Ethekwini Municipality v Phyllis and Others (7081/2012) [2012] ZAKZDHC 74 (12 November 2012)
- Citation
- [2012] ZAKZDHC 74
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
- Panel
- M Pillemer
- Case number
- 7081/2012
More details
- Court
- Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
- Panel
- M Pillemer
- Case number
- 7081/2012
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The application was dismissed because the applicant failed to establish a cause of action in law to justify the cancellation of the respondents' title deeds and deprivation of their ownership. The applicant did not prove the existence or breach of any contractual terms entitling it to relief, nor did it comply with statutory requirements for notifying the Registrar of Deeds. Section 25 of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property, and the applicant's reliance on regulations was insufficient without evidence of enforceable contracts. The court found no lawful basis for the relief sought and refused to adjourn the matter to allow the applicant to supplement its papers.
Court disposition
Application dismissed.
Orders
- The application is dismissed.
02
Material facts
Parties
Ethekwini Municipality
Applicant Counsel: M I MkhizeSindiswe B Phyllis and 24 Others
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Civil Application / Final Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicant is entitled to cancel the respondents' title deeds and deprive them of ownership of their land.
- 02
Whether the applicant has established a cause of action in law to justify deprivation of property.
- 03
Whether the requirements of section 25 of the Constitution regarding deprivation of property have been met.
- 04
Whether the applicant has proven the existence and breach of any contractual terms entitling it to relief.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant argued that the respondents failed to collect their title deeds and failed to erect structures on the allocated sites, justifying cancellation of ownership. Reliance was placed on regulation 11 in Chapter IV of the Township Establishment and Land Use Regulations, 1986, promulgated under the Black Communities Development Act, 1984, which allegedly allows for withdrawal of land in case of breach of terms. The applicant claimed that the social need for housing and development justified the relief sought.
- Respondent
- The respondents did not file opposing papers. However, the court noted that the applicant failed to prove the existence of any contractual terms or agreements that would entitle it to cancel the respondents' ownership. The Registrar of Deeds was not properly cited or notified, and there was no evidence of breach of contract or lawful basis for deprivation of property.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 25 of the Constitution
No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
- 02
Section 9(7) of the Less Formal Township Establishment Act, 113 of 1991
Ownership of an erf is deemed to have been transferred on the date of registration by the registrar of a deed of transfer.
- 03
Regulation 11, Chapter IV, Township Establishment and Land Use Regulations, 1986
The applicant must prove the terms of the agreement and the breach giving rise to the right to withdraw the land before relief can be granted.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The application was dismissed because the applicant failed to establish a cause of action in law to justify the cancellation of the respondents' title deeds and deprivation of their ownership. The applicant did not prove the existence or breach of any contractual terms entitling it to relief, nor did it comply with statutory requirements for notifying the Registrar of Deeds. Section 25 of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property, and the applicant's reliance on regulations was insufficient without evidence of enforceable contracts. The court found no lawful basis for the relief sought and refused to adjourn the matter to allow the applicant to supplement its papers.
Obiter and limits
- The social need for housing and land development is obvious, but legal requirements must be met before depriving individuals of property.
- If the contracts are located in future, proceedings relying on a valid cause of action may be brought, but the present application is fatally defective.
Court disposition
Application dismissed.
- The application is dismissed.
Source and reliance status
Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
Judgment
IN THE KWAZULU-NATAL HIGH COURT,
DURBAN
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE NO:7081/2012
In the matter between:
ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY...................................................Applicant
...................................................
SINDISWE B PHYLLIS AND 24 OTHERS..............................Respondents
..............................
______________
JUDGMENT
Delivered : 12 November 2012
M PILLEMER, AJ:
[1] The Applicant, the Ethekwini Municipality, seeks an order against a number of individual respondents for the cancellation of the registration of residential sites in their names in the Township of Luganda coupled with an order that the registrar of deeds is authorised “to act accordingly”. The Applicant in addition prays for a declaration that it is entitled to re-allocate the sites to other persons as it deems meet.
[2] The papers reveal that each of the respondents is the registered owner of an erf in the township and that a title deed has been issued to reflect such ownership; registration having occurred in terms of s9 of the Less Formal Township Establishment Act, 113 of 1991.
[3] In terms of s9(7) of the Act “Ownership of the erf shall be deemed to have been transferred on the date of registration by the registrar of a deed of transfer”.
[4] What is sought therefore is an order cancelling the title deeds and depriving the respondents of ownership of their land and conferring on the applicant the right to allocate what was the respondent’s property to others.
[5] The Registrar of Deeds has not been cited as a respondent and the registrar has not been given the requisite seven days notice required bys 97of theDeeds RegistriesAct, 1937. I was informed from the bar that it was only after I had asked a few days ago to see the report from the Registrar of Deeds that the papers were served on him and that a report is not yet available.
Deeds Registries
Act, 1937
[6] The properties in Luganda Township were transferred at various dates in 1995. Some of the persons who received transfer have not collected their title deeds. The respondents were alleged to fall into this category.
[7] The deponent to the founding affidavit is the Manager: Conveyancing at the municipality. He has annexed copies of the title deeds of the respondents that reflect their ownership, has explained that these were issued by the then Town Council of the Borough of Pinetown, which had developed the township of Luganda in terms the Less Formal Township Establishment Act and goes on to explain that it took a while for the title deeds to become available for collection and that some of the owners did not come to collect them. The Borough of Pinetown was incorporated into the Durban Metropolitan Council in 1995 and persons who would have had to report to the Pinetown offices now had to report to the Durban offices to collect their certificates. He testifies that the respondents failed to collect their certificates and failed to put up structures on the sites as was expected of them when the sites were allocated. He then explains the attempts made to contact the respondents, which largely involved publication in newspapers in Durban. Enquiries were also made at the sites themselves from occupants in the area initially to no avail in relation to all of the respondents. There were some who have been located since the application was launched and so no relief is being sought against them. There is some holding cost to the municipality for grass cutting and the like and there are people on the waiting list for housing who could take up the sites. The deponent then asked for the relief “in the interest of everybody”.
[8] An affidavit is also put up of a Mr Mhlongo, who is described as a Principal Professional Officer employed by the municipality. He confirms the contents of the main affidavit as it refers to him. There is no reference to him whatsoever in the main affidavit so his affidavit is completely pointless and takes the matter no further.
[9] For a reason that is not apparent on the file the court was persuaded to issue arule nisi, which was then served by publication in two newspapers. Considerable costs have been incurred to date and while the social need to have the land developed and for the owners to make meaningful use of their property is obvious, the applicant had to have a cause of action before it could come to court to deprive the respondents of their ownership of the land that had been transferred to them.
rule nisi
[10] The fundamental difficulty the applicant faces is that in terms of s25 of the Constitution no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. Mr Mkhize, who appeared for the applicant, furnished detailed written argument and in his oral address attempted to persuade me that there is a law of general application that applies and entitles the applicant to the relief. He placed reliance on regulation 11 in Chapter IV of the Township Establishment and Land Use Regulations, 1986 promulgated under the Black Community Act of 1984 which make provision for an agreement to contain terms and conditions relating to a breach and that such agreement must dealinter aliawith the failure to erect improvements within a given period which will then be regarded as a breach of the terms on which the land was made available and the land may be withdrawn.
inter alia
[8] I have misgivings as to whether the regulations apply. But even if they do the regulations are of no assistance to the applicant without it first proving the terms of the agreement in terms of which the land was allocated and the breach giving rise to the right to withdraw the land. Applicant fails to do this, making no mention of the contracts in the papers and I was informed from the bar that it is having difficulty locating the agreements that were signed at the time. In the absence of an enforceable contractual term that would confer such a right, short of expropriation there is no immediately apparent basis in law to cancel the respondents’ ownership and give their land to someone else.
[5] Mr Mkhize, in the alternative when it was apparent that he was unlikely to persuade me that he was entitled to relief on the papers, asked for the application to be adjourned to enable the applicant to attempt to locate the contracts and to supplement the papers. There does not appear to me to be any point in doing this. If a cause of action can be sustained when and if the contracts are located then proceedings relying upon that cause of action can be brought. The papers in the present application do not make a cause of action and there is no reason for an application that is fatally defective to remain in limbo.
[6] The application is dismissed.
_______
M PILLEMER, AJ
Counsel for the Applicant: M I Mkhize
Applicant’s Attorneys: Mbele Dube and Partners
Date of hearing : 9 November 2012
Date of Judgment : 12 November 2012
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