Costa and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited (63765/2012) [2016] ZAGPPHC 1055 (15 December 2016)
- Citation
- [2016] ZAGPPHC 1055
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- De Kok
- Case number
- 63765/2012
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- De Kok
- Case number
- 63765/2012
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The applicants provided a reasonable explanation for their default, as they were unaware of the proceedings due to substituted service by publication, which they did not read. Their defence is bona fide and not merely a delaying tactic. They have disclosed a prima facie defence: Kensington was not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed, and their accessory liability under section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act does not arise because the loan agreement continued and repayments were made. These allegations, if proven, would constitute a defence to Standard Bank's claim. Accordingly, the requirements for rescission are met, and the default judgment must be rescinded.
Court disposition
Default judgment rescinded; costs to be determined in the main action.
Orders
- The default judgment granted against the applicants on 19 August 2013 is rescinded.
- The costs of this application are costs in the cause.
02
Material facts
Parties
Norberto Jose Dos Santos Costa
Applicant Counsel: Mr G Kairinos SCAna Paula Ribeiro Goncalves Costa
Applicant Counsel: Mr G Kairinos SCStandard Bank of South Africa Limited
Respondent Counsel: Mr R RaubenheimerAmounts and remedies
- Default Judgment Amount: ZAR 1,310,564.44
03
Procedural history
Posture
Rescission Application / Application for Rescission of Default Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicants have shown good cause for rescission of the default judgment.
- 02
Whether the applicants have provided a reasonable explanation for their default.
- 03
Whether the applicants have disclosed a bona fide defence with prospects of success.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants contend they were unaware of the action due to substituted service by publication, which they did not see. They only became aware when their banking facilities were frozen following sequestration orders obtained without their knowledge. They argue that Kensington is not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed, as the loan agreement was not terminated and repayments continued, negating their accessory liability under section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act.
- Respondent
- Standard Bank does not effectively dispute the applicants' explanation for their default. The respondent maintains that the default judgment was properly obtained following substituted service and that the applicants are liable as sureties for Kensington's debt.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA)
An applicant for rescission must show good cause by providing a reasonable explanation for default, demonstrating bona fides, and disclosing a bona fide defence with prospects of success.
- 02
Grant v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd 1949 (2) SA 470 (O)
It is sufficient for an applicant to set out averments which, if established at trial, would entitle them to the relief sought.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The applicants provided a reasonable explanation for their default, as they were unaware of the proceedings due to substituted service by publication, which they did not read. Their defence is bona fide and not merely a delaying tactic. They have disclosed a prima facie defence: Kensington was not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed, and their accessory liability under section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act does not arise because the loan agreement continued and repayments were made. These allegations, if proven, would constitute a defence to Standard Bank's claim. Accordingly, the requirements for rescission are met, and the default judgment must be rescinded.
Obiter and limits
- The costs of the rescission application should follow the result of the trial in the action, as this is not a case where the applicants are seeking an indulgence.
Court disposition
Default judgment rescinded; costs to be determined in the main action.
- The default judgment granted against the applicants on 19 August 2013 is rescinded.
- The costs of this application are costs in the cause.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO: 63765/2012
15/12/2016
In the matter between:
NORBERTO
JOSE DOS First Applicant
SANTOS
COSTA
ANA
PAULA RIBEIRO GONCALVES Second Applicant
COSTA
and
THE
STANDARD BANK OF Respondent
SOUTH
AFRICA LIMITED
JUDGMENT
De Kok. AJ
1. This is an application for the rescission of a default judgment granted in favour of the respondent, Standard Bank Ltd ("Standard
Bank") against the first and second applicants (Mr and Mrs Costa) in an amount of R1 310 564.44 together with interest and
costs.
2. The application was heard together with applications for the final sequestration of the estates of Mr and Mrs Costa under case number 75020/2014 and 74955/2014.
3. The background facts and the cause of action advanced against Mr and Mrs Costa are dealt with in the judgment relating to the
sequestration applications and I do not repeat them herein.
4. Mr and Mrs Costa must show "good cause". In Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape)[1] it was held that " ...the Courts generally expect an applicant to show good cause by (a) giving a reasonable explanation of his default; (b) by showing that his application is made bona fide; and (c) by showing that he has a bona fide defence to the plaintiff's claim which prima facie has some prospect of success..."
5. The summons was served by way of publication in the Citizen newspaper, and after Standard Bank had obtained an order authorising
such substituted service. Mr and Mrs Costa contend that they did not read such publication and that they first became aware of the action when their personal banking facilities were frozen as a result of the provisions sequestration orders obtained against them (which orders were also obtained without their knowledge). This is not effectively disputed by Standard Bank and constitutes a reasonably acceptable explanation for their failure to defend the action.
6. It cannot be contended that their defence is not bona fide - in the sense of one which they seriously intend to advance on the merits, as opposed to a mere delaying tactic.
7. It remains to be considered whether they have disclosed a prima facie defence. The test that they must meet is described in the oft quoted decision in Grant v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd[2] 1949 (2) 470 (0) as follows: "It is sufficient if he makes out a prima facie defence in the sense of setting out averments which, if established at the trial, would entitle him to the relief asked for."
8. The essence of the defence advanced by Mr and Mrs Costa is that Kensington is not indebted to Standard Bank in the amount claimed
(and that their accessory liability in terms of the former section 26(5) of the Close Corporations Act, 69 of 1984 thus does not arise) because Kensington borrowed these monies in terms of an existing loan agreement, which was not terminated by Standard Bank after cancellation of the mortgage bond which served as security for the loan, and that Kensington continued to make monthly repayments in the agreed amounts.'
9. In my view these allegations, if proven at trial, would constitute a defence to the cause of action advanced by Standard Bank.
10. If follows that the default judgment must be rescinded.
11. This is not a case where the applicants for rescission are seeking an indulgence and should therefore bear the costs of the application, even if successful. In my view it is appropriate that the costs of this application should follow the result of the trial in the action.
12. I make the following order:
(1) The default judgment granted against the applicants on 19 August 2013 is rescinded;
(2) The costs of this application are costs in the cause.
_______
A
DE KOK
Acting Judge of the High
Court, Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date of hearing: 30 November 2016
Date of judgment: 15 December 2016
Appearances
For applicants: Mr G Kairinos SC instructed by E Da C Luiz Attorneys c/o Jansen and Jansen Inc.
For respondent: Mr R Raubenheimer instructed by Vezi de Beer Inc
[1] 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA) par 11
[2] 1949 (2) SA 470 (0) at 467-477
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