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South Africa Judgment

South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg

Du Randt Richards Inc. Attorneys v Scheepers No and Another (29608/12) [2012] ZAGPJHC 239 (29 November 2012)

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01

Holding and result

The court found that, regardless of the approach to calculating 'advantage to creditors', the sale price of the property would be insufficient to cover both the costs of sequestration and the secured debt owed to ABSA Bank. As a result, no funds would be available for distribution to any other creditors. The costs of sequestration would merely reduce the amount paid to the secured creditor, with no practical benefit to any other creditor. The court declined to resolve the jurisprudential dispute between the parties, as the arithmetic and practicalities of the case rendered such analysis unnecessary. The application for final sequestration was therefore dismissed, as no advantage to creditors would result from granting the order.

Court disposition

Application for final sequestration dismissed with costs; provisional order discharged.

Orders

  • The application for final sequestration is dismissed with costs.
  • The provisional order of sequestration of 8 August 2011 is discharged.

02

Material facts

Parties

Du Randt Richards Inc. Attorneys

Applicant Counsel: A Bishop

Jacobus Frederick Scheepers NO.

Respondent

Wenda Scheepers NO

Respondent

ABSA Bank Limited

Respondent Counsel: J Swanepoel

Amounts and remedies

  • Applicant's Claim: ZAR 107,209
  • Intervening Creditor's Claim: ZAR 2,135,214
  • Estimated Forced Sale Price (low): ZAR 1,400,000
  • Estimated Forced Sale Price (high): ZAR 2,300,000
  • Administration Costs (low): ZAR 215,384
  • Administration Costs (high): ZAR 307,724

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Sequestration Application / Final Order Application

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicant argued that, for purposes of evaluating 'advantage to creditors', all assets—secured or otherwise—should be considered collectively. After deducting sequestration costs, the remainder should be available for the benefit of the general body of creditors. The applicant did not dispute the prioritised rights of secured creditors in actual distribution, but maintained that the evaluation by the court should include all assets. Numerous authorities were cited to support this approach, and the applicant contended that previous judgments and the Practice Manual of the Division were incorrect.
Respondent
The intervening creditor argued that assets secured by special mortgage must first be excluded from the computation for the benefit of the secured creditor. Only the free residue remaining in the estate should be used to calculate the dividend payable to concurrent creditors. The respondent relied on previous judgments and the Practice Manual, asserting that only unsecured assets should be considered in determining advantage to creditors.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, section 12(c)

    For a sequestration order to be granted, there must be an advantage to creditors as contemplated by section 12(c) of the Insolvency Act.

  2. 02

    Meskin & Co v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W)

    Secured creditors have priority in the distribution of proceeds from secured assets, and only the free residue is available for concurrent creditors.

  3. 03

    Ex parte Steenkamp 1996 (3) SA 822 (W)

    The court should not engage in hypothetical exercises that do not reflect the practical realities of the estate's administration.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that, regardless of the approach to calculating 'advantage to creditors', the sale price of the property would be insufficient to cover both the costs of sequestration and the secured debt owed to ABSA Bank. As a result, no funds would be available for distribution to any other creditors. The costs of sequestration would merely reduce the amount paid to the secured creditor, with no practical benefit to any other creditor. The court declined to resolve the jurisprudential dispute between the parties, as the arithmetic and practicalities of the case rendered such analysis unnecessary. The application for final sequestration was therefore dismissed, as no advantage to creditors would result from granting the order.

Obiter and limits

  • The court noted that debtors may prefer sequestration for their own benefit, but the insolvency process is intended to benefit creditors, not insolvents.
  • The judge expressed appreciation for the detailed arguments presented by counsel, but found that the practical outcome obviated the need for jurisprudential analysis.

Court disposition

Application for final sequestration dismissed with costs; provisional order discharged.

  • The application for final sequestration is dismissed with costs.
  • The provisional order of sequestration of 8 August 2011 is discharged.

Source and reliance status

South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg

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Judgment text

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Source document

South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg

Judgment

[2012] ZAGPJHC 239

SOUTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT

JOHANNESBURG

CASE NO: 29608/12

NOT REPORTABLE

In the matter between

DU RANDT RICHARDS INC. ATTORNEYS Applicant and

JACOBUS FREDERICK SCHEEPERS NO.. First Respondent

WENDA

SCHEEPERS NO Second Respondent and

ABSA

BANK LIMITED Intervening Creditor

Neutral citation: Du Randt Richards Inc Attorneys v Scheepers NO and another and ABSA Bank Ltd 2012 SA (GSJ)

Coram:

SATCHWELL J

Heard: 17th October 2012, further argument on 12th November

Delivered: 29th November 2012

Summary: Different approach to “Advantage to creditors” argued but not decided; practical implementation as opposed to hypothetical evaluation preferred; sequestration is intended to be for the benefit of creditors not for the benefit of the insolvent(s).

JUDGMENT

SATCHWELL J:

INTRODUCTION

[1] In an application for a final order of sequestration, an extremely interesting argument emerged between a creditor applicant and an intervening creditor on the approach to and the manner in which “advantage to creditors” is to be computed for purposes of determining whether or not the opposed sequestration should be granted.

THE

FACTS

[2] In November 2010, ABSA (the intervening creditor) instituted action against respondents, judgment was obtained in August 2011, immovable property situate at Oak Tree Agricultural Holdings was declared executable and a sale in execution was arranged for 8th August 2012. Notice of such sale resulted in respondents’ erstwhile attorneys instituting these sequestration proceedings on the basis of inability to pay fees owing for professional services rendered.

[3] The sums of money involved in this matter are as follows: the applicant is owed R107,209.00 in respect of professional services; the intervening creditor took judgment for the amount of R2,135,214.00; valuations indicate that the property would secure a sale price ranging between R1,400,000.00 on a forced sale in execution and perhaps R2,300,000.00 if sold as part of the winding up of the estates; administration costs ranging from R215,384.00 to R307,724.00 depending on the amount realised from the sale of the property.

“ADVANTAGE TO CREDITORS”

[4] Applicant and intervening creditor are in dispute as to the meaning of the term “advantage to creditors” as used in section 12(c) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. I am enormously indebted to both Mr Bishop who appeared for the applicant and Mr Swanepoel who appeared for the intervening creditor for the great deal of thought and hard work both put into their most informative heads of argument which were prepared at my request. I must apologise to both of them that, by reason of the view I have taken of the practicalities of the situation, I have not found it necessary to determine the dispute as formulated and argued.

[5] Mr Bishop contended that, when evaluating whether or not there is an “advantage to creditors”, no distinction should be drawn between creditors who should be viewed as a single entity. All assets, secured or otherwise, should therefore be placed in one imaginary pot. After deducting the costs of sequestration, the remainder available for the benefit of the “general body”, i.e. all creditors, should then be determined. No creditor should be excluded from this arithmetical calculation which should include all assets, secured or otherwise.

[6] It is important to note that Mr Bishop did not argue that the prioritised rights of a secured creditor, such as the holder of a mortgage bond, should be ignored when it comes to the actual distribution. His submissions as regards the computation of “advantage to creditors” were only for purposes of the evaluation by the insolvency court as to whether or not a sequestration should be granted and not as regards the actual distribution to be made.

[7] Mr Swanepoel contends that those assets of the estate which are secured, inter alia by reason of special mortgage, have first to be removed from the computations for the benefit of the secured creditor. Only then can one determine the “free residue” remaining in the estate in order to calculate the dividend payable to concurrent creditors and, of course, that portion of the secured creditor’s claim which has not been satisfied.

[8] These opposing arguments boil down to the following financial computations.

[9] On applicant’s argument, the sale price of the property[1] less costs of administration[2] is weighed against the debts of both applicant and intervening creditor[3] in order to determine whether or not it is to the 殿dvantage of creditors・ for the sequestration to be finally ordered. On this basis the potential dividend would range between 53 cents and 89 cents in the Rand. Mr Bishop called in aid a host of authorities[4] which he carefully analysed and then asked this court to find that a number of earlier judgments were clearly wrong in law and that the Practice Manual of this Division has followed an incorrect approach.

[10] On the intervening creditor’s argument, the sale price of the property[5] is set against sequestration costs[6] and then the secured debt of the intervening creditor.[7] This would not cover the secured intervening creditor痴 claim. It would also not leave any 吐ree residue・ available for distribution to the applicant creditor. Mr Swanepoel referred the court to additional authorities asking the court to follow the approach taken earlier in judgments of this Division and as understood by our Practice Manual.

[11] I do not think that it is necessary in the present case to pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of the jurisprudential history to which I have been referred. I am sitting as a single judge and believe that I should only do so if such a step cannot be avoided and the interests of justice require this.

CONCLUSION

[12] However, in the present case the arithmetic involved and the practicalities of the situation direct me towards a view which does not require such jurisprudential exegesis.

[13] There is no suggestion that there would be any advantage to creditors other than the possible distribution of a dividend. No investigation is required or unearthing of additional assets is expected.

[14] I must confess that I see no benefit to this or any other insolvency court in embarking upon an exercise which would rewrite the law of South Africa solely in order to establish a hypothetical “advantage to creditors” which is not intended to be carried out in practice. On applicants’ submissions, the court would be concerned with one process in evaluating “advantage to creditors” while the administrator would adopt an entirely different process in first paying the secured creditor from the bonded property and thereafter calculating any dividend available to concurrent creditors.

[15] However, in the present case I do not need to engage in these hypothetical legal and arithmetical gymnastics.

[16] Whatever the sale price (forced or otherwise) (R1,400,000.00 to R2,300,000.00) received for the immovable property, it seems to be common cause that this would be insufficient to meet both the costs of sequestration (R215,384.00 to R307,724.00) and the debt owed to the only secured creditor, ABSA (R2,135,214.00). If a final sequestration was ordered then the costs of sequestration would do no more than decrease the amount to be paid to the secured creditor. I can see no “advantage” to any creditor to incur these costs of sequestration when all that means is that less money is paid to the secured creditor who is the only creditor who will receive any funds anyway.

[17] It may well be that the debtor respondents in this matter would prefer to have the “advantages” of sequestration of their estates if they are obliged to endure the loss of their immovable property. However, contrary to the approach of the majority of debtors who approach the insolvency court in this Division, that is not a consideration.[8]

ORDER

1. In the result an order is made as follows:

a. The application for final sequestration is dismissed with costs.

The provisional order of sequestration of 8th August 2011 is discharged.

DATED AT JOHANNESBURG ON THIS 29th DAY OF NOVEMBER 2012.

SATCHWELL J

JUDGE OF THE HIGH

COURT

APPEARANCES:

APPLICANT: A Bishop

Instructed by Du Randt Attorneys, Roodepoort

INTERVENING CREDITOR: J Swanepoel

Instructed by Smit Sewgoolam Inc, Johannesburg

[1] R1,400,000.00 to R2,300,000.00.

[2] R215,384.00 to R307,724.00.

[3] R107,209.00 and R2,135,214.00.

[4] Stainer v Estate Bukes 1933 OPD 86; Meskin & Co v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W); Sacks Morris (Pty) Ltd v Smith 1951 (3) SA 167 (O); Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v MacKan 1954(2) SA 109 (N); London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 1957 (3) SA 591 (N); Lotzof v Raubenheimer 1959 (1) SA 90 (O); Epstein v Epstein 1987 (4) SA 606 (C); Hillhouse v Stott Freban Investments (Pty) Ltd v Itzkin; Botha v Botha 1990 (4) SA 580 (W); Nel v Lubbe 1999 (3) SA 109 (W); Ex parte Steenkamp and related cases 1996 (3) SA 822 (W); Dunlop Tyres (Pty) Ltd v Brewitt 1999 (2) SA 580 (W); Fesi and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 (1) SA 499 (C).

[5] R1,400,000.00 to R2,300,000.00.

[6] R215,384.00 to R307,724.00.

[7] R2,135,214.00.

[8] Mayet v Pillay 1955 (2) SA 309 (N); Hillhouse v Stott supra; Ex parte Steenkamp supra at 827.

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Stainer v Estate Bukes 1933 OPD 86

Case cited

Meskin & Co v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W)

Case cited

Sacks Morris (Pty) Ltd v Smith 1951 (3) SA 167 (O)

Case cited

Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v MacKan 1954(2) SA 109 (N)

Case cited

London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 1957 (3) SA 591 (N)

Case cited

Lotzof v Raubenheimer 1959 (1) SA 90 (O)

Case cited

Epstein v Epstein 1987 (4) SA 606 (C)

Case cited

Hillhouse v Stott Freban Investments (Pty) Ltd v Itzkin

Case cited

Botha v Botha 1990 (4) SA 580 (W)

Case cited

Nel v Lubbe 1999 (3) SA 109 (W)

Case cited

Ex parte Steenkamp 1996 (3) SA 822 (W)

Case cited

Dunlop Tyres (Pty) Ltd v Brewitt 1999 (2) SA 580 (W)

Case cited

Fesi and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 (1) SA 499 (C)

Case cited

Mayet v Pillay 1955 (2) SA 309 (N)

Case cited

Insolvency Act 24 of 1936

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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