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South Africa Judgment

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

D.J.M v L.M (Leave to Appeal) (22730/2017) [2021] ZAGPPHC 495 (2 August 2021)

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01

Holding and result

The court found that the applicant's omission to allege the Master's approval in the particulars of claim was the basis for upholding the exception. However, the court accepted that another court might find that this issue should be determined by evidence at trial rather than on the pleadings, and that the applicant should have been given an opportunity to amend the particulars of claim. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted on the second ground of exception and the associated costs order, as another court may reach a different conclusion regarding the excipiability of the claim and the procedural fairness of dismissing all claims without leave to amend.

Court disposition

Leave to appeal is granted to the Full Court of this Division on the second ground of exception and the costs order.

Orders

  • Leave to appeal is granted to the Full Court of this Division only in respect of the second ground of exception relating to the issue of the consent of the Master of the High Court and the cost order.
  • Costs are costs in the appeal.

02

Material facts

Parties

M[....] D J

Applicant Counsel: Adv Riani Ferreira

M[....] L

Respondent Counsel: Adv D Block

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Dismissal of Claim on Exception

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicant contends that the court erred in upholding the exception based on the absence of an averment regarding the Master's approval. The applicant argues that this issue relates to facta probantia and not the cause of action, and should be determined by evidence at trial. The applicant further submits that the dismissal of all claims without an opportunity to amend the particulars of claim was unjustified.
Respondent
The respondent maintains that the particulars of claim are excipiable due to the lack of an allegation that the applicant obtained the Master's approval to institute action, as required by the Court Order. The respondent argues that this omission is a fatal defect and justifies dismissal of the claim.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

    Leave to appeal may only be granted if the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason, such as conflicting judgments.

  2. 02

    Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

    The threshold for granting leave to appeal is raised; the use of 'would' denotes a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the judgment.

  3. 03

    Relevant case law interpreting exception procedure

    An exception should only be upheld if the particulars of claim are excipiable on the face of the pleadings, not on facts to be proved at trial.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that the applicant's omission to allege the Master's approval in the particulars of claim was the basis for upholding the exception. However, the court accepted that another court might find that this issue should be determined by evidence at trial rather than on the pleadings, and that the applicant should have been given an opportunity to amend the particulars of claim. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted on the second ground of exception and the associated costs order, as another court may reach a different conclusion regarding the excipiability of the claim and the procedural fairness of dismissing all claims without leave to amend.

Obiter and limits

  • The threshold for granting leave to appeal has been raised by the Superior Courts Act, requiring a measure of certainty that another court will differ.
  • The applicant did not seek to appeal the finding regarding locus standi, which was correctly decided.

Court disposition

Leave to appeal is granted to the Full Court of this Division on the second ground of exception and the costs order.

  • Leave to appeal is granted to the Full Court of this Division only in respect of the second ground of exception relating to the issue of the consent of the Master of the High Court and the cost order.
  • Costs are costs in the appeal.

Source and reliance status

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

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Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Judgment

[2021] ZAGPPHC 495

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

IN

THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

(1) REPORTABLE: NO

(2)

OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO

DATE: 02-08- 2021

Case Number: 22730/2017

In the matter between:

M[....]

D

J

APPLICANT

and

M[....]

L

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT:

LEAVE TO APPEAL

KUBUSHI J

Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by e-mail. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on 02 August 2021.

[1] The applicant (respondent/plaintiff in the main action) has made application for leave to appeal against the whole order, including costs, handed down on 15 June 2021, under the above case number. The application is opposed.

[2] The application is determined on the papers filed on Caselines without oral hearing as provided for in this Division’s Consolidated Directives re Court Operations during the National State of Disaster issued by the Judge President on 18 September 2020.

[3] The applicant has approached the court for leave to appeal in terms of section 17 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. The section provides that leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that –

(i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or

(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be granted, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.

[4] From the case law dealing with the interpretation of the section as regards the test employed for determining whether leave to appeal should be granted, it is evident that the threshold has been raised. The use of the word “would” in the section has been held to denote a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against. In terms of the section, that there are reasonable prospects of success, should be in the opinion of the judge(s) whose judgment is sought to be appealed. The applicant in the application for leave to appeal must, as a result, convince the judge(s) involved that there are reasonable prospects of success on appeal.

[5] The gravamen of the applicant’s contention is that the court erred in making an Order wherein the applicant’s entire claim is dismissed, therefore, including all three alternative claims as set out in the amended particulars of claim, without providing the applicant an opportunity to amend such particulars of claim.

[6] The question, therefore, is whether another court on consideration of the matter, might find for the applicant. Put differently, the question is whether another court might provide the applicant an opportunity to amend the particulars of claim.

[7] In the judgment sought to be appealed, the issue of an exception against the applicant's amended particulars of claim, wherein the applicant had pleaded three claims in the alternative, was considered.

[8] The respondent (the excipient in the main action) had excepted to the amended particulars of claim of the applicant on two grounds, namely:

8.1 That the applicant (as a curator bonis) "lacks the necessary locus standi" to institute divorce proceedings on behalf of the patient, owing to the nature of the proceedings being too personal in nature, with reference to the Court Order dated 29 June 2016 (herein referred to as the “Court Order”).

8.2 That the order which purportedly appointed the applicant as the patient's curator bonis, has not been complied with, as "no averment" is made in the amended particulars of claim that the applicant obtained the necessary approval of the Master of the High Court (“the Master”), to institute action.

[9] It was found in respect of the first ground that the Court Order stands, granting the applicant the necessary locus standi. The applicant agrees with this finding and does not seek to appeal it.

[10] The submission, however, is that the court erred in upholding the exception based on the second ground, namely that "no averment" has been made in respect of the Master's approval, and that the 'absence of the allegation of this essential element . . . renders the particulars of claim excipiable'. The contention is that the exception based on the Master's apparent lack of approval should not have been upheld as same should have been allowed to be dealt with in evidence by the trial court.

[11] The applicant’s contention, in this regard, is that the court erred in accepting as fact that the applicant lacked the necessary approval to have instituted the action, because an allegation of this nature does not go to the cause of action, but relates to the facta probantia, in establishing compliance with the Court Order, which if evidence was led at the hearing of the trial, could have rendered the respondent's contentions moot.

[12] On consideration of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant in the application for leave to appeal and the arguments for and against such application by all the parties as set out in their respective heads of argument, I am of the opinion that leave to appeal ought to be granted only in respect of the second ground of exception, that is, on the base that another court might come to a different conclusion.

[13] Leave to appeal should, also, be granted in respect of the order for costs since it was granted on the basis of both grounds of exception being upheld.

[14] In the circumstances I make the following order:

1. Leave to appeal is granted to the Full Court of this Division only in respect of the second ground of exception relating to the issue of the consent of the Master of the High Court and the cost order.

2. Costs are costs in the appeal.

E.M KUBUSHI

JUDGE

OF THE HIGH COURT

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

Appearance:

Applicant’s Counsel

: ADV RIANI FERREIRA

Applicant’s Attorneys

: LOOTS BASSON INC

Respondents’ Counsel

: ADV D BLOCK

Respondents’ Attorneys : STRAUSS DALY INC

Date of hearing

: 12 July 2021

Date of judgment

: 02 August 2021

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Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

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