Chauchard and Others v Fire Ring Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd (Reasons) (17910/2019) [2023] ZAGPJHC 465 (12 May 2023)
The court found that the respondent's indebtedness was uncontested following the dismissal of the postponement application. The default judgment established a debt exceeding R2 million, and execution against the respondent's assets yielded only minimal returns, confirming the respondent's inability to pay its debts...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2023] ZAGPJHC 465
- Parties
- Applicant: Chauchard, Lucien Norbert Guy; Applicant: Chauchard, Calaria Gay; Applicant: Harbour Town Homeowners Association NPC; Applicant: Vaalmarina Boatlockers Body Corporate; Respondent: Fire Ring Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Case Number
- 17910/2019
- Procedural Posture
- Winding Up Application / Provisional Order With Written Reasons
- Outcome
- Provisional winding-up order granted against the respondent.
- Judges
- R M Keightley
- Legal Topics
- Company Winding Up, Default Judgment, Indebtedness, Postponement Application
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Chauchard, Lucien Norbert Guy
Applicant
Chauchard, Calaria Gay
Applicant
Harbour Town Homeowners Association NPC
Applicant
Vaalmarina Boatlockers Body Corporate
Applicant
Fire Ring Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Winding Up Application / Provisional Order With Written Reasons
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the requirements for a provisional winding-up order were satisfied.
- 2 Whether the respondent's indebtedness was established and uncontested.
- 3 Whether the court should grant a provisional or final winding-up order given the pending rescission application.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the respondent's indebtedness was uncontested following the dismissal of the postponement application. The default judgment established a debt exceeding R2 million, and execution against the respondent's assets yielded only minimal returns, confirming the respondent's inability to pay its debts under section 345(1)(b) of the Companies Act. Although the applicants sought a final winding-up order, the court exercised its discretion to grant a provisional order due to the remote possibility that the rescission application could succeed. This approach preserved the respondent's opportunity to resolve the rescission application without unduly prejudicing the applicants.
Court Disposition
Provisional winding-up order granted against the respondent.
Orders
- The respondent is placed under provisional winding-up.
- The order is subject to the outcome of the pending rescission application.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
23 paragraphs
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
CASE NO:17910/2019
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTERST TO OTHER JUDGES
12.05.23
In the matter between:
CHAUCHARD, LUCIEN NORBERT GUY First Applicant CHAUCHARD, CALARIA GAY Second Applicant HARBOUR TOWN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION NPC Third Applicant VAALMARINA BOATLOCKERS BODY CORPORATE Fourth Applicant And FIRE RING TRADING 15 (PTY) LTD Respondent
Neutral citation: Chauchard, Lucien Norbert Guy & Others v Fire Ring Trading 15 (PTY) Ltd (Case No. 17910/2019) [2023] ZAGPJHC 465 (12 May 2023)
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR ORDER
KEIGHTLEY J:
[1] On 08 March 2023 I granted a provisional winding-up order in respect of the first respondent. The order followed the dismissal of a postponement application launched from the Bar at the commencement of the hearing of the winding-up application. I dismissed the postponement application and immediately gave full ex tempore reasons for that order. I have been requested to provide reasons for the provisional winding-up order. I was unable to trace the ex tempore reasons captured on the MS Teams recording for the winding-up order. Accordingly, the following reasons are hereby provided.
[2] The postponement application was premised on a last-ditch attempt by the respondent to rescind a default judgment order granted against it in 2012. As noted in my ex tempore judgment in the postponement application, two previous rescission attempts over the intervening years had got nowhere. A third attempt at rescission had been launched but was not yet finalised by the time the winding-up application was made. What the respondent wanted was for the court to agree to postpone the matter so that the rescission application could be finalised. As the default judgment gave rise to the debt upon which the applicant sought to wind-up the first respondent, the respondent reasoned that a postponement should be granted because, if the rescission was successful, it would be fatal to the applicants’ case for winding-up.
[3] It followed from the dismissal of the postponement application that the respondent’s indebtedness to the applicant was uncontested. The judgment debt was for an amount of over R2 million. At the same time, the default judgment court had made an order declaring certain properties to be specially executable. That order had been implemented and the properties in question sold for some R746 000, meaning that the first respondent remained indebted to the applicant for the balance of the default judgment amount plus interest.
[4] Further attempts at execution against the respondent’s bank account yielded only a further R700. The Sheriff’s return thus recorded that there were insufficient movables to satisfy the judgment debt. In terms of s 345(1)(b), the respondent was thus deemed unable to pay its debts.
[5] The requirements for a winding-up order having been satisfied, the only question remaining was whether it should be in provisional or final form. Counsel for the applicant sought a final order. In the exercise of my discretion, I granted a provisional order. There remained a possibility (albeit in my view no more than an outside chance) of the rescission order being finalised in the first respondent’s favour without undue delay. Out of an abundance of caution, I elected to keep the door open for such eventuality by granting the order in provisional form.
R M KEIGHTLEY
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Delivered: These written reasons were prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Case Lines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 12 MAY 2023
APPEARANCES
COUNSEL FOR APPLICANTS ADVOCATE P VAN DER BERG SC APPLICANTS’ ATTORNEYS MASHABANE LIEBENBERG SEBOLA INC COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS ADVOCATE S MILLER RESPONDENTS’ ATTORNEYS COX YEATS
DATE OF HEARING: 06 MARCH 2023
DATE OF DELIVERY OF WRITTEN REASONS: 12 MAY 2023