Inhlakanipho Consultants (Proprietary) Limited v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (66076/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 463 (23 May 2024)
The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The central argument regarding the alleged error in granting condonation for the respondent's late answering papers was rejected, as such decisions are discretionary and only subject to appellate interference in...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2024] ZAGPPHC 463
- Parties
- Applicant: Inhlakanipho Consultants (Proprietary) Limited; Respondent: Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Case Number
- 66076/2020
- Procedural Posture
- Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Judgment Delivered on 19 February 2024
- Outcome
- Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
- Judges
- G S Myburgh
- Legal Topics
- Leave to Appeal, Condonation, Tax Administration Act, Judicial Discretion
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Inhlakanipho Consultants (Proprietary) Limited
Applicant
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Judgment Delivered on 19 February 2024
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the applicant has reasonable prospects of success on appeal against the judgment delivered on 19 February 2024.
- 2 Whether the judge erred in granting condonation for the late delivery of the respondent's answering papers.
- 3 Whether the applicant's remaining arguments warrant leave to appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The central argument regarding the alleged error in granting condonation for the respondent's late answering papers was rejected, as such decisions are discretionary and only subject to appellate interference in limited circumstances. The Valor IT case cited by the applicant did not support its position, as it endorsed the granting of condonation under similar circumstances. The remainder of the applicant's arguments were a repetition of those previously considered and dismissed in the main judgment. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.
Court Disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
- Costs are to be taxed on Scale B.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
44 paragraphs
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number: 66076/2020
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3) REVISED: YES / NO
DATE: 23/05/2024
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
INHLAKANIPHO CONSULTANTS (PROPRIETARY)
LIMITED
Applicant
and
THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
DELIVERED: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by e mail and publication
on Case Lines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 23 May 2024.
G S Myburgh AJ
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment which I handed down on 19 February of this year.
[2] In terms of section 17 (1) of the Superior Courts Act [1]a judge may only grant such an application if either:
[a] He or she is satisfied that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
[b] There is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.
[3] In casu the argument advanced by the applicant was that it enjoys a reasonable prospect of success. It was not suggested that leave should be granted even if I am not satisfied that the applicant would enjoy reasonable prospects of success, and I do not consider that
that would be appropriate in casu. This is so notwithstanding that the underlying dispute concerns the application of an important
statute, viz the Tax Administration Act.[2]
[4] A thesis which was central to the applicant’s argument was that I erred in granting the respondent’s application for condonation in respect of the late delivery of its answering papers. The difficulty that I have with this argument is that the grant or refusal of such an application is matter for the discretion of the judge of first instance , and it is well settled that a decision in respect of such an application will not be overturned on appeal unless the appeal court is satisfied that the discretion was not exercised in a proper manner – i.e. that an incorrect legal principle was applied or that the judge of first instance acted on the basis on an incorrect factual premiss.[3] Added to this, while there are numerous precedents for finding, on appeal, that such an application was wrongly refused, thereby excluding evidence which ought properly to have been received into evidence, there is (in my view understandably) a dearth of authority going the other way. In the course of argument Mr Swanepoel SC, who appeared for the applicant, sought to rely on the decision in Valor IT[4] as support for the proposition that a court on appeal would, or at least might, reasonably find that I erred in granting condonation. That decision does not however assist the applicant as the court in that matter endorsed the decision of the court of first instance to grant condonation and so receive the contents of the late affidavit into evidence – essentially on the same basis as I did in granting the respondent’s application for condonation in casu. In my view there is no realistic prospect that the applicant’s argument on this issue would be upheld on appeal.
[5] As to the remainder of the applicant’s argument, it essentially comprised a rehashing of the arguments which were advanced in the main application, and which I dealt with in my judgment.
[6] On balance, I am not satisfied that the applicant would enjoy reasonable prospects of success on appeal .
[7] The application is accordingly dismissed with costs. As far as counsel’s charges are concerned, my view is that the matter as a whole was relatively complex, and I see no reason why a different scale should apply to the application for leave to appeal per se. Scale B will therefore apply.
Acting Judge of the High Court
Pretoria
Date of Hearing:
21 May 2024
Date of judgment:
23 May 2024
Appearances
For Applicant: P Swanepoel SC assisted by C Boonzaaier Instructed by: L Mbangi attorneys. For Respondent: L Haskins Instructed by: Mothle Jooma Sabdia Inc
[1] Act 10 of 2013
[2] Act 28 of 2011
[3] Valor IT v Premier North West Province and Others [2020] ZASCA 62
[4] Ibid