Eastern Cape and Tourism Agency v Medbury (Pty) t/a Crown River Safari and Another (1466/2012) [2016] ZAECGHC 26 (5 May 2016)
- Citation
- [2016] ZAECGHC 26
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown
- Panel
- J.E Smith
- Case number
- 1466/2012
More details
- Court
- Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown
- Panel
- J.E Smith
- Case number
- 1466/2012
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that section 2(1)(a) of the Game Theft Act, when read with section 2(2)(a), clearly limits protection against loss of ownership of escaped game to land for which a certificate of sufficient enclosure has been issued. The applicant's proposed interpretation was rejected as it would require judicial amendment of the statute, which is not permissible. The court further held that the development of the common law was not warranted, as the legislature had already intervened and was considering further reform. The applicant failed to provide sufficient factual and scientific basis for the proposed development, and the court found no reasonable prospects that another court would decide differently.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal refused with costs, including costs of two counsel.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is refused.
- The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of two counsel.
02
Material facts
Parties
Eastern Cape and Tourism Agency
Applicant Counsel: Mr Buchanan SCMedbury (Pty) Ltd t/a Crown River Safari
Defendant Counsel: Mr Smuts SC03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal After Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether section 2(1)(a) of the Game Theft Act protects ownership of escaped game only for land with a certificate of sufficient enclosure.
- 02
Whether the common law should be developed to extend protection beyond the statutory requirements.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant argued that interpreting section 2(1)(a) of the Game Theft Act to protect only land with a certificate of sufficient enclosure leads to an absurd result not intended by the legislature. They contended that protection should extend to land that is in fact sufficiently enclosed, even if no certificate has been issued. The applicant also submitted that there are reasonable prospects another court may find for the development of the common law to provide broader protection.
- Respondent
- The respondent opposed the application, maintaining that the wording of section 2(1)(a) is clear and limits protection strictly to land with a certificate of sufficient enclosure. They argued that any extension of protection would amount to judicial legislation rather than interpretation. The respondent further contended that the legislature has already amended the common law through the Act, and any further change should be made by legislative amendment, not judicial development.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Game Theft Act 105 of 1991
Statutory interpretation must follow the ordinary meaning of the words unless it leads to absurdity clearly not intended by the legislature.
- 02
Game Theft Act 105 of 1991
Development of the common law by the court is inappropriate where the legislature has already intervened and is considering further reform.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that section 2(1)(a) of the Game Theft Act, when read with section 2(2)(a), clearly limits protection against loss of ownership of escaped game to land for which a certificate of sufficient enclosure has been issued. The applicant's proposed interpretation was rejected as it would require judicial amendment of the statute, which is not permissible. The court further held that the development of the common law was not warranted, as the legislature had already intervened and was considering further reform. The applicant failed to provide sufficient factual and scientific basis for the proposed development, and the court found no reasonable prospects that another court would decide differently.
Obiter and limits
- An ill-considered development of the common law, founded upon insufficient information, may have unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
- Where the legislature is actively considering reform, judicial intervention in the development of the common law is both unnecessary and inappropriate.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal refused with costs, including costs of two counsel.
- The application for leave to appeal is refused.
- The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of two counsel.
Source and reliance status
Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE DIVISION – GRAHAMSTOWN
Case no: 1466/2012
Case Heard: 07/04/2016
Date Delivered: 05/05/2016
In the matter between:
EASTERN
CAPE AND TOURISM AGENCY
APPLICANT
and
MEDBURY (PTY) LTD t/a CROWN RIVER SAFARI 1ST
DEFENDANT
WILDLIFE
RANCHING SOUTH AFRICA Amicus Curiae
JUDGMENT
ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
SMITH J:
[1] The plaintiff seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, alternatively to the Full Bench of the Eastern Cape Division, against my judgment delivered on 18 February 2016. The defendant opposed the application.
[2] Mr Buchanan SC, who appeared for the plaintiff, submitted that there are reasonable prospects that an appeal court may find that to interpret section 2(1)(a) of the Game Theft Act, 105 of 1991 (“the Act”) so as to extend protection against loss of ownership of escaped game only to land covered by a certificate of sufficient enclosure mentioned in section 2 (2)(a) of the Act, results in an absurdity not intended by the legislature. The contended absurdity lies in the fact that, interpreted in this manner, the section provides no protection in respect of land, which, although de facto sufficiently enclosed, has not been issued with the certificate of sufficient enclosure. He argued that there are reasonable prospects
that another court may find that a reasonable interpretation of that section would be that the protection against loss of ownership
extends to land which is in fact sufficiently enclosed, or in respect of which a current certificate mentioned in section 2(2)(a) of the Act had been issued.
[3] I do not agree. For the reasons mentioned in my judgment, when considered in the light of the accepted canons of construction, the
wording of the section allows for only one interpretation namely, that section 2(1)(a) of the Act limits protection against loss of ownership only to land in respect of which a certificate mentioned in section 2)(2)(a) had been issued. The construction contended for by the plaintiff is so far removed from the ordinary meaning of the wording of the section that it is really contending for a legislative act rather than a mere construction of the section. I do not think that there are reasonable prospects that another court may find differently.
[4] I am similarly of the view that there are no reasonable prospects that another court may find that the plaintiff has made out a case for the development of the common law. As mentioned in my judgment, the legislature has already amended the common law by virtue of the provisions of the Act. The plaintiff’s contention is in essence that it has not gone far enough in this regard. The appropriate course in such a case is the amendment of the legislation and not the development of the common law by the court. In the light of the fact that it is common cause that the Department of Environmental Affairs has undertaken a process that may result in the reform of the impugned common law rule, it is both unnecessary and inappropriate for the court to develop the common law in these circumstances. In the event, I have also found that the plaintiff has not made out a case for the contended alteration of the common law, and the court has not been provided with a satisfactory factual and scientific bases for such an undertaking. An ill-considered development of the common law, founded upon insufficient information, will do more harm than good, and could have numerous unforeseen (and perhaps even unfortunate) ramifications.
[5] I am accordingly not satisfied that there are reasonable prospects that another court may find that a proper case has been made out for the contended development of the common law.
[6] In the result the application for leave to appeal is refused with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
_____
J.E
SMITH
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
Counsel for the Plaintiff : Mr Buchanan SC
Attorney for the Plaintiff : Netteltons
118A High Street
GRAHAMSTOWN
Ref: Mr Hart
Tel: 046 611 7149
Counsel for the Defendant : Mr Smuts SC
Attorney for the Defendant : Weyer Waldick and Willemse
c/o
Wheeldon Rushmere and Cole
199 High Street
Grahamstown
Ref: B Brody
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae: McCallum Attorneys
87 High Street
Ref: M G McCallum
Date Heard
: 07 April 2016
Date Delivered : 05 May 2016
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