Head of Department: North-West Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment and Another v Malambo and Another (1202/06) [2006] ZANWHC 1 (1 January 2006)
The court found that while the original grounds for leave to appeal did not present a reasonable prospect of success, the additional grounds raised a legal issue regarding whether the concession made by the Head regarding the peremptory nature of clause 2.7(2)(c) of the Senior Management Service Handbook was...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2006] ZANWHC 1
- Parties
- Applicant: Head of Department: North-West Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment; Applicant: Matthews Feseko N.O.; Respondent: Lovejoy Malambo; Respondent: Mogomotso Kgantsi
- Court
- North West High Court, Mafikeng
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Case Number
- 1202/06
- Procedural Posture
- Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal to Full Bench
- Outcome
- Leave to appeal granted to the full bench of the Division.
- Judges
- A Landman
- Legal Topics
- Disciplinary Hearing, Suspension of Employees, Senior Management Service Handbook, Procedural Fairness
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Head of Department: North-West Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment
Applicant
Matthews Feseko N.O.
Applicant
Lovejoy Malambo
Respondent
Mogomotso Kgantsi
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal to Full Bench
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether clause 2.7(2)(c) of the Senior Management Service Handbook is peremptory.
- 2 Whether failure to hold a disciplinary hearing within sixty days of suspension precludes the employer from conducting such hearing.
- 3 Whether the parties are bound by the Head's express acceptance that clause 2.7(2)(c) is peremptory.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that while the original grounds for leave to appeal did not present a reasonable prospect of success, the additional grounds raised a legal issue regarding whether the concession made by the Head regarding the peremptory nature of clause 2.7(2)(c) of the Senior Management Service Handbook was binding. The court accepted that there is a reasonable possibility another court may find the concession was one of law and not fact, and thus not binding. Consequently, leave to appeal to a full bench was granted to allow reconsideration of the legal effect of the handbook and the consequences of failing to hold a disciplinary hearing within sixty days of suspension.
Court Disposition
Leave to appeal granted to the full bench of the Division.
Orders
- Leave is granted to the first respondent in the main application to appeal against the whole of the judgment dated 16 November 2006 to the full bench of this Division.
- The costs of the application for leave to appeal are reserved for decision by the court of appeal.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
33 paragraphs
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
BOPHUTHATSWANA PROVINCIAL DIVISION
CASE NO.: 1202/06
In the matter between:
THE HEAD OF DEPARTMENT: NORTH WEST DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, CONSERVATION & ENVIRONMENT 1ST APPLICANT
MATTHEWS FESEKO N.O. 2ND APPLICANT
and
LOVEJOY MALAMBO 1ST RESPONDENT
MOGOMOTSO KGANTSI 2ND RESPONDENT
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
JUDGMENT ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
LANDMAN J:
[1] The Head of Department: NW Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment (âthe Headâ) applies for leave to appeal against the whole of my judgment handed down on 16 November 2006.
[2] The Head relies on 11 grounds set out in his notice of application dated 23 November 2006.
[3] I am of the view that there is no reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different conclusion based on those grounds.
[4] That, however, is not the end of the matter. On 8 May 2008 the Head filed additional grounds to found the application for leave to appeal. These grounds read as follows:
â1. The learned Judge erred in holding that clause 2.7(2)(c) of the Senior Management Service Handbook (âthe Handbookâ) is peremptory.
2. The learned Judge erred in failing to hold that the handbook contains guidelines from which there may be reasonable departure, dependent upon the exigencies of the case.
3. Alternatively, the learned Judge erred in holding that clause 2.7(2)(c) is peremptory in the sense that any failure to hold a disciplinary hearing within sixty days of a memberâs suspension has the consequence that the employer is thereafter precluded from conducting a disciplinary hearing.
4. The learned Judge accordingly erred in holding that as a result of the employerâs failure to hold the disciplinary hearing within sixty days of the suspensions, the suspensions were invalid.
5. The learned Judge accordingly erred in granting the relief in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the order.â
[5] Mr Hitge, who appeared on behalf of the applicants in the main application, (âthe employeesâ) objected to the filing of the additional grounds. It seems to me that it is open to an applicant for leave to appeal to rely on additional grounds save only that the other side is not prejudiced thereby to the extent that such prejudice cannot be cured by an order as to costs.
[6] The employees will not be prejudiced by the additional grounds. However, it is true that the common cause basis upon which the application was decided is challenged. It is alleged that I was not bound by the Headâs express acceptance that clause 2.7(2)(c) of Chapter 7 of the SMS handbook was peremptory. Mr Hitge has submitted that this was a factual admission and that the parties are bound by it.
[7] Mr Watt-Pringle SC, who appears for the Head, submitted on the other hand that the concession was one of law and that consequently neither the Head nor the court was bound by it. There is a reasonable possibility that another court would accept this line of reasoning and arrive at a different conclusion to mine.
[8] On the facts presented I am unable to hold that the matter in dispute is of purely academic interest, even though one of the appellants has resigned and the other is performing his duties.
[8] In the premises I am of the opinion that leave to appeal to a full bench of this Division should be granted. I do not intend making costs of the application for leave to appeal costs in the appeal. It would be more appropriate to reserve the costs for the decision of the court of appeal.
[9] In the result:
1. Leave is granted to the first respondent in the main application to appeal against the whole of my judgment dated 16 November 2006 to the full bench of this Division.
2 The costs of the application for leave to appeal are reserved for decision by the court of appeal.
___________________
A A LANDMAN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT