Eureka DIY Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Soda Cleaning and Equipment North West t/a DIY Depot Fochville and Another (A945/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 347 (20 May 2014)
The court found that the agreement between the parties did not constitute a credit facility as defined by section 8(3) of the National Credit Act because no charges, fees, or interest were levied on amounts payable within 30 days. Interest was only charged as a penalty on default, which does not bring the agreement...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2014] ZAGPPHC 347
- Parties
- Appellant: Eureka DIY Solutions (Pty) Ltd; Respondent: Soda Cleaning and Equipment North West t/a DIY Depot Fochville; Respondent: Strydom, Marius Sigfried
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Case Number
- A945/2013
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Appeal / Appeal Against Magistrate's Dismissal of Claim
- Outcome
- Appeal upheld; magistrate's order set aside; special plea dismissed with costs; matter referred back for adjudication on the merits.
- Judges
- Potterill, A.C.M. Pieterse
- Legal Topics
- National Credit Act, Credit Facility Definition, Section 8 Nca, Section 129 Notice, Incidental Credit Agreement
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Eureka DIY Solutions (Pty) Ltd
Appellant
Soda Cleaning and Equipment North West t/a DIY Depot Fochville
Respondent
Strydom, Marius Sigfried
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal Against Magistrate's Dismissal of Claim
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the agreement between the parties constitutes a credit facility under section 8(3) of the National Credit Act.
- 2 Whether the appellant was required to comply with section 129 of the National Credit Act.
- 3 Whether the magistrate erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claim based on non-compliance with the NCA.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the agreement between the parties did not constitute a credit facility as defined by section 8(3) of the National Credit Act because no charges, fees, or interest were levied on amounts payable within 30 days. Interest was only charged as a penalty on default, which does not bring the agreement within the scope of the NCA's credit facility provisions. The magistrate erred in finding otherwise, and the special pleas relating to non-compliance with section 129 and non-registration as a credit provider were not applicable. The appeal was upheld, the magistrate's order set aside, and the matter referred back for adjudication on the merits.
Court Disposition
Appeal upheld; magistrate's order set aside; special plea dismissed with costs; matter referred back for adjudication on the merits.
Orders
- The appeal is upheld with costs.
- The order of the magistrate is set aside.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
55 paragraphs
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case Number: A945/2013
Date: 20 May 2014
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
In the matter between:
EUREKA DIY SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD.........................................................................Plaintiff/Appellant
and
SODA CLEANING AND EQUIPMENT NORTH
WEST t/a DIY DEPOT FOCHVILLE...................................................................1st Defendant/Respondent
STRYDOM, MARIUS SIGFRIED.........................................................................2nd Defendant/Respondent
JUDGMENT
POTTERILL J
[1] The appellant is appealing against the court a quo's order that the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs. In coming to this order the court found that the “arrangement"
between the parties was a credit agreement for the purposes of the National Credit Act. Act 3^+ of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the NCA”). The appellant accordingly was bound by section 129 of the NCA and because a section 129(1)(a) notice was not delivered to the respondent the plaintiff’s claim was irregular.
[2] At the date of the hearing there were no heads of argument filed on behalf of the first and second respondents and there was no appearance on behalf of the first and second respondents.
[3] On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the magistrate erred in not considering the totality of section 8 of the NCA. If consideration was given to the whole of section 8 then it was clear that there is a further requirement which would render the agreement as attached to the summons as not being a credit facility as defined in the NCA. It speaks for itself that if the agreement is not a credit facility as defined in section 8 and specifically section 8(3) then the special pleas raised pertaining to the non-compliance with section 129 of the NCA and the nonregistration of the appellant as a credit provider falls away.
[4] Section 8(3) of the NCA reads as follows:
"An agreement, irrespective of its form but not including an agreement contemplated in subsection (2) or section U(6)(b), constitutes a credit facility if. in terms of that agreement —
(a) a credit provider undertakes -
(i) to supply goods or services or to pay an amount or amounts, as determined by the consumer from time to time, to the consumer or on behalf of, or at the direction of, the consumer: and
(ii) either to ~
(aa) defer the consumer's obligation to pay any part of the cost of goods or services, or to repay to the credit provider any part of an amount contemplated in subparagraph (i); or
(bb) bill the consumer periodically for any part of the cost of goods or services, or any pari of an amount, contemplated in subparagraph (i); and
(b) any charge. fee or interest is payable to the credit provider in respect
of -
(i) any amount deferred as contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii)(aa); or
(ii) any amount billed as contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii)(bb) and not paid within the time provided in the agreement."
[5] The argument of the appellant was that the last part of section 8(3) as quoted above was ignored by the court a quo. Plainly put the appellant did not charge interest on the deferred amount and only charged interest as a penalty on nonpayment of amounts.
[6] It is accepted that the appellant supplied goods and that the purchase price is fixed at the time the goods are ordered and
supplied. The price must be paid within 30 days upon presentation of the invoice. The appellant did not levy any finance charges,
administrative costs and/or interest despite the provision therefor in the standard terms and conditions of the appellant as attached to the summons, i agree with the findings of the court in JMV Textiles (Pty) Ltd v De Chaiain Spareinvest 14 CC and Others 2010 (6) SA 173 (KZD) and specifically at paragraphs [15] and [16]:
[ 15 ] ...In my view s 8(3) is directed at the provision by credit providers of charge cards and credit cards and similar arrangements,
and not at conventional safes on credit... ”
[16] Viewed from a broader perspective, that conclusion is consistent with the thrust and purpose of the NCA. In a broad sense it is concerned with the activities of those whose business it is to provide credit to the public and who seek to profit from that business by way of fees, charges and interest.."
[7] I am accordingly satisfied that the agreement before the court is neither an incidental credit agreement nor a credit facility. To reiterate, in the case of a credit facility described in section 8(3) part and parcel of the arrangement between the consumer and the credit provider is that the consumer may take advantage of the offer of credit and the credit provider profits from this agreement in enforcing charges, usually by way of interest, for this advantage of credit. In casu there are no charges or interest on the amounts to be paid within 30 days. There is an entitlement to charge interest on default if the contractual terms were silent on that point by virtue of the provisions of the prescribed Rate of Interest Act, Act 55 of 1975.
[8] The magistrate thus erred in finding that the standard terms and conditions as attached to the particulars of claim qualifies as a credit facility in terms of the NCA. It is thus not necessary to address any of the other special pleas as they ail relate to the NCA.
[9] I accordingly make the following order:
1. The appeal is upheld wilh costs;
2. The order of the magistrate is set aside;
3. The special plea is dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale; and
4.The matter is referred back to the magistrate's office for adjudication on the merits.
S. POTTERILL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree
A.C.M. PIETERSE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE NO: A9U5/2013
HEARD ON: 20 May 201U
FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: ADV. L. STEYN
INSTRUCTED BY: Pierre Krynauw Attorneys
FOR THE 1 and 2 DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENT: NO APPEARANCE
INSTRUCTED BY: Havenga & Viljoen Attorneys
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20 May 201U