Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Others v The remaining gold mining South African operations of AgloGold Ashanti Ltd (LM171Mar20) [2020] ZACT 22 (27 May 2020)
- Citation
- [2020] ZACT 22
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Competition Tribunal
- Panel
- Y Carrim, A Ndoni, F Tregenna
- Case number
- LM171Mar20
More details
- Court
- Competition Tribunal
- Panel
- Y Carrim, A Ndoni, F Tregenna
- Case number
- LM171Mar20
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The Tribunal found that the proposed merger would not substantially lessen or prevent competition in the international markets for gold and silver, as the merged entity's market share would remain low and the markets are highly fragmented. No participant's market share exceeded 10%, and competitive constraints would persist post-merger. The Tribunal also found that public interest concerns regarding employment, ownership by historically disadvantaged persons, and supplier contracts were adequately addressed by the merging parties' undertakings and the protections afforded by the Labour Relations Act. The merger would result in a greater spread of ownership and increased B-BBEE shareholding. Accordingly, the Tribunal approved the merger without conditions.
Court disposition
Merger approved unconditionally.
Orders
- The large merger between Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd, Harmony Moab Khotsong Operations (Pty) Ltd, Golden Core Trade & Invest (Pty) Ltd and the remaining gold mining South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd is approved without conditions.
02
Material facts
Parties
Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd
Applicant Counsel: L MabidikaneHarmony Moab Khotsong Operations (Pty) Ltd
Applicant Counsel: L MabidikaneGolden Core Trade & Invest (Pty) Ltd
Applicant Counsel: L MabidikaneThe remaining gold mining South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd
Respondent Counsel: M Garden & T TheronAmounts and remedies
- Post Merger Market Share (gold): 1.7
- Accretion (gold): 0.4
- Post Merger Market Share (silver): 0.3
03
Procedural history
Posture
Large Merger / Approval
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the proposed merger would substantially lessen or prevent competition in the relevant markets.
- 02
Whether the merger raises any public interest concerns, including employment and ownership by historically disadvantaged persons.
- 03
Whether the merger should be approved with or without conditions.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The merging parties argued that the acquisition of the WW and VR packages by Harmony Gold would not result in any substantial lessening of competition in the international markets for gold and silver, as these markets are highly fragmented and the merged entity's market share would remain low. They also submitted that employees would not be worse off post-merger, with no retrenchments resulting from the transaction, and that the merger would enhance ownership by historically disadvantaged persons due to Harmony Gold's B-BBEE shareholding. Contracts with historically disadvantaged suppliers would be maintained and economic participation of local black-owned businesses would be facilitated.
- Respondent
- The unions representing employees of the target firms raised concerns regarding the security of employment and proposed a 12-month moratorium on retrenchments. The Competition Commission investigated these concerns and assessed the impact of the merger on competition, employment, ownership by historically disadvantaged persons, and supplier contracts. The Commission found that the merging parties' undertakings adequately addressed these concerns and that the merger would not negatively impact competition or public interest.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998
A merger may not be approved if it is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, unless the parties can show technological, efficiency, or other pro-competitive gains outweigh the anti-competitive effects.
- 02
Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995 as amended
Employees affected by a transfer of business are entitled to terms and conditions of employment that are on the whole not less favourable than those prior to the transfer.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The Tribunal found that the proposed merger would not substantially lessen or prevent competition in the international markets for gold and silver, as the merged entity's market share would remain low and the markets are highly fragmented. No participant's market share exceeded 10%, and competitive constraints would persist post-merger. The Tribunal also found that public interest concerns regarding employment, ownership by historically disadvantaged persons, and supplier contracts were adequately addressed by the merging parties' undertakings and the protections afforded by the Labour Relations Act. The merger would result in a greater spread of ownership and increased B-BBEE shareholding. Accordingly, the Tribunal approved the merger without conditions.
Obiter and limits
- The Tribunal noted the importance of maintaining and enhancing economic participation of local black-owned businesses in post-merger supplier contracts.
- The Tribunal observed that the merger aligns with AngloGold's previous and projected disposals of its South African gold mining assets.
Court disposition
Merger approved unconditionally.
- The large merger between Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd, Harmony Moab Khotsong Operations (Pty) Ltd, Golden Core Trade & Invest (Pty) Ltd and the remaining gold mining South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd is approved without conditions.
Source and reliance status
Competition Tribunal
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Competition Tribunal
Judgment
COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: LM171Mar20 In the matter between Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd, Harmony Moab Khotsong Operations (Pty) Ltd and Golden Core Trade & Invest (Pty) Ltd Acquiring Firms And The remaining gold mining South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Target Firms Panel : Ms Y Carrim (Presiding Member) : Ms A Ndoni (Tribunal Member) : Prof. F Tregenna (Tribunal Member) Heard on : 29 April 2020 Order Issued on : 29 April 2020 Reasons Issued on : 27 May 2020
REASONS
FOR DECISION
APPROVAL
[1] On 29 April 2020, the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) unconditionally approved a large merger between Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd, Harmony Moab Khotsong Operations (Pty) Ltd and Golden Core Trade & Invest (Pty) Ltd and the remaining gold mining South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd.
[2] The reasons for the approval of the proposed transaction follow.
PARTIES
TO THE PROPOSED TRANSACTION
Acquiring firms
[3] The acquiring firms are Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd (“Harmony Gold”), Harmony Moab Khotsong Operations (Pty) Ltd (“Harmony Moab”) and Golden Core Trade & Invest (Pty) Ltd (“Golden Core”).
[4] Harmony Gold is a JSE-listed firm incorporated in South Africa, and is not controlled by any firm. Harmony Gold controls multiple firms, including its wholly owned firms Harmony Moab and Golden Core.
[5] Harmony Gold conducts gold mining and exploration in nine mines in South Africa, primarily producing gold. Silver and uranium are by-products of its gold production. Harmony Gold sells its gold and silver on the London Bullion Market.
Target firms
[6] The target firms are the remaining gold mining South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd (“AngloGold”).
AngloGold is not controlled by any firm. It controls multiple firms.
[7] The primary target firms consist of the WW package[1] and the VR package,[2] which are wholly owned firms and assets of AngloGold. The target firms do not control any firms outside of these packages.
[8] AngloGold’s WW and VR packages also conduct gold mining and exploration, primarily producing gold. Silver is the only by-product from these packages.
PROPOSED
TRANSACTION AND RATIONALE
[9] Harmony Gold intends to acquire the WW package and the VR package from AngloGold. Post-merger, Harmony Gold will have sole control of the WW package and the VR package.
[10] The Competition Commission (“Commission”) noted that this proposed transaction aligns with AngloGold’s previous as well as projected disposals of its gold mining assets in South Africa. The Commission also found that Harmony Gold stood to acquire gold assets which were a strategic fit.
RELEVANT
MARKET AND IMPACT ON COMPETITION
[11] The Commission found a horizontal overlap in the activities of the merging parties as both are active in the production and supply of gold and silver. The Commission concluded on two relevant markets in which it assessed the proposed transaction’s impact on competition. The first being the international market for the production and supply of gold, and the second being the international market for the production and supply of silver.
[12] In the international market for the production and supply of gold, the Commission found that the merged entity would have a post-merger market share of 1.7% following an accretion of 0.4%. The Commission found that this market was highly fragmented and the merged entity would continue to face competitive constraints as no participant’s market share exceeded 10%.
[13] In the international market for the production and supply of silver, the Commission found that the merged entity would maintain a post-merger market share of 0.3% following no discernible accretion. Similarly, the merged entity would continue to face competitive
constraints from a highly fragmented market as no participant’s market share exceeded 10%.
[14] In light of the above, the Commission concluded that the proposed transaction was unlikely to substantially lessen or prevent
competition in either of these markets.
PUBLIC
INTEREST
[15] During the Commission’s investigation, unions representing the employees of the target firms were concerned about conditions and security of employment post-merger. A 12-month moratorium on retrenchments was also proposed as a condition of the merger.
[16] In response to these concerns, the merging parties confirmed that all employees would, ultimately enjoy terms and conditions of employment that were on the whole not less favourable than those that existed pre-merger. The merging parties also submitted that the Labour Relations Act[3] afforded the employees protection in this regard. The Commission found that the merging parties’ submissions adequately addressed these concerns.
[17] As to the proposed imposition of a 12-month moratorium on all post-merger retrenchments, the merging parties made an undertaking
that no retrenchments would occur as a result of the proposed transaction. The Commission found that this undertaking adequately
addressed this concern.
[18] The Commission also assessed whether a dilution in the ownership by historically disadvantaged persons of the target firms (the WW & VR Packages) would occur post-merger. The Commission noted that both packages are wholly owned by AngloGold. The Commission also noted that both Harmony Gold and AngloGold (neither being controlled by any firm) are JSE-listed companies whose shares are widely traded. The Commission concluded that the proposed merger would result in a greater spread of ownership and increased levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons due to Harmony Gold’s +30% B-BBEE shareholding at group level.
[19] The Commission assessed the proposed transaction’s effects on historically disadvantaged suppliers that supply services such as cleaning, gardening, food and beverages to the target firms. The merging parties confirmed that all such contracts would be transferred to them on similar, commercially reasonable terms. The merging parties additionally undertook to facilitate and enhance the economic participation of local black-owned businesses. Based on this, the Commission found that the proposed transaction was unlikely to result in a negative impact on these suppliers as well as AngloGold’s previous community initiatives.
CONCLUSION
[20] In light of the above, we concluded that the proposed transaction was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market. In addition, no public interest concerns arise from the proposed transaction.
[21] Accordingly, we approved the transaction without conditions.
27 May 2020 Ms Y Carrim Date Ms A Ndoni and Prof. F Tregenna concurring Tribunal Case Manager: P Kumbirai For the Merging Parties: L Mabidikane of Bowmans for Harmony Gold M Garden & T Theron of ENSafrica for AngloGold For the Commission: T Loate and R Darji
[1] The West Wits (“WW”) package comprises of: the WW mining business as a going concern made up of 3 mines in Carletonville;
AngloGold’s 25 ordinary shares in as well as its loan claims against Covalent Water Company (Pty) Ltd; 1 ordinary share in AGA Security Services (Pty) Ltd; 100 ordinary shares in Masakhisane Investment (Pty) Ltd.
[2] The Vaal River (“VR”) package comprises of: the VR remaining businesses as a going concern, made up of the assets and liabilities excluded from Harmony Moab’s 2018 acquisition of AngloGold’s VR mining business (see LM229Nov17); AngloGold’s 1633 ordinary shares in as well as its loan claims against First Uranium (Pty) Ltd.
[3] No. 66 of 1995 as amended.
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