claims, and, second, to identify problems attendant upon a sale plan in order to avoid a similar problem in the future. Carlos undertook to furnish the information on all such accounts within two weeks from 13 December 2000. In his answering affidavit delivered in the review application, Carlos admits having made this undertaking.

[4] On 15 December 2000, barely two days after the meeting and before furnishing the information he had undertaken to furnish, Carlos, through his attorneys, addressed a letter to IBM tendering his resignation. He alleged in the letter that the resignation was due to IBM having rendered his continued employment intolerable through its failure to pay him the commission allegedly due to him for the months of November and December. In response to that letter of resignation on 10 January 2001 IBM denied non-payment of his basic salary and benefits for November and December 2000. Regarding the commission claimed by Carlos, IBM stated that the commission was normally payable monthly in arrears in terms of the Company Sales Incentive Plan and that the commission owed to Carlos before tax was R703.26 for October 2000 which amount, due to an oversight, remained unpaid. It denied that it repudiated the contract of employment or terminated the contract of employment by way of constructive dismissal. It stated further that Carlos had resigned voluntarily.

Arbitration.

[5] On 10 January Carlos referred a dispute concerning constructive dismissal in terms of section 186(e) of the Act to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (‘CCMA’), for arbitration claiming compensation and payment of outstanding monies allegedly owed to him by IBM.

[6] At arbitration a bundle of documents, including written communication between the parties, was handed in by agreement. The parties agreed that the documents in the bundle were to be what they purported to be. The commissioner found that the reason that prompted Carlos’ resignation was unfair and that Carlos had established that he had been constructively dismissed. The commissioner ordered IBM to pay Carlos compensation in an amount ‘equal to R480 333.00 within 14 days of receiving this award’. He further ordered the parties to convene a meeting to reconcile their calculations of the commission …’. In reaching the conclusion the commissioner stated that-

‘The respondent’s letter referring to ‘oversight was served on the applicant on or about 10 January 2001, it is about 25 days after the resignation of the applicant. No evidence was placed before me that his information was made available to the applicant on 15 December 2000. For this reason, I cannot see why the applicant was precluded from seeking help I (sic) this regard or to declare a dispute with the respondent.

The respondent’s failure to pay was deliberate….

I fail to find any justification in what Mr Hassim had said and I must state such statement is in contradiction to the 'oversight letter' referred to earlier.

To this end, I am satisfied that the reason that prompted the applicant to resign [was] unfair. A constructive dismissal has been established by the applicant.’

Review application in the Labour Court.

[7] The employer launched a review application in terms of s 145 of the Act for an order, among other things, to review and set aside the award and to declare that Carlos had voluntarily resigned. The grounds for review were that the commissioner had committed gross irregularities in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings in that he had failed to give proper consideration to relevant facts and evidence placed before him and to properly assess the evidence, and, that he had failed to apply the proper test in determining whether Carlos had indeed been constructively dismissed.

[8] The employer's contention was that payment of the outstanding commission was to be effected upon Carlos furnishing the information he had undertaken on 13 December to furnish to the employer within two weeks of that date. Carlos admitted that he had undertaken to furnish the information which the employer had requested. His contention was that he was under the impression that payment would be effected immediately after the meeting held on 13 December 2000. The Labour Court set the award aside. In setting the award aside with costs and declaring that Carlos had resigned voluntarily, the Court a quo remarked, inter alia, that-

"In casu Carlos could have lodged a grievance if he was unhappy about the instruction to supply the required information. It was open to him to show that the supply thereof would be prejudicial to him as he stated in the meeting and in what way he would be prejudiced. There is no evidence that the suspicions of undue claims by Hassim were not true and/or were unfounded. Carlos admitted in papers that he had undertaken to supply such information within two weeks. He could not explain, however, why he decided to renege on this agreement. He stated that the sole reason for the resignation was the failure to pay the commission.

In my view [IBM] was entitled to demand the information from Carlos and he was unreasonable to expect payment before such information was furnished as agreed. To the knowledge of Carlos this was the source of concern, which was subject of the investigation. In other words the information required was directly linked to amounts of commission claimed. Consequently it is highly improbable that he would have expected immediate payment when the information was still outstanding.

The finding by the arbitrator that the reason that prompted the resignation was unfair does not make sense, especially if regard is being had to the circumstances of this case. There was an agreement to supply the information at the meeting of the 13th December 2000. Carlos advanced no reasons why he failed to do so. The reasoning of the arbitrator demonstrates clearly that he did not apply his mind to the facts placed before him. [Carlos| was paid his normal monthly salary. It was not as if the situation was such that he could not tolerate the employment conditions. There was no change in the conditions as such. The investigations were necessary before any decision could be taken regarding the continuation of payments. The continuation of payments. If anything out of that decision became intolerable it was self induced and [Carlos] is not entitled to benefit therefrom."

With the leave of the Court a quo Carlos now appeals to this Court.

The Appeal

[9] On appeal Carlos contended that the furnishing by him of information to IBM which was within the knowledge of IBM was a term which the latter sought to impose unilaterally upon him in an unreasonable manner. It was argued further that the resignation by Carlos was a measure of last resort as he had made attempts to resolve the situation. It was further contended on behalf of Carlos that the employer had admitted, 25 days after Carlos' resignation, that the commission was due to him and that, at the meeting held on 13 December 2000, Carlos had understood Hassim to mean that he (Carlos) would be paid immediately after the meeting.

[10] On appeal the appellant attacked the judgment of the Court a quo and submitted that the award was justifiable. The employer contended that the award was unjustifiable and the Court a quo was correct in reviewing and setting it aside.

[11] Section 186(1)(e) of the Act deals with the type of dismissal commonly known as "constructive dismissal". It provides that it is a dismissal if-

(e) "an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice because the employer made continued employment intolerable for the employee."

It is clear from the provisions of sec 186(1)(e) that for there to be a constructive dismissal,

there must be a termination of the contract of employment;

the employee must be the one who terminated the contract of employment;

the employee’s reason for the termination of the contract of employment must be that continued employment had become intolerable, and,

the employer must be the one who made continued employment intolerable for the employee.

The employee bears the onus to prove all of the above requirements for constructive dismissal. The employee must act reasonably in resorting to terminating the contract of employment. In other words, if the employee’s conduct in resorting to terminating the contract of employment when faced with the situation which he found unacceptable was unreasonable, there can be no constructive dismissal. Also, if the employee could reasonably be expected to have given the employer more time to address the situation or problem, then constructive dismissal has not been proved because in such a case it cannot be said that continued employment had become intolerable.

[12] In determining whether the employer's conduct made the continued employment intolerable an arbitrator or the Court ought to-

‘look at the employer's conduct as a whole and determine whether ... its effect, judged reasonably and sensibly is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it.”

(see Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots

(1997) 18 ILJ (LAC) at 985C)

The arbitrator or the Court should also 'consider whether or not the employee has taken advantage of any internal procedures available to him (Old Mutual Group Schemes v Dreyer and Another (1999) 20 ILJ 2030 (LAC) at para 16).

[13] In this matter Carlos resigned on 15 December but had agreed, on 13 December, to provide Hassim with information that Hassim had requested him to provide before his claim(s) could be decided upon or honoured. It is common cause that between 13 and 14 December the employer did not do anything that could have prompted Carlos to change his mind and resign even before he could supply the information that he had agreed to supply.

[14] Whether or not continued employment was intolerable must be determined as at the date of the resignation. That would be on 15 December. Carlos had agreed on 13 December to give Hassim more time to deal with his concern and had undertaken to give Hassim the information that the latter required. He was to give such information within two weeks from 13 December. He resigned before that period of two weeks could expire. He gave no acceptable justification for doing so before the expiry of that period. The commissioner’s finding completely ignored this and was, in my view, unjustifiable. In those circumstances the Court a quo was correct in its conclusion that no constructive dismissal had been proved. As to costs, there is no reason why costs should not follow the result.

[15] In the premises the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Nkabinde AJA.

I agree.

Zondo JP

Davis AJ

Appearances:

For the appellant : Adv CC Ascar

Instructed by : McLaren and Associates

For the respondent : Adv D Loxton

Instructed by : Bowman Gilfillan

Date of judgment : 22 March 2006