Jacobs v Maritz and Others; Maritz and Others v Jacobs (4525/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 15 (12 February 2009)
- Citation
- [2009] ZAFSHC 15
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
- Panel
- Kruger, R
- Case number
- 4525/2008
More details
- Court
- Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
- Panel
- Kruger, R
- Case number
- 4525/2008
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the applicant's plea was delivered to the respondents' attorney on the last day for delivery, and although it was filed with the registrar one day late, the circumstances justified condonation and the lifting of the bar. Both parties' attorneys made errors, but the applicant demonstrated a bona fide intention to defend and disclosed a defence in the incorporated plea. The court held that it would be senseless to set aside the judgment without also lifting the bar and condoning the late filing, as this would necessitate a separate application. The applicant was not at fault for the confusion, and the interests of justice required that he be allowed to defend the claim. The court also noted possible errors in the calculation of damages in the default judgment, further justifying its setting aside. No order as to costs was made due to mistakes on both sides.
Court disposition
Default judgment set aside; applicant's plea deemed timeously filed; bar lifted; no order as to costs.
Orders
- The default judgment granted against the applicant on 6 November 2008 is set aside.
- The applicant's plea delivered to the respondents' attorney on 7 October 2008 and filed with the registrar on 8 October 2008 is deemed to have been filed timeously, and the bar in respect thereof is lifted.
- The time periods for filing further pleadings or taking further steps under the court rules run from the date of this order and are deemed to commence from the date the applicant's plea was filed.
- No order as to costs is made.
02
Material facts
Parties
Marius Jacobs
Applicant Counsel: T.A.L.L. PotgieterJohan Frederick Maritz
Respondent Counsel: P.C.F. van Rooyen SCMaria Susanna Maritz
Respondent Counsel: P.C.F. van Rooyen SCAnna Hendrina Myburgh
Respondent Counsel: P.C.F. van Rooyen SC03
Procedural history
Posture
Urgent Application / Application to Set Aside Default Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the default judgment granted on 6 November 2008 should be set aside.
- 02
Whether the applicant's plea was properly and timeously delivered and filed.
- 03
Whether the applicant has shown good cause for condonation and the lifting of bar.
- 04
Whether the applicant has disclosed a bona fide defence.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contends that the default judgment was erroneously sought in his absence, as his plea was delivered to the respondents' attorney on the last permissible day and filed with the registrar one day late. He argues that under Rule 42(1)(a), the judgment was granted in error and should be set aside without the need to show good cause. Alternatively, he submits that good cause exists for condonation, as there was confusion regarding the delivery and filing of the plea, and he has a bona fide defence to the claim.
- Respondent
- The respondents argue that the applicant was in default because the plea was filed late and the annexures were missing. They assert that proper notice of the hearing was given and that the applicant has not disclosed a substantive defence, as the plea incorporated by reference lacks supporting documents and detail. They rely on authority requiring evidence of a bona fide defence and a present intention to defend if the judgment is set aside.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Uniform Rule 42(1)(a)
A default judgment may be set aside if it was erroneously sought or granted in the absence of a party, and under Rule 42(1)(a), good cause need not be shown.
- 02
Uniform Rules 6 and 27(1)
If a party fails to deliver a pleading within the allowed period, they are in default and barred from further steps unless the court condones the delay and lifts the bar upon good cause shown.
- 03
GALP v TANSLEY, N.O. AND ANOTHER 1966 (4) SA 555 (K) at 560A–C
The applicant must show a bona fide defence and a present desire to defend the claim if the judgment is set aside.
- 04
SANTAM LTD & OTHERS v BAMBER 2005 (5) SA 209 (W) at 211J–212A; 213G–H
Courts should not lightly deprive a party of the opportunity to defend a claim, especially where a bona fide defence is disclosed.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the applicant's plea was delivered to the respondents' attorney on the last day for delivery, and although it was filed with the registrar one day late, the circumstances justified condonation and the lifting of the bar. Both parties' attorneys made errors, but the applicant demonstrated a bona fide intention to defend and disclosed a defence in the incorporated plea. The court held that it would be senseless to set aside the judgment without also lifting the bar and condoning the late filing, as this would necessitate a separate application. The applicant was not at fault for the confusion, and the interests of justice required that he be allowed to defend the claim. The court also noted possible errors in the calculation of damages in the default judgment, further justifying its setting aside. No order as to costs was made due to mistakes on both sides.
Obiter and limits
- It is not appropriate to critically assess the applicant's defence at this stage without evidence; the papers disclose a bona fide defence.
- The approach of the courts is that an applicant should not lightly be deprived of the opportunity to defend a claim.
- Possible errors in the calculation of damages in the default judgment further support the need to set aside the judgment.
Court disposition
Default judgment set aside; applicant's plea deemed timeously filed; bar lifted; no order as to costs.
- The default judgment granted against the applicant on 6 November 2008 is set aside.
- The applicant's plea delivered to the respondents' attorney on 7 October 2008 and filed with the registrar on 8 October 2008 is deemed to have been filed timeously, and the bar in respect thereof is lifted.
- The time periods for filing further pleadings or taking further steps under the court rules run from the date of this order and are deemed to commence from the date the applicant's plea was filed.
- No order as to costs is made.
Source and reliance status
Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
Judgment
IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA
(ORANJE VRYSTAATSE PROVINSIALE AFDELING)
Saak Nr. : 4525/2008
In die saak tussen:-
MARIUS JACOBS Applikant
en
JOHAN FREDERICK MARITZ 1ste Respondent
MARIA SUSANNA MARITZ 2de Respondent
ANNA HENDRINA MYBURGH 3de Respondent
In Re:
JOHAN FREDERICK MARITZ 1ste Eiser
MARIA SUSANNA MARITZ 2de Eiser
ANNA HENDRINA MYBURGH 3de Eiser
MARIUS JACOBS Verweerder
_____________
UITSPRAAK DEUR: KRUGER,
R
AANGEHOOR OP: 5 FEBRUARIE 2009
GELEWER OP: 12 FEBRUARIE 2009
[1] Hierdie is ân aansoek om tersydestelling van ân vonnis wat op 6 November 2008 in applikant se afwesigheid toegestaan is. Die agtergrond is soos volg:
(1) Op 30 September 2008 het die respondente ân kennisgewing van belet op die applikant beteken.
(2) Die laaste dag van die dies induciae van die kennisgewing van belet was 7 Oktober 2008.
(3) Op die laaste dag van die dies induciae van die kennisgewing van belet (7/10/2008) het die applikant se Pretoria prokureur 2 keer ân skrywe met ân afskrif van die applikant se pleit aan die respondente se prokureur van rekord te Bloemfontein gefaks.
(4) Afgesien van hierdie gefaksde afskrifte van applikant se pleit, is applikant se pleit op 7Oktober 2008 op die respondent se prokureur van rekord se kantore beteken.
(5) Die pleit is die volgende dag, 8 Oktober 2008, d.w.s. een dag laat, by die griffier geliasseer.
[2] Respondent se prokureur het nie besef dat die pleit inderdaad beteken is nie, en het gemeen dat dit net nog ân gefaksde afskrif van die pleit is. Hy skryf op 17 Oktober 2008 ân brief aan respondent se prokureur waarin die volgende vermeld word:
â1.3 Op 7 Oktober 2008 het ons ân faksimilee ontvang van u korrespondent waarby aangeheg was ân afskrif van u kliënt se pleit wat deur korrespondent onderteken is.
In die omstandighede is u kliënt in verstek en onder belet.
Ons opdrag is om aansoek te doen vir vonnis by verstek teen u kliënt op Donderdag, 6 November 2008.â
Hierdie brief is beteken op applikant se prokureur op 20 Oktober 2008. Op daardie selfde dag beteken respondent se prokureur ân kennisgewing van terrolleplasing op applikant se Bloemfontein prokureur. Op 30 Oktober 2008 beteken respondent se prokureur ân indeks van die stukke op applikant se Bloemfontein prokureur.
[3] Daar was belangrike oorsigte by sowel applikant se prokureur as respondent sân. Respondent se prokureur het nie, tot nadat verstekvonnis geneem is, besef dat applikant se pleit behoorlik en betyds op respondent se kantore beteken is nie. Aan die ander kant het applikant se Bloemfontein prokureur nie besef dat ân kennisgewing van terrolleplasing op hulle beteken is nie. Die pleit wat op 8 Oktober 2008 by die griffier afgelewer is, was op 6 November 2008, die dag toe verstekvonnis toegestaan is, nie in die hoflêer nie, skynbaar omdat dit êrens in die griffier se kantore was. Hierdie omstandighede het daartoe gelei dat verstekvonnis aangevra en toegestaan is.
[4] Mnr. Potgieter, vir applikant, voer aan dat hierdie aansoek onder reël 42(1)(a) ressorteer aangesien die vonnis foutiewelik aangevra is in die afwesigheid van die applikant. Hy maak hierdie submissie omdat, toe verstekvonnis aangevra is, respondent se prokureur onbewus was daarvan dat die pleit op respondent se kantoor beteken was. Ingevolge reël 42(1)(a) hoef applikant nie goeie redes te bewys nie.
[5] Die omstandighede waaronder vonnis by verstek aangevra is, was die volgende:
ân Pleit is op respondent se prokureur se kantore beteken op die dag toe die periode vir belet verstryk het.
ân Pleit is een dag nadat die periode vir belet verstryk het, by die griffier geliasseer, dus buite tyd.
Die aanhangsels tot die pleit was nie by enige van die pleite wat beteken of geliasseer is nie.
Applikant se prokureur is in kennis gestel van die verhoordatum van 6 November 2008 by wyse van ân brief wat op sy Bloemfontein prokureur beteken is, sowel as by wyse van ân kennisgewing van terrolleplasing wat op 30 Oktober 2008 op sy Bloemfontein prokureur beteken is.
In hierdie omstandighede waar behoorlik kennis aan appikant gegee is, en waar daar nie ân geldige pleit bestaan het nie, kan nie gesê word dat respondent verkeerdelik aansoek om vonnis gedoen het nie. Die aansoek moet onder reël 31(2)(b) beoordeel word.
[6] Reël 6 van die Eenvormige Hofreëls bepaal dat as ân party nie ân pleitstuk aflewer (aan die griffier) binne die toegelate tydperk (hier: voor of op 7 Oktober 2008) nie, is hy in verstek en ipso facto onder belet. Reël 27(1) bepaal dat, as goeie redes aangevoer word, kan die hof enige tydperk verleng (m.a.w. die belet ophef).
[7] Dit sou weinig sin hê om die vonnis tersyde te stel sonder om die belet om te hef. Dan sal applikant ân afsonderlike aansoek moet rig vir kondonasie van die laat-liassering van die pleit en opheffing van die belet. Dit sou meer sinvol wees om te oordeel of die applikant in die huidige verrigtinge goeie redes aangevoer het, dus, of daar ân verweer is.
[8] Mnr. Van Rooyen betoog, met verwysing na GALP v TANSLEY, N.O. AND ANOTHER 1966 (4) SA 555 (K) op 560A â C dat daar getuienis moet wees van ân substansiële verweer, en ân huidige begeerte by die applikant om daardie verweer te opper indien die vonnis tersyde gestel word. In die funderende eedsverklaring sê die applikant dat sy pleit geag moet word ingelyf te wees by sy eedsverklaring. Mnr. Van Rooyen betoog dat die inlywing van die pleit toon nie die applikant se verweer nie, aangesien die bylaes nie aangeheg is nie en openbaar applikant ook nie wat die inhoud van die bylaes is nie. Hy opper ân groot aantal punte van kritiek teen applikant op grond waarvan hy betoog dat die applikant nie ân verweer openbaar nie.
[9] Mnr. Potgieter, vir applikant, voer aan dat die stukke toon dat applikant se verweer is dat die respondente hul eie besluite geneem het.
[10] Dit is nie gerade of moontlik om op hierdie stadium, sonder getuienis, die verweer krities te beoordeel nie. Die stukke toon ân bona fide verweer. ân Verdere belangrike punt, wat nie in geskil is nie, is dat daar geen vinger gewys kan word na die applikant nie. Dis duidelik dat hy die saak wil verdedig. Die howe se benadering is dat ân applikant nie ligtelik ontneem moet word van die geleentheid om die eis te verdedig nie â SANTAM LTD & OTHERS v BAMBER 2005 (5) SA 209 (W) te 211J â 212A; 213G â H.
[11] ân Aspek wat in betoog geopper is, en wat moontlik rede tot kommer is of die vonnis wat toegestaan is, korrek is, is die kwessie dat dit ân skadevergoedingseis is, volgens mnr. Potgieter een vir kontrakbreuk en positiewe interesse. In die besonderhede van eis is daar ân bewering dat al die eisers rente ontvang het, en dit lyk nie of sulke rente-bedrae afgetrek is van die eise nie, soos wat moontlik moes gebeur. Ook om hierdie rede moet die vonnis tersyde gestel word.
[12] Wat koste betref, was daar foute aan beide kante. Geen kostebevel behoort gemaak te word nie.
[13] Bevel:
13.1 Die vonnis wat by verstek op 6 November 2008 teen applikant toegestaan is, word tersyde gestel.
13.2 Die applikant se verweerskrif wat op 7 Oktober 2008 op respondente se prokureur van rekord beteken is, en op 8 Oktober 2008 by die griffier geliasseer is, word geag betyds geliasseer te gewees het, en die belet ten opsigte daarvan word opgehef.
13.3 Die tydperke vir die liassering van verdere pleitstukke, of die neem van verdere stappe in die Hofreëls beoog, geld vanaf die datum van hierdie hofbevel, en moet geag word die datum te wees waarop die applikant se pleit geliasseer is.
13.4 Geen kostebevel word gemaak nie.
____
A. KRUGER, R
Namens die applikant: Adv. T.A.L.L. Potgieter
In opdrag van:
EG Cooper Majiedt Ing.
BLOEMFONTEIN
Namens die respondente: Adv. P.C.F. van Rooyen SC
Naudes
/sp
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.