Department of Road and Transport: Gauteng Province v Govender and Others (JR1436/19) [2021] ZALCJHB 335 (6 October 2021)
The arbitrator's finding that the non-renewal of Govender's fixed-term contract constituted a dismissal under section 186(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act was correct. The evidence that Govender was informed of the intention to absorb him permanently was undisputed and not challenged in cross-examination. The...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2021] ZALCJHB 335
- Parties
- Applicant: Department of Road and Transport: Gauteng Province; Respondent: Perumal G Govender; Respondent: General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council; Respondent: S J Lombard N O
- Court
- Labour Court Johannesburg
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Case Number
- JR1436/19
- Procedural Posture
- Review Application / Judgment
- Outcome
- Application for review dismissed with costs.
- Judges
- Mosam
- Legal Topics
- Unfair Dismissal, Fixed Term Contracts, Reinstatement, Costs in Labour Matters
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Department of Road and Transport: Gauteng Province
Applicant
Perumal G Govender
Respondent
General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council
Respondent
S J Lombard N O
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Review Application / Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the non-renewal of the fixed-term contract constituted a dismissal under section 186(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act.
- 2 Whether the dismissal was substantively unfair.
- 3 Whether the applicant's subjective belief in permanent employment was reasonable.
Ratio Decidendi
The arbitrator's finding that the non-renewal of Govender's fixed-term contract constituted a dismissal under section 186(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act was correct. The evidence that Govender was informed of the intention to absorb him permanently was undisputed and not challenged in cross-examination. The arbitrator properly applied the two-stage enquiry, finding both a subjective belief and its reasonableness. The Labour Court found no grounds to review or set aside the award. Given the meritless nature of the litigation, the court exercised its discretion to award costs against the applicant.
Court Disposition
Application for review dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application for review is dismissed with costs.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
72 paragraphs
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Not Reportable
Case No: JR1436/19
In the matter between:
DEPARTMENT OF ROAD AND TRANSPORT:
GAUTENG PROVINCE Applicant
and
PERUMAL G GOVENDER First
Respondent
GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICE SECTORAL
BARGAINING COUNCIL Second Respondent
S J LOMBARD N O Third Respondent
Heard: 29 June 2021
Delivered: 06 October 2021
JUDGMENT
MOSAM, A J
Introduction
1. The Applicant brought an application to review and set aside the arbitration award dated 7 May 2019 under case number GPBC 2612/2018. The Third Respondent (“the Arbitrator”) found that the non-renewal of the First Respondent’s contract by the Applicant amounted to a dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”), that the dismissal was unfair and ordered reinstatement.
The Relevant Facts
2. It is not necessary for the purpose of this Judgment to restate the facts, but the salient ones are mentioned below.
3. The First Respondent (“Govender”) was initially employed by the Applicant (“DRT”) on a one year contract running from 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017.[1]
4. The contract was extended for a further 12 months to 30 September 2018.[2]
5. On 15 September 2018, Govender’s Head of Department, Ron Swart (“Swart”) made application for a further six months’ extension for Govender’s contract to 31 March 2019.[3]
6. Swart told Govender that the reason for the six month extension was that the Department was absorbing contract workers on a permanent basis and the six month period would be sufficient to do the same with Govender.[4]
7. In terms of the appropriate legislation and regulations authority to provide for employment of persons additional to the fixed establishment, of whom Govender was one, had been delegated to the Head of Department, Swart.[5]
8. It is common cause that Govender was the sole witness at the arbitration and that his evidence was not challenged in cross-examination.
9. In his arbitration award, the Arbitrator found the following:
9.1. that he was required to conduct a two-stage enquiry;[6]
9.2. that the evidence of Govender that he harboured a subject belief that his employment would continue and become permanent, was “wholly undisputed”.[7]
9.3. the Arbitrator expressly stated in his arbitration award as follows:
“The evidence considered supports a finding that the respondent clearly and unambiguously communicated its express intention to absorb the applicant permanently. Once again, the applicant provided direct evidence on oath and stated that he was informed that the anticipated process for his absorption would not take more than 6 months. The respondent presented no evidence to weigh against the applicant’s sworn testimony, which is strongly corroborated by further undisputed evidence that the respondent also recommended that a 3rd term for the very same period of 6 months.” [8]
9.4. It is on this basis that the Arbitrator concluded that both stages of the enquiry should be answered in Govender’s favour, firstly that he held a subjective belief that his fixed term contracts would be extended and turned into permanent employment, and, secondly, that this belief was reasonable in the circumstances.
9.5. In light of his finding that Govender’s dismissal was substantively unfair, he reinstated Govender with back pay.
Discussion
10. It is common cause that the DRT did not to challenge Govender’s evidence that he was informed by Swart that his contract would be extended for a further six months to provide time for Govender’s permanent absorption and that Swart had the delegated authority to do so.
11. In this regard, the Labour Court in Masilela v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd[9] held that:
“[28]…It is trite that if a party wishes to lead evidence to contradict an opposing witness, he should first cross-examine him upon the facts that he intends to prove in contradiction, to give the witness an opportunity for explanation. Similarly if the court is to be asked to disbelieve a witness, he should be cross-examined upon the matters that it will be alleged to make his evidence unworthy of credit. In Small v Smith 1954(3) SA 434 (SWA) Claassen J said at 438 –
‘… It is grossly unfair and improper to let a witness’s evidence go unchallenged in cross-examination and afterwards argue that he must be disbelieved.’”
12. In President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others[10] the Constitutional Court held that:
“[61] … If a point in dispute is left unchallenged in cross-examination, the party calling the witness is entitled to assume that the unchallenged witness’s testimony is accepted as correct. This rule was enunciated by the House of Lords in Browne v Dunn and has been adopted and consistently followed by our courts.”
13. The consequence of the unchallenged evidence of Govender meant that the only possible conclusions that the Arbitrator could have come to, on the evidence before him, were:
13.1. that Govender had a subjective belief that his contract would be extended for his ultimate permanent absorption; and
13.2. that Govender’s belief was reasonable.
14. In the circumstances, the Arbitrator’s finding of a dismissal was correct and it follows that there is no ground to review and set aside the Arbitrator’s finding.
Costs
15. The Court has a broad discretion, established by section 162 of the LRA to make an order of costs according to the requirements of law and fairness. The requirement of law has been interpreted to mean that the cost would follow the result. In considering fairness, the conduct of the party should be taken into account and mala fides, unreasonableness and frivolousness are, inter alia, factors justifying the imposition of a costs order.
16. In Zungu v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal & Others[11] the Constitutional Court confirmed that the Rule that costs follow the result does not apply in labour matters. The Court should seek to strike a fair balance between unduly discouraging parties from approaching the Labour Court to have their disputes dealt with and, on the other hand, allowing those parties to bring to this Court (or oppose) cases that should not have been brought to Court (or opposed), in the first place.
17. The generally accepted purpose of awarding costs is to indemnify the successful litigant for the expense he/she had been put through by having been unjustly compelled to initiate or defend litigation. This is the case where the Court has to strike a balance.
18. In argument, Mr Orr, for the Respondent, submitted that the application be dismissed with costs. He argued that “Govender made all the running in this application.” and that serious consideration must be given to the granting of costs as a mark of disapproval.[12]
19. I am of the view if one considers the totality of the circumstances in this matter that the litigation was meritless. In my view, this is a case where it is appropriate to make a costs order.
20. In the premises, I make the following Order.
Order
21. The application for review is dismissed with costs.
A MOSAM
ACTING JUDGE OF THE LABOUR COURT
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPLICANT: ADV V P NGUTSHANA
Instructed by The State Attorney
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: ADV C ORR SC
Instructed by A F Van Wyk Attorneys
[1] Transcript Vol 1 p.37 line 15 to p.38 line 5
[2] Transcript Vol 1 p.38 line 11 to p.40 line 5
[3] Transcript Vol 1 p.41 line 2 to p.43 line 18
[4] Transcript Vol 1 p.43 line 19 to p.44 line 3
[5] Transcript Vol 2 p.86 lines 7-25
[6] Respondents’ heads of argument: The Legal Authorities paras 6-10, pp.3-5
[7] Pleadings p.54 para 45
[8] Pleadings arbitration award p.54 para 46
[9] (2004) 25 ILJ 544 (LC)
[10] 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC)
[11] (2018) 39 ILJ 523 (CC) at para 24
[12] See: First Respondent’s supplementary affidavit dated 10 June 2021