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South Africa Judgment

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Costa and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited (63765/2012) [2016] ZAGPPHC 1055 (15 December 2016)

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Source document

01

Holding and result

The applicants provided a reasonable explanation for their default, as they were unaware of the proceedings due to substituted service by publication, which they did not read. Their defence is bona fide and not merely a delaying tactic. They have disclosed a prima facie defence: Kensington was not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed, and their accessory liability under section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act does not arise because the loan agreement continued and repayments were made. These allegations, if proven, would constitute a defence to Standard Bank's claim. Accordingly, the requirements for rescission are met, and the default judgment must be rescinded.

Court disposition

Default judgment rescinded; costs to be determined in the main action.

Orders

  • The default judgment granted against the applicants on 19 August 2013 is rescinded.
  • The costs of this application are costs in the cause.

02

Material facts

Parties

Norberto Jose Dos Santos Costa

Applicant Counsel: Mr G Kairinos SC

Ana Paula Ribeiro Goncalves Costa

Applicant Counsel: Mr G Kairinos SC

Standard Bank of South Africa Limited

Respondent Counsel: Mr R Raubenheimer

Amounts and remedies

  • Default Judgment Amount: ZAR 1,310,564.44

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Rescission Application / Application for Rescission of Default Judgment

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicants contend they were unaware of the action due to substituted service by publication, which they did not see. They only became aware when their banking facilities were frozen following sequestration orders obtained without their knowledge. They argue that Kensington is not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed, as the loan agreement was not terminated and repayments continued, negating their accessory liability under section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act.
Respondent
Standard Bank does not effectively dispute the applicants' explanation for their default. The respondent maintains that the default judgment was properly obtained following substituted service and that the applicants are liable as sureties for Kensington's debt.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA)

    An applicant for rescission must show good cause by providing a reasonable explanation for default, demonstrating bona fides, and disclosing a bona fide defence with prospects of success.

  2. 02

    Grant v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd 1949 (2) SA 470 (O)

    It is sufficient for an applicant to set out averments which, if established at trial, would entitle them to the relief sought.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The applicants provided a reasonable explanation for their default, as they were unaware of the proceedings due to substituted service by publication, which they did not read. Their defence is bona fide and not merely a delaying tactic. They have disclosed a prima facie defence: Kensington was not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed, and their accessory liability under section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act does not arise because the loan agreement continued and repayments were made. These allegations, if proven, would constitute a defence to Standard Bank's claim. Accordingly, the requirements for rescission are met, and the default judgment must be rescinded.

Obiter and limits

  • The costs of the rescission application should follow the result of the trial in the action, as this is not a case where the applicants are seeking an indulgence.

Court disposition

Default judgment rescinded; costs to be determined in the main action.

  • The default judgment granted against the applicants on 19 August 2013 is rescinded.
  • The costs of this application are costs in the cause.

Source and reliance status

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Judgment

[2016] ZAGPPHC 1055

IN

THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

CASE NO: 63765/2012

15/12/2016

In the matter between:

NORBERTO

JOSE DOS First Applicant

SANTOS

COSTA

ANA

PAULA RIBEIRO GONCALVES Second Applicant

COSTA

and

THE

STANDARD BANK OF Respondent

SOUTH

AFRICA LIMITED

JUDGMENT

De Kok. AJ

1. This is an application for the rescission of a default judgment granted in favour of the respondent, Standard Bank Ltd ("Standard

Bank") against the first and second applicants (Mr and Mrs Costa) in an amount of R1 310 564.44 together with interest and

costs.

2. The application was heard together with applications for the final sequestration of the estates of Mr and Mrs Costa under case number 75020/2014 and 74955/2014.

3. The background facts and the cause of action advanced against Mr and Mrs Costa are dealt with in the judgment relating to the

sequestration applications and I do not repeat them herein.

4. Mr and Mrs Costa must show "good cause". In Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape)[1] it was held that " ...the Courts generally expect an applicant to show good cause by (a) giving a reasonable explanation of his default; (b) by showing that his application is made bona fide; and (c) by showing that he has a bona fide defence to the plaintiff's claim which prima facie has some prospect of success..."

5. The summons was served by way of publication in the Citizen newspaper, and after Standard Bank had obtained an order authorising

such substituted service. Mr and Mrs Costa contend that they did not read such publication and that they first became aware of the action when their personal banking facilities were frozen as a result of the provisions sequestration orders obtained against them (which orders were also obtained without their knowledge). This is not effectively disputed by Standard Bank and constitutes a reasonably acceptable explanation for their failure to defend the action.

6. It cannot be contended that their defence is not bona fide - in the sense of one which they seriously intend to advance on the merits, as opposed to a mere delaying tactic.

7. It remains to be considered whether they have disclosed a prima facie defence. The test that they must meet is described in the oft quoted decision in Grant v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd[2] 1949 (2) 470 (0) as follows: "It is sufficient if he makes out a prima facie defence in the sense of setting out averments which, if established at the trial, would entitle him to the relief asked for."

8. The essence of the defence advanced by Mr and Mrs Costa is that Kensington is not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed

(and that their accessory liability in terms of the former section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act, 69 of 1984 thus does not arise) because Kensington borrowed these monies in terms of an existing loan agreement, which was not terminated by Standard Bank after cancellation of the mortgage bond which served as security for the loan, and that Kensington continued to make monthly repayments in the agreed amounts.'

9. In my view these allegations, if proven at trial, would constitute a defence to the cause of action advanced by Standard Bank.

10. If follows that the default judgment must be rescinded.

11. This is not a case where the applicants for rescission are seeking an indulgence and should therefore bear the costs of the application, even if successful. In my view it is appropriate that the costs of this application should follow the result of the trial in the action.

12. I make the following order:

(1) The default judgment granted against the applicants on 19 August 2013 is rescinded;

(2) The costs of this application are costs in the cause.

_______

A

DE KOK

Acting Judge of the High

Court, Gauteng Division,

Pretoria

Date of hearing: 30 November 2016

Date of judgment: 15 December 2016

Appearances

For applicants: Mr G Kairinos SC instructed by E Da C Luiz Attorneys c/o Jansen and Jansen Inc.

For respondent: Mr R Raubenheimer instructed by Vezi de Beer Inc

[1] 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA) par 11

[2] 1949 (2) SA 470 (0) at 467-477

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA)

Case cited

Grant v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd 1949 (2) SA 470 (O)

Case cited

Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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