Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Williams N.O and Others (JR1552/21; JR1625/21) [2024] ZALCJHB 482 (28 November 2024)

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

Not Reportable

Case No: JR1552/21

In the matter between:

EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Applicant and WILLIAMS, G.I. N.O. First Respondent SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT BARGAINING COUNCIL Second Respondent ELIAS MZWANELE YAWA Third Respondent Case No: JR1625/21 In the matter between: ELIAS MZWANELE YAWA Applicant and SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT BARGAINING COUNCIL First Respondent WILLIAMS, G.I. N.O. Second Respondent EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Third Respondent

Heard: 31 October 2024

Delivered: 28 November 2024

JUDGMENT

MAKHURA, J

Introduction

[1] This Court is seized with two review applications against the arbitration award dated 29 June 2021. The award was issued subsequent to a referral of an unfair dismissal dispute in terms of section 191(1)(a)(i) of the Labour Relations Act[1] (LRA) by Elias Mzwanele Yawa (employee or Yawa), the third respondent in case number JR1552/21 and applicant in JR1625/21, to the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC). The employee was employed by Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Municipality)

in terms of a five year fixed contract of employment. In his dispute referral, the employee alleged that he was unfairly dismissed for “other” reasons and sought reinstatement.

[2] The unfair dismissal claim was opposed by the Municipality, the applicant in case number JR1552/21 and the third respondent in case number JR1625/21. The Municipality opposed the claim on the basis that the employee’s fixed contract of employment terminated automatically upon expiration of the five year period, which was the contracted period.

[3] The review applications by the Municipality and the employee were filed on 27 July 2021 and 3 August 2021 respectively. The Municipality challenges the whole of the award and seeks an order dismissing the unfair dismissal claim alternatively remitting the dispute to the SALGBC for arbitration de novo. It seeks the dismissal of the employee’s review application.

[4] The employee seeks the dismissal of the Municipality’s review application. In his application, he seeks to review that part of the commissioner’s award which found that reinstatement or re-employment is “not feasible” and seeks an order of retrospective reinstatement, alternatively, he seeks this Court to determine the reasonable expectation dispute and not to remit the matter to the SALGBC for a de novo hearing.

[5] The Municipality applied for reinstatement of the review application. The employee raised a preliminary point relating to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Municipality’s reinstatement application because the reinstatement application is archived and the Municipality has not applied for its retrieval or revival. I deal with this point first.

Has the reinstatement application of the review application lapsed or archived?

[6] The Municipality applied for reinstatement of the review application simultaneously with a consolidation of the two applications. The employee, in his oral arguments, submitted that the reinstatement application is archived and that in the absence of an application to retrieve the file from the archives or revive the application, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Municipality’s

application. Reliance was placed on item 16 of the Practice Manual[2], as it was applicable at the time, which provided that where a period of six months has elapsed without any steps taken by the applicant from the date of the application or the last process filed, the Registrar will archive the file.

[7] The review application brought by the employee was previously enrolled for hearing on 3 August 2023, where the Municipality was ordered to file a consolidation application. The Municipality filed the consolidation and reinstatement application on 18 August 2023. The pleadings in this application closed on 26 September 2023 and the index to the application was also filed on the same day, suggesting that the court file was also paginated on the same day.

[8] This reinstatement application was brought in terms of Rule 7 of the rules of this court as they applied then[3]. It is not a review application, which was subject to the provisions of item 11.2 of the Practice Manual. The question is what steps or process was the Municipality required to take or file after it indexed and paginated the application. Unlike item 11.2.7[4] of the Practice Manual which dealt with review applications and required an applicant to inform the Registrar in writing that the

matter is ready for allocation of a date, item 16 is silent on this point. There is no requirement that in all other applications save for review, this procedure is applicable. The next process after the closure of pleadings was for the matter to be enrolled for hearing, particularly considering that the main application was before Court on 3 August 2023. There was no ‘next process’ the Municipality had to undertake or file.

[9] Based on the above, the jurisdictional point raised by the employee that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the consolidation and reinstatement application is dismissed. I proceed to deal with the merits of the consolidation and reinstatement application below.

Consolidation and reinstatement of the review application

[10] The employee’s review application appeared before this Court on 3 August 2023. On that day, an order was issued that the Municipality should bring an application for consolidation of the two matters. The Municipality filed this application on 18 August 2023. In its notice of motion, it sought an order for consolidation of the two applications, which erroneously refers to the employee’s review application as a cross review.

[11] With regard to the consolidation application, I indicated to the parties at the commencement of the proceedings that the two review applications, though against the same award, remain two independent applications. The relief sought by the applicants in each application is different. I informed the parties that whilst the two applications must be heard simultaneously, I was not inclined to consolidate the matters. The parties did not persist with the consolidation application.

[12] The Municipality sought an order for reinstatement of its review application under case number JR1552/21. It is clear from the founding affidavit that the Municipality seeks an order albeit conditionally condoning the late delivery of the record and reinstatement of the deemed withdrawn review application.

[13] On 23 August 2021, the Registrar notified the Municipality’s attorneys that the record had been received from the SALGBC and that it was ready for collection. The 60 days lapsed on 15 November 2021 and therefore the review application was, as of 16 November 2021, deemed withdrawn. The Municipality filed the reconstructed record of proceedings on 22 February 2022. The record, peculiarly, was preceded by the Municipality’s supplementary affidavit on 9 February 2022. Nothing turns on this issue.

[14] The delay in filing the record is three months. The Municipality explained that after filing the review application, the commissioner deposed to an affidavit on 24 August 2021 that he lost the record. Subsequently, the parties met to reconstruct the record. The last reconstruction meeting took place from 17 to 19 November 2021.

[15] The last transcriber’s certificate to the record shows that the reconstructed record was transcribed and completed on 25 November

2021. The Municipality’s application for condonation is silent on the explanation from 26 November 2021 to 22 February 2022 when it filed the record. The explanation is therefore deficient. However, that is not the end of the enquiry as all the factors for condonation must be considered holistically[5]. The Municipality’s application is predicated on prospects of success, the importance of the matter and prejudice.

[16] Having considered these factors, the importance of properly ventilating all the issues before the Court and the lack of prejudice on the part of the employee, I am of the view that it is in the interest of justice to grant the Municipality condonation for the late delivery of its record and reinstate the review application. Accordingly, the late delivery of the record is condoned and the review application is reinstated.

Material facts

[17] The facts of the matter appear from the record filed under case number JR1625/21. Yawa was employed as a Director: Labour Relations on a five year fixed term contract of employment with effect from 1 February 2012 to 31 January 2017. Clause 2.6.1 of the contract of employment incorporated the policies of the Municipality as part of the terms and conditions of the employment. Despite the contract of employment stating that the employee’s employment was in terms of section 56 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act[6] (Systems Act), it is common cause that the employee was not a section 56 employee.

[18] On or about 22 January 2014, the Mayoral Committee of the Municipality approved the Employee Retention Strategy Policy (ERS Policy). This ERS Policy was subsequently approved by Council. The contract of employment stated, though superfluous in my view, that the resolutions passed by Council are part of and incorporated into the contract of employment.

[19] The ERS Policy’s purpose was to retain key employees already in the employ of the Municipality and to attract new employees with the necessary skills to assist the Municipality to implement its mandate and strategic objectives. The ERS Policy further recognized as “untenable” a situation created by the uncertain future of the fixed term contract employees and sought to “ensure certainty of employment” for these employees. To address this “untenable” situation and create certainty, the ERS Policy introduced a three-mechanism concept. This concept was to be developed further by way of an introduction of a new policy called “Contract Roll-Over Policy” (CRO Policy) for fixed term employees.

[20] The CRO Policy was subsequently developed, tabled before and approved by Council on 26 March 2015. Its purpose was articulated as amongst others to create timeous certainty on whether the employee’s fixed term contract would be “rolled over or extended or not”. It applied to employees employed in terms of section 56 of the Systems Act and other employees on five years or more fixed term contracts.

[21] The CRO Policy introduced two mechanisms – (1) automatic or undisputed roll over or renewal and (2) non-automatic or disputed roll over. In terms of the automatic or undisputed roll over, an employee who obtains a final moderated performance level consistently above the score which attracts a payment of performance bonus for a period of three successive years shall have his or her fixed term contract renewed or rolled over for five years at the end of the third year of employment. In simple terms, an employee who meets or exceeds the performance standard and qualifies for performance bonus shall, after the outcome of his or her moderated performance score, be entitled to a renewal of his or her fixed term contract.

[22] The disputed or non-automatic roll over was for those employees whose performance is not consistent during the first three years of their five year fixed term contract period. For these employees, their fixed term contracts would be provisionally renewed for another five years at the end of their third year. These employees are then given an opportunity during their fourth year to perform and if they do so to the required standard, their provisional renewal would then be confirmed. Those who perform below the required

level would not be considered for renewal and their contracts would lapse.

[23] On 15 July 2016, the employee, in his capacity as the Acting Head of Department: Human Resource Management and Development, prepared a submission motivating for the CRO Policy to apply to him and another employee and for their fixed term contracts to be renewed. The employee submitted that they qualify on the basis of undisputed or automatic roll over provision of the CRO Policy.

[24] On 6 September 2016, the HR department prepared a report on the implementation of the CRO Policy. The report recommended the renewal of ten employees’ fixed term contracts for a period of another five years. The employee was amongst the ten employees whose contracts were recommended for renewal. The report reflected the employee’s performance scores for the previous three years from 2012/13 financial year as 3.53, 3.64 and 3.31 respectively.

[25] On 20 September 2016, the employee addressed a letter to the acting City Manager arguing that he qualified for contract renewal or extension until 31 January 2022 and requested confirmation in writing that his “employment contract has or shall be so extended”.

[26] However, Human Resources Department prepared another report, to be presented to Council on 29 September 2016, motivating for the rescission of the CRO Policy. The report indicated that the Municipality was unable to implement the CRO Policy to renew the fixed term contracts. It cited the provisions of section 56 of the Systems Act and raised a number of irregularities with the CRO Policy.

[27] The report stated that the CRO Policy allows the re-appointment or renewal of the fixed term contract on the basis of the performance of the current incumbent. Secondly, the authority and power to renew (appoint or re-appoint) in terms of the CRO Policy is with the City Manager and the HOD: HR whilst the Systems Act reserved this power for Council in consultation with the municipal manager. Further, the report stated that the CRO Policy, which was approved on 26 March 2015, had not been implemented.

[28] On the strength of this motivation, Council rescinded the CRO Policy and authorized Human Resources department to embark on a recruitment process for those fixed term contracts that were about to expire.

[29] On or about 26 September 2016, the employee referred an unfair labour practice dispute to the SALGBC. The unfair labour practice dispute allegedly arose in August and persisted on 23 September 2016. In this referral, the employee contended that the City Manager failed to communicate the extension of his fixed term contract for another five years until 31 January 2022. Under special features, the employee stated that Council took a resolution that employees who are below the secretary to Council must be employed on a permanent basis and that he wanted that benefit. The result sought was a declaratory ruling that his employment was extended to 31 January 2022. It is common cause that the unfair labour practice claim was dismissed on 15 November 2021.

[30] In late January 2017, the employee launched proceedings before this Court seeking inter alia to interdict the Municipality from terminating his employment pending finalisation of the unfair labour practice dispute. In his affidavit in support of the application, the employee stated that his fixed term contract was due to expire on 31 January 2017, that he received no communication that his fixed term contract had been extended, that the previous City Manager “agreed to [give] effect to the Council resolution and extend [his] contract by five years” and that the Municipality has not denied his “assertion that [his] employment contract is automatically extended to 31 January 2022”. Further, the employee stated that he realised on 9 January 2017 in a letter from the Municipality that it was “disputing [his] contractual right of automatic extension of [his] contract of employment”.

[31] On 30 January 2017, the Municipality wrote to Yawa informing him that his fixed term contract was due to lapse on 31 January 2017 and would not be renewed. The employee’s contract, according to the Municipality, was not renewed.

[32] On 1 March 2017, the employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the SALGBC. In his referral, the employee alleged that the dispute arose on 31 January 2017 and that he was dismissed for “other” reasons. The facts of the dispute were summarised as - “Employer should have renewed/confirmed renewal of a fixed term contract on same terms but did not”. He sought the remedy of reinstatement to the “renewed contract on same terms”.

The arbitration proceedings and award

[33] The commissioner, in his analysis of evidence and arguments, recorded the common cause fact that the employee was employed on a fixed term contract of employment from 1 February 2012 to 31 January 2017. He reiterated that the question before him was whether the employee was dismissed or whether his contract terminated automatically on its expiry.

[34] The commissioner then analysed the ERS and CRO policies. He observed that the ERS Policy was intended to retain employees with scarce and critical skills and concluded that the employee possessed critical skills which the Municipality sought to retain through the introduction of the ERS Policy.

[35] The Municipality’s submission was that the CRO Policy was rescinded and therefore was not applicable to the employee. Further, the Municipality submitted that the CRO Policy applied prospectively from 26 March 2015, not retrospectively and that the employee, at the time the policy came into operation, had already completed three years on 31 January 2015. Therefore, the CRO Policy did not apply to him.

[36] The commissioner found that the ERS Policy, which was approved in January 2014, became part of the terms and conditions of the employment contract. The CRO Policy, the commissioner concluded, did not alter the position set out in the ERS Policy and that whether the CRO Policy applied retrospectively or prospectively was irrelevant. He found that the submission that the CRO Policy came into effect after the employee had been employed for more than three years ignored the fact that the ERS Policy came into effect in January 2014. Further, he found that the performance management system is based on the financial year from July to June of the following year and that the contextual interpretation of the ERS Policy and CRO Policy means that the renewal of the fixed term

contract should be triggered by the moderated performance scores after three consecutive years. The commissioner then concluded that the employee performed to the required standard in the three years from 2012 to 2015 and that the “right to the roll over of the fixed term contract accrued on the 13 July 2016 upon the Council taking a resolution to pay performance

incentive bonus to numerous employees, including the applicant”.

[37] Dealing with the Council’s rescission of the CRO Policy, the commissioner found as follows:

‘That the Council Resolution rescinding the ROP remains binding until set aside in a proper forum does not detract from the unfairness of the removal of the accrued right to extend the said contract as envisaged in the rescinded Council Resolution read with the ERS which itself is a valid Council Resolution.’

[38] He then found that the fixed term contract “ought to have been extended” as the employee was entitled thereto pursuant to the ERS and CRO policies. Further, the commissioner found that the employee’s

contract “certainly did not terminate automatically” at the end of 31 January 2017 and that it was not necessary to determine whether or not the employee had legitimate expectation of renewal of the fixed term contract. He found that the employee was dismissed and proceeded to deal with the appropriate relief.

Evaluation

[39] During the hearing, both parties referred me to various authorities which in my view are not critical to the issue. The authorities are also contained in their heads of arguments.

[40] The first critical question is whether the commissioner was correct that the employee was dismissed. To answer this question, this Court has to consider, amongst others, the nature of the dispute referred by the employee and the evidence presented. If the commissioner was correct and the employee was dismissed, the second question is whether the issue relating to the fairness of the dismissal was before the commissioner. If this issue was not before the commissioner, then the matter must be remitted for arbitration on

the fairness of the dismissal. The result of this finding would mean that the review application by the employee must fail as the

commissioner would have determined the issue of the remedy prematurely. If the issue was before the commissioner, the remedy review brought by the employee would be entertained on its merit.

[41] The applicable test to a commissioner’s jurisdictional ruling is that set out in SA Rugby Players Association and others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd and others[7]. Therefore, the question before me is whether the commissioner’s finding that the employee was dismissed is correct.

[42] At the arbitration proceedings, the parties concluded a pre-arbitration minute, narrowing the issues and setting the commissioner’s terms of reference. The pre-arbitration minute recorded the facts in dispute and the issues that the arbitrator was required to determine as follows:

‘Whether the Applicant was dismissed.

That the Applicant’s FTC terminated by effluxion of time.

Whether the provisions of 7.1.1.(a) of the Respondent’s Roll Over Policy applies to the Applicant.

The legal effect of the decision to rescind the Roll Over Policy.

Applicant’s reasonable expectation of renewal of FTC.

Whether the Applicant’s FTC (was) automatically renewed or not.

Whether the employee retention strategy has been rescinded.

Whether the Applicant’s FTC has been terminated.’

[43] The significance of the pre-arbitration minute, just like the pre-trial minute, cannot be overstated. The LAC recently dealt with this issue as follows:

‘The binding nature of a pre-arbitration minute is well accepted. Like a pre-trial minute, a pre-arbitration minute “…is a consensual document which binds the parties thereto and obliges the [arbitrator] (in the same way as the parties’ pleadings do) to decide only the issues set out therein”. In South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Louw, this Court, per Sutherland JA, suitably restated the purpose of a minute as follows:

‘The chief objective of the pre-trial conference is to agree on limiting the issues that go to trial. Properly applied, a typical minute – cum – agreement will shrink the scope of the issues to be advanced by the litigants. This means, axiomatically, that a litigant cannot fall back on the broader terms of the pleadings to evade the narrowing effect of the terms of a minute. A minute, quite properly, may contradict the pleadings, by, for example, the giving an admission which replaces an earlier denial. When, such as in the typical retrenchment case, there are a potential plethora of facts, issues and sub-issues, by the time the pre-trial conference is convened, counsel for the respective litigants have to make choices about the ground upon which they want to contest the case. There is no room for any sleight of hand, or clever nuanced or contorted interpretations of the terms of the minute or of the pleadings to sneak back in what has been excluded by the terms of a minute. The trimmed down issues alone may be legitimately advanced. Necessarily, therefore, the strategic choices made in a pre-trial conference need to be carefully thought through, seriously made, and scrupulously adhered to. It is not open to a court to undo the laces of the strait-jacket into which the litigants have confined themselves.’’[8]

[44] The commissioner understood what he was called upon to determine. This is recorded in paragraphs 3 and 13 of the award. He stated that he was required to determine whether the employee was dismissed or his contract of employment automatically lapsed at the end of the fixed term period or whether the employee had a legitimate expectation of renewal of his fixed term contract of employment. Having determined the issue, his answer was as follows:

‘The fixed term contract of employment of Mr. Yawa ought [to] have been extended as he was entitled thereto pursuant clauses 12.6 of the ERS and clause 7.1.1.(a) of the ROP more so he was not a section 56 employee. This contract certainly did not terminate automatically by affluxion of time. It is unnecessary, in light of the above finding, to determine whether or not Mr. Yawa had a legitimate expectation of renewal of the fixed term contract.

The applicant had been dismissed for the right to extension of his contract accrued prior the rescission of the Council Resolution on RDP and was further rooted in the ERS which is extant.’

[45] On the face of it, the commissioner decided that the contract did not lapse or that it did not terminate by effluxion of time. However, he immediately found that the fixed term contract “ought” to have been extended, but then decided that it was not necessary to deal with a claim for reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed term contract. He concluded that the applicant was dismissed.

[46] The commissioner’s decision is not that the employee was dismissed as envisaged in section 186(1)(b) of the LRA, that is, that he reasonably expected his fixed term contract to be renewed but the Municipality failed to renew it. Inexplicably, despite his decision to not deal with whether the employee was dismissed within the meaning of section 186(1)(b) of the LRA, he found that his contract ought to have been extended and he was therefore dismissed because he had accrued the right of an extension of his contract, which suggests that the employee’s termination is based on non-renewal or non-extension of the fixed term contract.

His findings are contradictory and untenable.

[47] It is therefore not clear on what basis he found that the employee was dismissed. Was the employee dismissed because of his alleged reasonable expectation of renewal or extension of his contract which was due to lapse on 31 January 2017? The commissioner recorded that it was not necessary to entertain the reasonable expectation of the renewal of the contract.

[48] Is the commissioner’s finding that the employee’s fixed term contract was automatically renewed and that the Municipality terminated the “renewed” fixed term contract which was due to take effect on 1 February 2017 and expire on 31 January 2022? What was the dispute referred by the employee to the SALGBC?

[49] The employee’s referral simply states that he was dismissed for “other” reasons, not to be confused with dismissal for “unknown reasons”. He stated that the Municipality should have renewed his fixed term contract but failed to do so and that he wanted to be reinstated to the “renewed contract”. His referral appears to suggest that the Municipality dismissed him for failure to renew his fixed term contract, but it equally suggests that, with reference to the remedy of reinstatement to the “renewed contract”, that the Municipality terminated the renewed contract, for “other” reasons.

[50] The common cause facts are that (1) the employee was employed on a five-year fixed term contract until 31 January 2017, (2) the Municipality informed the employee that his fixed term contract would not be renewed and (3) the fixed term contract was not renewed. It is unclear whether the applicant’s alleged unfair dismissal dispute was intended to enforce the contract of employment or whether the claim was one in terms section 186(1)(b) of the LRA.

[51] The incoherences and contradictions in the commissioner’s findings mean that his decision is ambiguous. For the Municipality to be able to discharge its duty of showing whether the dismissal was fair or not, the reason why the commissioner found that the employee was dismissed is critical. It is impossible to delineate from the award whether or not the dismissal is one envisaged in sections 186(1) and 188 of the LRA or on some other provisions.

[52] By virtue of his referral to the SALGBC, the employee sought to vindicate his right in terms of section 185(a) of the LRA not to be unfairly dismissed. He was not vindicating the right to be dismissed as I do not believe there is such a right. The commissioner, having found that the employee was dismissed, then veered from the parties’ agreed scope of the issues and proceeded to deal with the remedy and found that reinstatement or re-employment was “not feasible” because the employee was succeeded by another employee and that the position he held had since changed. He concluded that compensation would be an appropriate remedy and ordered that the matter be rescheduled to deal with the appropriate order of compensation.

[53] The commissioner erred, committed a gross irregularity and exceeded his powers. First, he determined the issue that was not before him. The parties have delineated the issues for determination in the pre-arbitration minute. They asked the commissioner to determine whether the employee was dismissed, and nothing further. The issue of the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal (in the event he determined that the employee was dismissed), was not before him, leading to unfair arbitration proceedings. Second, he was required to determine first whether the dismissal was fair or not. For him, it followed axiomatically after his decision that the employee was dismissed, that the dismissal was unfair.

[54] The appropriate approach the commissioner should have adopted after a finding that the employee was dismissed was to reschedule the matter for arbitration on the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal and the remedy. The award falls to be reviewed and set aside. The appropriate remedy, considering the reasons above, is to remit the matter to the SALGBC to be arbitrated de novo in its entirety.

[55] Based on the findings above, the remedy or penalty review application brought by the employee cannot succeed. It is in fact rendered academic. It is overtaken by the finding that the whole award stands to be reviewed and set aside and the referral of the dispute for arbitration de novo. The relief sought by the employee that this Court should entertain the claim for reasonable expectation is not sustainable and not legally grounded. The SALGBC has jurisdiction to determine that issue. It has not determined it and this Court has no decision to review and to substitute. Significantly, this issue was not properly ventilated during arbitration proceedings. The Court does not assume jurisdiction on request by the parties.

[56] In the premises, the following order is made:

Order

1. The preliminary point raised that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the consolidation and reinstatement application is dismissed.

2. The application for consolidation of the two matters is dismissed.

3. In case number JR1552/21:

3.1. The late delivery of the record is condoned and the review application is reinstated.

3.2. The review application succeeds.

3.3. The arbitration award issued by the first respondent under case number GPD061712 dated 29 June 2021 is reviewed and set aside.

3.4. The unfair dismissal dispute between the parties is referred to the second respondent for arbitration de novo.

3.5. The second respondent is ordered, within 10 days of receipt of this order, to schedule the matter for arbitration and serve the parties with a notice of set down.

4. In case number JR1625/21:

4.1. The review application is dismissed.

5. The Municipality is ordered to serve this judgment on the second respondent by email and by hand within 5 days of the date of this judgment.

6. There is no order as to costs.

M. Makhura

Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

Appearances:

For the Applicant in JR1552/21 & Third Respondent in JR1625/21: Mr. D. Mogaswa of Mogaswa Incorporated

For the Applicant in JR1625/21 & Third Respondent in JR1552/21: Mr. E.M. Yawa (In person)

[1] Act 66 of 1995, as amended.

[2] Practice Manual of the Labour Court of South Africa, 2 April 2013 (repealed).

[3] Rules for the conduct of proceedings in the Labour Court, GN 1665 in GG 17495, 14 October 1996 (repealed).

[4] Item 11.2.7 provides: “A review application is by its nature an urgent application. An applicant in a review application is therefore required to ensure

that all the necessary papers in the application are filed within twelve (12) months of the date of the application (excluding Heads of Arguments) and the registrar is informed in writing that the application is ready for allocation for hearing. Where this time limit is not complied with, the application will be archived and be regarded as lapsed unless good cause is shown why the application should not be archived or removed from the archive”.

[5] Mphephu-Ramabulana and Another v Mphephu and Others [2021] ZACC 43; 2022 (1) BCLR 202 (CC) at para 38.

[6] Act 32 of 2000, as amended.

[7] (2008) 29 ILJ 2218 (LAC)[2008] ZALAC 3; ; [2008] 9 BLLR 845 (LAC) at paras 39 – 41; see also: Ukweza Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Nyondo and Others [2020] ZALAC 7; (2020) 41 ILJ 1354 (LAC) at para 12.

[8] Thamsanqa Mbeje and others Department of Health, Kwazulu Natal and others [2024] ZALAC 38; [2024] 11 BLLR 1111 (LAC) at para 18.