Kuyper v S (A911/2011) [2013] ZAGPPHC 76 (7 March 2013)
- Citation
- [2013] ZAGPPHC 76
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- B Neukircher, Baqwa
- Case number
- A911/2011
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- B Neukircher, Baqwa
- Case number
- A911/2011
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The appeal succeeded because the evidence of the single child witnesses was found to be unsatisfactory, vague, and tainted by suggestibility and inconsistencies. The trial court failed to properly apply the cautionary rule and did not adequately consider the objective evidence and the behaviour of the children towards the appellant before and after the alleged incidents. The State did not discharge the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the convictions and sentences on charges 1, 3, and 4 were set aside.
Court disposition
Appeal upheld; convictions and sentences on charges 1, 3, and 4 set aside.
Orders
- The appeal against convictions and sentences is upheld.
- The convictions and sentences on charges 1, 3, and 4 are set aside.
02
Material facts
Parties
Enrico Kuyper
AppellantThe State
Respondent Counsel: Adv Harmzen03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal Appeal / Appeal Against Conviction and Sentence
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the evidence of single child witnesses was sufficiently credible to sustain convictions for sexual offences.
- 02
Whether the State discharged the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt in respect of charges 1, 3 and 4.
- 03
Whether discrepancies and suggestibility in the witnesses' evidence undermined the reliability of the convictions.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The appellant argued that the evidence of the child complainants was riddled with inconsistencies, vagueness regarding the incidents and dates, and was tainted by suggestibility, particularly due to the manner in which disclosures were elicited. The appellant contended that the State failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the trial court erred in accepting the evidence of single child witnesses without sufficient corroboration or hallmark of trustworthiness.
- Respondent
- The State argued that the child witnesses answered questions honestly and sincerely, and that any differences between their police statements and court testimony could be explained by language and cultural differences, as well as the manner in which statements were taken. The State maintained that the evidence was sufficient to convict, and that the trial court correctly applied the cautionary rule and found the witnesses credible.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
S v Hanekom 2011 (1) SACR 430 (WCC) at [15]
When evaluating the evidence of a single child witness, courts must articulate the need for caution, examine the evidence for clarity and material satisfaction, seek corroboration where appropriate, and look for hallmarks of trustworthiness to reduce the risk of wrongful reliance.
- 02
S v Jaffer 1988 (2) SA 84 (C); S v Heslop
The onus remains on the State to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, even where both State and defence cases are unsatisfactory. If reasonable doubt exists, the accused must be given the benefit of the doubt.
- 03
Miller, The Judicial Officer, the Child Witness
Retractions, amendments, and inconsistencies in child witness testimony are part of the disclosure process and should not automatically be seen as indicative of lying.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The appeal succeeded because the evidence of the single child witnesses was found to be unsatisfactory, vague, and tainted by suggestibility and inconsistencies. The trial court failed to properly apply the cautionary rule and did not adequately consider the objective evidence and the behaviour of the children towards the appellant before and after the alleged incidents. The State did not discharge the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the convictions and sentences on charges 1, 3, and 4 were set aside.
Obiter and limits
- The behaviour of the children towards the appellant at school, both during and after the alleged incidents, did not change and was inconsistent with the allegations.
- The manner in which disclosures were elicited from the complainants, particularly through confrontation and suggestion, may have influenced the reliability of their evidence.
- Differences between police statements and viva voce testimony must be considered in light of language and cultural differences, and not every discrepancy affects credibility.
Court disposition
Appeal upheld; convictions and sentences on charges 1, 3, and 4 set aside.
- The appeal against convictions and sentences is upheld.
- The convictions and sentences on charges 1, 3, and 4 are set aside.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN DIE NOORD GAUTENG HOOGGEREGSHOF,
PRETORIA (REPUBLIEK VAN SUID AFRIKA)
Saaknommer: A911/2011
Datum:07/03/2013
In die saak tusser
ENRICO
KUYPER …...............................................................................................Appellant
En
DIE STAAT................................................................................................................Respondent
UITSPRAAK
1.
Die appellant is in die Pta-Noord Streekhof aangekla as volg:
1.1. die onsedelike aanranding van RR (10 jaar oud) gedurende 2007 - Maart 2008;
1.2. die onsedelike aanranding van CB (12 jaar oud) gedurende Oktober 2007 - Augustus 2008;
1.3. die onsedelike aanranding van LdP (10 jaar oud) gedurende 2007;
1.4. die verkragting van LdP (10 jaar oud) gedurende Julie 2008; en
1.5. die onsedelike aanranding van CM dP gedurende 2007.
2.
2.1. Die appellant is vrygespreek op aanklagtes 2 en 5 en skuldig bevind op aanklagtes 1, 3 en 4.
2.2. Hy is gevonnis as volg:
2.2.1. op klagtes 1, 3, 5 jaar gevangenisskap elk;
2.2.2. op klagte 4,10 jaar gevangenisskap;
2.2.3. die vonnisse op klagtes 1 en 3 word samelopend met die vonnis klagte 4 uitgedien;
2.2.4. die appellant was onbevoeg verklaar om ‘n vuurwapen te besit; en
2.2.5. die appellant se naam moet in die register van seksuele oortreders opgeneem word.
3.
Al die kinders het getuig deur middel van ‘n tussenganger en hulle was enkelgetuies ten opsigte van elke insident en in hierdie verband is S v Hanekom 2011 (1) SACR 430 (WCC) relevant. Ek sal terugkom na hierdie aspek.
4.
4.1. Die voorsittende Landdros het die versigtigheidsreel in ag geneem in die opweeg van die getuienis en ook sekere opmerkings uit ‘n boek gekryf deur ene Miller getiteld “The Judicial Officer, the Child Witness”. Die relevansie daarvan kom deur in die uitspraak en veral interessant was die volgende opmerking:
"... what a child tells may vary with the adult’s style of communication. Very often the child may amend or even record an accusation before, because of pressure for secrecy and reaction of others to the disclosure. Retractions, amendments and certain
inconsistencies are therefore part of the disclosure process and should not be seen as indicative or lying...”
5.
Die hof a quo het bevind dat in terme van klagtes 1,3 en 4 die getuies geloofwaardig was, dat die kinders genoegsame feite oor die voorvalle kan onthou en oordra en dat enige verskille tussen hulle polisieverklarings en hulle hof getuienis aanvaarbaar verduidelik is. Hy het ook in ag geneem dat:
"... daar taal en kultuur verskille tussen getuie en opskrif stelle mag wees en dat die verklaarder selde of ooit deur die polisie beampte gevra word om detail, om in detail haar of sy verklaring te verduidelik...”
6.
Hy het ook bevind dat daar geen bymotiewe was in die beskuldigings i.e. om ‘n valse beskuldiging te maak.
7.
Wat die getuienis van Mev Redelinghuys (i.e. R) se ma betref het, die hof a quo bevind:
“Sy het wel bepaalde insinuasies aan die getuie gemaak en gese het oom Enrico aan jou gevat? En sy was kwaad gewees na die reaksie wat sy daarop gekry het In die motor het sy vir R verder gekronfronteer en gese jy moet die waarheid praat Jy kan in groot moeilikheid kom as jy dit nie doen nie.
Die kruisondervraging van hierdie getuie se getuienis het niks van belang op gelewer nie. Maar in die lig van die manier waarop die rapport van die getuie bekom is, is die hof van oordeel dat dit beperkte waarde het...”
Wat die getuienis van CB betref (i.e. klagte nr. 2) is bevind dat sy onseker was oor haar getuienis en dat daar in getuienis uitgekom het dat sy ook gepenetreer was met die vinger - iets wat sy erken sy nooit voorheen openbaar het nie. Sy het ook getuig dat die appellant haar hand op sy privaatdele geplaas het - ook iets wat sy nooit voorheen openbaar het nie.
9.
Die relevansie hiervan is dat C die indirekte getuie is van die onsedelike aanranding van LdP (klagtes 3 en 4).
10.
Die hof het bevind dat, met uitsondering van C, al die getuies ‘n goeie indruk op die hof gemaak het.
11.
Daarteenoor het die appellant nie ‘n goeie indruk op die hof gemaak nie. Die hof het bevind...
“... die voigende inderdaard onwaarskynlik in die verbale weergawe van die beskuidigde en dit is dat daar soveel van die klaagsters op soveel verskillende, ... insidente aan die hof kan kom opper. Dat hulle hierdie insidente sou opmaak met betrekking tot die verskil en aard daarvan, die erns daarvan en plekke daarvan met die uitsluitlike doel om die beskuldige vir wie hulle so lief is dan valslik te impliseer...”
12.
Die hof het ook bevind dat die verdediging op getuies, alhoewel miskien nie ongeloofwaardig nie, min of beperkte waarde toevoeg tot die saak van die appellant.
13.
Soos reeds opgemerk is al die kinders enkel getuies ten aansien van hulle aanklages en daar moet met versigtigheid na hulle getuienis gekyk word:
“The imaginativeness and suggestibility of children are only two of a number of elements that require their evidence to be scrutinised with care amending perhaps the suspicion....Perhaps the trial court must fully appreciate the dangers inherent in the acceptance of such evidence where there is reason to suppose that such appreciation was absent a court of appeal may hold that the conviction should not be sustained”1
Die versigtigheidsreel is deur die hof in S v Hanekom2 soos volg uitgele:
15.] “So, in evaluating the evidence of a single witness, who is also a child, our courts have laid down certain general guidelines
which are of assistance when applying the cautionary rules. In such a case:
(a) A court will articulate the warning in the judgment, and also the reasons for the need for caution in general, and with reference to the particular circumstances of the case.
(b) A court will examine the evidence in order to satisfy itself that the evidence given by the witness is clear and substantially satisfactory in all material respects.
(c) Although corroboration is not a prerequisite for a conviction, a court will sometimes, in appropriate circumstances, seek corroboration which implicates the accused before it will convict beyond reasonable doubt.
(d) Failing corroboration, a court will look for some feature in the evidence which gives the implication by a single child witness,
enough of a hallmark of trustworthiness to reduce, substantially, the risk of a wrong reliance upon her evidence...”
16.
Verder moet daar onthou word dat die bewyslas die van die Staat is en dat die Staat sy saak bo redelike twyfel moet bewys. Selfs waar beide Staat en verdedigingsake onbevredigend is skuif die bewyslas nie:
“Both were tainted with unsatisfactory features. The complainant is a single witness and in the light of ail the omissions and contradictions, I do not agree with the findings of the trial court that the evidence of the complainant was satisfactory in every material aspect. The version of the appellants, although highly suspect, cannot, on the totality of the evidence and the probabilities, be said to be not to be reasonably possibly true or false beyond reasonable doubt. In our view the State has failed to cross the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court, in our opinion, convicted the accused on a balance of probabilities. In the circumstances, the appellants ought to have been given the benefit of the doubt (S v Jaffer 1988 (2) SA 84 ( C); S v Heslop (supra))”3
17.
Die Staat het betoog dat die getuienis van die Staatsgetuies genoegsaam was om die appellant skuldig te bevind en dat, alhoewel die kinders jonk was, hulle vrae beantwoord het op ‘n eerlike en opregte wyse. Selfs waar hulle aanvanklik nie vrae verstaan het nie, toe dit herfraseer was, het hulle geantwoord. Die verskille tussen polisieverklaring en die getuienis kan verduidelik word soos volg:
17.1. die taal en kulturele verskille tussen die persoon wat die verklaring geskryf het en die getuie;
17.2. dit is nie elke fout of verskil wat ‘n getuie se geloofwaardigheid sal affekteer nie;
17.3. die verskillende weergawes moet as geheel oorweeg word met verwysing na verskillende aspekte;
17.4. die verklaring moet teen die viva voce getuienis opgeweeg word.
18.
Ek stem saam met die analise hierbo uiteengesit maar kan nie saamstem met die slotsom wat Adv Harmzen, namens die Staat, betoog het. Die feit bly staan dat al die enkel getuie se getuienis deurspek is met onbevredigende antwoorde, dat die kinders vaag was oor gebeure, hoe dit plaasgevind het en tyd (i.e datums met uitsondering van LdP en die een insident in die stoorkamer - alhoewel dit ook vaag was).
19.
Wat suggestie en aantygings betref is die beste voorbeeld daarvan CdP wie tydens die ondersoek verklaar het dat sy gesien het hoe die ander dogters betas word, maar in haar getuienis ontken het dat sy enigiets sou gesien het.
20.
So ook is dit moontlik dat, deur die wyse waarop Mev Redelinghuys vir R gekonfronteer het, daar ‘n mate van suggestie en bei'nvioeding
sou wees en die feit dat alles vorendag gekom het as gevolg van die mededelings van CB is ook ietwat verdag.
21.
Verdermeer, die verskille tussen die klaagsters se verklarings en hulle getuienis in die hof moet ook as ‘n faktor oorweeg word in die beoordeling van die vraag of die Staat sy saak teen die appellant bo redelike twyfel bewys het.
22.
Die finale opweging is die kinders se gedrag teenoor die appellant tydens en na die beweerde insidente by hulle skool, en die het nie verander nie en die getuienis van mnr du Plooy en mev Snyman ten aansien van die kinders se gedrag is nie weerle nie. Inteendeel die kinders self het daaroor getuig:
22.1. Mnr du Plooy het getuig dat wanneer die appellant by die skool aankom, die kinders saamgedrom het om sy kar om sy tas te dra;
22.2. Mev Snyman het getuig dat R se prestasies goed was en dat sy nie gedragsprobleme gehad het nie;
22.3. die kinders se voortdurende gedrag teenoor die appellant wys ook geen afwyking in gedrag teenoor horn na die beweerde insidente.
23.
Dit blyk ook dat L en R se bekendmaking van die beweerde insident eers na konfrontasie plaasgevind het en die effek daarvan in die totale beoordeling van feite moet ook as ‘n faktor oorweeg word.
24.
Die vraag is gevra: waarom sou die kinders so iets fabriseer? Myns insiens is dit ‘n vraag wat nie hier beantwoord hoef te word nie.
25.
Die punt bly staan dat daar na objektiewe getuienis bekyk moet word in die beoordeling van die vraag of die Staat sy saak bo redelike twyfel bewys het al dan nie.
26.
Myns insiens is die antwoord daarop “nee”. Ek kan, in die besonder omstandighede van hierdie saak, nie saamstem dat die woorde van die outeur Miller toepaslik is nie. Die bietjie twyfel wat daar mag wees is genoeg om die beginsels uitgele in S v Janse v Rensburg (supra) toe te pas en die appellant moet die voordeel van die twyfel te kry.
27.
Gevolglik word die volgende bevel gegee:
27.1. die appel teen skuldigbevindings en vonnisse word gehandhaaf;
27.2. die skuldigbevindings en vonnisse op klagtes 1, 3 en 4 word ter syde gestel.
B NEUKIRCHER (AJ)
Ek stem saam
BAQWA J
1R v Manda 1951 (3) SA158 (A) at 163 D - E
22011 (1 ) SACR 430 (WCC) by [15]
3S v Janse van Rensbura and another 2009 (2) SACR 216 at g [20].
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