Compagnie Gervais Danone Clover Beverages and Clover SA (Pty) Ltd Danone-Clover (Pty) Ltd (04/LM/Jan03) [2003] ZACT 13 (13 March 2003)
- Citation
- [2003] ZACT 13
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Competition Tribunal
- Panel
- N. Manoim, D. Lewis, P. Maponya
- Case number
- 04/LM/Jan03
More details
- Court
- Competition Tribunal
- Panel
- N. Manoim, D. Lewis, P. Maponya
- Case number
- 04/LM/Jan03
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The Tribunal found that the merger is an internal restructuring within the Clover Group, with no product or geographic overlap between the parties. The non-compete clause was deemed commercially reasonable and not anti-competitive, given the absence of prior competition between Clover and Danone in South Africa. The merger does not alter the market structure or remove any existing competitors. There are no public interest concerns that would affect the approval. Accordingly, the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of competition and is approved unconditionally.
Court disposition
Merger approved unconditionally; no substantial lessening of competition or public interest concerns identified.
Orders
- The merger between Compagnie Gervais Danone, Clover SA (Pty) Ltd, Clover Beverages, and Danone-Clover (Pty) Ltd is approved unconditionally.
- No conditions are imposed on the approval of the merger.
02
Material facts
Parties
Compagnie Gervais Danone
Applicant Counsel: Edward Nathan Friedland AttorneysClover SA (Pty) Ltd
Applicant Counsel: Edward Nathan Friedland AttorneysClover Beverages
RespondentDanone-Clover (Pty) Ltd
RespondentAmounts and remedies
- Danone Post Merger Shareholding in Clover Beverages (%): 37.6
- Clover Post Merger Shareholding in Clover Beverages (%): 55
- Danone Right to Acquire Additional Shares in Clover Beverages (%): 7.4
03
Procedural history
Posture
Merger Clearance / Merger Approval
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the internal restructuring of the Clover Group constitutes a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market.
- 02
Whether the non-compete clause in the Shareholders' Agreement is commercially reasonable and anti-competitive.
- 03
Whether there are any public interest concerns arising from the merger.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The merging parties argued that the transaction is an internal restructuring with no product or geographic overlap between the parties. They contended that the non-compete clause is commercially reasonable for parties entering a joint venture and necessary to protect their investment. They further submitted that there is no history of competition between Clover and Danone in South Africa, and the merger is a realignment of their longstanding cooperative relationship.
- Respondent
- The Competition Commission highlighted the existence of the non-compete clause in the Shareholders' Agreement, which restricts Danone and Clover from competing with Clover Beverages and Danone-Clover for a period of five years after ceasing to be shareholders. The Commission found no product or geographic overlap and no removal of existing competitors, concluding that the merger would not fundamentally change the market structure.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Competition Act, section 16(2)(a)
A merger will not be prohibited unless it is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in the relevant market.
- 02
Shareholders' Agreement; Tribunal acceptance
Non-compete clauses in joint ventures may be commercially reasonable if they serve to protect the parties' investment and do not result in anti-competitive effects.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The Tribunal found that the merger is an internal restructuring within the Clover Group, with no product or geographic overlap between the parties. The non-compete clause was deemed commercially reasonable and not anti-competitive, given the absence of prior competition between Clover and Danone in South Africa. The merger does not alter the market structure or remove any existing competitors. There are no public interest concerns that would affect the approval. Accordingly, the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of competition and is approved unconditionally.
Obiter and limits
- The Tribunal noted that the parties have operated in a cooperative manner since Danone entered the South African market in 1996.
- The right to acquire additional shares by Danone is acknowledged but does not affect the competitive assessment.
- The lack of relationship between Clover and other foreign competitors was considered in the analysis.
Court disposition
Merger approved unconditionally; no substantial lessening of competition or public interest concerns identified.
- The merger between Compagnie Gervais Danone, Clover SA (Pty) Ltd, Clover Beverages, and Danone-Clover (Pty) Ltd is approved unconditionally.
- No conditions are imposed on the approval of the merger.
Source and reliance status
Competition Tribunal
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Competition Tribunal
Judgment
COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 04/LM/Jan03
In the large merger between:
Compagnie Gervais Danone and Clover Beverages
AND
Clover SA (Pty) Ltd and Danone-Clover (Pty) Ltd
Reasons for Decision
________________
APPROVAL
On 3 March 2003 the Competition Tribunal issued a Merger Clearance Certificate approving the merger between Compagnie Gervais Danone, Clover SA (Pty) Ltd, Clover Beverages and Danone-Clover (Pty) Ltd in terms of section 16(2)(a). The reasons for the approval of the merger appear below.
The Merger Transaction
1. This transaction is essentially a restructuring of the Clover Group which is being effected by means of a two stage transaction. In the first stage, Danone (a French firm) will cease to be a shareholder in Clover Holdings, disposing of this shareholding to Clover Holdings and to NCD. Danone is in turn acquiring a stake in Clover Beverages (South African firm). In the second stage, Clover is acquiring an element of control of Danone-Clover, Danoneâs South African subsidiary, namely the rights of appointment and termination of certain managers.
2. Accordingly, post-merger, Clover will control 55% of the share capital in Clover Beverages and Danone will hold a 37.6% interest (together with rights relating to appointment and termination of managers1). The shareholdings in Danone-Clover will remain unchanged.
The Parties
2. In Stage 1 of the transaction, the acquiring firm is Compagnie Gervais Danone (âDanoneâ), a subsidiary of Groupe Danone and incorporated under the laws of France. Clover SA (Pty) Ltd (âCloverâ), the (acquiring firm in Stage 2), is controlled by Clover Holdings , which is in turn controlled by National Co-operative Dairies (âNCDâ). Clover has a host of subsidiaries, none of which are relevant for the purpose of this analysis.
3. The target firm in stage 1 is Clover Beverages Ltd (âCBâ), which is directly controlled by Clover SA. Danone-Clover (Pty) Ltd, the target firm in stage 2, is controlled by Danone. Danone is the French companyâs only South African subsidiary and entity through which Danoneâs activities are conducted in RSA.
Rationale for the Transaction
4. Danone, the French firm, is contributing its marketing skills and expertise in the global food industry to Clover Beverages, whilst Clover is contributing its insight and knowledge of the South African market.
The Relevant Market
5. The Commission finds there are no product overlaps between the products of Clover Beverages and the Danone group on the one hand, or between Danone-Clover and Clover Group on the other.
6. There is furthermore no geographical overlap because most of Danoneâs sales are concluded in Western Europe.
Impact on competition
7. This is merely an internal restructuring within the Clover Group. This, together with the lack of product overlap, ensures that there will be no fundamental change to the existing structure of the market, nor will any existing competitor be removed.
The Commission highlighted the existence of the non-compete clause in the Shareholdersâ Agreement between Danone, Clover and Clover Beverages. In terms of this provision, Danone and Clover will not compete with Clover Beverages in the manufacture and marketing of their products while they are shareholders in Clover Beverages and for a period of 5 years after. Similarly, Danone and Clover will not compete with Danone Clover in respect of the marketing and distribution of its product range. We accept the partiesâ contentions that such a restraint is commercially reasonable for parties entering into a joint venture in order to protect their investment.
There is no history of Clover and Danone competing against one another in the South African market. When Danone entered the SA market in 1996 it did so in a joint venture with Clover and this has been the way it has operated since. Clover has no relationship with any other foreign firm that competes in these markets. The merger is just a re-alignment of the co-operative relationship that has existed between Clover and Danone since Danone entered South Africa.
Conclusion
This is an internal restructuring and there is no significant competitive change from the status quo. We conclude that the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of competition. There are no public interest concerns which would alter this conclusion. The merger is therefore approved unconditionally.
_____ 13 March 2003
N. Manoim Date
Concurring: D.Lewis, P. Maponya
For the merging parties: Edward Nathan Friedland Attorneys
For the Commission: L. Mtanga, J. Liebenberg, Competition Commission
1 And the right to acquire 7.4% of shares in Clover Beverages from the minority shareholders, which will take its total shareholding in Clover Beverages to 45%.
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