Jobe v Tyesi and Others (1075/2013) [2015] ZAECMHC 64 (3 September 2015)
- Citation
- [2015] ZAECMHC 64
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha
- Panel
- P.L.C Maseti, L.P. Pakade
- Case number
- 1075/2013
More details
- Court
- Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha
- Panel
- P.L.C Maseti, L.P. Pakade
- Case number
- 1075/2013
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed because the grounds of appeal were found to be bad in law, being too widely expressed and failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 49 and Section 16 of the Superior Courts Act. The notice of appeal did not clearly inform the respondent of the case to be met, and the application did not have reasonable prospects of success. The court confirmed that, as the original judgment was delivered by two judges, any appeal should be directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, not the full court of the division. The substantive findings of the court a quo regarding the proprietary consequences of the marriage and the invalidity of the customary marriage were supported by the evidence and relevant case law.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
02
Material facts
Parties
Nomathamsanqa Cynthia Jobe
Applicant Counsel: M. BodlaniBeatrice Tinky Tyesi
Respondent Counsel: V. KunjuVuyani Victor Msindo
RespondentMaster of the High Court
RespondentGwiliza Undertakers
RespondentFirst National Bank, Mthatha
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal to the Full Court
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the application for leave to appeal has reasonable prospects of success.
- 02
Whether another court may come to a different conclusion on the facts and law.
- 03
Whether the notice of appeal complies with the requirements of Rule 49 and Section 16 of the Superior Courts Act.
- 04
Whether the proprietary consequences of the marriage were correctly determined by the court a quo.
- 05
Whether the customary marriage was correctly declared invalid.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contended that the court a quo erred in granting all prayers in the counter-application but still dismissed it, misdirected itself on the facts regarding the proprietary consequences of the marriage, wrongly relied on Josephina Nangula Mofuka v Teofilus Mofuka, erred in declaring the customary marriage invalid, and incorrectly directed the Master to dispose only 50% of the joint estate. The applicant argued there were reasonable prospects of success and that another court may reach a different conclusion.
- Respondent
- The first respondent opposed the application, arguing that Section 16 of the Superior Courts Act prohibits an appeal from a judgment of two judges to the full court, and that any appeal should be directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The respondent further contended that the grounds of appeal were too widely expressed, failed to comply with Rule 49, and did not inform the respondent of the case to be met on appeal.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
An appeal against a decision of a division constituted by more than one judge must be directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, not the full court of the division.
- 02
Harvey v Brown 1964 (3) SA 381
A notice of appeal must clearly and unambiguously inform the respondent of the case to be met on appeal; vague or overly broad grounds are invalid.
- 03
Hollard v Daysel 1970 (1) SA 90 (A) at 93E
An appeal can only be noted against the substantive order, not against the reasons for judgment.
- 04
Erasmus, Superior Court Practice; Van Aswegen v De Swardt Motors (Edms) Bpk 1958 (1) SA 579 (O)
Requirements for a valid notice of appeal are peremptory and cannot be cured by amendment.
- 05
Himunchol v Moharom 1947 (4) SA 778 (N)
Grounds of appeal must not be so widely expressed as to allow canvassing every finding of fact and law.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed because the grounds of appeal were found to be bad in law, being too widely expressed and failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 49 and Section 16 of the Superior Courts Act. The notice of appeal did not clearly inform the respondent of the case to be met, and the application did not have reasonable prospects of success. The court confirmed that, as the original judgment was delivered by two judges, any appeal should be directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, not the full court of the division. The substantive findings of the court a quo regarding the proprietary consequences of the marriage and the invalidity of the customary marriage were supported by the evidence and relevant case law.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted that the objects of a notice of appeal, as set out by Erasmus, were not achieved in this case.
- The court emphasized that persuasive authority, such as Josephina Nangula Mofuka v Teofilus Mofuka, was not relied upon for the substantive findings, which were based on binding precedent.
- The court reiterated the importance of clarity and specificity in notices of appeal to ensure fairness to respondents.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
Source and reliance status
Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, MTHATHA
CASE NO: 1075/2013
In the matter between
NOMATHAMSANQA
CYNTHIA JOBE
:
APPLICANT
AND
BEATRICE
TINKY TYESI
: 1ST
RESPONDENT
VUYANI
VICTOR MSINDO
:
2ND
RESPONDENT
MASTER
OF THE HIGH COURT
: 3RD
RESPONDENT
GWILIZA
UNDERTAKERS
: 4TH
RESPONDENT
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, MTHATHA
: 5TH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MASETI, AJ:
[1] This is an application by the applicant for leave to appeal to the full Court of this Division against the judgment handed down by this Court on 18 September 2014.
[2] Leave to appeal is based on the legal and factual grounds set out in paragraphs 1 to 6 and additional paragraphs 1 to 4 of the amended application for leave to appeal. The matter was heard on 9 June 2015.
[3] The First Respondent opposed the application mainly on the ground that the provisions of Section 16 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 prohibit the hearing of the appeal from the judgment of two judges by the full Court and that the appeal should be noted directly
to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[4] None of the parties filed Heads of Argument. The judgment was reserved upon hearing argument.
THE
FACTS
[5] The following are the grounds on which the judgment is sought to be impugned:
5.1. The Court a quo, erred in granting all the prayers sought by the Applicant in her counter-application but still dismiss same with the applicant to pay her own costs.
5.2. The Court a quo misdirected itself on the facts and evidence in finding that the applicant and the deceased agreed that the
proprietary consequences of their marriage inter se would be that of a marriage concluded in community of property.
5.3. The Court a quo erred and misdirected itself in relying on the case of Josephina Nangula Mofuka V Teofilus Mofuka for its conclusion on the issue as to whether the proprietary consequences of the deceased and the First Applicant’s marriage
inter se, were that of a marriage concluded in community of property.
5.4. The Court a quo, erred in declaring invalid and setting aside the customary marriage between Vuyisile Archibald Tyesi and the First Respondent.
5.5. The Court a quo, erred in directing the Master of the High Court, when administering the estate of Vuyisile Archibald Tyesi, to dispose by Will of Vuyisile Archibald Tyesi only 50% of the joint estate and to give the other 50% to the only surviving spouse of the deceased, namely Mrs Beatrice Tinky Tyesi.
5.6. The Court a quo erred in finding that costs of the application be costs in the joint estate.
[6] The applicant further stated in his Notice of Appeal that during the hearing it will be argued that the applicant has reasonable prospects on appeal and that another Court may come to a different conclusion to the one reached by the Court a quo in that:
6.1. Having granted all the orders sought by the applicant, there was no basis, in law, for the dismissal of the counter-application by the Court a quo;
6.2. On the evidence before the Court a quo, there was no evidence to support the finding that the applicant and the deceased had an agreement that the proprietary consequences of their marriage inter se would be that of marriage concluded in community of property.
6.3. The decision in Josephina Nangula Mofuka V Teofilus Mofuka is no authority for the conclusion reached by the Court a quo; and
6.4. In law, the marriage relationship between the late Vuyisile Archibald Tyesi and Mrs Beatrice Tinky Tyesi had the consequences of a marriage out of community of property and of profit and loss.
THE
ISSUES
[7] The issues are whether there are reasonable prospects of success and whether another Court may come to a different conclusion.
THE
LAW
[8] The application for leave to appeal is brought in terms of Section 16 of the Superior Courts Act No. 10 of 2013 and Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of this Court.
[9] Section 16 (1) provides; “Subject to Section 15 (1), the Constitution and any other law:-
(a) an appeal against any decision of a Division as a court of first instance lies upon leave having been granted-
(i) if the Court consisted of a single judge, either to the Supreme Court of Appeal or to a full Court of that Division, depending on the direction issued in terms of Section 17 (6); or
(ii) if the Court consisted of more than one judge, to the Supreme Court of Appeal.”
[10] In the present case the application for leave to appeal does not comply with the provisions of Section 16 (1) (a) (ii) of the Superior Courts Act No. 10 of 2013 since there were two Judges who constituted the Court a quo, and if leave to appeal is granted, it should be directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal and not the full Court of this division.
[11] The application for leave to appeal complies with Rule 49 (1) (b) as it was lodged within the period prescribed by the Rule.
[12] Erasmus in his book titled “Superior Court Practice” (B1-356) in his commentary under Rule 49 (3) stated that there are four objects to be served by a Notice of Appeal namely:
12.1. to enable the Presiding Officer to frame his reasons for judgment.
12.2. to give the respondent an opportunity of abandoning the judgment.
12.3. to inform the respondent of the case he has to meet.
12.4. to notify the appeal court of the points to be raised. See Kilian V Geregbode Uitenhage 1980 (1) SA 808 (A) at 815.
Erasmus states that the requirements of the subrule are peremptory and an invalid notice of appeal cannot be validated by the Court of Appeal allowing an amendment (See Van Aswegen Vs De Swardt Motors (Edms Bpk 1958 (1) SA 579 (O); Harvey Vs Brown 1964 (3) SA 381; T.ZOURAS Vs SA Wimpy (Pty) Ltd 1978 (3) SA 204 (W) at 205.
[13] An appeal can be noted only against the judgment itself (i.e. the substantive order), not against the reasons for judgment; and a notice which purports to appeal against the reasons for judgment is bad. See Hollard Vs Daysel 1970 (1) SA 90 (A) at 93E, LIPSCHITZ N.O. Vs SA AMBOUNASIONALE BOUVEREENING 1979 (1) SA 527 (T) at 529 H and Erasmus B1-357.
[14] In Harvey Vs Brown 1964 (3) SA 381 at 383 O’ Hagan J stated that the respondent in an appeal is entitled to be informed in the Notice of Appeal in clear and unambiguous terms exactly what case he must be prepared to meet on appeal.
[15] In Himunchol Vs Moharom 1947 (4) SA 778 (N) at 780 Hathorn J.P. ruled that a ground of appeal is bad if it is so widely expressed that it leaves the appellant free to canvas every finding of fact and every ruling of law made by the Court a quo in relation to the subject matter of the appeal; or which specifies the findings of fact or rulings of law so vaguely as to be of no value either to the Court or the respondent.
[16] In considering the reasonableness of the grounds of appeal, that is, the reasonable prospects of success and whether another Court may come to a different conclusion this Court has to address the question of law and facts in the following manner:
16.1. In addressing paragraph 7.1. above of the grounds of appeal, the appellant filed a Counter-application seeking a declaratory order to the validity of the Will and also seeking the same interdict sought by the applicant against her to be granted against the applicant. (See paragraph 5 of my brother Pakade J’s judgment). The Will was declared valid in paragraph 39.1. of the judgment and the other relief sought in the counter-application was dismissed in paragraph 39.4. Therefore there is absolutely nothing wrong with the judgment.
16.2. In addressing paragraph 7.2. above, the evidence reflected in paragraph 21 and its sub-paragraphs support the finding that the first respondent and the deceased had an agreement that the proprietary consequences of their marriage inter se would be that of a marriage in community of property.
16.3. This Court, in coming to its conclusion that the proprietary consequences of the marriage between first respondent and the
deceased inter se were that of a marriage concluded in community of property, never relied on Josephina’s Case which only had a persuasive effect but relied entirely in the Judgment of Watermeyer CJ in Exparte Minister of Native Affairs in re Molefe Vs Molefe 1946 AD 315; judgment of Corbett JA in Exparte Spinazze and Another NNO 1985 (3) SA 650 (A) and; judgment of Stegman J. in Mathabathe 1987 (3) SA 45 (w) at 51C-D. (See paragraphs 16.2., 17 and 18.1. of the judgment appealed against.
16.4. Paragraphs 30 to 32 of the judgment appealed against with reference to Palesa N.O. Vs Moleko 2013 (4) All SA 166 (GSJ) and Motsoatsoa Vs Roro and Another 2011 (2) all SA 324 (GSJ) support the finding by the Court a quo why the customary marriage allegedly contracted between the applicant and the deceased was
declared null and void.
[17] From the aforesaid it is clear that the grounds of appeal are bad in law in that they are so widely expressed as to leave the appellant free to canvas every finding of fact and every ruling of law (See Himunchol Moharom cited in paragraph 17 above).
[18] The four objects to be served by a notice of appeal stated by Erasmus in paragraph 14 above have not been achieved.
[19] As stated by O’ Hagan J. in Harvey Vs Brown cited in paragraph [16] supra, the respondent is entitled to be informed in the Notice of Appeal in clear and unambiguous terms
exactly what case he must be prepared to meet on appeal. The present application for leave to appeal does not comply with this
requirement.
[20] In the premises the application for leave to appeal against the judgment delivered by this Court on 18 September 2014 does not have any reasonable prospects of success.
[21] I now make the following order:
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
______
P.L.C
MASETI
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I
CONCUR
L.P.
PAKADE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
For the Applicant
: MR M. BODLANI
Instructed by
: L.G. NOGAGA ATTORNEYS
45 LEEDS ROAD
MTHATHA
For the First Respondent : MR V. KUNJU
Instructed by
: ABDO & ABDO ATTORNEYS
33 TECOMA STREET,
BEREA
EAST LONDON
Date Heard
: 09 JUNE 2015
Date Delivered
: 03 SEPTEMBER 2015
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