Lombaard v Droprop CC and Others (5895/08) [2009] ZAKZPHC 52 (18 June 2009)
- Citation
- [2009] ZAKZPHC 52
- Status
- Ruling
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
- Panel
- Ndlovu
- Case number
- 5895/08
More details
- Court
- Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
- Panel
- Ndlovu
- Case number
- 5895/08
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the use of the word 'certain' in the property description created ambiguity and failed to identify the land with reasonable certainty, thus not meeting the requirements of section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act. Furthermore, the court held that a member of a close corporation acting as agent in a land sale transaction must have written authority from the corporation, as required by section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act and section 54 of the Close Corporation Act. Without such written authority, the contract is null and void. Both findings were in favour of the respondents, and the application for leave to appeal was considered to have reasonable prospects of success due to the national importance and lack of precedent on the second issue.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal granted.
Orders
- Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
- Costs of the application shall be costs in the course of the appeal.
02
Material facts
Parties
Jan Antonie Lombaard
Applicant Counsel: RG MossopDroprop CC
Respondent Counsel: L Pillay SCDropathy Preethepaul
Respondent Counsel: L Pillay SCDharumdaw Preethepaul
Respondent Counsel: L Pillay SCOmesh Preethepaul
Respondent Counsel: L Pillay SC03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Does the inclusion of the word 'certain' in the property description in a lease agreement render the description non-compliant with section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981?
- 02
Does a member of a close corporation acting as agent require written authority under section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act to conclude a sale of land on behalf of the corporation?
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contended that the use of the word 'certain' in the property description did not create ambiguity and that the lease agreement sufficiently identified the property as required by section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act. Regarding agency, the applicant argued that a member of a close corporation acting in terms of section 54 of the Close Corporation Act did not require additional written authority to conclude a sale of land on behalf of the corporation.
- Respondent
- The respondents argued that the inclusion of the word 'certain' in the property description created confusion and ambiguity, rendering the description non-compliant with section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act. They further contended that a member of a close corporation must have written authority from the corporation to act as agent in land sale transactions, failing which the contract is null and void.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981
A property description in a contract for the alienation of land must identify the land with reasonable certainty to comply with section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.
- 02
Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984; Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981
A member of a close corporation acting as agent in a transaction involving the alienation of land must have written authority from the corporation as required by section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act, read with section 54 of the Close Corporation Act.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the use of the word 'certain' in the property description created ambiguity and failed to identify the land with reasonable certainty, thus not meeting the requirements of section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act. Furthermore, the court held that a member of a close corporation acting as agent in a land sale transaction must have written authority from the corporation, as required by section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act and section 54 of the Close Corporation Act. Without such written authority, the contract is null and void. Both findings were in favour of the respondents, and the application for leave to appeal was considered to have reasonable prospects of success due to the national importance and lack of precedent on the second issue.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted that the second issue had not previously been decided by any South African court, including the Supreme Court of Appeal, and that its resolution would have far-reaching implications for property transactions involving close corporations.
- Both counsel agreed that the appropriate appellate forum for this matter was the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal granted.
- Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
- Costs of the application shall be costs in the course of the appeal.
Source and reliance status
Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
Ruling
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU NATAL, PIETERMARITZBURG
CASE NO. 5895/08
In the matter between:
JAN ANTONIE LOMBAARD
PLAINTIFF
and
DROPROP CC FIRST RESPONDENT
DROPATHY PREETHEPAUL
SECOND RESPONDENT
DHARUMDAW PREETHEPAUL
THIRD RESPONDENT
OMESH PREETHEPAUL FOURTH
RESPONDENT
RULING ON
APPLICATION
FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
NDLOVU J
This is an application for leave to appeal against my entire judgment in this matter handed down on 23 February 2009.
There were primarily two issues which I had to decide, namely:
1. Whether the inclusion of the prefixed word âcertainâ in the description of immovable property in a lease agreement made any difference as to render the description as such non-compliant with section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, in the context where such word did not appear in the official description of the same property in the title deed.
2. Whether a member of a close corporation who acts as agent of the corporation in terms of section 54 of the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 requires written authority as envisaged in section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act to conclude a transaction involving the sale of land on behalf of the corporation.
On the first issue I held, in part, as follows:
â[41] In my view, the use of the word âcertainâ in the description of the property in the head lease did create confusion and ambiguity as to the precise piece of land which was leased to the applicant.
[47] In my judgment, I am satisfied, on the papers, that the description of the property in the head lease did not clearly identify the land in dispute with reasonable certainty and, therefore, did not pass muster of the peremptory requirement prescribed by section 2(1) of the Act.â
On the second issue I held as follows:
â[57] Therefore, it seems to me that the careful reading of section 2(1) of the Act in conjunction with section 54 of the CC Act dictates the position to be that in every contractual transaction involving alienation of land, entered into by a member of a close corporation who signed the transaction as agent on behalf of the corporation in terms of section 54(1) of the CC Act, such contractual performance by the said member shall be null and void and of no legal force or effect unless the member concerned (1) had the âpower to act for the corporation in the particular matterâ in the manner and to the extent as provided for in section
54(2) of the CC Act; and (2) âwritten authorityâ was given to him or her by the corporation to act on its behalf in the particular
matter, as required under section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.â
Both decisions were in favour of the respondents. Hence, I dismissed the application with costs. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the said judgment.
I do recognise, with regard to the second issue, in particular, that there was no decision thus far by any Court (including the Supreme Court of Appeal) which could be found dealing with the issue. There was no doubt that this decision had far-reaching implications, and was of national importance as it affected property transactions concluded by close corporations nationwide.
Having considered the application and submissions made, it does appear to me that there is a reasonable prospect that a higher court might consider the matter differently on either or both issues and that leave to appeal should therefore be granted. Both counsel were ad idem that the appropriate appellate forum should be the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Accordingly the following order is granted:
1. Leave to appeal of the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
2. Costs of the application shall be costs in the course of the appeal.
18 June 2009 â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦.
Application heard on : 18 June 2009
Counsel for the applicant : Mr RG Mossop
Instructed by : J Leslie Smith & Company
Counsel for the respondent : Mr L Pillay SC
Instructed by : R Sham & Associates
Judgment handed down on : 18 June 2009
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