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South Africa Judgment

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Firstrand Bank Limited (FNB Division) v Schalwyk (41874/2017) [2018] ZAGPPHC 554 (1 August 2018)

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Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

The court found that the respondent had alleged material facts regarding the calculation of interest rates and the amount of indebtedness, which, if proved at trial, would constitute a defence to the applicant's claim. The respondent's affidavit raised sufficient doubt about the accuracy of the claimed amount, thereby satisfying the requirements for leave to defend in a summary judgment application. Consequently, the application for summary judgment was dismissed, and the respondent was granted leave to defend the matter.

Court disposition

Application for summary judgment dismissed; respondent granted leave to defend; costs to be costs in the cause.

Orders

  • The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
  • The respondent is granted leave to defend the main action.
  • Costs are to be costs in the cause.

02

Material facts

Parties

Firstrand Bank Limited (FNB Division)

Applicant Counsel: Adv. J. Minaar

Samuel Schalwyk

Respondent Counsel: Adv S. F. Fisher-Kleie

Amounts and remedies

  • Amount Claimed by Applicant: ZAR 813,683.69

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Summary Judgment Application / Opposed Summary Judgment

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicant contends that the respondent is in breach of three mortgage loan agreements and owes R813,683.69. The applicant asserts that the respondent has no bona fide defence and has entered an appearance solely to delay the finalisation of the claim.
Respondent
The respondent argues that the amount of indebtedness is unclear due to the application of incorrect, higher interest rates than those agreed in the mortgage bonds. This uncertainty casts doubt on the actual amount due and payable, and thus constitutes a bona fide defence.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Uniform Rule 32(3)

    In summary judgment applications, the respondent must deliver an affidavit fully disclosing the nature and grounds of its bona fide defence and the material facts on which such defence is based. The respondent need not prove the defence but must set up facts that would constitute a defence at trial.

  2. 02

    Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Pty) Ltd 1976 (2) 226 (T)

    If the respondent alleges material facts which, if proved at trial, would constitute a defence, leave to defend should be granted.

  3. 03

    Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Limited 1976 (1) SA 418 (A)

    The respondent is not required to prove the defence at the summary judgment stage, only to set up facts which would constitute a defence at trial.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that the respondent had alleged material facts regarding the calculation of interest rates and the amount of indebtedness, which, if proved at trial, would constitute a defence to the applicant's claim. The respondent's affidavit raised sufficient doubt about the accuracy of the claimed amount, thereby satisfying the requirements for leave to defend in a summary judgment application. Consequently, the application for summary judgment was dismissed, and the respondent was granted leave to defend the matter.

Obiter and limits

  • It is trite that where summary judgment is refused, costs are ordered to be costs in the cause.
  • The respondent conceded other defences and argued only the issue of the amount of indebtedness.

Court disposition

Application for summary judgment dismissed; respondent granted leave to defend; costs to be costs in the cause.

  • The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
  • The respondent is granted leave to defend the main action.
  • Costs are to be costs in the cause.

Source and reliance status

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

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Judgment text

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Source document

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Judgment

[2018] ZAGPPHC 554

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC

OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH

AFRICA

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

(1)

NOT

REPORTABLE

(2)

NOT OF

INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES

(3) REVISED.

CASE NO : 41874/2017

1/8/2018

In the matter between:

FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED (FNB DIVISION)

APLICANT

and

SAMUEL SCHALWYK (ID: [….])

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

KUBUSHI J

[1] This opposed summary judgment application emanates from a summons in which the applicant is claiming an amount of R813 683, 69 against the respondent in respect of three mortgage loan agreements entered into between them. In the summons the applicant is claiming that the respondent is in breach of the said mortgage loan agreement s.

[2] The respondent is resisting the summary judgment application. He denies the applicant's contention that he does not have a bona fide defence to the applicant's claim and has entered appearance solely to delay the finalisation of the applicant's claim. The respondent has, in his answering affidavit, raised a number of defences, but , before me the other defences were conceded and only one defence was argued .

[3] The nub of the respondent' s defence is that the amount of indebtedness is not clear. The contention is that incorrect interest rates, higher than those agreed in terms of the mortgage bonds, were applied and put doubt as to the real amount due and payable by him.

[4] In a summary judgment application, a respondent is required in accordance with uniform rule 32 (3) to deliver an affidavit which fully discloses the nature and grounds of its bona fide defence and the material facts on which such defence is based. The respondent is not necessarily required to prove the defence. All it is required to do is to set up facts which would constitute a defence at the trial.[1]

[5] I am sufficiently persuaded that the respondent has alleged facts which are material and which if proved at the trial will constitute a defence to the applicant's claim. The respondent should on the premises be granted leave to defend the matter.

[6] It is trite that where summary judgment application is refused costs are ordered to be costs in the cause. I see no reason to deviate from this rule. Costs in this matter should be in the cause.

[7] In the circumstances the application for summary judgment is dismissed and costs are costs in the main case.

E.M . KUBUSHI

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

APPEARANCE :

Counsel for Applicant : Adv. J. Minaar

Instructed by

: Hammond Pole Majola

Counsel for Respondent : Adv S. F. Fisher-Kleie

Instructed by

: Locketts Attorneys

Date heard

: 30 May 2018

Date of judgment

: 01 August 2018

[1] See Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Pty) Ltd 1976 (2) 226 (T) and Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Limited 1976 (1) SA 418 (A).

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Pty) Ltd 1976 (2) 226 (T)

Case cited

Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Limited 1976 (1) SA 418 (A)

Case cited

Uniform Rule 32(3)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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