Crystal Clear Consulting & Merchants (Pty) Ltd v MS & Khudu Holdings (35849/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 309 (11 October 2017)
- Citation
- [2017] ZAGPJHC 309
- Status
- Ruling
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- M Senyatsi
- Case number
- 35849/2016
More details
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- M Senyatsi
- Case number
- 35849/2016
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court considered the submissions of both parties and the merits of the case. It found that the respondent's grounds for appeal did not meet the heightened threshold set by Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act. The grounds amounted to a re-argument of the merits and did not demonstrate a reasonable prospect of success or any compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. The court was not persuaded that another court would reach a different conclusion and therefore dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
Orders
- Leave to appeal is dismissed.
- The respondent is ordered to pay the costs.
02
Material facts
Parties
Crystal Clear Consulting & Merchants (Pty) Ltd
Applicant Counsel: Adv. BokabaMS & Khudu Holdings
Respondent Counsel: Adv. Segal03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Judgment in Main Application
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the respondent has satisfied the test for leave to appeal as set out in Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act.
- 02
Whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different conclusion.
- 03
Whether there is any compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The respondent's grounds of appeal do not meet the strict test under Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act. The grounds amount to a re-argument of the merits and do not demonstrate a reasonable prospect of success or any compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
- Respondent
- The respondent submits that another court may reach a different conclusion and that leave to appeal should be granted based on fifteen grounds of appeal, arguing that the judgment was incorrect and should be reconsidered.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
Leave to appeal may only be granted where the judge is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
- 02
Zweni v Minister of Law and Others 1993 (1) SA 523 (A); New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang 2005 (3) SA 231 (CPD); Goodwin Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd & Another 1999 (3) SA 353 (CPD)
The threshold for granting leave to appeal has been raised by the Act, requiring a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the judgment.
- 03
Van Tender v Master of the High Court, Pretoria 2017 JDR 0346 (GP); The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goose Case number LCC/4R/214
The test for leave to appeal is now more stringent and must be consistently applied, with regard to the merits of each case.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court considered the submissions of both parties and the merits of the case. It found that the respondent's grounds for appeal did not meet the heightened threshold set by Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act. The grounds amounted to a re-argument of the merits and did not demonstrate a reasonable prospect of success or any compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. The court was not persuaded that another court would reach a different conclusion and therefore dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
Obiter and limits
- The test for leave to appeal under Section 17 of the Act is more stringent than the previous standard and must be consistently applied.
- The use of the word 'would' in the statute indicates a higher degree of certainty required for granting leave to appeal.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
- Leave to appeal is dismissed.
- The respondent is ordered to pay the costs.
Source and reliance status
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
Ruling
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 35849/2016
Not reportable
Not of interest to other judges
Revised.
11/10/2017
In the consolidated application between:
CRYSTAL CLEAR CONSULTING
& MERCHANTS (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
MS & KHUDU HOLDINGS First respondent
J U D G M E N T
SENYATSI, AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]. This is an application leave to appeal against the judgment I handed down on the 30th of June 2017. The parties will be referred as in the main application. In the judgment, I came to a conclusion that there was an oral agreement in terms of which the 50% profit sharing margin was agreed to by the parties and I granted judgment in favour of the applicant.
[2]. The Respondent has filed leave to appeal and raised fifteen (15) grounds of appeal. Its counsel, Mr Bokaba submitted that another court will come to a different conclusion and that leave should be granted to appeal.
[3]. The application is opposed by the Applicant Mr Segal, on behalf of the applicant, submitted that the Respondent’s grounds of appeal do not pass the test as provided for in Section 17 (1) (a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (“the Act”) which lays down a strict test that needs to be passed for leave to appeal to be granted. Mr Segal furthermore submitted that the Respondent’s grounds for appeal do not pass the test as provided in Section 17 (1)(a) of the Superior Court Practice Act 10 of 2013 (“the Act”) which lays down a test that needs to be passed for leave to appeal to be granted. Mr Segal contended that the grounds of appeal amount to re-argument of the merits of the case.
[4]. The issue for determination is whether the test as provided for by Section 17 (1) (a) of the Act has been passed.
[5]. Section 17 (1) (a) of the Act provide as follows:
“(i) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that:
(a) (i) The appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) There is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgment on the matter under consideration.”
[6]. Prior to this Act coming into effect during August 2013, the criterion which an Applicant had to satisfy was that leave would be granted if there were reasonable prospect of success.[1]
[7]. It is now trite law, after the coming into effect of the Act that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against the judgment of a High Court has been raised. The use of the word “would” in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.[2]
[8]. There is therefore an agreement between the authorities that the test for leave to appeal introduced by Section 17 of the Act has placed the standard much higher and is more stringent than the traditional test.[3]
[9]. The test has new been consistently applied. In applying the test, the court must always have regard to the merits of each case.
[10]. I have considered the submission made by Mr Bokaba on behalf pf the Respondent. I have also considered the submission made by Mr Segal on behalf of the Applicant. In addition to the consideration of the submissions, I also had regard to the merits of the case and the context under which I reached the conclusion. I hold the view that the grounds for appeal relied on have not passed the test as laid down in Section 17 of the Act.
[11] As a consequence thereof, I am not persuaded that the Respondent has passed the test that another court will come to a different conclusion.
Order
[12] Leave to appeal is dismissed with costs
_______
M SENYATSI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For the Applicant: ADV. Bokaba
Instructed by: Ngoato Attorneys
For the Respondent: ADV. Segal
Instructed by: Witz Calicchio Isakow & Shapiro Attorneys Inc.
[1] See Zweni v Minister of Law and Others 1993 (1) SA 523 (A) at 531 B-E; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang 2005 (3) SA 231 (CPD) 236 H; Goodwin Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd & Another 1999 (3) SA 353 (CPD) at 355 B
[2] See the unreported judgment of The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goose Case number LCC/4R/214.
[3] See Van Tender v Master of the High Court, Pretoria 2017 JDR 0346 (GP)
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