Firstrand Bank Limited t/a Wesbank v Arm Development Programme and Another (86814/2018) [2021] ZAGPPHC 110 (18 February 2021)
- Citation
- [2021] ZAGPPHC 110
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- E.M Kubushi
- Case number
- 86814/2018
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- E.M Kubushi
- Case number
- 86814/2018
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court held that the application for summary judgment was initiated prior to the amendment of Uniform Rule 32 and should be determined under the previous rule. The respondents raised defences, including a counterclaim and allegations of manipulation regarding the suretyship, which the court found to be bona fide and good in law. As such, the requirements for summary judgment were not met, and the respondents should be allowed to defend the matter at trial.
Court disposition
Application for summary judgment dismissed; respondents granted leave to defend.
Orders
- The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
- The respondent is granted leave to defend the matter.
- Costs are costs in the application.
02
Material facts
Parties
Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank
Applicant Counsel: P M W BothaARM Development Programme
Respondent Counsel: D A De KockMorodu Andries Motse
Respondent Counsel: D A De Kock03
Procedural history
Posture
Summary Judgment Application / Application for Summary Judgment Prior to Trial
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the application for summary judgment should be granted under the pre-amended Uniform Rule 32.
- 02
Whether the respondents have disclosed a bona fide defence to the applicant's claim.
- 03
Whether the second respondent is liable as surety for the first respondent's debt.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contends that the respondents have no bona fide defence to its claim arising from the breach of a written loan agreement. It asserts that the second respondent is bound as surety and that the requirements for summary judgment under the previous Uniform Rule 32 are met.
- Respondent
- The respondents argue that they have a bona fide defence, with the first respondent raising a counterclaim and the second respondent denying indebtedness on the basis that he was manipulated into signing as surety. They submit that these defences are valid and should be ventilated at trial.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Uniform Rule 32 (3)
Under Uniform Rule 32 (3), the court must be satisfied that the defendant's affidavit discloses the nature and grounds of a bona fide defence and material facts relied upon.
- 02
Raumix Aggregates (Pty) Ltd v Richter Sand CC & Another and 8 other related matters
The amended Uniform Rule 32 does not apply retrospectively to summary judgment applications initiated before 1 July 2019.
- 03
Erasmus: Superior Court Practice 2ed Volume 2 pD1-411
A summary judgment should not be granted where the defendant has disclosed a defence that is bona fide and good in law.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court held that the application for summary judgment was initiated prior to the amendment of Uniform Rule 32 and should be determined under the previous rule. The respondents raised defences, including a counterclaim and allegations of manipulation regarding the suretyship, which the court found to be bona fide and good in law. As such, the requirements for summary judgment were not met, and the respondents should be allowed to defend the matter at trial.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted that the amended Uniform Rule 32, effective from 1 July 2019, does not apply retrospectively to pending summary judgment applications.
- The court emphasized that summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy and should only be granted where the defendant clearly has no bona fide defence.
Court disposition
Application for summary judgment dismissed; respondents granted leave to defend.
- The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
- The respondent is granted leave to defend the matter.
- Costs are costs in the application.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
DATE: 18-02- 2021
Case Number.: 86814/2018
In the matter between:
FIRSTRAND BANK LTD T/A WESBANK
Applicant
and
ARM
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
First Respondent
MORODU
ANDRIES
MOTSE Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
KUBUSHI J
This judgement is handed down electronically by circulating to the parties’ representatives by email and by uploading on Caselines.
[1] This is an opposed application for summary judgment which emanates from an action instituted against the first and the second respondents for the alleged breach of a written loan agreement entered into between the applicant and the first respondent, in respect of which the second respondent has purportedly bound himself as surety thereto.
[2] Uniform Rule 32 was amended with effect from 1 July 2019. Under the amended Rule a plaintiff must wait for the defendant to deliver a plea before a plaintiff may institute summary judgment proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the said rule without a Plea having been filed a Judge cannot entertain a summary judgement application.
[3] However, in this instance I was informed that summons was issued on 30
November 2018, the notice of intention to defend was delivered on 29 January 2019, and the application for summary judgment was delivered on 19 February 2019.
Uniform Rule 32 was only amended on 1 July 2019, after the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment was delivered on 19 February 2019. The Court in Raumix [1] determined that the amended Rule did not apply retrospectively in respect of pending summary judgment applications. Therefore, the application for summary judgment, in this instance, having been initiated prior to 1 July 2019, it should be dealt with in terms of the previous Rule 32.
[4] The applicant has applied to court for summary judgment on the basis that the respondents do not have a bona fide defence to its claim. The respondents, on the other hand, are opposing the summary judgment application on the ground that they have a bona fide defence.
[5] In accordance with uniform rule 32 (3), upon hearing of an application for summary judgment the defendant may satisfy the court by affidavit that she/he has a bona fide defence to the action; such affidavit shall disclose fully, the nature and grounds of the defence and the material facts relied upon.
[6] In this instance, the nature and grounds of the respondent's bona fide defence to the applicant's claim are based on a counterclaim raised by the first respondent. The second respondent denies being
indebted to the applicant on the basis of having been manipulated into signing as surety for the debts of the first respondent.
[7] Uniform Rule 32 (3) requires that the court be satisfied that the respondent’s defence as stated in his plea constitutes a bona fide defence to the applicant's claim.
In deciding whether the defendant has set out a bona fide defence, all the court enquires, is whether on the facts so disclosed, the defendant has disclosed the nature and grounds of her/his defence; and whether on the facts so disclosed the defendant appears to have, as to either the whole or part of the claim, a defence which is bona fide and good in law.[2]
[8] The defences raised by the respondent in this regard are, in my view, bona fide. The defences are valid and good in law and it is clear that there is a possibility that if advanced, at trial, may succeed.
[9] On the basis of the aforesaid, the summary judgment application cannot succeed.
[10] In the circumstances I make the following order:
1. The application for summary judgment is dismissed;
2. The respondent is granted leave to defend the matter;
3. Costs are costs in the application.
E.M KUBUSHI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearance:
Applicant’s Counsel
: Adv. P M W Botha
Applicant’s Attorneys
: Brooks & Luyt Incorporated
Respondents Counsel
: Adv. D A De Kock
Respondents’ Attorneys
: Van Rensburg Attorneys
Date of hearing
: 30 October 2020
Date of judgment
: 18 February 2021
[1] Raumix Aggregates (Pty) Ltd v Richter Sand CC & Another and 8 other related matters (Case Numbers: 2019/8153, 2018/37011, 2017/14846X, 2019/6412, 2019/12142, 2019/10245, 2019/14229, 2019/14870, 2019/7918)
[2] Erasmus: Superior Court Practice 2ed Volume 2 pD1-411.
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